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ABSTRACT 
Reassurance strategy is derived from a critique of deterrence strategy. It is the persuasion 
of one’s opponent that a state has no malignant intentions to be an aggressor, 
demonstrated by limiting offensive capabilities, in order to reduce tensions and the 
possibility of war. The main research questions addressed in this dissertation are under 
what conditions is reassurance most likely to be an appropriate strategy, and what factors 
are associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy. To answer the research 
questions, the case study method of “structured, focused comparison” was used. The 
three case studies include—a partial success case of South Korea toward North Korea, a 
failure case of the United States toward North Korea, and a success case of the Soviet 
Union toward the United States. 
From the case studies, this dissertation concludes that explanations based on any 
one theory (realism, liberalism, or constructivism), any one level of analysis (individual, 
state, or alliance), or any one party (sending or receiving state) alone cannot provide a 
satisfactory account for the outcome of reassurance strategy. An eclectic and broad 
approach incorporating two-party (the sending and receiving states) and three-level 
(leader, domestic politics and alliance politics) analysis, along with an understanding of 
the two states’ circumstances and relations is necessary to increase the explanatory power. 
In sum, reassurance strategy must be viewed in the context of the individual, domestic, 
and international factors of both sending and receiving states. This dissertation shows that 
reassurance can succeed, but only when several conditions are met. Of these, leader’s 
perceptions are the most important, but they alone cannot bring about change in the 
relations between two states unless other factors in the domestic and international 
environments are supportive.  
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A.  PURPOSE 
Reassurance strategy is derived from a critique of deterrence strategy. It is the 
persuasion of one’s opponent that a state has no malignant intentions to be an aggressor, 
demonstrated by limiting offensive capabilities, in order to reduce tensions and the 
possibility of war. The different assumption between reassurance and deterrence strategy 
is “the source of hostility.”1 Proponents of reassurance strategy argue that if the hostility 
of an adversary is driven by vulnerability, reassurance strategy is “more appropriate as a 
substitute for deterrence strategy.”2 In other circumstances, reassurance can also be used 
as a complement to deterrence.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to recognize the situations when reassurance is 
an appropriate strategy and to assess which conditions are important for the success and 
failure of reassurance strategy. This dissertation develops some “contingent 
generalizations”3 about the conditions that lead to the success or failure of reassurance 
strategy. Also, it recommends policy options to make reassurance strategy successful. 
B. MOTIVATION 
The most heavily militarized frontier in the world is the demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula, which was established in 1953. The Korean War is not 
officially over and the Korean peninsula remains unstable. Korean unification seems far 
more remote since the end of the Korean War. The dominant influence strategy of South 
                                                 
1 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues, 43, no. 4 
(1987): 40.  
2 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, ed. Philip 
E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 59.  
3 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), xi. George and Bennett say, “Contingent generalizations were 
intended to help policy specialists first to diagnose and then to prescribe for new situations, much as 
medical doctors in clinical settings.”  
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Korea and the United States on the Korean peninsula has been “deterrence” through 
superior military capability to prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea. On the 
other hand, North Korea has also tried to deter South Korea and the United States by 
using military threats and its nuclear weapons program.4 Is deterrence an appropriate 
strategy on the Korean peninsula to accomplish a peaceful outcome? Several scholars 
strongly believe that a deterrence strategy based on military power does not guarantee the 
avoidance of war nor tension reduction. Janice Gross Stein, for example, claims the 
irrelevance of military superiority to deterrence success:  
One of the most robust findings is that the military superiority of a 
defender may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
deterrence success. This proposition is generally supported across cases 
and across different kinds of evidence. Consideration of the relative 
military balance is not the primary determinant of the outcome of 
deterrence.5  
These possible limitations of deterrence provide the motivation to explore an 
alternative strategy to complement or possibly replace deterrence strategy.  
C. IMPORTANCE 
After the end of the Cold War, people hoped for a more peaceful world and 
expected a tremendous decrease in the frequency of war. However, war is still part of 
human life. Heracleitus’ remark, “Polemos Pater Pantom (War is the father of all 
things)”6 seems to be an immutable truth. Donald Kagan says that “Statistically, war has 
been more common than peace.”7 It seems that the arguments of classical realists and 
neorealists are true in human history. They basically argue that conflicts involving the use 
of force are inevitable. As one summary of his views puts it, Hans Morgenthau believed, 
“The reason why states behave as they do is firmly rooted in human biological impulses: 
                                                 
4 Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
5 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 29.  
6 Will and Ariel Durant, The Lessons of History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 81.  
7 Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 
570. 
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this inevitably generates a capacity for self-interested, egoistic behavior, either by 
individuals or in interstate relations via collective egoism.”8 Then, do we need to accept 
the inevitability of war? What is the best strategy for avoiding war and reducing tensions?  
Scholars who study security have devoted most of their attention to negative and 
hard instruments such as deterrence, coercive diplomacy, use of military power, and so 
on. They believe that the best answer for security is to build more arms and develop 
technology to win wars. However, there are not only negative and hard-line approaches 
but also positive and soft-line strategies for seeking security. Richard N. Haass and 
Meghan L. O’Sullivan state,  
The strategy of engagement, or the use of incentives alongside other 
foreign policy tools to persuade governments to change one or more 
aspects of their behavior, has received relatively little scrutiny. Instead, the 
attention of scholars, policymakers, and pundits has generally focused on 
those instruments of foreign policy—in particular military force or 
economic sanctions—that seek to attack, harm, or otherwise diminish the 
capabilities of the target country.9  
Richard Ned Lebow also explains the difficulty in researching positive and soft 
approaches such as reassurance strategy: 
No striking example of successful reassurance comes readily to mind. One 
of the reasons this is so may be simply that such an approach to conflict 
management has rarely been employed. Another reason may be 
methodological; it is extremely difficult to recognize the success as 
opposed to the failure of such a policy. Failure is manifest in crisis or war, 
events that readily impinge upon historical consciousness. Success, which 
results in greater tranquility than would otherwise be the case, can easily 
go unnoticed, for it may produce no observable change in the level of 
tension.10 
                                                 
8 John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, and Stuart Poore, eds. Neorealism and Strategic Culture (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2004), 30.  
9 Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Introduction” in Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, 
Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, ed. Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 1.  
10 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” in Psychology and 
Deterrence, eds., Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 192.  
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This dissertation explores “reassurance strategy” as a possible alternative strategy 
to deterrence to achieve the same goals of deterrence, which are to avoid war and reduce 
tensions. Compared to deterrence, less effort has been devoted to researching the 
conditions of success and failure of reassurance strategy. This dissertation focuses on 
discerning the most favorable conditions for the success of reassurance strategies.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Research Question 
The main research questions are under what conditions is reassurance most likely 
to be an appropriate strategy, and what factors are associated with the success or failure 
of reassurance.  
2. Variables and Hypotheses  
a.  The Independent Variable (IV), the Condition Variables (CV), 
the Intervening Variables (IntV), and the Dependent Variable 
(DV)  
Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible 
factors associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy can be drawn in a 
diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening variables 
(IntV) and dependent variable (DV)11 (Figure 1.1).  
In this dissertation, the independent variable (IV) is the implementation of 
reassurance strategy by the sending state. The dependent variable (DV) is the success or 
failure of reassurance strategy. These two variables frame the causal and caused 
phenomenon of the hypotheses. Also, there are two condition variables (CV), 
circumstances and relations between the two parties (CV 1) and the motivating factors of 
a receiving state (CV 2). These variables frame “antecedent conditions”12 which have 
                                                 
11 Stephen Van Evera, Guidance to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), 7–48. 
12 “Phenomena whose presence activates or magnifies the causal action of the causal and/or 
explanatory phenomena,” quoted from Van Evera, 16.  
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impacts on intervening variables (IntV). Also, the intervening variables (IntV) frame 
“intervening phenomenon,”13 which “are caused by the IV and cause the DV.”14 This 
arrow-diagram explanation, with variables, is proposed to connect causal hypotheses and 
explain the outcome of the reassurance strategy.  




(The sending state) 
→  
1. Sending state leader’s perceptions about 
the receiving state and its leader 
2. Receiving state leader’s perceptions 
about the sending state and its leader.  
3. Domestic politics of the receiving state  
4. Domestic politics of the sending state 
5. Alliance politics of the receiving state 
6. Alliance politics of the sending state 
→  




CV 1 →  CV 2 
Circumstances and 
relations between a 
sending state and a 





1. Balance of Power 
2. Interdependence 
3. Identity   
→  




Figure 1.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)15  
                                                 
13 “Phenomena that form the explanation’s explanation. These are caused by the causal phenomenon 
and cause the outcome phenomenon, “quoted from Van Evera, 16.   
14 Ibid., 11. “Q causes A, and A causes B”: A becomes an intervening variable.  
15 Van Evera, Guidance to Methods, 7–48. 
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In addition, the arrow-diagram can be described in another figure that 
focuses more on the condition variables and the intervening variables (Figure 1.2). The 
two-party (the sending state and the receiving state) and three-level (leader, domestic 
politics, and alliance politics) framework, including condition variables, is useful to 
understand the impacts of the reassurance strategy and predict its outcome.      
 
Figure 1.2. The Two-by-three Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending 
State, the Receiving State, IV, and CV) 
CV1-1:Balance of Power
CV1-2: Interdependence 
CV 1-3: Identity 





























The main focus of this dissertation is the conditions of success or failure 
of reassurance strategy. The main hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the 
sending state leader’s perceptions about the receiving state. 
H2: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the 
receiving state leader’s perceptions about the sending state. 
H3: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic 
politics in the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.  
H4: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic 
politics in the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.  
H5: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance 
politics of the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.  
H6. Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance 
politics of the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.  
If these hypotheses are correct, sending states should try to influence 
receiving state leader’s perceptions and the domestic politics and the alliance politics of 
both the receiving state and their own when using reassurance strategy.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW I: BACKGROUND ON REASSURANCE 
STRATEGY  
1. Origins of Reassurance Strategy 
a. Critique of Deterrence Strategy 
Scholars developed reassurance strategy due to criticisms of deterrence 
strategy and desire to find an alternative strategy. Deterrence strategy has been the main 
influence strategy in international relations, especially during the Cold War. However, 
there have been many critiques of deterrence strategy. For example, Alexander George 
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and Richard Smoke present cases of deterrence failure and argue that a deterrence 
strategy is not always effective and is dependent on prevailing conditions.16 Janice Gross 
Stein also argues that there are “limiting conditions that constrain the utility of 
deterrence.”17 She explains the possibility of a deterrence strategy being “provocative, 
ineffective, or irrelevant”: 
….deterrence can fail at times regardless of how well it is executed. It can 
provoke rather than prevent a challenge from a frightened or vulnerable 
adversary, because it intensifies the pressure on a would-be challenger to 
act. It can also fail because a defender or a challenger misinterprets the 
other’s intentions and signals; under these conditions, it becomes 
ineffective. Finally, it can be irrelevant when initiators are insensitive to 
threats and their consequences. This is most likely to happen when their 
attention is focused on their own needs. In short, deterrence can at times 
be provocative, ineffective, or irrelevant.18 
b. No Theory of Reassurance Strategy and Ambiguity Between 
Incentives of Reassurance Strategy and Conditions Needed for 
Success of Reassurance Strategy 
According to Janice Gross Stein, strategies of reassurance have been less 
researched than have strategies of deterrence, and it is necessary to develop a theory of 
reassurance by studying incentives for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy 
to reduce tension and avoid war. As she writes:   
Unlike deterrence, there is no “theory” of reassurance. There are, however, 
islands of theory in several of the behavioral sciences that address its 
functional purposes. Generally, strategies of reassurance have received 
less attention in the strategic literature than has deterrence, and there is 
less known about incentives for their use and the conditions of their 
success.19 
                                                 
16 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 
17 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59.  
18 Ibid., 32. 
19 Ibid., 34.  
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Furthermore, there has been no clear distinction between incentives for 
reassurance strategy and conditions for success of reassurance strategy. It is necessary to 
distinguish these two for the development of reassurance theory. “Incentives for their use 
and the conditions of their success” are two separate things to investigate.   
c. Need to Research Strategic, Domestic Political, and 
Psychological Obstacles to the Success of Reassurance Strategy  
In addition, Stein explains that strategic, domestic political, and 
psychological factors can lead to the failure of deterrence strategy. She also says that 
reassurance strategy must overcome similar obstacles to succeed, arguing: 
Preliminary historical and comparative research suggest that strategies of 
reassurance may at times be effective in reducing some of the obvious 
risks of deterrence. Restraint, the development of informal norms of 
competition, and irrevocable commitments can help to reassure a 
vulnerable adversary, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, and create 
alternatives to the use of force.  
Longer-term strategies of reassurance designed to gradually reduce 
international tension and create limited security regimes can, in addition, 
help the parties to move away from the use of threat of force as their 
dominant mode of discourse. To succeed, however, all these strategies 
must overcome some of the same psychological, political, and strategic 
obstacles that confound deterrence.20  
However, she does not explain strategic, domestic political, or 
psychological obstacles to reassurance success in detail. This dissertation explores these 
obstacles that can bedevil deterrence to see how they affect the success or failure of 
reassurance strategy. The factors that cause complications for deterrence and reassurance 
can be analyzed in similar ways by investigating strategic factors, domestic political 
factors and psychological factors.  
                                                 
20 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 58.  
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d. Response to Critique of Reassurance Strategy 
It is necessary to consider critiques arguing that reassurance strategy has 
an overly rosy view. Evan Braden Montgomery argues that the central debate between 
offensive and defensive realism is how to overcome the uncertainty that drives the 
security dilemma and fear of vulnerability.21 Fear of vulnerability is the main argument 
against a reassurance strategy. Montgomery says, “Small gestures that do not affect a 
state’s capabilities are thus likely to be discounted, and gestures sufficient to convey 
information are likely to be dangerous if others are in fact greedy.”22 Both the Sino-
Indian border conflict in 1962 and the Falklands war between Great Britain and 
Argentina in 1982 are useful examples to show how a reassurance strategy can be 
dangerous.23 China’s strategy of a limited demonstration of threat was interpreted as fear 
of military defeat by the Indian leaders. Great Britain’s reassurance strategy toward 
Argentina strengthened the resolve of Argentinian leaders committed to military action.  
In addition, Stein points out the need for further research. She says, 
“Evidence of the interactive impact of restraint and deterrence is fragmentary and 
episodic. Analysts have not yet examined the documentary record to identify the relevant 
universe of cases.” 24  It is necessary to research how to overcome this “reassurance 
dilemma”25 between costly signaling and fear of vulnerability because the main critique 
of reassurance is related to them.  
                                                 
21 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the 
Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31, no.2 (Fall 2006): 151–185.  
22 Ibid., 159.  
23 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 36–38. 
24 Ibid., 38.  
25 I would like to label this situation as the “reassurance dilemma.” 
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2. Previous Research and Need to Explain the Causal Mechanism 
Between Reassurance Strategy and Its Outcome 
a. Typology-type Approach  
Most research about reassurance strategy has followed a typology-type 
approach and has recommended an appropriate policy depending on types of states. For 
example, Charles L. Glaser categorized states into four types of adversaries (Table 1.1).  
Table 1.1.   Glaser’s Types of Adversaries26 
 Greedy Not-Greedy 
Always Secure Deterrence Model Ideal State 
Potentially Insecure Doubly Difficult Spiral Model 
Stephen R. Rock develops a similar typology of adversaries and suggests 
an appropriate strategy depending on each type (Table 1.2).  
Table 1.2.   Rock’s Matching Appeasement Strategies to Target States27 
Greed   
Low High 
Low Appeasement probably not necessary (no cases) 
Reciprocity; Mixed Strategy 
(Nazi Germany) 
Insecurity 
High Unilateral Concessions; Pure Inducements (the United States) 
No clear strategy: anything 
beyond limited appeasement 
problematic (the Soviet Union, 
Iraq, North Korea) 
                                                 
26 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Models,” in World Politics, 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 503.   
27 Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington, Kentucky: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 2000), 166.  
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Rock subdivides states into six types of adversaries depending on basic 
motivation and degree of needs/demands (Table 1.3).  




Low Insecure Revisionist 
Moderate Frightened Expansionist Needs/Demands 
High Paranoid Hegemonic 
Even though all these typology-type approaches assume the nature of the 
target state is important in deciding which strategy is appropriate, they do not explain 
enough about the causal mechanism between the implementation of reassurance strategy 
and the outcome of reassurance strategy. This dissertation assumes that state motivations 
can be transformed. The ultimate object in the dissertation is to explain the causal 
mechanism.  
b. Rational Model Approach  
(1) Utility Model Approach (The Cost/Benefit Calculation).  
Some scholars use a rational model approach. Both a deterrence strategy and a 
reassurance strategy are influence strategies aimed at persuading others by manipulating 
their cost/benefit calculation. Deterrence is “the persuasion of one’s opponent that the 
costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”29 On 
the other hand, reassurance is the persuasion of one’s opponent that a course of action to 
accept the status quo or the preferred policy direction decreases costs. That is, a 
reassurance strategy persuades an adversary by the expectation of a positive outcome 
after accepting the defender’s preferred policies. Therefore, based on the expected 
                                                 
28 Rock, Appeasement in International Politics, 158.  
29 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 11.  
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cost/benefit calculation of an adversary in the utility model, the influence strategy can be 
summarized and a reassurance strategy can be differentiated from a deterrence strategy as 
follows (Table 1.4):  
Table 1.4.   Deterrence and Reassurance in the Utility Model30 
Objective of strategy  




of an adversary 
Categories of strategy 
Increase cost Deterrence through punishment 
To prevent unwanted 
action 
Decrease benefit Deterrence through denial 
Increase benefit Positive incentive 
To encourage wanted 
action 
Decrease cost Reassurance 
This model needs further research to know the process of 
cost/benefit calculation and the conditions of success and failure of a reassurance strategy. 
In other words, it is necessary to know how the sending state makes an impact on the 
cost/benefit calculation and how the receiving state calculates cost and benefit.  
(2) Bayesian Approach.  According to Bayesian approach, the 
posterior probability of certain outcome is proportional to the product of the likelihood 
multiplied by the prior probability.31 Andrew Kydd uses a Bayesian approach to explain 
the conditions of success and failure of reassurance strategy. This approach explains the 
likelihood of escalation and de-escalation of tension. Specific factors to escalate and 
deescalate tensions need to be considered (Table 1.5): 
                                                 
30 Professor Jeffrey W. Knopf’s lectures and class discussions, NS 4669 Conflict and Cooperation in 
World Politics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, August 30, 2007. 
31 The posterior probability depends on the prior probability through the following formula: P(A│B) = 
P(B│A) P(A) / P(B). 
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Table 1.5.   Kydd’s Bayesian Approach32 
Beliefs about the other state’s motivation 
 





of Escalating: P(E|AF) 
Prior: P(AT) 
Likelihood 








of Escalating: P(E|SF) 
Prior: P(ST) 
Likelihood  
of Escalating: P(E|ST) 
Bayesian Approach: P(A|E) = P(E|A)*P(A) / [P(E|A)*(A) + P(E|~A)*(~A)] 
A: Aggressive and E: Escalate 
P(A|E): Aggressive after observing arms buildup 
P(E|A): the likelihood of escalation from an aggressive type 
P(E|S): the likelihood of escalation for the security seeking type 
(3) The Trust Game/The Reassurance Game.33  Game theoretic 
analysis methods are possible tools to analyze rational choice related to a reassurance 
strategy. One of the most widely influential analyses of the rational choice approach is 
the trust game provided by James Coleman.34 As shown in Figure 1.3, it based on if-then 
analysis with the probability of loss (1-P) or gain (P) of trust.     
                                                 
32 Andrew Kydd, “Fear and Reassurance in International Relations,” Ph.D. diss. (University of 
Chicago, 1996), 34–68.  
33 Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” in International Organization, Vol. 54, No.2 
(Spring 2000), 330–341 
34 James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mess: Belknap Press, 1990), 91–116.  
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Figure 1.3. Coleman’s Trust Game35 
The other analysis is the reassurance game explained by Andrew 
Kydd.36 Kydd modifies the trust game by adding second rounds to give the players the 
opportunity to decide whether to cooperate or defect after the first round.37 He also 
explains when reassurance is possible and when it is not based on “equilibria in the 
reassurance game”38 (see Appendix A).  
Kydd applied his model to the end of the Cold War. According to 
Kydd, “This process can be seen at work at the end of the Cold War, in the signals made 
by Gorbachev, and in the way Western perceptions of the Soviet Union changed in 
response. By sending costly signals to the other side, trust can be built.”39 However, his 
rational model approach is not adequate. By assuming rationality, it ignores the 
psychological and domestic political factors that can cause reassurance to fail. It is also 
necessary to trace the relationship between a reassurance strategy and its impact on the 
other side’s leader’s perception and domestic politics and those of its own. Kydd 
acknowledges that his effort is a beginning of study about reassurance strategy and 
research remains underdeveloped. He says, “The research game presented here is a first 
                                                 
35 Coleman, Foundations of Social Science, 91–116.  
36 Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 334.  
37 Ibid., 333.  
38 Ibid., 336.  
39 Ibid., 352.  
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step in providing a rational choice foundation for this literature. Many issues remain to be 
explored, such as problems introduced by the existence of multiple actors and mass 
publics, asymmetries between the actors, and bounded rationality.” 40  Therefore, this 
dissertation considers that the rational model approach is not adequate to answer the 
research question. Instead, it directly explores the causal mechanisms involved by 
focusing on three intervening variables—leader’s beliefs and perceptions, and the 
domestic and alliance politics of the receiving state and the sending state—which are 
related to those problems.  
c. The Need for Systematic Analysis of the Conditions  
Previous researches, such as typology-oriented and rational model 
approaches, are inadequate to understand the causal mechanisms between reassurance 
strategy and its success or failure. Alexander George recommends a reassurance strategy 
as an alternative strategy of influence and then emphasizes the need for detailed analysis. 
He says, “There is a need for more systematic analysis of the conditions and modalities 
for choosing between deterrence and reassurance, or combining them in an optimal 
manner….A correct image of the opponent and good intelligence is needed to distinguish 
between need for deterrence or for reassurance, and for sensitivity to the possibility that 
elements of both are appropriate in some situations.”41 A more systematic approach is 
necessary to create a framework to analyze the conditions for success or failure of 
reassurance. There has been a lack of theoretical and empirical research to explain the 
causal relationships involved in the outcome of reassurance strategy.  
Consequently, even though previous researches provide the policymakers 
with a basis for judging an appropriate strategy, they are not enough to apply to the real 
world because they do not provide a framework including causal mechanisms to judge 
whether a reassurance strategy is likely to be successful or unsuccessful in a particular 
situation. In-depth study of a variety of successful and unsuccessful cases is necessary to 
                                                 
40 Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 353.  
41 Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavior Models of 
Adversaries,” Comparative Strategy 22 (December 2003), 466.  
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help the policymakers make proper judgments. This research explores the situations and 
conditions that affect the success and failure of reassurance strategy.   
F. LITERATURE REVIEW II: HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES 
1. Independent Variable (IV): The Implementation of Reassurance 
Strategy (the Sending State)  
A reassurance strategy is the persuasion of one’s opponent that one’s state has no 
malignant intentions to expand, demonstrated by changes in one’s behavior or policy, in 
order to avoid war and reduce tensions. Derek D. Smith distinguishes a reassurance 
strategy from conciliation. He says, “Reassurance is a tactic where one seeks to convince 
an adversary of one’s benign intentions, hoping to forestall aggressive action; conciliation 
involves offering rewards to an opponent in order to achieve the same result.” 42 
Consequently, a reassurance strategy is an effort to compensate for the limitations of 
deterrence strategy through positive signals rather than negative threats of retaliation or 
punishment.  
There is no one particular reassurance strategy. Reassurance strategy can be 
implemented through various methods. Stein identifies five reassurance strategies, which 
cover all possible methods of reassurance strategy: 1) reassurance through restraint; 2) 
reassurance through norms of competition; 3) reassurance through irrevocable 
commitment; 4) reassurance through limited security regimes; and 5) reassurance through 
reciprocal strategies like “Tit for Tat (TFT)”43 or GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in 
Tension-reduction).44 
                                                 
42 Smith, Deterring America, 18.  
43 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
44 Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
1962), 85–134. 
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2. Condition Variables (CV): Circumstances and Relations Between 
Sending and Receiving States and Receiving State’s Motivating 
Factors  
Condition Variables (CV) help explain the conditions for success or failure of 
reassurance strategy because they provide the framework to understand how intervening 
variables are influenced by condition variables and cause the outcome of reassurance 
strategy. There are two condition variables for reassurance strategy. First, circumstances 
and relations between sending and receiving states need to be considered. Three main 
international relations theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide 
different perspectives to analyze the circumstances. Second, motivating factors are 
influenced by the circumstances and relations between sending and receiving states. If 
receiving states have only greedy intentions, the implementation of a reassurance strategy 
will end in a failure. Receiving states should have insecure and need-oriented motivations 
or at least mixed intentions for success of the reassurance strategy.  
a. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations 
Between a Sending State and a Receiving State  
(1) Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach).  According 
to structuralists, such as realists and neorealists, an increase of military power is the way 
to achieve security under anarchy. Some may argue that superior military capability 
brings recognition of the weakness of an adversary, which can lead to the success of 
reassurance strategy. Others may argue that military parity is an incentive for reassurance 
strategy. Stein says, “A recent study of United States-Soviet arms control notes that ‘arms 
control agreements have been concluded only when neither side has an appreciable 
advantage—that is, only when there already existed rough parity in the relevant forces on 
the two sides.’”45 The Balance of Power between two adversarial countries needs to be 
considered to understand the conditions for success of reassurance strategy and 
conditions for success or failure of reassurance strategy.  
                                                 
45 Janice Gross Stein, ed. Getting to the Table (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989), 131 cited from Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haas, eds, Superpower Arms Control: Setting 
the Record Straight (Cambridge MA: Ballinger 1987), 330.   
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(2) Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach).  The 
democratic peace theory argues that democratic states foster norms of peace and provide 
institutional mechanisms to find compromise rather than conflict. 46  One of the 
hypotheses of Bruce Russett and John Oneal about economic interdependence and 
conflict is that “the probability two states will become embroiled in conflict is inversely 
related to the degree to which they are economically interdependent.”47 For example, 
they argue that economic interdependence is an important factor for a peaceful Northeast 
Asia and could be a first step toward peace: 
In contemporary East Asia, a region that it still far short of a generalized 
system of virtuous circles and where there are only a minority of stable 
democracies, the most effective entry point for the promotion of peace may 
again be through continuing growth in economic interdependence. North 
Korea, while holding tightly to its authoritarian political system, seems to be 
inching forward partially opening its closed economy. China, though hardly 
democratic, now has a ratio of foreign trade to GDP higher than Japan’s and 
has come far toward a more open economy and better integration into global 
economic institutions. All the Kantian elements of change remain severely 
restricted in China, but major improvements have occurred. The strength of 
internal forces with an interest in maintaining and extending political and 
economic reforms and constructive engagement in world affairs suggests this 
is likely to continue.48 
However, Russett and Oneal are also concerned that there are 
possibilities of halting or even reversing the peaceful trend because of several 
circumstances such as “an economic slump, internal political unrest, or a deterioration of 
relations with the West.” 49  Due to its prominence in liberal theory, economic 
interdependence will be examined as a condition variable of reassurance strategy.  
Contrary to liberals, neorealists argue that interdependence and 
trade can promote conflict. Kenneth Waltz argues that interdependence is not necessary 
for peace and conflict is inevitable without regulation: 
                                                 
46 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 38–39. 
47 Ibid., 139.  
48 Ibid., 41.  
49 Ibid.  
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The fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones have been fought 
within arenas populated by highly similar people whose affairs had become 
quite closely knit together. It is hard to get a war going unless the potential 
participants are somehow closely linked. Interdependent states whose 
relations remain unregulated must experience conflict and will occasionally 
fall into violence. If regulation is hard to come by, as it is in the relations of 
states, then it would seem to follow that a lessening of interdependence is 
desirable.50  
Kenneth Waltz also argues that interdependence leads to instability 
and conflict. He says, “Many seem to believe that a growing closeness of 
interdependence improves the chances of peace. But close interdependence means 
closeness of contact and raises the prospect of occasional conflict.”51 The effects of 
interdependence on the use of reassurance thus need to be investigated. 
(3) Identity (from the Social Constructivist Approach).  Social 
constructivism considers state identity to be an important variable, and argues that 
identities can change in the direction of a larger shared identity or community.52 There 
are two useful articles to study the relationship between the change of identity and 
resolution of conflict. Janice Gross Stein argues that there are causal relationships among 
mediation, image change, and conflict resolution. She says, “In all these cases, conflict 
reduction required more than reciprocation of small concessions in a gradually building 
process. The core of the solution lies in the often difficult decision by senior leaders to 
acknowledge, respect, and accommodate different identities and share political power.”53 
On the other hand, R. William Ayres focuses on the correlation 
between image change and conflict resolution:  
                                                 
50 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Myth of National Interdependence.” in Globalism Versus Realism: 
International Relations’ Third Debate, ed. Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1982), 81.   
51 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 138.  
52 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 246–378. 
53 Janice Gross Stein, “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in Turbulent Peace: 
The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker Fen Osler Hampson, and 
Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 204.  
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The results sought here are not whether mediation causes image change, 
which in turn causes resolution (although this argument is made by some 
scholars—see Stein, 1996), but whether in situations of attempted 
mediation, image change and resolution are correlated. If the former 
argument is true (as is argued on the grounds of social psychological 
theory), the latter must be; if the latter is false, the former’s usefulness is 
seriously called into question.54 
In addition, constructivists such as Rey Koslowski and Friedrich 
Kratochwil argue that identity change was important at the end of the Cold War.55 Kydd 
also says, “Much of the debate about Soviet motivations in the 1980s was over whether 
they were being conciliatory because they were simply recognizing a temporary 
weakness, or because they had experienced a genuine transformation of identity into a 
state that no longer sought to expand its influence and subvert others.”56 This dissertation 
explores the outcome of reassurance strategy by investigating these kinds of changes in 
circumstances that can affect intervening variables and the outcome of reassurance 
strategy.  
b. Condition Variable (CV) 2: Receiving State’s Motivating Factors  
(1)  The Concept of “Motivating Factors.” 57   Robert Jervis, 
Charles Glaser, and Janice Gross Stein explain the concept of motivating factors. Robert 
Jervis divides adversaries into two types, a “status quo state” and an “expansionist 
state.”58 According to Jervis, the deterrence model provides appropriate prescriptions in 
the latter case, but the spiral model better predicts the results of threat-based strategies in 
                                                 
54 William Ayres, “Mediating International Conflicts: Is Image Change Necessary?” Journal of Peace 
Research 34, no.4 (November 1997): 432. 
55 Koslowski Rey and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The 
Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System” International Organization 48. no2 (1994): 215–
247. 
56 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 22. 
57 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59.  
58 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 100–102. 
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the former case.59 He says, “A major determinant of the effect of threats is the intention 
of the other side. When faced with an aggressor, threats and force are necessary….On the 
other hand, when conflict erupts between two status quo powers, the spiral model will 
probably provide the correct explanation and policy prescription.”60 Charles L. Glaser 
says, “I use the term greedy for a state willing to incur costs or risks for nonsecurity 
expansion; by contrast, a not-greedy state is unwilling to run risks for nonsecurity 
expansion.”61 Also, Stein divides adversaries’ motivating factors into “need-oriented” 
and “opportunity-oriented.” She claims that the determination of an adversary’s 
“motivating factors” is critical for understanding the implementation of either deterrence 
or reassurance strategies.  
In sum, all three explanations are similar and the perception of an 
adversary’s motivating factors can be divided into two types (Table 1.6):  
1) Aggressive / Greedy / Opportunity-oriented motivating factors; and  
2) Status quo / Not-greedy / Need-oriented motivating factors.  
Table 1.6.   Perceptions of Motivating Factors and Security Policy 
Scholars Motivating Factors 
Robert Jervis Aggressive Status quo 
Charles Glaser Greedy Not-greedy 
Janice Gross Stein Opportunity Need 
(2) The Relationship between Motivating Factors and the 
Outcome of Reassurance Strategy.  Even though, unlike deterrence, reassurance has not 
received much attention from political scientists and policymakers, those who consider 
reassurance as an important influence strategy agree that adversarial motives are  
 
                                                 
59 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 58–113. 
60 Ibid., 101–102.  
61 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Models,” in World Politics, 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 501.  
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significant for the outcome of reassurance strategy. For example, Janice Gross Stein 
distinguishes between three scenarios to determine the effectiveness of reassurance 
strategies. According to Stein: 
It is also important to analyze the outcome of reassurance strategies both 
in and outside the context of deterrence. An adversary’s mixture of need 
and opportunity, for example, may be important in determining the 
effectiveness of reassurance strategies. If an adversary is driven largely by 
domestic political needs or strategic weakness, then reassurance may be 
more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence. If adversarial motives are 
mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence. 
When an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity, reassurance is 
likely to misfire and encourage the challenge it is desired to prevent.62  
I accept Stein’s hypothesis for my dissertation and consider the 
receiving state’s motivating factor as one of the condition variables. Alexander George 
recommends Stein’s article as “the best discussion of various reassurance strategies”63 
and agrees with the hypothesis. He says, “A hypothesis has been advanced that 
reassurance of some kind might be more appropriate than deterrence when the 
adversary’s motivation for possibly taking a hostile action is defensive and stems from a 
sense of weakness, vulnerability, or mistaken concern that hostile actions are about to be 
directed towards it.”64  
Jervis also says, “…neither theory is confirmed all the time. There 
are many cases in which arms have been increased, aggressors deterred, significant gains 
made, without setting off spirals. And there are also many instances in which the use of 
power and force has not only failed or even left the state worse off than it was originally 
(both of these outcomes can be explained by deterrence theory), but has led to mutual 
insecurity and misunderstandings that harmed both sides.”65 In sum, the receiving state’s 
insecure motivating factor is a necessary condition for success of a reassurance strategy.  
                                                 
62 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59.  
63 George, “Need for Influence,” 484, note 4.  
64 Ibid., 466.  
65 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 84.  
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(3) Uncertainty about “Motivating Factors.”  As explained 
above, it is possible to distinguish motivating factors in theory. A country’s motives for 
expansion or security-seeking are important for defense decision-making. However, even 
though it is possible to differentiate motivating factors and they are important for success 
and failure of reassurance strategy, it is extremely difficult, almost impossible, to 
distinguish them in reality. It is clear that most states’ motivating factors do not exist with 
absolute certainty. Any mixture of two possible factors—need and opportunity—is 
plausible. Most states can be categorized to be a “greedy,” “not-greedy” or “mixed” state. 
Strategies have been fluctuating depending on how states assess the situation at a 
particular point. This changeability is common between adversarial countries.  
For example, it is difficult to analyze and predict North Korea’s 
strategy because North Korea seems to have both opportunity-driven and need-driven 
motives, and the relative weight of the two are dependent on circumstances. North Korea 
has not given up its “greedy” motive for expansion. Also, a matter of regime survival and 
economic need makes North Korea change into a “not-greedy” state, especially after the 
end of the Cold War. Therefore, we can conclude that North Korea’s strategy is multiple, 
flexible, and not easily predictable. However, we need to estimate its motivations as best 
as possible, based on the circumstances because the success or failure of each strategy is 
dependent on the motives of the receiving states. Each case study will present the 
evidence for each of the three possible motivations in order to come to at least a rough 
judgment of the relative balance of greed and insecurity. Stein says, “The important 
question for strategy, however, is the relative weight of need and opportunity as 
motivating factors. It is significant because it speaks to the approximate mixture of 
deterrence with other strategies of conflict management.”66  
Therefore, this dissertation considers the circumstances and 
conditions (Condition Variable 1), which impact the motivating factors (Condition 
                                                 
66 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance” 30. For more extensive discussion of the interactive effects of 
need and opportunity as motives to a challenge to deterrence, Stein recommends R.N. Lebow, “Deterrence: 
A political and psychological critique. In P. Stern, R. Axelrod, R. Jervis, and R. Radner, eds., Perspectives 
on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press).  
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Variable 2) of the receiving state. These two conditions variables frame antecedent 
conditions that influence the intervening variables, such as the sending state leader’s 
perception, the receiving state leader’s perception, the domestic politics of sending and 
receiving states, and the alliance politics of sending and receiving states. These variables 
and their relations are important to understand the prospects for the use of reassurance 
strategy.  
3. Intervening Variables (INTV)  
a. Sending State Leader’s Perceptions about the Receiving State 
(from the Individual-level Approach) 
Scholars had not given enough attention to the impact of the sending state 
leader’s perception of the implementation of the reassurance strategy and its outcome. To 
study incentives for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy, it is necessary to 
investigate the sending state leader’s perceptions about the receiving state and its leader. 
Usually, if two parties are in hostile adversary relations, there is only strong negative 
information about the receiving state. Therefore, it is not easy to catch any change of the 
target state in terms of the motivating factors. The sending state leader may have only 
limited information or misperceptions about the receiving state due to lack of sources or 
faulty assessment of intelligence. For example, Gorbachev believed that Reagan had only 
expansionist / greedy / opportunity motivating factors at the early stage of the Gorbachev 
period. The Soviet military and intelligence missed the signs of Reagan’s status quo / not-
greedy / opportunity-oriented motivating factors. Even so, Gorbachev implemented his 
reassurance strategy.   
That is, some leaders implement reassurance strategy even though there is 
only negative information about the receiving leader and the receiving state. Therefore, 
there are two necessary questions to ask: (1) Did the sending state leader still have doubts 
about the receiving state and its leaders in terms of the motivating factors when 
implementing reassurance strategy? And (2) Did the sending state leader’s perceptions 
change during the implementation of the reassurance strategy?   
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For example, Kim Dae Jung implemented his Sunshine policy toward 
North Korea, even though he was uncertain about Kim Jong Il because there was only 
negative information available. His perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
changed after their summit meeting. Also, Gorbachev’s summit meetings with Reagan 
provided him opportunities to change his image of Reagan. If a sending state leader 
confirms that a receiving state leader has status quo / not-greedy / need-oriented 
motivating factors and willingness to show a positive response, the leader would continue 
the reassurance strategy and the possibility of the success of the reassurance strategy 
would increase. When the sending state leader recognizes the receiving state leader as a 
counterpart with whom to work, he/she is likely to negotiate with that leader to solve 
conflicting issues rather than to vilify and threaten. In sum, the sending state’s leader’s 
perceptions need to be investigated to explore the incentive for and conditions of success 
of reassurance strategy.    
b. Receiving State Leader’s Perceptions about the Sending State 
(from the Individual-level Approach) 
The receiving state leader’s perceptions about the sending state are also an 
important variable from the individual-level approach. Even if the sending state 
implements reassurance strategy based on its own “not-greedy” motivations, it does not 
mean that the receiving state will interpret it that way. Aside from the “not-greedy” and 
“need-oriented” motivating factors of the sending state, the receiving state leader’s 
perceptions are equally crucial. If a receiving state’s leader believes that a sending state 
has expansionist / greedy / opportunity-oriented motivating factors, reassurance strategy 
is more likely to fail. On the other hand, if the receiving state’s leader considers the 
sending state’s status-quo / not-greedy / need-oriented motivating factors, the prospects 
for success of a reassurance strategy become more positive. Indeed, a major goal of 
reassurance is to change the target state’s image of the sender to one that does not have 
aggressive intentions. 
Even though a leader’s belief is difficult to know, it nevertheless plays an 
important role in success and failure of reassurance strategy. When Stein explains the 
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psychological factors in deterrence success, she emphasizes that it is important to know 
“the conditions that arouse deeply felt political needs and strategic fears and their relative 
impact on leaders’ calculations about a challenge to deterrence.” 67  Likewise, the 
heuristics and biases of leaders about sending state’s motivating factors can contribute in 
important ways to errors that can result in the failure of reassurance strategy. In sum, the 
issue is whether the receiving state perceives accurately that the sending state’s 
motivating factors as status quo / not-greedy / need-oriented or it misperceives and 
discounts or ignores the signal due to conditional factors such as strategic, domestic 
political and psychological obstacles. The relationship between perceptions of a receiving 
state’s leader about a sending state’s motivating factors and the implementation of 
national security policy are shown in the following (Table 1.7): 
Table 1.7.   Receiving State Leaders’ Perceptions and Prospects for Reassurance 
Strategy 
Receiving state leaders’ perceptions about sending 
state’s motivating factors  
Prospects for 
reassurance strategy 
Consider the sending state as expansionist / greedy / 
opportunity-oriented  Less successful 
Consider the sending state as status quo / not-greedy / 
need-oriented  More successful 
Consider the sending state’s motivating factors as the 
mixture of greedy and not greedy intentions  Partially successful  
A leader can be misinformed by the military or intelligence. The Sino-
Indian border conflict in 1962 is an example to show that miscalculation from faulty 
assessment of military intelligence can promote rather than reduce tension. Stein says, 
“Prime Minister Nehru and Defense Minister Menon were persuaded that China would 
want to avoid the condemnation by the nonaligned bloc that would follow if it were to 
use force. Indian leaders also incorrectly saw themselves as militarily superior and 
interpreted the apparent Chinese reluctance to fire on the Indian pickets as evidence of 
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fear of military defeat.”68 According to Stein, the cause of this misperception was “a 
series of self-serving and unrealistic intelligence reports from a highly politicized military 
bureaucracy.”69 The impact of psychological and organizational biases on the adversary 
leader’s decision making is important in determining whether reassurance strategy will 
succeed or not.  
c.  Domestic Politics of the Sending State (from the Domestic-level 
Approach) 
Domestic politics in the sending state is also an important intervening 
variable for success or failure of reassurance strategy. It can provide the incentive for use 
by the sending state or constrain the leader’s ability to implement reassurance strategy. 
Thus, this dissertation investigates the impact of domestic politics of the sending state on 
the success of reassurance strategy. There are several examples to show the importance of 
domestic politics of the sending state. Stein says, “Like deterrence, outside the laboratory 
reassurance through irrevocable commitment also requires a degree of freedom from 
domestic political and bureaucratic constraints.”70 She explains that Sadat could make an 
irrevocable commitment by visiting Jerusalem because he had great autonomy in decision 
making after the 1973 October War.71 Larson considers Khrushchev’s victory against 
Malenkov in the Kremlin power struggle as the main reason for the Soviet shift on 
Austria:  
The military objected to Malenkov’s efforts to reduce defense 
expenditures. Khrushchev agreed that Soviet defenses required further 
strengthening….Khrushchev’s advocacy of renewed emphasis on the 
priority of heavy industry enabled him to gain the support of Molotov, 
Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Lazar Kanovich, a majority of the 
Presidium. The army, fed by heavy-industry products, also allied with 
Khrushchev against Malenkov.72 
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Larson’s comparison of the political situation under Khrushchev to that 
under Malenkov shows how domestic politics play a role in reassurance strategy: 
By forging a broad coalition including old Stalinists and the military as 
well as the government and economic elite, Khrushchev was in a political 
position to make the concessions required for détente with the United 
States. In contrast, having united the hard-liners and armed forces against 
him through his consumer goods policy, Malenkov was unable to go 
beyond symbolic tension-reduction gestures that did not succeed in 
undermining Western suspicion.73 
Larson emphasizes the importance of analysis of domestic politics to 
understand Khrushchev’s policy:  
Thus, to explain the Austrian State Treaty and other of Khrushchev’s 
major innovations in Soviet foreign policy, one must go to the decision-
making level of analysis and examine the dynamics of the process by 
which Khrushchev formed a domestic coalition.74 
The Sunshine Policy in South Korea is another example to show the 
impact of domestic political constraints on the success of reassurance strategy. South 
Korean President Kim Dae Jung implemented the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. 
There was a summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong 
Il in 2000. One of the agreements at the 2000 summit meeting was Kim Jong-Il’s visit to 
Seoul: “President Kim Dae Jung cordially invited National Defense Commission 
chairman Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong Il decided to visit Seoul at 
an appropriate time.”75 
Actually, the second summit meeting between South Korean President 
Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il was held in Pyongyang instead of Seoul in October 2007. 
There are many reasons to explain why Kim Jong Il could not visit Seoul. One of them 
was the domestic politics of South Korea. Anti-communism, especially anti-North 
Korean conservatism has been the dominant ideology in South Korean politics since the 
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Korean War. Progressives in South Korea appeared upon the scene of South Korean 
politics after the transition to democracy in 1987, but conservative ideology is still strong 
in South Korean politics because of the existence of North Korea. Therefore, one of the 
main characteristics of South Korean domestic politics is debate between conservatives 
and progressives.76 Conservatives consider North Korea a menacing threat and they have 
criticized the Sunshine Policy. On the other hand, progressives see North Korea as a 
brother nation expected to live as one after unification. They have supported the Sunshine 
Policy.77 Therefore, the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun toward to 
North Korea were implemented under the conservative-progressive split. Kim Jong Il 
might have considered this political situation in South Korea in a negative light and 
decided not to visit Seoul because of anticipated protests by the strong conservatives in 
South Korea.  
Consequently, this dissertation considers the influence of domestic politics 
of the sending state as an important variable to lead to success or failure of reassurance 
strategy. Thus, it investigates the impact of domestic support on the perceptions of the 
receiving state and, eventually, the outcome of reassurance strategy. 
d.  Domestic Politics of the Receiving State (from the Domestic-level 
Approach) 
This hypothesis is similar with one of propositions of Lebow and Stein in 
When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? They say, “Reassurance is more 
likely to succeed when an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs and/or 
strategic weakness.”78 Stein points out that quantitative studies of deterrence have not 
systematically investigated the impact of domestic political factors on the outcome of 
deterrence.79 Just like deterrence, analyses of reassurance strategy need to look at the 
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relationship between domestic politics and the outcome of reassurance both 
systematically and empirically. Deborah Welch Larson and Janice Gross Stein explain 
the importance of domestic politics of the receiving state on success of reassurance 
strategy. 
(1) Larson’s Causal Discussion of GRIT (Graduated 
Reciprocation in Tension-reduction)80 in the Austrian State Treaty.  In Alternative to War 
or Surrender, Charles E. Osgood argues that the way to halt the spiral of continuous 
tension is “taking the initiative, not by creating threats and tensions but by reducing and 
controlling them.”81 He used Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction (GRIT) as a 
technical term for this type of policy. The main idea is “unilateral initiative.”82 The 
initiator of a GRIT strategy announces in advance that it will carry out a series of 
unilateral conciliatory actions and invite but does not expect the immediate reciprocation 
of the other side.83  
Larson discusses the process and causal mechanisms of signing the 
Austrian State Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. She argues that 
“GRIT better explains the Austrian State Treaty because departure from a strict tit-for-tat 
strategy of contingent concessions was required to elicit U.S. reciprocated cooperation in 
signing the treaty and agreeing to a summit meeting.” 84  She points out several 
differences between GRIT and the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The main differences are no 
assumption of immediate reciprocation, public statement, diversification of issues, and 
moderately risky concessions:85  
On the other hand, GRIT differs from tit for tat in several ways. First, 
unlike the tit for tat, GRIT does not assume that the other side will  
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immediately reciprocate….Persisting in conciliatory acts despite ridicule 
or dismissal from the recipient helps to convince the other side of one’s 
good faith.86   
Second, GRIT requires the decision maker to state publicly that the series 
of moves is intended to reduce tension, whereas tit for tat communicates 
mainly through the pattern of rewards and punishments. By incorporating 
a public statement, GRIT diminishes uncertainty and puts additional 
pressure on the other side to reciprocate by making salient the norm of 
reciprocity: public opinion generally favors returning “good for good and 
evil for evil.”87 
Third, GRIT spreads concessions over different issue-areas or geographic 
areas where tit for tat makes no provision for increasing the level of locus 
of cooperation….In addition, consistent conciliatory behavior over 
different modalities creates the impression of sincerity and fosters trust. 
Fourth, GRIT concessions must be moderately risky to engender trust….If 
the concessions involve some cost, they are less likely to be dismissed as 
having ulterior motives and more likely to elicit reciprocal cooperation.88 
One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to investigate the 
causal mechanism of domestic politics of the receiving state for the success of 
reassurance strategy. The four differences between GRIT and TFT are directly related to 
causal mechanisms between reassurance strategy and its success. 
(2) Stein’s Discussion of “Reassurance through Irrevocable 
Commitment.”  In addition, a dramatic, unilateral action of the sending state can have an 
impact on domestic politics of the receiving state. For example, Egyptian President 
Sadat’s speech to Israel’s parliament influenced Israel’s public. Stein analyzes success of 
the reassurance strategy of Sadat and introduces several factors of it. Most of the factors 
are related to the domestic politics of Israel. She says: 
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Why did reassurance succeed? Several factors were at play, some general 
and some specific to the historical context. First, the initiative was 
irreversible….Israel’s leadership and public recognized the irreversibility 
of the action and, consequently, gave it great weight.  
Second, the substantial cost to President Sadat of breaking the long-
standing Arab taboo of not dealing directly Israel was also apparent to 
Israel’s leaders….Israel’s leaders reasoned that Egypt’s president would 
not incur such heavy costs were he not sincere. 
Third, Sadat’s arrival in Jerusalem challenged the most important set of 
beliefs about Arab goals among Israel’s leadership and public….Once 
these core beliefs were shaken, it became easier for Israelis, as cognitive 
psychologists predict, to revise associated assumptions and expectations. 
Fourth, President Sadat spoke over the heads of Israel’s leadership directly 
to Israel’s public. With his flair for the dramatic, he created the 
psychological and political symbols that would mobilize Israel’s citizens 
to press their more cautious and restrained leaders….The strategy of 
reassurance had multiple audiences and multiple constituencies. 
Fifth, the president of Egypt adopted a strategy of reassurance only when 
he judged that the conflict between Egypt and Israel had “ripened for 
resolution.”89 In 1977, both leaders shared a common aversion to war. 
Sadat’s initiative took place after a war that both sides lost.90 
As shown above, domestic politics of the receiving state play an 
important role in the success of a reassurance strategy. Changing the views of domestic 
audiences can be necessary to reassurance success, and domestic actors can even pressure 
a relevant leader to respond positively. In other cases, domestic constraints may prevent a 
receiving state’s leader from reciprocating. This dissertation further investigates how 
reassurance strategy influences domestic politics of the receiving state and what the 
general causal mechanisms are.  
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e. Alliance Politics of the Sending State (from International-level 
Approach) 
Scholars have not given enough attention to the impact of alliance politics 
of the sending state in the implementation and outcome of the reassurance strategy. The 
influence of alliance partners creates different contexts within the reassurance strategy. 
The sending state can be constrained from fully implementing reassurance strategy 
because the receiving state can also be threatened by the allies of the sending state. The 
relations among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States are a good example. 
Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy 
toward North Korea were constrained by the Bush administration’s hard-line policy 
toward North Korea. Therefore, alliance politics of the sending state are added as one of 
the intervening variables between the implementation and the outcome of the reassurance 
strategy. 
f. Alliance Politics of the Receiving State (from International-level 
Approach)   
Just as there has been lack of study of the impacts of alliance politics of 
the sending state on the implementation and the outcome of reassurance strategy, the 
impacts of alliance politics of the receiving state have not been researched sufficiently by 
scholars. The influence of the allies of the receiving state plays a role when exploring the 
outcome of reassurance strategy. Therefore, the perceptions of the allies of the receiving 
state about the reassurance strategy of the sending state are important. Also, how much 
the allies of the receiving state can influence the receiving state for reciprocity also needs 
to be considered. For example, the United State has tried to solve the North Korean 
nuclear problem with the help of China, North Korea’s ally, through the Six-Party Talks. 
China’s perceptions of the United States’ reassurance strategy and its level of influence 
on North Korea are crucial to evaluate how much the efforts of the United States can lead 
to success. Therefore, alliance politics of the receiving state should be included to explore 
the outcome of the reassurance strategy.    
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4. Dependent Variable (DV): Success or Failure of Reassurance Strategy 
It is not easy to distinguish the success and failure of reassurance strategy in 
reality. The debate between Montgomery and Shiping Tang shows the difficulty. 
Criticizing Montgomery’s claim that reassurance rarely works, Tang says, “…other 
examples of successful reassurance include the détente between Britain and France 
before World War I, the reconciliation between Germany and France after World War II, 
the emerging strategic partnership between post-Soviet Russia and China, the 
rapprochement between China and Vietnam, and the forging of a partnership between 
Argentina and Brazil.”91 Montgomery responds that “…I believe Tang has confused my 
explicit and modest goal of examining military reassurance with the daunting task of 
explaining rivalry termination. Even a quick glance at his suggested examples of 
successful reassurance bears this out. For example, the pre-World War I détente between 
Britain and France and the post-World War II reconciliation of France and Germany were 
largely a reaction to the rise of Germany and the Soviet Union, respectively, not to 
military reassurance.” This debate shows the necessity to decide on the scope of success 
or failure of reassurance strategy.  
Compared to the success or failure of deterrence strategy, it is relatively easier to 
decide whether there is a success or failure of reassurance strategy. If there is no response 
to deterrence strategy, it is difficult to judge the outcome. However, in reassurance 
strategy, no response means a failure of reassurance strategy. Consequently, this 
dissertation codes success and failure of reassurance strategy for the purpose of analysis. 
Then, it selects cases to fit into those categories.  
a. Success of Reassurance Strategy: Tension Reduction Through 
Positive Response from the Receiving State and No War 
Because both avoidance of war and reduction of tensions are the main 
objectives of reassurance strategy, these are evaluated to decide the success of 
reassurance strategy. Tension reduction by getting any positive response from the 
                                                 
91 Shiping Tang and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Correspondence: Uncertainty and Reassurance in 
International Politics,” International Security 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 196.  
 36
receiving state or concluding any treaty with the receiving state can be considered as a 
success of reassurance strategy. For example, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was not 
successful in the early period. After the second-term Reagan administration responded 
positively and sought some compromise, the possibility of total war between the United 
States and the Soviet Union became less plausible. This is a typical example of successful 
reassurance strategy.  
Most scholars consider Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy as a successful 
case because there was no war, and it reduced tensions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had sent “costly signals” between 1985 and 1989. Costly 
signals are “signals designed to persuade the other side that one is trustworthy by virtue 
of the fact that they [the signals] are so costly that one would hesitate to send them if one 
were untrustworthy.” 92  Kydd argues that “the Soviet Union changed from an 
expansionist state to security seeker, but that this change was not transparent. Therefore, 
Gorbachev implemented a policy of costly signals to reassure the West.”93 Kydd points 
to three events as clear examples of costly signals showing the changes of Soviet 
intentions. The three examples are “the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty, the 1988 withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement of conventional force 
reductions, and the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe.”94 These three events made the 
United States change its perception of the Soviet’s motivating factors.  
The Reagan administration adopted “a much more accommodationist 
approach” 95  to the Soviet Union and showed positive responses. Negotiation is the 
typical example of the implementation of reassurance strategy and a precondition of its 
success. Reagan suggested that “the United States would seek to reduce the cost of 
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national security ‘in negotiations with the Soviet Union.’”96 Reagan had five meetings 
with Gorbachev between 1985 and 1988, more than any other American president.97 
The second and third summits were the most important ones for success of 
reassurance strategy. The 1986 Reykjavik summit focused on nuclear arms talks and 
agreed “in principle to reduce all strategic nuclear weapons 50 percent over a five-year 
period and to limit intermediate-range nuclear forces to 100 warheads for each side.”98 
The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was signed at the third summit in 
1987.99 The Soviet Union removed Soviet SS-20s that could target Western Europe and 
the United States removed American Pershing and cruise missiles it had deployed in 
Western Europe. In addition, negotiations toward the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) began during the second Reagan administration and START I was signed in 
July 1991.100 The significant change of the relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union during the 1985 and 1989 period is an example of the success of 
reassurance strategy. 
b. Failure of Reassurance Strategy: No Response or Rejection from 
the Receiving State, Tension Increase, or War  
If there is no response to deterrence strategy from the other side, it is 
difficult to decide whether the strategy is a success or failure. Contrary to deterrence 
strategy, reassurance fails when there are no responses from the receiving state and no 
relationship change between the two countries. However, it is necessary to decide the 
scope of time because a successful case in a short period can be interpreted as an 
unsuccessful case over a long period.  
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For example, according to Larson, the Austrian State Treaty is an example 
of successful reassurance strategy under Khrushchev.101 She says, “The period of détente 
following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in itself contributed to preventing 
crises….The tensions are now relaxed.” 102  However, the arms control proposal of 
Khrushchev in 1955 after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was rejected by the 
United States. Montgomery says, “Despite substantial reductions in the size of the Soviet 
military, these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.” 103  Overall, Khrushchev’s 
reassurance strategy was a failure because the United States considered his concessions 
as propaganda. Also, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union did 
not change that much after his proposal. Montgomery says, “Khrushchev’s troop 
reductions therefore did not reassure the United States and did not function as costly 
signals.”104 Even though the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was a successful case of 
reassurance strategy in the beginning of Khrushchev’s period, Khrushchev’s reassurance 
as a whole was a failure.  
There are similar cases between South Korea and North Korea. The first 
agreement between the two Koreas after the Korean War was the “July 4 Joint 
Statement” in 1972. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung proposed a meeting with South 
Korea on August 6, 1971.105  Kim Il Sung said, “We are ready to establish contact at any 
time with all political parties, including the [ruling] Democratic Republican Party, and all 
social organizations and individual personages in South Korea.”106 After the proposal, 
there was the historic initial secret meeting between Kim Il Sung and Lee Hu Rak, 
director of the South Korean intelligence agency, before the announcement of the joint 
statement. The discussion between North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and the second most 
powerful figure in South Korea showed the agreement on independence: 
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Lee: President Park Chung Hee and I believe unification should be 
achieved by ourselves without interference of the four powers [the United 
States, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union]…. We are never front men of 
the United States or Japan. We believe we should resolve our issues by 
ourselves…. 
Kim: Our position is to oppose reliance on external forces on the issue of 
unification. This is where I agree with Park Chung Hee…. 
Lee: I’d like to tell you that President Park is a person who detests foreign 
interference most.  
Kim: That being so, we are already making progress to solve the issue. Let 
us exclude foreign forces. Let’s not fight. Let’s unite as a nation. Let’s not 
take issue with communism or capitalism.107  
Three principles of the July 4 Joint Statement declared the goal of 
independent unification and peaceful relationship between the two Koreas: 
First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without 
being subject to external imposition or interference.  
Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not 
through use of force against one another.  
Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought 
first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.108 
Contrary to the two Koreas’ agreement, the North Korean visit to Seoul 
showed the difficulty of reconciliation and ended in the failure of reassurance. The South 
Korean government had purposely decided to televise the highly ideological Northerners’ 
speeches live because they believed that the northerners would offend most of the 
conservative South Korean public.109 The North Korean political advisor, Kibok Yun, 
attacked the United States and praised Kim Il Sung as “the Great Leader.”110 After the 
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live television speech by the highly ideological political advisor, the South Koreans were 
offended and scared because they were fearful of communism and trusted their strong 
friendship with the United States.111 In sum, even though the “July 4 Joint Statement” 
was the first successful agreement between the two Koreas, it was an example of a failure 
of reassurance because the relationship did not progress and tension instead increased.  
Consequently, the progress of the relationship between the two countries 
is an important factor in deciding whether it is a success or failure of reassurance strategy. 
Specifically, the conclusion of agreements or treaties, change of frequency of crises, and 
change in public statements are considered in the dissertation as signs of improvement in 
the relationship between the two countries.  
G. RESEARCH METHODS 
1. Case Methods: “Structured, Focused Comparison” 
a. The Method and Logic of “Structured, Focused Comparison”  
The main research method in this dissertation is “structured, focused 
comparison.” This method helps analyze reassurance strategy “in ways that would draw 
the explanations of each case of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex 
theory.” 112  Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explained this method in Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science: 
The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and 
straightforward. The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes 
general questions that reflect the research objective and that these 
questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data 
collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the 
findings of the cases possible.  
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The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the 
historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply 
equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional 
cases.113  
b. Strengths of Case Methods and Purpose of the Dissertation 
The reason for using case study methods with structured, focused 
comparison is that strengths of case study methods coincide with the purpose of the 
dissertation. George and Bennett explain four strong advantages of case methods: “their 
potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new 
hypotheses; their causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity 
for addressing causal complexity.”114 These advantages match with the purposes of my 
dissertation (Table 1.8).  
Table 1.8.   Strengths of Case Study Methods and Purposes of the Dissertation 
Strengths of Case Study Methods Purposes of the dissertation 
Conceptual validity Demonstrate conceptual validity of reassurance strategy 
Deriving new hypotheses Derive new hypotheses on success and failure of reassurance strategy 
Exploring causal mechanisms Explore causal mechanisms between reassurance strategy and the outcome of reassurance strategy 
Modeling and assessing complex 
causal relations 
Model and assess complex causal relations among 
variables 
This dissertation tried to achieve conceptual validity of reassurance 
strategy and explore causal mechanisms between the reassurance strategy and the 
outcome of reassurance strategy. Also, there are new hypotheses related to success or 
                                                 
113 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 19. 
114 Ibid., 67. 
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failure of reassurance strategy. Finally, it proposes a framework to model and assess 
causal relations among variables. Therefore, the primary method in this dissertation is 
“structured, focused comparison” 115  as outlined by Alexander George and Andrew 
Bennett. 
b. Questions116 
Based on “the diagram of the main argument and hypotheses” (Figure 1.1), 
similar questions are asked of each of the cases in order to explore similarities and 
differences among them. The process is used to develop “contingent generalizations” 
about conditions that affect the outcomes of reassurance strategy. This method requires 
the detailed examination of individual cases and helps identify variables and the causal 
mechanism and relationship between variables. Therefore, general questions can be asked 
depending on variables in this dissertation.  
(1) Independent Variable (IV): The Implementation of 
Reassurance Strategy (the Sending State).  Reassurance strategy is defined as actions 
taken with the aim of persuading the receiving state of evidence of the sender’s benign 
intentions to refrain from military action or an escalation in tensions. That is, one of 
critical questions is whether the sending state offers a reassurance strategy to ameliorate 
“the source of hostility”117 driven by the vulnerability and weakness of the receiving 
state. Assuming that the receiving state has a “not-greedy” motivating factor arising from 
vulnerability, the receiving state will not respond positively to serious threats to its 
sovereignty from the sending state. Which reassurance strategy was perceived as solving 
the security concern of the receiving state is an important question to ask. It is difficult 
for the sending state to give an absolute security guarantee to the receiving state at the 
                                                 
115 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 19.  
116 Ibid., 86, claim that “the proper focusing and structuring of the comparison requires a fine-tuned 
set of general questions.” Stephen R. Rock suggests seven general questions related to an appeasement 
policy example in Appeasement in International Politics. Some of my questions are similar with his general 
questions. Refer to, Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington, Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 17–20 (see Appendix B). 
117 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues, 43, no. 
4 (1987): 40. 
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beginning of implementation of a reassurance strategy. Therefore, how the receiving state 
perceives the reassurance strategy of the sending state from the perspective of its own 
security is important. In sum, the concept of security guarantee or co-existence in 
reassurance strategy is important to satisfy the receiving state’s concerns: 
Question 1: Did the sending state’s reassurance strategy communicate its 
willingness to offer a security guarantee to or accept co-existence with the 
receiving state? 
Also, it is essential to ask a question about the incentive for the use 
of reassurance strategy which should explain the context and background of the 
implementation of the reassurance strategy: 
Question 2: What was the incentive for the use of a reassurance strategy?   
As explained earlier, there is no one particular reassurance strategy. 
Reassurance strategy can be implemented through Stein’s five reassurance strategies, 
which cover all possible methods of reassurance strategy: 1) reassurance through 
restraint; 2) reassurance through norms of competition; 3) reassurance through 
irrevocable commitment; 4) reassurance through limited security regimes; and 5) 
reassurance through reciprocal strategies like ‘tit for tat (TFT)’ or GRIT (Gradual 
Reciprocation in Tension-reduction).118  
Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did the sending state offer 
to the receiving state? 
(b) Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations 
between a Sending State and a Receiving State.  Before exploring the causal mechanism 
between reassurance strategy and its outcomes, it is necessary to understand the 
circumstances and relationships between a sending state and a receiving state in order to 
investigate how those affect both the leader’s decision about how to respond to 
                                                 
118 Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1962), 85–134. 
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reassurance strategy and the success or failure of reassurance strategy in the end. 
Therefore, the following questions should be asked: 
Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between the 
sending state and receiving state over the time period a reassurance 
strategy was attempted? 
- Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the 
“balance of power” between the two countries? Was it changing 
and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence the balance of 
power affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving 
state? 
- Question 4-b (from the Liberal Approach): What was the level 
of “interdependence” between the two countries? Was it 
changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that 
interdependence affected the calculations of either the sending or 
receiving state?   
- Question 4-c (from the Constructivist Approach): To what 
extent was there a shared identity or norms between the two 
countries? Was the degree of shared understanding changing and 
if so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity/norms 
affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state? 
(3) Condition Variable (CV) 2: Receiving State’s Motivating 
Factors.  It is difficult to know the adversaries’ motivating factors. However, the 
determination of an adversary’s “motivating factors” is critical for understanding the 
implementation of reassurance strategy: 
Question 5: What were the receiving state’s motivations? Is the state best 
seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was the 
sending state’s perception of the receiving’s motivations? 
Also, an aversion to war is another factor to understand 
motivations. Thus: 
Question 5: Did the two parties share an aversion to war? 
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(4) Intervening Variable (IntV) 1: Sending State Leader’s 
Perceptions about the Receiving State and its Leader (from the Individual Level 
Approach).  The sending state leader’s beliefs and perceptions are changeable. When the 
sending state leader initiates the reassurance strategy, he or she may still have doubts 
about the receiving state and its leaders. Hence: 
Question 7: How did the sending state’s leader perceive the receiving state 
and its leader? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led the 
sending state leader to misperceive the receiving state’s leader? Or was 
reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome the 
sending state leader’s cognitive barriers to changing his/her image of the 
receiving state? 
(5) Intervening Variable (IntV) 2: Receiving State Leader’s 
Perception about the Sending State and its Leader (from the Individual Level).  The 
receiving state leader’s beliefs and perceptions is a critical intervening variable for the 
success of reassurance strategy. Hence:  
Question 8: How did the receiving state’s leader perceive the reassurance 
strategy offered by the sending state? Is there evidence that common 
psychological biases led the receiving state to discount the reassurance 
strategy? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to 
overcome the receiver’s cognitive barriers to changing its image of the 
sender? 
(6) Intervening Variable (IntV) 3: Domestic Politics of the 
Sending State (from the Domestic Level Approach).  The sending state can implement 
reassurance strategy without strong support from its own domestic politics. However, this 
situation will give suspicion to the receiving state and end in failure of the reassurance 
strategy. For example, Gorbachev had difficulty in persuading the Soviet military and 
party members to implement a reassurance strategy. There was even a military coup 
attempt. South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were criticized by 
the opposition party about their Sunshine Policy. Even though there has been some 
progress in the relationship between the two Koreas, tension has not been reduced 
significantly. Hence, the following questions should be asked:  
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Question 9: How did domestic politics of the sending state react to the 
reassurance strategy offer to the receiving state? Was there sufficient 
domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government 
constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy? 
(7) Intervening Variable (IntV) 4: Domestic Politics of the 
Receiving State (from the Domestic Level Approach).  Leaders in the receiving state play 
an important role in responding to reassurance strategy. However, leaders cannot decide 
the way to respond without considering domestic politics. Therefore, the domestic 
politics of the receiving state is another critical intervening variable for success of 
reassurance strategy. Questions related to domestic politics of the receiving state are:   
Question 10: How did key domestic actors in the receiving state perceive 
the reassurance strategy offered by the sending state? Did the reassurance 
strategy generate domestic support in the receiving state for reciprocity? 
Did powerful domestic actors try to prevent the receiving state from 
offering a positive response? 
(8) Intervening Variable (IntV) 5: Alliance Politics of the 
Sending State (from the International Level Approach).  The perceptions of the allies of 
the sending state and their level of influence need to be considered. Questions related to 
alliance politics of the sending state are:   
Question 11: How did key allies of the sending state affect the reassurance 
strategy to the receiving state? Was there sufficient alliance support to 
make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from 
fully implementing its reassurance strategy? 
(9) Intervening Variable (IntV) 6: Alliance Politics of the 
Receiving State (from the International Level Approach).  Alliance politics of the 
receiving states also plays a role in the outcome of the reassurance strategy. Hence the 
following questions should be asked: 
Question 12: How did key allies of the receiving state perceive the 
reassurance strategy? Did the reassurance strategy generate alliance 
support for the receiving state’s reciprocity? Did key allies try to prevent 
the receiving state from offering a positive response? 
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(10) Dependent Variable (DV): Success or Failure of 
Reassurance Strategy.  As explained earlier, if there is a positive response to the 
reassurance strategy followed by tension reduction, it can be categorized as a success. On 
the contrary, if there is no response or rejection from the receiving state, it is a failure of 
reassurance strategy. Hence, the questions relating the success or failure of reassurance 
strategy are as follows:  
Question 13: Was there any positive response to the reassurance strategy 
from the receiving state? Or, was there no response or rejection from the 
receiving state, followed by an increase in tensions? 
Consequently, this dissertation has total of 13 questions to use a 
“structured, focused comparison” method outlined by Alexander George and Andrew 
Bennett as the primary method. Each question will be applied to case studies and answers 
will be compared.  
2. Case Selection 
This dissertation plans to find successful and unsuccessful cases of reassurance 
strategy and to identify “contingent generalizations.” Even though some scholars believe 
that it is difficult to research reassurance strategy, there are cases to show success and 
failure of reassurance strategy in adversarial relations. Three adversarial relations cases 
are selected in this dissertation to fulfill the requirements of a “structured, focused 
comparison”: 1) South Korea and North Korea: Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Kim 
Il Sung; 2) the United States and North Korea: George W. Bush, and Kim Jong Il; and 3) 
the United States and the Soviet Union: Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.  
These three cases are selected because each case had a different outcome. Also, 
all variables can be compared across these cases. The first case study, South Korea’s 
reassurance strategy toward North Korea (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo 
Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) seems to be a partly successful case. The 
relationship between the United States and North Korea during the Bush administration 
in 2007 and 2008 shows an unsuccessful case of reassurance strategy. Finally, the 
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relationship between the Soviet Union and the United Stated during the Gorbachev and 
Reagan period seems to be a success. In sum, this dissertation tries to find the incentives 
for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy by comparing these three cases—
partial success, failure, and success—by explaining why reassurance strategy led to 
different outcomes.  
H. OUTLINE 
This dissertation is divided into three main parts. As discussed so far, Chapter I 
introduces the motivation for the research and explains the research questions, hypotheses 
and research methods. Chapters II, III, and IV are cases studies. Chapter II is a partial 
success of reassurance strategy of South Korea toward North Korea (Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea). 
Chapter III is a failure case of reassurance strategy of the United States toward North 
Korea (Bush’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea in 2007 and 2008). Chapter IV is 
a success case of reassurance strategy of the Soviet Union toward the United States 
(Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy). The same hypotheses and research method of a 
“structured, focused comparison” will be applied to the case studies.  
Finally, in Chapter V, research findings will be compared to explain the 
conditions and causal mechanisms of reassurance strategy outcomes and patterns of 
success and failure of reassurance strategy. This dissertation argues that reassurance 
strategy can succeed, but only when several conditions are met. Leader’s perceptions, 
domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending and receiving state need to be 
supportive for the success of reassurance strategy. Also, it finds that each leader’s beliefs 
and perceptions are the most important variables. Lastly, it recommends an appropriate 
policy based on the findings. The motivating factors of the target state should be 
investigated fully and objectively because the reassurance strategy will success only 
when the state has “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors. Also, an eclectic 
and broad approach including leader’s perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics 
of both the sending and receiving states is necessary to analyze conditions for success or 
failure and predict the outcome.  
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II. CASE I: A PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL REASSURANCE 
STRATEGY CASE (KIM DAE JUNG’S “SUNSHINE POLICY” AND 
ROH MOO HYUN’S “PEACE AND PROSPERITY POLITY”) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. A Partial Successful Reassurance Strategy Case Between South Korea 
and North Korea 
The prospects for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula remain highly 
unpredictable, and a solution to achieve Korean unification seems as far off as it did after 
the Korean War. Even though there have been many debates over policy in the Korean 
peninsula, no strategy to reduce tensions has seemed plausible. Victor D. Cha and David 
C. Kang described the debate over North Korea perfectly in the beginning of their co-
authored book, Nuclear North Korea. 
Put two people in a room to discuss North Korea and three different 
opinions will emerge-all likely to be charged with emotion, if not outright 
vitriol. Why? Because the debate on the Democratic People’s Republic 
Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has emerged in the past decade as one of 
the most divisive foreign policy issues for the United States and its allies 
in Asia.119  
Even though many different policy options have been considered by scholars and 
decision makers, the most dominant strategy of South Korea to prevent North Korea from 
attacking South Korea has been deterrence through hard power, mainly military power. 
However, two former South Korean presidents’ policies toward North Korea—Kim Dae 
Jung’s Sunshine Policy between 1998 and 2003 and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and 
Prosperity Policy between 2003 and 2008—were different from deterrence strategy. Their 
policies are good examples of reassurance strategy because Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 
Hyun tried to persuade North Korea that there were no intentions to attack North Korea 
                                                 
119 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1. 
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and that they wanted to reduce tensions and avoid war through engagement and 
coexistence rather than coercion and efforts to topple the North Korean regime.  
The results of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and 
Prosperity Policy are very controversial. There was some progress toward reconciliation 
and peace between the two Koreas. For example, there were the first two summit 
meetings in 2000 and 2007 between the two Koreas. During the summit meetings, leaders 
of the two Koreas agreed on the 2000 Joint Declaration and the October 4 declaration, 
respectively. Also, during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, trade 
and interchange of people between the two Koreas increased significantly. However, 
there were not only positive results but also continuous provocative actions by North 
Korea and political and military tensions between the two Koreas. Furthermore, the North 
Korean nuclear threat was the primary threat to stability on the Korean peninsula, and it 
proved very difficult to solve.   
Consequently, Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and 
Prosperity Policy achieved some objectives, yet there was no significant tension 
reduction on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, they can be considered as partially 
successful cases of reassurance strategy. This chapter investigates the conditions and 
outcomes of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity 
Policy in an effort to understand what factors are associated with the success or failure of 
a reassurance strategy.  
2. Variables  
Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors 
associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy during the Kim Dae Jung 
administration (1998 – 2003) and the Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003 – 2008) can 
be drawn in a diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), 
intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). The independent variable is the 
implementation of a reassurance strategy, such as the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and 
Prosperity Policy; and the dependent variable is the success or failure of those strategies.  
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There are six intervening variables that influence the dependent variable: (1) the South 
Korean leader’s beliefs and perceptions about North Korea and its leader; (2) the North Korean 
leader’s beliefs and perceptions about South Korea and its leader; (3) the domestic politics of 
South Korea; (4) the domestic politics of North Korea; (5) the alliance politics of South Korea; 
and (6) the alliance politics of North Korea. Also, two condition variables—the circumstances 
and relations between South Korea and North Korea and North Korea’s motivating factors—
are included in the hypotheses. In sum, the hypotheses and all variables can be drawn as in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2:  





(Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy and 
Roh Moo Hyun’s 
Peace and Prosperity 
Polity) 
→  
1. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s 
beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong 
Il and North Korea  
2. Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and perceptions 
about Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
and South Korea 
3. Domestic politics of South Korea  
4. Domestic politics of North Korea 
5. Alliance politics of South Korea 







CV 1 → CV 2 
Circumstances and 
relations between 






1. Balance of Power 
2. Interdependence 
3. Identity  
→




Figure 2.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)120 
                                                 
120 Van Evera, Guidance to Methods, 7–48. 
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Figure 2.2. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the Receiving 
State, and CV) 
3. Hypotheses 
The main focus of this dissertation is on the conditions that lead to success or 
failure of reassurance strategy. The hypotheses of this case study are as follows: 
H1: South Korea’s reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy 
and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to 
succeed if it altered the South Korean leader’s beliefs and perceptions 






Kim Dae Jung’s 













H2: South Korea’s reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy 
and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to 
succeed if it altered Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and perceptions about Kim Dae 
Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea. 
H3: South Korea’s reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy 
and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to 
succeed if it altered domestic politics in South Korea towards support for 
foreign policy change.  
H4: South Korea’s reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy 
and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to 
succeed if it altered domestic politics in North Korea towards support for 
foreign policy change.  
H5: South Korea’s reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy 
and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to 
succeed if it altered alliance politics of South Korea (the United States) 
towards support for foreign policy change.  
H6: South Korea’s reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy 
and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity policy) was more likely to 
succeed if it altered alliance politics of North Korea (China and Russia) 
towards support for foreign policy change. 
If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of South Korea’s reassurance 
strategy (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity 
Policy) would have been influenced by the six intervening variables (leader’s perceptions, 
domestic politics, and alliance politics of South Korea and North Korea). For the full 
success of South Korea’s reassurance strategy, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
administrations should have tried to influence Kim Jong Il’s perceptions and the domestic 
politics and the alliance politics of both South Korea and North Korea.  
4. Chronology 
A chronological narrative of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
administrations will clarify the main argument and hypothesis with various variables. The 
main events are combinations of success and failure of reassurance strategy which show 
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that Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy 
were partially successful cases of a reassurance strategy.  
Table 2.1.   The Kim Dae Jung Administration (1998–2003)  
1998 February 25 Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as South Korea’s 15th President and introduced his Sunshine Policy. 
1999 June 7-15 
Several North Korean ships provoked a nine-day naval confrontation in 
the Yellow Sea. On June 15, there was an exchange of gunfire between 
the two Koreas’ ships. One North Korean torpedo boat was sunk and 




Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang and had a summit meeting with Kim 




An inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting was held for the first time 
ever on Cheju island, South Korea. 
October  
9-12 
Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, North Korea’s second-highest ranking 
military and civilian official visited the United States.  




Madeleine Albright, the former U.S. Secretary of State visited Kim Jong 
Il in Pyongyang 
2001 January 20 George W. Bush took office and U.S. policy toward North Korea was reconsidered. 
January 29 Bush called North Korea part of an “Axis of Evil” in the Union address. 
June 29 
There was a naval skirmish near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the 
West Sea. Six South Koreans and an underdetermined number of North 
Koreas were killed. 2002 
October 
3-4 
When James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang, 
Kang Sok Ju, first vice-minister for foreign affairs acknowledged the 
nuclear program and requested security guarantee. 
                                                 
121 The Republic of Korea Navy, ROK Navy History, 
http://www.navy.mil.kr/english/sub_guide/sub_data.jsp?menu=3 (accessed on June 16, 2009).  
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Table 2.2.   The Roh Moo Hyun Administration (2003–2008)  
2003 February 25 Roh Moo Hyun inaugurated as South Korea’s 16th President and introduced his Peace and Prosperity Policy. 
2004 May 26 and June 3-4 
The first and second general level talks were held to prevent 
another skirmish and reduce tension in the West Sea 
July 4 North Korea test-fired six short- and medium-range missiles and one long-range missile.122  
2006 
October 9 North Korea conducted a nuclear test. 
October  
2-4 
The second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was held. Roh 




The second defense ministerial talks were held to support the 
implementation of the October 4 Declaration. 
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV): THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
REASSURANCE STRATEGY (THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE 
PEACE AND PROSPERITY POLICY) 
1. Coexistence and Security Guarantee 
Question 1: Did Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s 
Peace and Prosperity Policy communicate the South Korean leaders’ 
willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to 
North Korea? 
                                                 
122 According to Steven A. Hildreth, ballistic missiles are classified by range as follows: Short Range 
Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) = 150–799kms; Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) = 800–2,399kms; 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) = 2,400–5,499kms; and Intercontinental Range Ballistic 
Missiles (ICRBMs) = 5,500kms and greater. Refer to “North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States,” CRS Report for Congress, February 24, 2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 
1.  
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a. Acceptance of Coexistence  
The first question regarding the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and 
Prosperity policy is whether the policies communicated willingness to accept coexistence 
with or offer a security guarantee to North Korea. This question is essential to analyze the 
implementation of reassurance strategy and evaluate the success or failure of the 
Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy.  
(1) Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy.  The name of Kim Dae 
Jung’s reassurance strategy is known as the Sunshine Policy. The name came from 
Aesop’s famous fable, “The Wind and the Sun.” 
The Wind and the Sun were disputing which was the stronger. Suddenly 
they saw a traveller coming down the road, and the Sun said: “I see a way 
to decide our dispute. Whichever of us can cause that traveller to take off 
his cloak shall be regarded as the stronger. You begin.” So the Sun retired 
behind a cloud, and the Wind began to blow as hard as it could upon the 
traveller. But the harder he blew the more closely did the traveller wrap 
his cloak round him, till at last the Wind had to give up in despair. Then 
the Sun came out and shone in all his glory upon the traveller, who soon 
found it too hot to walk with his cloak on. Kindness effects [sic] more than 
severity.123  
As in the fable, Kim Dae Jung wanted to persuade North Korea to give up its bellicosity 
and change its attitude toward South Korea and the outside world in order for South 
Korea to achieve reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.  
Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as South Korea’s President on 
February 25, 1998.124 In his inauguration speech, he declared three principles regarding 
North Korea. One of those principles was about the acceptance of coexistence:  
                                                 
123 Aesop, “The Wind and the Sun,” Aesop’s Fables, 
http://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Aesop/Aesops_Fables/The_Wind_and_the_Sun_p1.html (accessed on 
February 17, 2009). 
124 Nicholas D. Kristof, “South Korea’s New President Appeals to North to End Decades of Division,” 
New York Times, February 25, 1998, A8, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/world/south-korea-s-new-
president-appeals-to-north-to-end-decades-of-division.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed on February 17, 
2009).  
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First, he said, in a clear warning not to mistake courtesy for weakness, “we 
will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind.” Second, he sought to 
reassure the North that the South’s policy is not threatening, saying “we 
do not have any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea.” Third, he 
added, “we will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation between 
the South and the North.”125 
Also, he showed his intention of non-aggression and coexistence 
by emphasizing the implementation of the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement126 (see 
Appendix C). The full name of the Basic Agreement is “Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.”127 It 
is composed of four chapters and twenty-five articles. The first two chapters are about 
mutual recognition and nonaggression. For example, Chapter 1, Article 1, states “South 
and the North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.”128 Also, in 
Chapter 2, Article 9, it says, “South and North Korea shall not use force against each 
other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.”129 Kim Dae Jung 
said he wanted to carry the Basic Agreement into practice: 
The path toward resolution of the South-North problem is already open. It 
lies in the enactment of the South-North Basic Agreement, adopted on 
December 13, 1991. The authorities in the South and the North have 
already reached complete agreement on three issues, namely 
reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation, and non-aggression between 
the South and the North.130  
                                                 
125 Kristof, “South Korea’s New President.” 
126 USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center, “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and 
Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea,” 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/korea-agreement.htm (accessed on February 26, 2009) 
and CSIS Working Group Report, “Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Working 
Group Report of the CSIS International Security Program,” 47, 
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/conventionalweapons/CSISConventionalArmsControl.pdf  
(accessed on February 23, 2009). 
127 “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South 
and North Korea.” 
128 USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center, “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and 
Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.” 
129 Ibid.  
130 New York Times, “Words of Kim Dae Jung: Call for Reconciliation,” February 25, 1998, A8, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/world/words-of-kim-dae-jung-call-for-
reconciliation.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed on February 26, 2009).  
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The relations between the two Koreas became better than ever after 
adopting the Basic Agreement.131 However, the Agreement was never put into effect 
because there was neither enough confidence between the two Koreas nor consultation 
between the United States and South Korea. Furthermore, North Korea made an 
announcement of nullification of the Basic Agreement in January 2009. The Committee 
for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in North Korea says, “All of the agreements 
concerning the issue of putting an end to the political and military confrontation between 
the North and South will be nullified. The Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-aggression, 
Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South and the points on the 
military boundary line in the West Sea stipulated in its appendix will be nullified.”132 
The Basic Agreement was “by far the most important document 
adopted by the two sides since the North-South joint statement of July 4, 1972.”133 It 
provided guidelines for a peace treaty, and ultimately for peaceful unification. Don 
Oberdorfer says, “The guidelines of the ‘special interim relationship,’ if implemented, 
would have meant a nearly complete cessation of the conflict on the peninsula and a 
reversal of decades of policy on both sides.”134 He points out four important contents of 
the agreement: 
Mutual recognition of each other’s systems, and an end to interference, 
vilification, and subversion of each other. 
Mutual efforts “to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state 
of peace,” with continued observance of the armistice until this was 
accomplished. 
Nonuse of force against each other, and implementation of confidence-
building measures and large-scale arms reductions. 
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Economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges, free correspondence 
between divided families, and the reopening of roads and railroads that 
had been severed at the North-South dividing line.135  
Therefore, the Basic Agreement was based on the concept of 
coexistence and Kim Dae Jung’s proposal of an exchange of special envoys to carry out 
the Basic Agreement meant that he was willing to recognize North Korea and expressed 
his acceptance of coexistence. In addition, in his inauguration speech, Kim Dae Jung 
proposed a summit meeting. He said, “First of all, I propose an exchange of special 
envoys for carrying out the South-North Basic Agreement. I am ready to agree to a 
summit meeting, if North Korea wants [it].”136  
Two years later, Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang and had a 
summit meeting on June 13-15, 2000. Kim Dae Jung was selected for the 2000 Nobel 
Peace Prize on October 13, 2000. The Nobel Prize committee announced that “Through 
his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae Jung has attempted to overcome more than fifty years of 
war and hostility between North and South Korea. His visit to North Korea gave impetus 
to a process which has reduced tension between the two countries. There may now be 
hope that the cold war will also come to an end in Korea.”137 When Kim Dae Jung 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on December 10, 2000, he explained the 
intentions of his Sunshine Policy:  
To replace the dangerous stand-off with peace and cooperation, I 
proclaimed my Sunshine Policy upon becoming President in February 
1998, and have consistently promoted its message of reconciliation with 
the North: first, we will never accept unification through communization; 
second, nor would we attempt to achieve unification by absorbing the 
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and cooperation. Unification, I believe, can wait until such a time when 
both sides feel comfortable enough in becoming one again, no matter how 
long it takes.138 
Consequently, Kim Dae Jung communicated two messages: “that 
his administration’s goals would be peaceful coexistence, not unification; and that its 
policies would seek to reassure the North Korean regime of, not undermine confidence in, 
South Korea’s good intentions.” 139  The Sunshine policy is based on the concept of 
coexistence. 
(2) Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy.  The 
succeeding Roh Moo Hyun administration continued to follow a policy similar to the 
Sunshine Policy and emphasized the concept of coexistence. Roh Moo Hyun renamed the 
reassurance policy as the Peace and Prosperity Policy and focused more on economic 
cooperation. One month after the 2003 presidential election, Chung Dong Young, an 
advisor to Roh Moo Hyun explained the grand vision of the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration. He said: 
If North Korea responds to the outside world and abandons its nuclear 
program, South Korea will reward them beyond their expectations. We 
don’t know how long it will take to reunify the two Koreas so our priority 
is peaceful coexistence. Mr. Roh’s grand vision is to make North and 
South Korea into a single economic community.140  
Chung also added that “The Sunshine policy has been successful in reducing hostility 
between North and South Korea. However, it was less effective in changing the North 
Korean system. The new government will strive to induce North Korea to reform, open 
up and come out of isolation.”141 
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Roh Moo Hyun introduced his Peace and Prosperity Policy in his 
inauguration speech on February 25, 2003: 
I have several principles that I plan to adhere to in pushing the “policy for 
peace and prosperity” on the Korean peninsula:  
First, I will try to resolve all pending issues through dialogue.  
Second, I will give priority to building mutual trust and upholding 
reciprocity.  
Third, I will seek active international co-operation on the premise that 
South and North Korea are the two main actors in inter-Korean relations.  
And fourth, I will enhance transparency, expand citizen participation, and 
secure bipartisan support.  
I will implement my policy for peace and prosperity with the support of 
the general public.142 
His principles state that he recognized North Korea as a counterpart of dialogue and trust 
building based on the concept of coexistence.  
b. Difficulty of Offering Security Guarantee 
Even though Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun expressed their intentions 
of non-aggression, security guarantees could not be offered to North Korea. At that time, 
the United States played an important role in security matters on the Korean peninsula 
and North Korea considered that a security guarantee from the Unites States was 
necessary. The Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed by the Commander-in-
Chief of the United Nations Command and the Supreme Commander of the Korean 
People’s Army, along with the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on 27 
July 1953.143 South Korea was not a signatory. South Korean President Syngman Rhee 
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wanted to keep the war going in order to unify the peninsula. Rhee found the prospect of 
a divided Korea unacceptable. 144 Therefore, South Korea did not sign the Armistice 
Agreement. Presently, the United States and South Korea want a peace treaty limited to 
North Korea and South Korea, but this is an untenable position because South Korea did 
not sign the Armistice in 1953.145 A non-aggression agreement between South Korea and 
North Korea was not enough to provide a security guarantee to North Korea. This shows 
that alliance politics is one of intervening variables which influence the outcome of the 
reassurance strategy. The process of how the Basic Agreement became a dead document 
confirms the difficulty of offering a security guarantee by South Korea only.  
Contrary to the optimistic Basic Agreement, there was an unexpected 
announcement that influenced its implementation. In October 1992, the defense ministers 
of the U.S. and South Korea made a statement about a renewal of the “Team Spirit” 
exercise, “which was deemed important for readiness as well as a potent pressure point 
against the North.”146 It was an explosive announcement because “the 1992 exercise had 
been canceled in the period of mutual accommodation that led to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Yongbyon”147, the main nuclear site in 
North Korea. It was very surprising that the interagency policy committee in Washington 
had neither been informed nor consulted before the decision was made at the defense 
ministers’ annual meeting.148 Oberdorfer explained the situation with a quotation from 
the U.S. ambassador to Seoul, “To Korea experts in Washington and to Donald Gregg, 
U.S. ambassador to Seoul, it was an unpleasant bolt from the blue—he later called it ‘one 
of the biggest mistakes’ of Korea policy on his watch.”149 North Korea described the 
announcement to resume the Team Spirit exercise as “a criminal act” and cancelled all 
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North-South contacts except for the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.150 This incident 
shows how important the influence of the U.S. is in the progress of negotiation with 
North Korea.  
After Kim Dae Jung became a president, the Clinton administration 
supported the Sunshine Policy and considered normalization with North Korea in late 
October 2000. However, there was not enough time to develop the relationship between 
the United States under the Clinton administration and North Korea. In January 2001, 
George W. Bush took office and the Sunshine Policy was not supported as much as it had 
been by the Clinton administration. From North Korea’s perspective, the United States 
was its main threat. North Korea requested security assurance and a bilateral peace treaty 
with the United States as a precondition of no nuclear weapons development. North Korea 
felt threatened by the United States, especially since the end of the Cold War and the “Axis 
of Evil” statement in the president Bush’s State of the Union address in 2002. North Korea 
considered regime survival as a primary goal of its nuclear strategy based on its perception 
that the United States maintained the hard-line policy toward North Korea.  
North Korean leaders repeatedly stated that they are willing to restrict 
their nuclear program if the United States guarantees the country’s security. When James 
Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang in October 2002, Kang Sok Ju, 
first vice-minister for foreign affairs acknowledged the nuclear program and requested 
security assurances. Kang said, “If the U.S. recognized North Korea’s system of 
government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere 
in his country’s economic development, Pyongyang would seriously discuss U.S. 
concerns about the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) programme.”151  
Two weeks after North Korea’s admission about having an HEU program 
in October 2002, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that the United 
States’ hostile policy was the cause of their nuclear program and requested a non-
aggression treaty between North Korea and the United States: 
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As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it 
cropped up as the U.S. has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South 
Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with 
those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hostile policy toward it 
in accordance with the strategy for world supremacy…. If the U.S. legally 
assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear 
weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK will be ready to 
clear the former of its security concerns.152 
Based on North Korea’s request for the security guarantee, regime 
survival seems to be the primary motive for the nuclear program. Even though there had 
been this kind of difficulty to offer a security guarantee, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 
Hyun continuously expressed the intention of non-aggression and tried to persuade the 
United States to support the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy.  
In sum, the first answer to the question of whether Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy communicate South 
Korea’s willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to North 
Korea is “yes.” However, the concept of coexistence was related to the security guarantee 
issue and there was a limitation on South Korea’s ability to offer a security guarantee to 
North Korea because the United States, as a main actor, did not want to provide a security 
guarantee.  
2. The Incentive for Use of Reassurance Strategy 
Question 2: What was the incentive for Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo 
Hyun’s use of a reassurance strategy?  
The biggest incentive for use of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy was the expected high cost of unification by the collapse and absorption of North 
Korea. South Korea learned from the lessons of German unification that the costs of 
Korean unification would be extremely high and South Korea would need to pay greatly 
for it. The costs of Korean unification are not clear because estimates vary widely 
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depending on the conditions. However, it is clear that the costs of Korean unification 
would be very high under any conditions. Shin Gi Wook and Kristin Burke explain the 
inspiration of the Sunshine Policy:  
A turning point in South Korea’s policy toward the North occurred with 
Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.” South Korea in the 1990s was 
increasingly concerned about the prospect of heavy financial burdens if a 
hasty reunification occurred, having seen the “costly” unification process 
of Germany. The Sunshine Policy was inspired by this new thinking.153 
The expected high costs of Korean unification and the possibility of North 
Korea’s collapse were considered when implementing the Sunshine Policy.  
a. Estimates of Capital Cost of Korean Unification  
In the 1990s, many scholars estimated the capital cost of Korean 
unification and the South Korean government considered their research. Selig S. Harrison 
said, “Estimates of the cost of reunification range from $182.7 billion to $2 trillion 
depending on assumptions concerning such factors as the timing of reunification, how 
reunification costs are defined, the level of development in the North and South at the 
time of integration, and development priorities in the North after reunification.” 154 
Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Liu estimated the cost of unification 
range from $600 billion to $3 trillion between 1990 and 2000.155 Charles Wolf, Jr., and 
Kamil Akramov predicted the range of the costs of Korean unification from about $50 
billion to $670 billion in 2003 U.S. dollars based on their simulation model of a targeted 
doubling of North Korea’s GDP in four years.156 
                                                 
153 Shin Gi Wook and Kristin C. Burke, “North Korea and Identity Politics in South Korea,” The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2008): 289.  
154 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 97.  
155 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Liu, “The Costs and Benefits of Korean 
Unification: Alternate Scenarios,” Asian Survey 38, no. 8. (August 1998): 801–803. 
156 Charles Wolf, Jr. and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and 
Consequences of Korean Unification (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), 39. 
 66
b. Other Possible Cost Elements 
It is necessary to consider other possible cost elements for Korean 
unification. Most of the studies on the costs of Korean unification have focused on the 
capital costs because that assumption is necessary for simulation or prediction. However, 
there are definitely other possible costs for Korean unification such as social, cultural, 
educational, and psychological costs. Those elements will make the costs of Korean 
unification even higher. Wolf and Akramov observed, “Most of the studies focus 
primarily on the capital costs of reunification, as does our own analysis, and do not 
encompass humanitarian, social, and psychological costs as well as other possible cost 
elements.”157 Noland pointed out that estimated costs of Korean unification should be 
doubled to include the cost of “social-economic adjustment.”158  
Choi Young Back argued that there would be huge additional costs during 
Korean unification saying: 
The costs of developing the North would be staggering—a great burden if 
the South alone is to bankroll it. Broadly, costs are the following kinds: 
costs of restructuring and privatization uneconomic state enterprises, costs 
of building up infrastructure, costs of cleaning up environmental 
degradation, costs of assuming the North Korean external debts (largely to 
Russia, China, and Japan), and costs of providing welfare for the North 
Koreans during transition.159  
Consequently, not only the capital costs of Korean unification but also 
other elements would raise the total costs of Korean unification.  
c. Possibility of Collapse 
The economic gap between the two Koreas is dramatic. North Korea’s 
economy is a total failure. There is the possibility of the collapse of North Korea due to 
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the horrible economic conditions. One goal of economic engagement for South Korea is 
to prevent North Korea from collapsing suddenly. West Germany’s absorption of East 
Germany after its collapse showed that it was a very expensive process. Some scholars 
have estimated the costs of Korean unification by comparing them with German 
unification. Most of them think Korean unification would be more costly. For example, 
according to William W. Lewis, Korean unification would be much harder than German 
unification because: 
North Korea’s GDP per capita is only 5 percent of that of the South, yet its 
population is about half. The corresponding ratios for East Germany were 
50 percent of West Germany’s GDP per capita and only 25 percent of the 
population. The difficulties of German unification look like a piece of 
cake next to the difficulties of Korean unification.160 
Therefore, South Korea prefers gradual unification rather than rapid 
absorption after a North Korean collapse. However, there is the possibility of collapse 
and it would be much more expensive without preparation. Harrison says, “The general 
expectation in the South is still that its overwhelming economic superiority makes 
eventual absorption inevitable.”161 In order to cushion the economically difficult impact 
of reunification, especially in the case of the collapse of North Korea, the Sunshine 
Policy was considered by South Korea. 
3. The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy 
Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did South Korea offer to 
North Korea during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
administrations?  
South Korea implemented reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment 
and limited security regimes. As an irrevocable recognition of the North’s sovereignty, 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun visited Pyongyang and showed their intentions to  
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reduce tension through dialogue. Also, South Korea proposed measures to reduce 
tensions through limited security regimes such as inter-Korean defense ministerial talks, 
general-level talks and working-level talks  
a. Reassurance Through Irrevocable Commitment: Inter-Korean 
Summit Meetings and Joint Declarations 
(1) Kim Dae Jung’s Visit to Pyongyang and the First Inter-
Korean Summit Meeting in 2000.  Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang on June 13, 2000. It 
was the first visit by a South Korean president since the Korean War. This first inter-
Korean summit meeting showed that President Kim had no intention of using military 
force for unification. His visit was an expression of the sincere desire of Kim Dae Jung 
for reconciliation and peaceful unification. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il presented the 
2000 Joint Declaration on June 15, 2000 (see Appendix D). 
Above all, Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang is an example of 
reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment. When leaders consider the status 
quo unacceptable, they can try a strategy of irrevocable commitment to “persuade their 
adversary to enter into serious negotiations to reduce the costs of the status quo.”162 
Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 is a typical example of a 
strategy of irrevocable commitment. Once he had publicly recognized Israel’s existence 
with this highly symbolic step, the action could not be undone.  
Similar to Sadat’s irreversible initiative to visit Jerusalem, Kim 
Dae Jung’s action was also irreversible. The first visit of a South Korean president to 
Pyongyang was a historic event and it was treated as a sincere effort to show his 
intentions to reduce tensions and have negotiations with North Korea. Also, both leaders 
shared a common aversion to war and there were some conditions for the initiation of 
negotiations such as “hurting stalemate” and “sense of a way out.163 However, compared 
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to Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang has some differences. 
The substantial political cost to President Kim Dae Jung’s direct contact with North 
Korea was not apparent to North Korean leaders, while Israeli leaders and the republic 
clearly recognized the great political risk Sadat was taking.  
Also, even though Kim Dae Jung’s arrival in Pyongyang provided 
an opportunity to change views about South Korea among North Korea’s leadership and 
public, their beliefs were not shaken that much. Furthermore, Kim Dae Jung did not have 
a chance to speak directly to North Korea’s public which is tightly controlled by North 
Korean government. Consequently, even though Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang was 
an irrevocable commitment, it did not have the same impact as Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.  
However, the inter-Korean summit meeting provided both leaders 
with the opportunities to recognize their misperceptions and stereotyping of their 
adversary’s judgments and to reassure their adversary of their benign intentions.164 When 
Kim Dae Jung accepted the Nobel peace prize, he described his experience during the 
2000 summit meeting and explained the result of his efforts:  
At first, North Korea resisted, suspecting that the sunshine policy was a 
deceitful plot to bring it down. But our genuine intent and consistency, 
together with the broad support for the sunshine policy from around the 
world, including its moral leaders such as Norway, convinced North Korea 
that it should respond in kind. Thus, the South-North summit could be 
held. 
I had expected the talks with the North Korean leader to be extremely 
tough, and they were. However, starting from the shared desire to promote 
the safety, reconciliation and cooperation of our people, the Chairman and 
I were able to obtain some important agreements.  
First, we agreed that unification must be achieved independently and 
peacefully, that unification should not be hurried along and for now the 
two sides should work together to expand peaceful exchanges and 
cooperation and build peaceful coexistence.  
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Second, we succeeded in bridging the unification formulas of the two 
sides, which had remained widely divergent. By proposing a “loose form 
of federation” this time, North Korea has come closer to our call for a 
confederation of “one people, two systems, two independent 
governments” as the pre-unification stage. For the first time in the half-
century division, the two sides have found a point of convergence on 
which the process toward unification can be drawn out.  
Third, the two sides concurred that the U.S. military presence on the 
Korean peninsula should continue for stability on the peninsula and 
Northeast Asia.165  
The U.S. military presence has been the hottest topic among 
security issues on the Korean peninsula. The summit meeting gave an opportunity to 
discuss it. North Korea has requested the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Korean 
peninsula since the end of the Korean War. Kim Jong Il gave his frank perspective on the 
role of the U.S. forces in South Korea. Kim Dae Jung explains his discussion with Kim 
Jong Il about this issue:  
During the past 50 years, North Korea had made the withdrawal of the U.S. 
troops from the Korean peninsula its primary point of contention. I said to 
Chairman Kim: “The Korean peninsula is surrounded by the four powers 
of the United States, Japan, China and Russia. Given the unique 
geopolitical location not to be found in any other time or place, the 
continued U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula is indispensable 
to our security and peace, not just for now but even after unification.  
Look at Europe. NATO had been created and American troops stationed in 
Europe so as to deter the Soviet Union and the East European bloc. But, 
now, after the fall of the communist bloc, NATO and U.S. troops are still 
there in Europe, because they continue to be needed for peace and stability 
in Europe.” To this explanation of mine, Chairman Kim, to my surprise, 
had a very positive response. It was a bold switch from North Korea’s 
long-standing demand, and a very significant move for peace on the 
Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.166 
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In sum, Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang and the 2000 Joint Declaration was an 
example of reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment.  
(2) Roh Moo Hyun’s Visit to Pyongyang and the Second Inter-
Korean Summit Meeting in 2007.  The second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was 
held on October 2–4, 2007.167 Roh Moo Hyun travelled by car instead of airplane and 
stepped out of his vehicle to walk across the border. He said, “Our people have suffered 
from too many hardships, and development has been held up due to this wall. This line 
will be gradually erased and the wall will fall.”168 It was a very symbolic gesture, to step 
across a yellow strip to visit Pyongyang. Compared to the first summit meeting, the 
second summit meeting was an opportunity for more substantial and practical dialogues. 
Military and economic issues were the main agenda. Compared to the 2000 Joint 
Declaration, the October 4 Declaration 169  includes more specific agreements to 
implement military and economic items (see Appendix E).  
For example, the October 4 Declaration includes an agreement to 
hold defense ministerial talks and designate a joint fishing area to avoid clashes in the 
West Sea.170 Furthermore, the two Koreas agreed on several infrastructure plans to help 
economic cooperation: a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea” 
encompassing Haeju, the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, 
freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong, repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju 
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railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.171 All these specific 
agreements are commitments that the two Koreas need to carry into practice for success.   
b.  Reassurance Through Limited Security Regimes: Inter-Korean 
Military Talks  
Limited security regimes are agreements of principles or procedures 
between adversaries to “reduce the likelihood of an unintended and unwanted war.”172 
Many dialogues between the two Koreas started right after the 2000 Joint Declaration. 
During the Kim Dae Jung administration, between February 1998 and February 2003, 
there was one inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting and fifteen rounds of the inter-
Korean military working level talks. Also, during the Roh Moo Hyun administration, 
between February 2003 and February 2008, there were other inter-Korean defense 
ministerial meetings, twenty-one rounds of the inter-Korean military working-level talks, 
and seven rounds of the inter-Korean general-level talks. All these inter-Korean military 
talks are examples of reassurance through limited security regimes (see Appendix F). 
(1) Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks.  Most significantly, 
an inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting was held for the first time ever between the 
two Koreas on Cheju Island, South Korea, on September 25–26, 2000, “to provide a 
military assurance for the implementation of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration 
adopted during the historic Inter-Korean Summit.”173 After the talks, a delegation of five, 
headed by Minister of Defense Cho Seong Tae of South Korea and a delegation of five, 
headed by the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Kim Il Chol of North Korea, made 
joint press statements (see Appendix G).  
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The main agreements were to support the implementation of the 
2000 Joint Declaration militarily. For example, they agreed to “actively cooperate with 
each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation 
between civilians…allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and materials into their 
respective sections of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the construction of a railway 
and a road that connects the South and the North…[and] handle the problem of opening 
the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the areas around the 
railway and the road that connect the South and the North on the basis of the armistice 
treaty.”174 
Also, in the second defense ministerial talks, on November 27–29, 
2007, the two Koreas agreed to support the implementation of the October 4 Declaration 
militarily. The two Koreas agreed to guarantee military security “for the inter-Korean 
freight train service between the South’s Munsan and the North’s Bongdong, the direct 
maritime route to the North’s port at Haeju, joint use of the Hangang estuary, and 
nonstop flight service for tourists between Seoul and the North’s mountain resort at 
Baedusan.”175 These agreements during defense ministerial talks were more economic 
than military in nature. However, the behavior of the military was constrained by some of 
the steps agreed to as a result of the economic engagement. For example, opening the 
Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) puts a tremendous 
burden on the military from a security perspective. Not only opening the railway or 
highway across the DMZ but also opening the maritime route and flight route can be 
onerous to the military.  
It is more difficult to make limited security regimes than economic 
regimes because the defection of an adversary from a regime is more dangerous when the 
issue is related to security than the economy.176 Europe is a successful example of how a 
                                                 
174 Inter-Korean Document, “Joint Press Statement.” 
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176 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 50. 
 74
more economic relationship led to formation of an international organization. European 
leaders, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Jean Monnet, and Robert Shuman believed 
that economic interdependence would lead to peace. 177  Two new institutions—the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC)—were formulated for the purpose of peace and stability 
rather than economic development.178 However, ECSC and OEEC are not security regimes 
but economic institutions. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun expected similar progress 
between the two Koreas. Inter-Korean defense ministerial talks were held based on the 
similar anticipation. Therefore, even though they also agreed to set up a joint military 
committee and discuss the Northern Limit Line (NLL) issue again within the committee 
to avoid accidental clashes,179 the main agreements were related to economic issues.  
Consequently, the first and second inter-Korean defense ministerial 
talks provided opportunities for the two Koreas to discuss how take steps for building 
mutual trust and guaranteeing military security. They focused on how to support the 
implementation of both the 2000 and 2007 Joint Declarations.   
(2) General-Level Talks and Working-Level Talks: Tension 
Reduction Plan over the NLL and the MDL.  The most sensitive military issue on the 
Korean peninsula is the western sea borderline, in other words, the NLL. According to 
the explanation of the Ministry of Defense, the Republic of Korea, the NLL is “a line the 
United Nations Command (UNC) commander established in August 1953 to restrict 
patrol activities of the ROK Air Force in conjunction with the purpose of reducing the 
possibility of an occurrence of and preventing accidental armed clashes between the 
South and the North. The NLL was established on the criteria of the prolonged line of the 
                                                 




Military Demarcation Line (MDL) 180  toward the East Sea and an intermediate line 
between five islands in the northwest and North Korean area toward the West Sea.”181 
The sea border was not clearly delineated at the end of the Korean War and North Korea 
refuses to recognize the NLL drawn by the U.S.-led UN command.182 The NLL has been 
the de facto maritime border in the West Sea. However, North Korea neither accepted its 
validity nor agreed with South Korea and the UNC and they often violated the NLL.183  
The number of violations has increased since the economic 
difficulty in the 1990s and there have been two skirmishes in the West Sea between 
South Korea and North Korea. First, on June 14, 1999, there was an exchange of gunfire 
in the West Sea and one North Korean patrol boat was sunk and another one was badly 
damaged by South Korean warships.184 Second, on June 29, 2002, there was a naval 
skirmish near the NLL in the West Sea. There were scores of casualties on both sides; six 
South Koreans died and eighteen were injured.185  
To prevent another skirmish and reduce tension in the West Sea, 
there were the first and second general level talks in May and June 2004. A tension 
reduction plan over the MDL was also discussed because the NLL is an extension of the 
MDL. The two Koreas took a small first step to mitigate military tension around the NLL 
and the MDL by adopting the “Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes 
in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities, the Elimination of 
                                                 
180 The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, 2006 Defense White Paper, 129, 
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184 Korea Times, “Two North Korean Navy Boats Sunk,” June 15, 1999, http://times.hankooki.com 
(accessed on April 4, 2009). 
185 Jung, Sung Ki, “S. Korea Marks 4th Anniversary of Bloody Naval Clash,” Korea Times, June 28, 
2006, http://times.hankooki.com (accessed on February 26, 2009). 
 76
Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas.”186 The two sides agreed 
on measures to prevent accidental skirmishes: “(1) use/communication of an international 
common network for commercial vessels; (2) establishment/use of visual signal (signal 
lights and flags) provisions; (3) intelligence sharing regarding illicit fishing boats of a 
third country; and (4) installation of a communication liaison office in the West Sea.”187 
With regard to the suspension of propaganda activities and the elimination of propaganda 
means, the Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, says “Owing to this 
agreement, the Inter-Korean propaganda war activities which used to be labeled as war 
without bullets were suspended and there [sic] means were eliminated, resulting in 
making an opportunity to support the ROK government reconciliation and cooperation 
policy.”188  
In March 2006, South Korea made proposals to prevent maritime 
clashes in the West Sea and establish a joint fishing area through the third round of the 
general level military talks.189 South Korea also expressed its intension to discuss the 
NLL issue in the inter-Korean defense ministerial talks based on two principles: “(1) 
Respect/Observe the NLL as agreed in the Basic Agreement and (2) Comprehensive 
implementation as for agreed items of military area in the Basic Agreement.”190  
After the announcement of second summit meeting between the 
two Koreas in August 2007, there were arguments about whether the NLL should be 
discussed or not during the summit meeting. South Korea previously had a firm position 
that the NLL is not a negotiable issue, but there were some changes in the South Korean 
government. Unification Minister Lee Jae Joung said in a National Assembly session, “I 
don’t think that the NLL is basically a territorial concept, but a security concept to 
                                                 
186 The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, 2006 Defense White Paper, 130. 
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prevent military clashes.”191 Then, the NLL issue was also discussed during the military 
talks that followed the summit meeting. However, the NLL problem could not be solved 
and tensions always exist in the Western Sea.  
Consequently, even though inter-Korean military talks have not 
achieved significant results, the number of inter-Korean military talks during the Kim 
Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations increased significantly, and those talks 
provided opportunities for the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations to 
make proposals to and discuss with North Korea to reduce tensions and avoid 
unnecessary military clashes. The two Korean military sides tried to support the 
implementation of the 2000 and 2007 Joint Declarations made during the two summit 
meetings from the military perspective. In sum, the inter-Korean military talks played 
important roles in implementing the reassurance strategy through limited security regimes. 
C. CONDITION VARIABLES (CV): CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS 
BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA AND NORTH 
KOREA’S MOTIVATING FACTORS  
1. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations Between 
South Korea and North Korea 
Before exploring the causal mechanisms between Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 
Hyun’s reassurance strategies and their outcomes, it is necessary to explore the 
circumstances and relationships between South Korea and North Korea. This research 
takes an eclectic approach by combining realism, liberalism, and constructivism in order 
to investigate how the circumstances and relationships affect the intervening variables 
(leader’s perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending state and 
the receiving state) between the implementation of reassurance strategy, such as the 
Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy and their outcomes.  
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Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between South 
Korea and North Korea over the time period when Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy were 
attempted? 
a. Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach): Unfavorable to 
North Korea 
Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the 
“balance of power” between the two Koreas? Was it changing 
and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence the balance of 
power affected the calculations of either South Korea or North 
Korea? 
(1) Balance of Power between the Two Koreas: Comparison of 
Gross National Product (GNP).  To explore the balance of power between the two Koreas, 
Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural realism needs to be considered. Waltz tried to bring more 
conceptual clarity to the meaning of power and suggested capability rather than power. 
He says that capabilities can be ranked depending on the scores of several items: “size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence.” 192  Also, he recognizes that states have different 
combinations of capabilities which are difficult to measure and compare, and that the 
wrong answers can be reached.193  
With regard to material capabilities, mainly two measures have 
been used: gross national product (GNP) and the index of the Correlates of War (COW) 
project. In this dissertation, GNP is used to compare the power of South Korea and North 
Korea because the COW cannot measure the differences in industrialization and 
technological advances. John R. Oneal compared GNP and COW of the United States 
and the Soviet Union after 1971 and concluded that GNP is more valid because “the 
COW index no longer accurately measures industrialization and technological 
                                                 
192 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 131. 
193 Ibid. 
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sophistication for the economically advanced countries.”194 Technological gaps between 
South Korea and North Korea are difficult to measure to compare capabilities.  
There are two ways to compare GNP195: GNP at current prices in 
millions of U.S. dollars and per capita in U.S. dollars. Both show that the balance of 
power became favorable to South Korea. First, GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. 
dollars shows that the GNP of South Korea in 1998 was 33 times bigger than that of 
North Korea and the gap was getting bigger. By 2007, the GNP of South Korea was 65 
times bigger. The average GNP ratio of South Korea versus North Korea between 1998 
and 2007 was almost 52. Power cannot be measured accurately by these numbers, but it 
shows that the balance of power has been leaning toward South Korea. GNP at current 
prices in U.S. dollars can be summarized as in Figure 2.3:  
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Figure 2.3. GNP at Current Prices in U.S. Dollars196 
Second, per capita GNP in U.S. dollars show the same results. As 
shown in Table 2.3, South Korea’s per capita GNP between 1998 and 2007 was much 
greater than that of North Korea. It was an average of 26 times bigger. Also, it became 
more favorable to South Korea, growing from 16 times bigger in 1998 to 32 times in 
2007.  
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Table 2.3.   Per Capita GNP in U.S. Dollars197 
Year  S. Korea (U.S. $)  N. Korea (U.S. $)  S. Korea / N. Korea 
1998 7,364 455 16.18 
1999 9,472 451 21.00 
2000 10,890 461 23.62 
2001 10,225 475 21.53 
2002 11,581 467 24.80 
2003 12,819 470 27.27 
2004 14,304 472 30.31 
2005 16,508 548 30.12 
2006 18,481 577 32.03 
2007 19,840 617 32.16 
   Avg. 25.90  
Even though GNP showed that the balance of power was 
unfavorable to North Korea between 1998 and 2007, North Korean military forces still 
posed a serious threat to South Korea. Comparison of GNP does not provide a complete 
picture of the security situation between the two Koreas. The existing military capability 
(or “power”) still matters. The Military Balance198 and The SIPRI Yearbook199 estimate 
elements of force structure such as the numbers and size of units, their equipment, 
military expenditures and so on. Also, The Defense White Paper of South Korea makes a 
comparative quantitative assessment of the two Koreas. 200  Based on quantitative 
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comparison of the force structures available from these sources, it is clear that North 
Korea has considerable military capability to threaten South Korea.  
For example, compared to South Korea’s approximately 680,000 
troops, North Korea had about 1.1 million between 1998 and 2007. 201  In terms of 
numbers, North Korea’s Army units such as corps, divisions, and brigades were two or 
three times as many as South Korea’s. In 2006, whereas South Korea had 12 army corps 
including special warfare command and 50 divisions, North Korea had 19 corps and 75 
divisions.202 North Korea had also more military equipment in its Army, Navy, and Air 
Force in terms of quantitative assessments.  
However, this quantitative comparison will overestimate the gap 
between South Korea and North Korea because qualitative factors would favor the South. 
As Stephen Biddle argues, material factors alone cannot explain military capability.203 
There are more factors to consider other than force structure to understand military 
capability. Military capability has four major components: “force structure, 
modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability.”204 From the qualitative comparisons 
considering modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability, it appears that North 
Korea’s military capability became more unfavorable between 1998 and 2007.  
First, North Korea could not modernize its weapon systems and 
equipment because of the decline of its economy between 1998 and 2007. As shown in 
Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3, North Korea’s GNP did not increase much. According to The 
Military Balance, The SIPRI Year Book, and The Defense White Paper, there was not 
significant modernization of any military equipment or weapon systems of North Korea 
except the development of strategic weapons. Second, the training of military personnel 
was constrained by a lack of economic resources. For example, North Korean pilots had 
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about 20 or less flying hours per year because of fuel shortages.205 South Korean pilots 
had more than 100 hours per year. Third, most of North Korea’s military assets have 
exceeded their life span and they definitely have maintenance and support problems. 
North Korea still has T-34/T-54/T-55, MiG-15/17/19s, and so on. Some of them were 
used during the Korean War. However, South Korea has consistently ungraded its 
military equipment and purchased newer weapons. All these factors change the mere 
quantitative comparison of force structure. The combination of quantitative and 
qualitative assessments of military capability of the two Koreas suggests that the balance 
became unfavorable for North Korea between 1998 and 2007.  
Therefore, the answer for the question of what the “balance of 
power” between the two Koreas was that South Korea was in a better position than North 
Korea in terms of balance of power. Also, it became more favorable to South Korea 
between 1998 and 2007.  
(2) The Impact of Unfavorable Balance of Power to North 
Korea on Its Calculations.  The unfavorable balance of power to North Korea affected the 
calculations of North Korea. The evidence is North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 
Even though there are many arguments about North Korea’s capability, it is clear that 
North Korean leaders felt the necessity of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence and 
substitution for conventional forces to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power. 
The problem with maintaining conventional forces is cost. Nuclear deterrence was used 
as the only way to reduce costs. According to North Korea’s news service, the Korea 
Central News Agency (KCNA), “The intention to build up a nuclear deterrent is not 
aimed to threaten and blackmail others but to reduce conventional weapons…to channel 
manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the betterment of people’s 
living.”206  
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Because of the expense to expand the army, North Korea might 
have intended to substitute nuclear for conventional power. Victor Cha said, “they fear 
the growing disparity in the balance of forces on the peninsula in favor of the U.S. and 
South Korea.”207 North Korea appears to have opted to purchase a nuclear deterrence 
capability after the end of the Cold War and the loss of its Soviet ally.208 North Korea 
leaders would have thought nuclear weapons posed a firm deterrent measure with low 
cost in the 1990s. The threat posed by North Korea in the 1980s diminished after the end 
of the Cold War because North Korea’s military capabilities deteriorated as “a result of 
severe resource constraints.”209 A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) study on North 
Korean conventional warfighting capabilities concluded, “North Korea’s capability to 
successfully conduct complex, multiechelon, large-scale operations to reunify the Korean 
peninsula declined in the 1990s. This was, in large measure, the result of severe resource 
constraints, including widespread food and energy shortages.”210  
Since the end of the Cold War, North Korean leaders have not 
considered that its conventional warfighting capabilities are strong enough to deter the 
United States and South Korea. During the Gulf War in 1991, North Korea was stunned 
by the use of the superior conventional weapons of the United States. North Korea’s 
weaponry was very similar to that of Iraq at the time. Lacking military and economic 
assistance from the Soviet Union and China, North Korea could not modernize its 
conventional forces. Several scholars support the idea that North Korea uses its nuclear 
program to neutralize its deteriorated military capability. John Pike, a defense analyst at 
GlobalSecurity.org, argued that the North Korean army is not the main threat, “As long 
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as the war was conventional, I don’t think North Korea would do much better than Iraq 
did.”211 Harrison summarizes North Korea’s change: 
Pyongyang has responded with nuclear and missile programs designed 
both to deter any United States use of nuclear weapons in Korea and to 
neutralize the superiority of South Korean airpower over its aging Mig 
[sic] force. Unless the United States joins in a denuclearization of Korea 
and in arms-control agreements that reduce or remove the threat of a 
preemptive strike by United States aircraft, North Korea is unlikely to 
foreclose the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities.212 
North Korea has felt the unfavorable balance of power, especially 
the disparity in conventional forces and its economic constraints. Therefore, it has 
focused on its nuclear program since the 1990s. The adverse change in the balance of 
power has made North Korea more interested in receiving reassurance, but also more 
reluctant to give up its nuclear program. This made it harder for reassurance to succeed.  
b. Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach): Low 
Interdependence 
Question 4-b (From the Liberal Approach): What was the level 
of “interdependence” between the two Koreas? Was it changing 
and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that 
interdependence affected the calculations of either South Korea 
or North Korea?  
Katherine Barbieri’s, and Bruce Russett’s and John Oneal’s approaches 
have been frequently used to measure economic interdependence between two countries. 
Both approaches are considered. They show that there was very low interdependence 
between South Korea and North Korea. Therefore, it did not affect the calculations of 
either South Korea or North Korea.  
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(1) Barbieri’s Model.213  There are four equations to calculate 
economic interdependence in Barbieri’s model.   
(1)  Trade Share i   = Dyadic Trade ij / Total Trade i  
(2)  Salience ij   =  Trade share i *  Trade share j  
(3)  Trade symmetry ij  = 1 -  | Trade share i – Trade share j | 
(4)  Interdependence ij  = Salience ij * Symmetry ij  
As shown in Table 2.4, the trade share of North Korea in South 
Korea is very low. The average trade share of North Korea in South Korea between 1998 
and 2007 is 0.17%. In Table 2.5, the trade share of South Korea in North Korea reached 
35% of North Korea’s total trade in 2007. In Table 2.6, the economic interdependence is 
extremely low, even though the values had increased between 1999 and 2007. The 
average economic interdependence between 1999 and 2007 is only 1.5%.  
Table 2.4.   Trade share of North Korea in South Korea214   
Year Trade b/t SK & NK (millions of U.S. $) 
Total Trade of SK 
(millions of U.S. $) Trade Share of NK in SK 
1998 222 225,600 0.00098  
1999 334 263,400 0.00127  
2000 425 332,700 0.00128  
2001 403 291,500 0.00138  
2002 642 314,600 0.00204  
2003 724 372,600 0.00194  
2004 697 478,300 0.00146  
2005 1,055 545,600 0.00193  
2006 1,350 634,900 0.00213  
2007 1,797 728,300 0.00247  
   Avg.    0.00169 
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Table 2.5.   Trade share of South Korea in North Korea215   
Year Trade b/t SK & NK (millions of U.S. $) 
Total Trade of NK 
(millions of U.S. $) Trade Share of SK in NK 
1998 222   
1999 334 2,383 0.14016  
2000 425 3,166 0.13424  
2001 403 4,231 0.09525  
2002 642 3,248 0.19766  
2003 724 3,300 0.21939  
2004 697 4,139 0.16840  
2005 1,055 4,776 0.22090  
2006 1,350 5,010 0.26946  
2007 1,797 5,096 0.35263  
   Avg.    0.19979 
Table 2.6.   Trade salience, symmetry, and economic interdependence between South 
Korea and North Korea   
Year Trade salience Trade symmetry Economic Interdependence 
1998    
1999 0.01333  0.86111  0.01148  
2000 0.01310  0.86704  0.01135  
2001 0.01148  0.90613  0.01040  
2002 0.02008  0.80438  0.01616  
2003 0.02065  0.78255  0.01616  
2004 0.01567  0.83306  0.01305  
2005 0.02067  0.78104  0.01614  
2006 0.02394  0.73267  0.01754  
2007 0.02950  0.64984  0.01917  
Avg. 0.01836  0.80190  0.01473  
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(2) Russett and Oneal’s Method.216  Russett and Oneal used 
the ratio of trade to gross domestic product (GDP) based on Purchase Power Parities 
(PPP).217 
(1) Trade dependence ij = (Import ij + export ij)/GDPi =  Trade ij/GDPi 
(2) Trade dependence ji = (Import ji + export ji)/GDPi =  Trade ji/GDPj 
(3) Economic Interdependence ij = lower of (trade dependence ij & trade dependence ji) 
(4) Trade asymmetry ij  = higher of (trade dependence ij & trade dependence ji) 
South Korea’s trade dependence on its linkages with North Korea 
is low. North Korea’s trade dependence on its linkages with South Korea has been 
increasing rapidly, but it is still low and the average is about 6%. Therefore, the 
measurement of the economic interdependence between the two Koreas is very low. The 
average of economic interdependence between the two Koreas from 1998 to 2007 is 
0.001118 (Table 2.6).  
Table 2.7.   Trade Dependence of South Korea and North Korea218   
Year 
Trade SK, NK 
(millions of 
U.S. dollars)  
SK GDP 
(millions of 















1998 222 345,433 0.000643 10,273 0.021610 
1999 334 445,401 0.000750 10,280 0.032490 
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based on US dollar and data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts 
aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama (accessed on March 11, 2009). 
218 GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP). 
 89
Year 
Trade SK, NK 
(millions of 
U.S. dollars)  
SK GDP 
(millions of 















2000 425 511,659 0.000831 10,608 0.040064 
2001 403 481,894 0.000836 11,022 0.036563 
2002 642 546,935 0.001174 10,910 0.058845 
2003 724 608,146 0.001191 11,051 0.065514 
2004 697 680,492 0.001024 11,168 0.062410 
2005 1,055 791,429 0.001333 13,031 0.080961 
2006 1,350 888,023 0.001520 13,764 0.098082 
2007 1,797 956,788 0.001878 14,753 0.121806 
Avg. 765 625,620 0.001118 11,686 0.061835 
(3) No Economic Interdependence between the Two Koreas.  
The two Koreas were not economically interdependent between 1998 and 2007. Two 
Korean scholars, Ju Sung Whan and Han Chung Young used the two previous models to 
measure economic interdependence of the two Koreas between 1990 and 2003 and show 
similar results. 219  They conclude that “The results of measuring economic 
interdependence by Barbieri’s methods indicate that the trading relationships between 
South Korea and North Korea is neither extended nor balanced in dependence, these 
produced low economic interdependence between the two Koreas. These are the same as 
the results of measurement by Oneal and Russett’s method.”220 
                                                 
219 Ju Sung Whan and Han Chung Young, “Measuring of Economic Interdependence between South 
Korea and North Korea,” The Northeast Economic Association of Korea, http://www.neak.or.kr/ (accessed 
on February 15, 2008). 
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North Korea has been economically weaker and more dependent 
on other countries’ aid, including South Korean aid, since the end of the Cold War. The 
two Koreas are not interconnected enough to expect economic interdependence to bolster 
the chances for the success of reassurance strategy. Therefore, there is no evidence to 
show a possible impact of economic interdependence on North Korea’s calculations. 
c. Identity (from the Constructivist Approach): Rise of New Identity 
Question 4-c (From the Constructivist Approach): To what extent 
was there a shared identity between the two Koreas? Was the 
degree of shared understanding changing, and if so, in what 
direction? Is there evidence that identity affected the calculations 
of either South Korea or North Korea? 
(1) New Identity in South Korea toward North Korea: From 
Enemy to Partner.  A new identity related to North Korea was built before and after the 
implementation of the Sunshine Policy. The evidence of that new identity is the different 
response of South Korea to the North Korean threat. Several polls illustrate identity changes 
from enemy (anti-Communist/anti-North Korea) identity to partner (peaceful coexistence) 
identity in South Korea. They show very interesting results about how some South Koreans 
view North Korea, as well as how they view the relationship between South Korea and the 
United States. In June 1994, the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula escalated. Some 
South Koreans stockpiled food such as noodles and canned goods in preparation for 
emergency use. An opinion poll conducted by Seoul Shinmun on June 22, 1994, 
demonstrated that 65.7 percent of respondents favored the use of economic sanctions 
against North Korea.221 
However, in the 2002 nuclear crisis, South Koreans did not feel an 
immediate threat from North Korea. Son Key Young says, “In 2002, however, North 
Korea was far from the image of an enemy, with South Korea taking a ‘neutral’ stance 
between Pyongyang and Washington.”222 A Gallup Korea survey about images of North 
                                                 
221 Son Key Young, South Koran Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms, and the 
Sunshine Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 160.   
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Korea and the United States in 2002 shows that South Koreans had more positive images 
toward North Korea than toward the United States. (Table 2.8)  
Table 2.8.   Images of North Korea and the United States in 2002223 
 North Korea United States 
Positive 47.4 37.2 
Negative 37.0 53.7 
Don’t know 15.6 9.1 
There is another example to show that the concept of the main 
enemy has changed in South Korea. The term “main enemy” was first used in the 1995 
Defense White Paper after two events—the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 and the 
March 1994 threat to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” made by a North Korean negotiator 
during intra-Korean contacts in Panmunjeom.224 The Ministry of Defense said it would 
drop the term “main enemy” in reference to North Korea in a defense white paper for 
2004.225 The white paper had been stalled since 2000 due to disputes over the “main 
enemy” designation. In inter-Korean meetings since the June 2000 summit meeting, 
North Korea persistently asked for the “main enemy” terminology to be dropped.226  
Also, several other polls show that South Koreans think the nuclear 
problem should be solved by dialogue. This means that they consider North Korea as a 
partner in negotiation rather than an evil to fight against. An opinion poll by the Yonhap 
News Agency on October 23–24, 2002, shows that over 85 percent of people interviewed 
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favored dialogue.227 A similar survey conducted by the Advisory Council on Democratic 
and Peaceful Unification demonstrated that 91 percent of respondents favor diplomatic 
and peaceful solutions and over 60 percent support economic cooperation and the Mt. 
Geumgang tour project.228  
Identity change in South Korea was expressed in the presidential 
election in December 2002. A progressive leader, Roh Moo Hyun, who called for a 
continuous engagement policy with North Korea and more independent relations with the 
United States, won the presidential election against a conservative leader, Lee Hoi Chang, 
who supported a more coercive approach toward North Korea and a strong U.S.-South 
Korean alliance. Positive images toward North Korea declined in 2004 and 2007 polls, 
such that more people now had a negative than a positive image. However, it is 
significant that 21.9 percent and 32.8 percent of South Koreans in 2004 and 2007, 
respectively, still had positive images toward North Korea because it illustrates the 
identity change of South Koreans after the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the 
Peace and Prosperity Policy (Table 2.9).   
Table 2.9.   Images of North Korea in 2004229 and 2007230 
 2004 2007 
Positive 21.9 32.8 
Negative 47.6 62.1 
Don’t know 30.5 5.2 
According to a telephone survey conducted in January 2004, 
respondents considered the United States more of a threat to South Korean security than 
North Korea. According to that telephone survey of 800 people conducted by Research & 
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Research, 39 percent of respondents said that the United States poses a threat to South 
Korea, compared with only 33 percent who said the same about North Korea, followed 
by 12 percent for China and 8 percent for Japan.231  Korea Times had an interesting 
comparison with the results of a similar survey conducted in 1993. 
The results of the poll are remarkable when compared with those of a 
similar survey conducted by Gallup Korea back in 1993. At that time, 44 
percent picked North Korea as a top military threat, followed by 15 
percent for Japan and 4 percent for China. Only 1 percent chose the U.S., 
with as many as 72 percent supporting the presence of American troops 
here to preserve peace and stability on the peninsula.232  
This identity change from enemy identity to partner identity in 
South Korea is more obvious in the younger generations. Almost half (47.7 percent) of 
people aged 18 to 23 years old surveyed in February 2006 said that South Korea should 
side with North Korea, if Washington attacked nuclear facilities in the North without 
Seoul’s consent. Here is the figure to show the remarkable result: 
 
Figure 2.4. South Korea’s youngsters’ survey about U.S. strike and Seoul’s aid for 
N.K.233 
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This survey was conducted by Korea Times and its sister paper 
Hankook Ilbo from 16–19 February 2006. In the survey of 1000 young people aged 18 to 
23, “nearly 48 percent of respondents said that if the United States attacked nuclear 
facilities in North Korea, Seoul should act on Pyongyang’s behalf and demand 
Washington stop the attack.”234 Furthermore, 40.7 percent of them said Seoul should 
keep a neutral stance in the event of such attacks, while 11.6 percent said South Korea 
needs to act in concert with the United States.235 Even though these opinions do not 
represent the whole of South Korea, the results show a transformation of the South 
Korean attitude toward North Korea. Those young people will be the main actors in 
future Korean politics and their identity and norms will influence the politics of South 
Korea. In the 2002 presidential election, the voter turnout of those aged between 20 and 24 stood 
at 57.9 percent.236  
In sum, there was an identity change of South Koreans vis-à-vis 
the North. This identity change means that South Koreans shifted their images toward 
North Korea from an enemy that they cannot live together with to a bad partner that they 
should try to live together with.  
(2) New Identity in North Korea toward South Korea: From 
Enemy (Revolutionary Object) to Rivalry (Competing Object).  There is very limited 
information to show the identity change in North Korea. In the 1960-70s, North Korean 
leaders were confident of the communization of the Korean peninsula and felt it was only 
a matter of time. South Korea was a revolutionary object. The transcript of the 
confidential discussions between Kim Il Sung and Erick Honecker in December 1977 has 
recently been released from East German archives. Three strategic directions in the 
transcript show Kim Il Sung’s views on South Korea:  
 
                                                 




First, to successfully carry out the organization of socialism in the 
northern part of the country; second, to support the revolutionary struggle 
in South Korea; third, to develop solidarity and unity with the international 
revolutionary forces.237 
However, the circumstances became more favorable to South 
Korea in the 1980s. They dramatically changed in the 1990s after the end of the Cold 
War. There is some evidence showing that North Korea understands that it is almost 
impossible to enact a communist revolution in South Korea. Thus, it does not consider 
South Korea as a revolutionary object any more. Oberdorfer introduced the conversation 
between Selig Harrison and Hwang Jang Yop238 in Pyongyang in 1987. Hwang told 
Harrison that “a communist revolution in the South was ‘completely out of question’ and 
that ‘we must find a way for North and South to co-exist peacefully under different social 
and economic systems.’”239  
Cha points out several indications showing North Korea’s changes 
in identity toward South Korea by acknowledging the difficulty of success of revolution 
in South Korea and a low possibility of North Korea’s invasion for hegemonic unification. 
For example, North Korea abolished the Unification Committee at the September 1998 
session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (1st session, 10th term).240 According to Cha, 
this is “a low-key but very significant event” 241  to show North Korea’s change. 
According to Cha, “Russian observers note that among the core principles that have made 
up the juche (self-reliant) ideology, emphasis has shifted recently from universal 
‘communization’ to ‘self-dependency’ as the ultimate revolutionary goal.”242 Cha argues  
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that these changes come from “an enormous and insurmountable gap between the two 
countries” 243  and North Korea’s experiences of the “trials and tribulations in our 
construction of socialism.”244  
As shown in Figure 2.5, analysis of North Korean news shows 
some identity changes, too. Jun Mi Young explains North Korea’s identity change toward 
South Korea after the 2000 summit meeting by analyzing Rodong Sinmum245 between 
1999 and 2001.246  
 
Figure 2.5. The number of articles that criticize South Korean presidents or government 
(1999–2001)247 
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According to Jun Mi Young, the number of articles that criticize 
the South Korean president and government decreased significantly between 1999 and 
2001 (156 articles in 1999, 46 articles in 2000, and 1 article in 2001).248 Compared to the 
1960s when North Korea was more aggressive, the change in the number is more obvious. 
In the 1960s, the number of articles that criticized South Korean presidents or 
government was higher: 189 articles in 1964, 223 articles in 1965, and 214 articles in 
1966.249 
These facts show that there was a start of shift from Hobbesian 
enemy identities to Lockean rivalry identities. 250  According to Alexander Wendt, a 
Hobbesian enemy identity “constitutes by representations of the Other as an actor who 
(1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore 
(2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.”251 North Korea’s identity toward 
South Korea in the 1960s can be categorized as Hobbesian enemy identity. Without the 
change of identity, the number of articles that criticize the South Korean president and 
government should have been the same or increased. The significant decrease between 
1999 and 2001 can be interpreted as a change in North Korea’s attitude toward South 
Korea and a partial shift of identity, even though it was hardly permanent.  
Whereas the Hobbesian identity is “enemies” that want to 
eliminate each other, the Lockean identity is “rivals” that recognize each other and agree 
to coexist.252 Wendt says, “Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they 
recognize their sovereignty, their ‘life and liberty,’ as a right, and therefore not to try to 
conquer or dominate them.”253 However, unlike Kantian friend identity, Lockean identity 
is not free from violence and it can lead to dispute by force. The decreasing number of 
criticizing articles does not mean the elimination of the possibility of disputes. 
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Consequently, the new identity was created in North Korea toward South Koreans from 
Hobbesian enemy identity to Lockean rivalry identity. This means that North Korea 
considered South Korea as a competing object rather than a revolutionary object or 
existential threat. This shift improved the changes for successful reassurance.  
2. Condition Variable (CV) 2: North Korea’s Mixed and Uncertain 
Motivating Factors 
Question 5: What were North Korea’s motivations? Is North Korea best 
seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was South 
Korea’s perception of North Korea’s motivations?  
Question 6: Did the two Koreas share an aversion to war? 
The first step in evaluating whether or not reassurance strategy toward North 
Korea would be successful and effective is to analyze the “motivating factors” of North 
Korea, because if North Korea has only a “greedy” motivating factor, reassurance 
strategy would fail in the end. Also, strategy must still be made based on some 
assessment of motivating factors. This section attempts to identify the needs and 
opportunities of North Korea and determine whether or not North Korea is greedy and 
has the motive to expand. Also, it is necessary to explore whether North Korea shared an 
aversion to war with South Korea because an aversion to war implies “need-oriented” 
and “not-greedy” motivating factors. 
a. North Korea’s “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” Motivating 
Factors: Defensive Motive 
Even though North Korea’s attack on South Korea for unification under its 
control cannot be ruled out, the unfavorable change in the balance of power toward North 
Korea made a communist revolution in the South almost impossible. As explained in the 
previous section of this chapter, the balance of power is much more favorable to South 
Korea and it affected the calculations of North Korea. South Korea’s GNP at current 
prices is about more than fifty times larger and GNP per capita is almost thirty times 
larger (Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3). The situation is totally different compared to 1950s and 
1960s.  
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Victor Cha introduces several evidences showing that North Korea 
changed its goals from “universal ‘communization’ to ‘self-dependency’ as the ultimate 
revolutionary goal.”254 For example, North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yop admitted 
that “a communist revolution in the South is no longer a viable DPRK objective.”255 The 
national goal of North Korea thirty years ago was “enforcing a Socialist unification upon the 
South.”256 According to Cha, the change of this goal can be found in Kim Jong Il’s words to 
admit the need for change, “self-reliance should not be interpreted as meaning that we will 
not import what others have because we will import selectively.”257 Cha concludes that 
“Now, Pyongyang’s end game has changed from one of hegemonic unification to basic 
survival, avoiding collapse, and avoiding dominance by the South, precisely the type of 
fears behind a preventive lashing-out type action.”258 
North Korea’s perspective about U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula 
shows North Korea’s need-oriented motivating factors. During the 2000 summit meeting 
between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Il expressed his idea that the United 
States needed to stay on the Korean peninsula after unification. This is a significant 
change after the end of the Cold War. Bruce Cumings points out, “In the new century, the 
North does not want the United States out of Korea, in spite of regime propaganda, but 
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the collapse of the Soviet Union (which abruptly abandoned the North in 1991259) to help 
the country through its current difficult transition, and to keep the South from swallowing 
it.”260 
Based on the change of the balance of power between the two Koreas, a 
communist revolution in South Korea does not seem to be the primary motive of North 
Korea. Regime survival seems to be one and it illustrates their “not-greedy” and “need-
oriented” motivating factors from weakness and insecurity. However, North Korea also 
shows “greedy” and “opportunity-motivated” motivating factors as well as “not-greedy” 
and “need-oriented” motivating factors.  
b. North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” Motivating 
Factors: Offensive Motive 
The possibility of success of a North Korean attack against South Korea 
has waned because of South Korea’s growing economic, military, and diplomatic power 
and its better relationships with China and Russia. However, its offensive doctrine cannot 
be ruled out. The evidence to show North Korea’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” 
motive is its forward-deployed military. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the Korean 
peninsula is one of the most heavily militarized frontiers in the world. North Korea 
deploys about 70 percent of its ground forces south of Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and 65 
percent of its military units and up to 80 percent of its estimated firepower are within 
approximately 60 miles of the DMZ.261 The North Korean artillery around the DMZ such 
as 240mm multiple rocket launcher system and 170mm self-propelled guns is the most 
serious threat to South Korea. This forward deployment means that North Korea can 
invade South Korea without redeployment.  
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Andrew Scobell and John M. Sandford assess that “It is estimated that if 
North Korea  decided to initiate hostilities, the Republic of Korea and the United States 
would have at most 24-36 hours warning under ideal conditions, or as little as 12 hours if 
the Korean People’s Army (KPA) already was at an alerted status.” 262  Phillip C. 
Saunders says that a strategy of unification is consistent with North Korea’s military 
doctrine and force deployments. “Most North Korean military units are located close to 
the Demilitarized Zone and are positioned and trained to undertake offensive 
operations.”263 
In addition, even though the possibility of North Korea’s attack has 
decreased due to the shift of the balance of power, there is a possibility of a North Korean 
attack as a last push against South Korea. Cha also warns of the worst case of North 
Korea’s attacking South Korea: 
At the worst-case end of the spectrum, through long-range artillery 
barrages, missile strikes, or chemical weapons attacks deliberately non-
American in target and short of all-out war, the North could seek to hold 
Seoul hostage with the hope of renegotiating a new status quo. Again, the 
relevant point here is not the objective feasibility of “winning” with such 
an action, but the belief in North Korea that acting is better than doing 
nothing, and that doing nothing promises slow and certain death.264 
Like Egyptian decision making in 1973 and Japanese decision making to 
attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, there is the possibility of North Korean military action due 
to conditions of military inferiority and unfavorable changes in the balance of military 
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capabilities to avoid further loss. 265  Such a scenario, however, would reflect North 
Korean survival motivations rather than greedy or expansionist goals.  
c. Mixed Motivations 
In the analysis, it is clear that the North Korean motivating factor does not 
exist with absolute certainty. Either of two possible factors—need and opportunity—is 
plausible. North Korea can be categorized to be either a “greedy” or “not-greedy” state. 
North Korea’s strategies have been fluctuating depending on how North Korea assesses 
the situation at a particular point. This changeability is a characteristic of North Korea’s 
motivational factors and is expected to continue.  
A country’s motivating factors are important because there could be some 
contradictions and differences between alternative strategies for responding. If North 
Korea has a “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” doctrine, deterrence strategies may be 
the best option. On the other hand, if North Korea’s motivating factor focuses more on 
“not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motive, there is high chance of success to implement 
reassurance strategy to reduce tension and the possibility of war on the Korean 
peninsula.266 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to analyze and predict North Korea’s strategy 
because North Korea has both opportunity-oriented and need-oriented motives and the 
relative weight of two are dependent on circumstances. North Korea has not given up its 
“greedy” motive for expansion. Also, a matter of regime survival makes North Korea 
change into a “not-greedy” state. Therefore, we can conclude that North Korea’s strategy 
is mixed, flexible and not easily predictable. Even though it is difficult to know the 
intentions, North Korea’s mixed motivations means that reassurance strategy should be 
tried to reduce tensions with North Korea because there is a possibility of success. 
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d. South Korea’s Perception of North Korea’s Motivating Factors 
Just as there are evidences of both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motivating 
factors in North Korea, South Korea’s perceptions of North Korea’s motivating factors 
are divided into two groups. Division and disputes over North Korea’s motivating factors 
can be categorized into conservative and progressive factions in South Korea. 
Conservatives perceive North Korea as an enemy whereas progressives consider it a 
partner.267 Before the transition to democracy in 1987, there was no competition between 
conservatives and progressives in South Korea because the authoritarian government 
reinforced anti-communism and anti-North Korean concepts as the only primary 
legitimate ideology.268 Progressives ascended and the monopoly of conservatives ended 
in the 1990s. In sum, the biggest difference between conservatives and progressives in 
South Korea is their perception of North Korea.  
However, both conservatives and progressives generally perceive North 
Korea as a substantial threat. They believe that North Korea did not give up “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. Chae Hae Sook and Steven Kim used “cluster 
analysis” 269 to identify the general trend of conservatives and progressives in South 
Korea. The results of survey are shown in Figure 2.6:  
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Figure 2.6. Perception of Conservatives and Progressives about the Sunshine Policy and 
the North Korean Threat270 
Chae and Kim collected survey data from 1,001 South Korean adult 
citizens during March 8–28, 2007.271 They considered two main issues relating to inter-
Korean relations: engagement with North Korea (the Sunshine Policy) and the North 
Korean nuclear weapons threat (North Korean threat) and asked questions about them 
(see Appendix H). As shown in Figure 2.6, the analysis of this survey shows that South 
Koreans perceive that North Korea has “greedy” motivating factors. That is, both 
conservatives and progressives feel a threat from North Korea. On the other hand, 
progressives’ support for the Sunshine Policy suggests that some progressives think that 
North Korea also has “not-greedy” motivating factors from vulnerability and that the 
Sunshine Policy is necessary to reduce tension.  
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(1) North Korea’s “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” 
Motivating Factors: Progressives’ Support for Sunshine Policy.  Even though there are 
common perceptions about North Korea as a “greedy” state in South Korea, progressives 
recognize that North Korea feels vulnerable and alongside residual greedy motivations it 
also shows “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors. The survey about the 
Sunshine Policy shows that conservatives and progressives are situated on opposite sides 
of the reference line on questions regarding the Sunshine Policy. 272  (Figure 2.6). 
Progressives consider North Korea as a reliable partner (VIEWNK) and believe that 
North Korean can be influenced though the Sunshine Policy (SPCHANGE).273 These 
responses would have been impossible if progressives had perceptions that North Korea 
had only “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. These perceptions are 
based on the idea that North Korea is not only a “greedy” state but also “not-greedy” state.  
Also, according to Chae and Kim, progressives and conservatives 
show different perspectives on the results of the Sunshine Policy:  
Likewise, progressives and conservatives disagreed about whether the 
Sunshine Policy has led to a reduction of tension (SPTENSN) or can 
prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime (SPPREVENT) and 
whether it has bolstered the North Korean regime (SPBOLSTR). On these 
questions about the underlying assumptions and effectiveness of the 
Sunshine Policy, progressives and conservatives lined up on opposite sides 
of the fence.274  
Chae and Kim conclude that “In sum, the survey data shows that the South Korean public 
is only moderately divided on the issue of inter-Korean reconciliation, while it is loosely 
united on the issue of national security.” That is, contrary to expectations that 
conservatives are more concerned about the nuclear program and progressives downplay 
North Korea’s threat, both conservatives and progressives essentially agree that North  
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Korea is a threat. 275 Consequently, South Koreans generally see North Korean as a 
“greedy” state and yet some progressives recognize that North Korea has “not-greedy” 
motivating factors as well.  
(2) North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” 
Motivating Factors: North Korean Threat.  Generally speaking, South Koreans have low 
trust in North Korea and consider North Korea as a threat having “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. According to Figure 2.6, the analysis of 
responses to questions about a North Korean threat shows that both conservatives and 
progressives share a common ground on the North Korean threat.276 According to Chae 
and Kim, “On the North Korean threat, however, the two clusters essentially 
agreed….Both clusters mean lines run below the reference line, indicating that the North 
Korean threat distressed both groups.”277 Che and Kim explain that progressives share 
the views of conservatives on North Korean threat issues: 
Like the conservatives, they are keenly aware of the danger posed by the 
North Korean nuclear threat (THRTSK, TRNKNUKE, and TRNKSALE) 
and show a strong dislike of North Korea and its leadership (FEELNK and 
FEELKIM). Furthermore and contrary to the prevailing portrait, 
progressives do not strongly object to South Korea’s forceful measures to 
censure North Korea for the continued development of its nuclear program 
(PROJECTS, UNSNCTN, SUPPOTUS, PSI, and USNKPLCY).  
In fact, progressives go so far as to join conservatives in their support of 
the developing of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons to counter the 
North Korean threat (DEVPNUKE).278  
Regardless of South Korean attitudes on international relations, 
conservatives or progressives, South Koreans feel that North Korea is a substantial threat 
and it has a motivating factor to threaten or attack South Korea. This means that domestic 
support for reassurance may have been weak and Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
were constrained by that.  
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e. Aversion to War by South Korea and North Korea 
(1) South Korea.  South Korea had a strong aversion to war. 
Considering the geographic location, the size, formation, tactics and technology of the 
two Koreas’ military forces, the cost of war on the Korean peninsula would be very high. 
Therefore, even though military action might be the most direct way to dismantle North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and topple the North Korean regime, it was difficult to take 
military action against North Korea.  
Seoul, the capital of South Korea, has over 10 million inhabitants. 
Including the satellite towns and the major port city of Incheon, the population of the 
Seoul National Capital area is almost 25 million out of the about 48 million total South 
Korean population.279 This area is only 25 miles away from the DMZ and the North 
Korean artillery attacks and missile attacks would panic Seoul. 280  South Koreans 
remembered the “sea of fire” statement by North Korean representative, Park Yong Su at 
the final South-North working level meeting at Panmunjom in March 1994. He 
threatened his South Korean counterpart, Song Young Dae, by saying, “Seoul is not far 
from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be 
difficult for you to survive.”281  
A chemical, biological, or nuclear attack against Seoul would be 
horrible. Bruce Bennett, a policy analyst at Rand, predicted the tremendous threat of 
North Korea: 
One battery of North Korean 240-mm multiple rocket launchers fired into 
Seoul can deliver roughly a ton of chemical weapons, which, according to 
various accounts, could kill or injure thousands or tens of thousands. 
North Korea has many such batteries. In addition, North Korean special  
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forces teams might each spray several kilograms of anthrax in Seoul, 
leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people infected, many of whom 
would die unless properly treated. 
A North Korean nuclear weapon fired into Seoul might cause damage 
similar to that of the nuclear weapon detonated on Hiroshima in World 
War II, which left some 70,000 dead and 75,000 injured.282 
Roh Moo Hyun expressed his aversion to war and emphasized the 
importance of dialogue:  
If you say it is foolish to have dialogue with him then we should exercise 
pressure on Kim Jong Il. But if he does not bend to pressure, then it means 
we should go ahead and attack. It all comes down to the fact that we can’t 
have a military attack. It’s our judgment that we cannot face or embrace 
war with North Korea. It is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even 
imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in such a way that 
we do not have to face such a situation.283 
South Koreans knew that even though South Korea could win the 
war, the damage could be tremendous and reconstruction would be very difficult. 
Therefore, South Koreans had strong aversion to war based on the calculations of cost of 
war on the Korean peninsula.  
(2) North Korea.  North Korea also had an aversion to war. 
North Koreans had horrific memories of the Korean War. Bruce Cumings explained how 
North Koreans felt about the Korean War and how much aversion there was to war at a 
conference in October 2008.284 He started his presentation with his personal impression 
during his first visit to North Korea in 1981. He said, “I was struck by the degree to 
which the war seemed to have ended only a few years earlier. There were posters all over  
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the county about the American bombing of North Korea. My guide wanted to tell me 
about his relatives who died in that bombing.”285 Then, he explained how North Koreans 
consider the Korean War. He said: 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the DPRK as a nation is like a Korean 
or Vietnam or Iraq war veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder….Nobody knows how many Koreans died in the Korean War. 
Most scholars accept the figure of two million North Korean civilians.  
The initial population in North Korea in the 1950s was 8 million. So we’re 
talking about a holocaust like the one that hit Poland or Russia during 
WWII. Maybe it was less but it was just a horror.286  
Bruce Cumings described the air campaign as “everything but atomic bomb.”287 
Jasper Becker also said, “It is understandable why the North has 
invested enormous efforts into protecting itself. Even more than the Chinese, Kim had 
bitter firsthand experience of what a sustained U.S. bombing attack could mean.”288 Then, 
he describes how the United States’ air campaign was conducted in detail: 
In the first Korean War, three years of bombing attacks had left almost no 
modern buildings standing and no more targets to destroy. UN forces, 
largely American, had flown 720,980 sorties and had dropped 476,000 
tons of ordnance. B-29s had flown 20,448 sorties (10,125 by day) and had 
dropped 168,368 tons of bombs.  
The war’s largest air raid came on August 29, 1952, when Pyongyang was 
leveled by a 1,403-sortie assault. The bombing had destroyed the entire 
economy and infrastructure. Cumulatively, the bombs killed nearly 
150,000 North Korean and Chinese troops and destroyed 975 aircraft, 800 
bridges, 1,100 tanks, 800 locomotives, 9,000 railroad cars, 70,000 motor  
 
                                                 
285 Video of Bruce Cuming’s presentation, “War is a Stern Teacher.” It is available at 
http://kpolicy.org/documents/policy/081201paulliemreunification.html. (accessed on March 14, 2009). 
“Reunification: Building Permanent Peace in Korea,” a conference held at the University of California, 
Berkeley, October 10, 2008. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 2005, 151. 
 110
vehicles, and 80,000 buildings. Aircraft attacks shattered three of North 
Korea’s 20 irrigation dams, and the floods wiped out roads, railroad tracks, 
and thousands of acres of rice fields.289  
This experience has brought a tremendous aversion to war to North Koreans.  
North Korea has felt the disparity and vulnerability in air power 
and conventional forces. Therefore, North Korea has not only a “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factor but also a “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” one 
from aversion to war based on the superior military capability of South Korea and the 
United States in the 1990s and the calculations of the cost of war on the Korean peninsula 
from the Korean War experience and the 1991 Iraq War. Consequently, the two Koreas 
shared an aversion to war because of the expected high costs of war.  
The next section will explore the impacts of circumstances and 
relations between South Korea and North Korea (CV1) and North Korea’s motivating 
factors (CV2) on leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of South 
Korea and North Korea (IntV).  
D. INTERVENING VARIABLE (INTV): LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS, 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS OF SOUTH KOREA 
AND NORTH KOREA 
1. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and 
North Korea 
Question 7: How did Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun perceive Kim 
Jong Il and North Korea? Is there evidence that common psychological 
biases led Kim Dae Jung or Roh Moo Hyun to misperceive Kim Jong Il? 
Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s cognitive barriers to change their 
image of Kim Jong Il and North Korea?  
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Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
changed during the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy. The summit meetings especially provided them opportunities to change their 
images of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.  
a.  Kim Dae Jung’s Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
(1) Before the 2000 Summit Meeting.  Even though there had 
been negative information about Kim Jong Il, Kim Dae Jung considered Kim Jong Il as a 
dialogue partner several months before the summit meeting. He described Kim Jong Il as 
“a pragmatist, a man of insight, a decisive leader with whom it is possible to 
negotiate.”290 Selig Harrison argued that this kind of expression was one of the decisive 
factors of Kim Jong Il’s acceptance of the summit meeting.291 This suggests Kim Dae 
Jung did not have strong cognitive biases and was open to changing his image. However, 
Kim Dae Jung was uncertain about Kim Jong Il and North Korea, and there was only 
negative information about Kim Jong Il. Kim Dae Jung asked, “If all this information 
were true, how can I have meeting with this kind of person?”292 He wanted to have more 
objective and accurate information about Kim Jong Il.  
Therefore, Kim Dae Jung sent Lim Dong Won, a director general 
of the National Intelligence Service, as a special envoy to Pyongyang in May 2000. Kim 
Dae Jung gave Lim Dong Won three missions. Kim Dae Jung said, “By any means, you 
should visit Pyongyang as a presidential envoy. Meet Kim Jong Il and carry out three 
missions. First, find out what kind of person Kim Jong Il is. Second, thoroughly explain 
discussion items of the summit meeting in advance and find out North Korea’s position. 
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Third, reach an agreement on a joint declaration draft. Basically, your task is to have a 
preliminary meeting for the summit meeting.”293  
Lim Dong Won found out that Kim Jong Il was very different from 
what he had heard and read about him before his meeting. He made a six-point report to 
Kim Dae Jung about Kim Jong Il to prepare for the first summit meeting:  
1.  He is a strong dictator, stronger than his father, whom Lim had met 
on two occasions in the early 1990s. 
2.  He is the only person who is open-minded and pragmatic in the 
North Korean system. 
3.  He is a good listener. He took notes on the meeting with Lim, like 
a student with a professor. 
4.  When he is persuaded by another’s point of view, he is decisive. 
5.  He is gentle and polite to older people around him, as he was to 
Hyundai founder Chung Ju Yung.  
6.  He has a sense of humor.294 
Kim Dae Jung was relieved by Lim Dong Won’s report and became more optimistic 
about the meeting with Kim Jong Il.  
(2) After the 2000 Summit Meeting.  After the 2000 summit 
meeting, Kim Dae Jung expressed his personal feelings about Kim Jong Il and North 
Korea: 
I found that Pyongyang, too, was our land, indeed. The Pyongyang people 
are the same as we, the same nation sharing the same blood….We lived as 
a unified nation for 1,300 years before we were divided 55 years ago 
against our will. It is impossible for us to continue to live separated 
physically and spiritually. I was able to reconfirm this fact first-hand 
during this visit. I have returned with the conviction that, sooner or later, 
we will become reconciled with each other, cooperate, and finally get 
reunified.295 
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In an interview with Anjaili Rao of CNN, Kim Dae Jung candidly 
described his impression of Kim Jong Il: 
Anjaili Rao (AR): Kim Jong-iI is such a secretive figure but you've met 
him. Give us an idea of your impressions of this man. 
Kim Dae Jung (KDJ): That's a very interesting question! Kim Jong-il is 
very different from how the outside world perceives him to be. And I'm 
not the only one who thinks so. Secretary Albright, Prime Minister 
Koizumi and former Prime Minister Peterson of Sweden also had that 
same impression when they visited North Korea and met Kim Jong-il. 
KDJ: Kim Jong-il is a very smart man who's very quick to make a 
decision. If he sees that another person's ideas are right, he can accept 
them on the spot. These are his merits. 
KDJ: Of course, Kim Jong-il is also completely committed to a 
dictatorship, which fits our perception of him as an evil man.296 
Also, Kim Dae Jung recognized the vulnerability of North Korea 
and understood the motivating factors of North Korea. Kim Dae Jung explained that the 
North Korean nuclear crisis could be solved with a security guarantee after the North 
Korean nuclear test in 2006:  
Even after the nuclear test, Pyongyang has pledged that if its security is 
guaranteed through North Korea-U.S. direct bilateral talks and [the U.S.] 
lifts economic sanctions against it, it will positively accept the 
denuclearization of the peninsula.297  
Kim Dae Jung’s perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
changed because of the 2000 summit meeting. It was sufficient to overcome Kim Dae 
Jung’s cognitive barriers to changing his image of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.  
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b.  Roh Moo Hyun’s Perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
(1) Faith in a Conciliatory Approach.  Roh Moo Hyun had 
faith in a conciliatory approach and followed Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy. Roh Moo 
Hyun believed that North Korea developed its nuclear program because it felt insecure 
and vulnerable. Han Sung Joo, a South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. said: 
In contrast, President Roh Moo Hyun’s view was that North Korea had 
developed its nuclear program because of a keen sense of insecurity in the 
face of the overwhelming military might of the United States and the 
prosperous South Korea. “If the source of the sense of insecurity is 
removed, North Korea will rid itself of nuclear weapons and the nuclear 
weapons program.” This was what Roh insisted on both in private and in 
public.298 
In an interview with The New York Times after his presidential 
election, Roh Moo Hyun expressed his perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea and 
explained his approach toward North Korea. Roh Moo Hyun believed that Kim Jong Il 
sincerely wanted to have a dialogue rather than a confrontation. Roh Moo Hyun said:  
If you treat someone with mistrust he will come back to you with more 
mistrust and skepticism. I think the fundamental thing is Mr. Kim Jong Il’s 
situation. He has to keep his people fed and he has to assure the stability of 
his own system, and he has to come out to the world. There are various 
occasions on which he has made this clear.299  
Therefore, the unfavorable balance of power toward North Korea 
and rise of a new identity influenced his perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. 
Roh Moo Hyun believed that North Korea had “not-greedy” intentions and was capable 
of accepting negotiation. Because he did not start with a strongly negative image of North 
Korea, there was not a significant cognitive barrier that had to be overcome to convince 
Roh Moo Hyun to continue with reassurance.   
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(2) The 2007 Summit Meeting.  The second inter-Korea 
summit meeting, this time involves Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il, provided another 
opportunity for Roh Moo Hyun to consider Kim Jong Il as a negotiation partner for 
discussing many difficult issues. The summit did nothing to make Roh Moo Hyun’s 
image of his counterpart more negative and seems even to have shifted it in a more 
favorable direction. Roh Moo Hyun had an interview with CNN’s Sohn Jie Ae on 
December 10, 2007, after the summit meeting and expressed his impression of Kim Jong 
Il:  
Sohn Jie Ae (SJA): What was your first impression of Kim Jong Il when 
you first met him? 
Roh Moo Hyun (RMH): People that have met Chairman Kim get a lot of 
questions about him. I think this is because there is the perception that he 
is probably a strange man. But I think that that perception itself is not 
correct. In a word, he speaks with candor, and in a direct manner without 
hesitation. But that is not to say that what he says is offensive or he makes 
everyone around him uncomfortable.  
He is someone who knows how to maintain a pleasant atmosphere and is 
considerate of others in conversation. Honestly, he is not someone that is 
aggressive or makes people uncomfortable. He is considerate, listens, and 
at times is humorous. And while he is talking with you, he makes you feel 
safe and makes you like him.300 
Roh Moo Hyun expressed his beliefs that North Korea would give 
up its nuclear program if the circumstances changed and North Korea felt secure: 
SJA: What were your discussions about the North's nuclear issue? Did you 
feel or did Kim Jong Il ever tell you that he was willing to give up his 
nuclear weapons system, or do you believe that he will? 
RMH: Yes, I do. I have believed for a long time that North Korea was 
willing to give up nuclear weapons, and there is no change in my belief. 
That is, I believe that North Korea thinks it is more beneficial not to have 
nuclear weapons than to have them, and that if the circumstances were 
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right, they would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons. I have no 
doubt about such assertions from North Korea. I think there are sufficient 
grounds to think so.301 
During the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace 
and Prosperity Policy, both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun changed their perceptions 
of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. They were able to perceive Kim Jong Il as a reasonable 
leader to negotiate with rather than an unreasonable leader as was perceived before the 
summit meetings. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun believed that the motivating factor 
of North Korea’s nuclear program was its security and that a security guarantee would be 
a solution to resolving the nuclear crisis. 
c. Condition Variables and the Perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and 
Roh Moo Hyun 
Why did Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun change their perceptions of 
Kim Jong Il and North Korea? First, the change in the balance of power was a factor that 
led to their change in perception. As explained in the previous section, the balance of 
power became unfavorable to North Korea, especially from the economic perspective. 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun understood that Kim Jong Il needed to cooperate with 
them for survival. Oberdorfer introduced Kim Dae Jung’s beliefs about the opening of 
North Korea: 
Kim Dae Jung, in a dinner for Korea experts and friends in New York 
three months later, said he believed the most important reason of the 
opening was North Korea’s desperate economic travail, which made 
assistance from the outside essential to its survival. “Without improved 
relations with South Korea, others won’t help them.”302  
Second, along with the unfavorable shift of the balance of power in North 
Korea, North Korea’s economic dependence on South Korea increased. Even though the 
two Koreas were not economically interdependent, North Korea became dependent on 
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South Korea economically. For example, trade dependence increased from 2 percent in 
1998 to 12 percent in 2007 (Table 2.5). Also, North Korea agreed on the Mt. Geumgang 
project and Gaesung Industrial Complex project. These changes made Kim Dae Jung and 
Roh Moo Hyun’s perception of North Korea from that of a hostile enemy to a partner 
with which to work by starting economic projects.  
Third, two summit meetings and the agreement of the 2000 Joint 
Declaration and October 4 Joint Declaration established new identities among Kim Dae 
Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Kim Jong Il. It brought an identity shift away from hostile 
enemy relations. They recognized each other as counterparts to work together and to 
negotiate with to solve many issues rather than vilify and threaten each other.  
2. Kim Jong Il’s Perceptions of Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun and 
South Korea 
Question 8: How did Kim Jong Il perceive the Sunshine Policy and the 
Peace and Prosperity Policy offered by South Korea? Is there evidence 
that common psychological biases led Kim Jong Il to discount those 
reassurance strategies? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was 
sufficient to overcome Kim Jong Il’s cognitive barriers to changing his 
image of South Korea? 
The beliefs and perceptions of Kim Jong Il are an important factor because he 
fully controlled North Korea. According to Michael J. Mazarr, “There is a strong 
evidence that Kim is a fully engaged leader, that he is closely involved in the details of 
governing.”303 He introduced one anecdote: 
In one widely reported incident, during Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2000, the U.S. delegation gave 
Kim a list of more than a dozen questions about the technical 
specifications of North Korea’s missile programs. The Americans 
expected Kim to hand them to an aide; instead he answered many of the 
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night owl who reads hundreds of reports from officials of his regime and 
who routinely calls people in the middle of the night with questions or 
guidance.304  
a. Kim Jong Il’s Perception of Kim Dae Jung: The 2000 Summit 
Meeting  
There are limited sources from which to learn about Kim Jong Il’s 
perceptions of Kim Dae Jung. However, there were several interviews with Kim Jong Il 
from which his perception of Kim Dae Jung can be interpreted. Moon Myong Ja,305 a 
Korean-American journalist, conducted an exclusive interview with Kim Jong Il after the 
summit meeting. Kim Jong Il expressed his impression of Kim Dae Jung and his 
willingness to carry out the Joint Declaration: 
Moon Myong Ja (MMJ): On June 13, you showed exceptionally good 
hospitality to President Kim Dae Jung by meeting him at the airport. It 
was unprecedented in terms of protocol. Please tell me what made you do 
that?  
Kim Jong Il (KJI): I spontaneously made that decision. As a matter of fact, 
Mr. Kim Dae Jung’s image had been not so good among our people. His 
image is derived from the negative information about his words and deeds. 
For instance, he has advocated continued U.S. military presence in South 
Korea even after the unification has been realized; he detained a number 
of South Korean unification activists; and he failed to take due steps to 
send our unconverted long-term prisoners back to us. In contrast, however, 
President Kim made a brave decision to come visit Pyongyang. Therefore, 
necessity to change such a mood of the Pyongyang citizens drove me to 
greet him at the airport. 
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MMJ: What was your impression about President Kim?  
KJI: The 5-point joint declaration agreed at the current summit talks is so 
significant that it may be named a great charter for national unification. 
You cannot do everything at one go. It may take some time, however, we 
must put it into practice without fail. I do believe that President Kim has a 
firm will and good faith to put the agreement into action with unwavering 
attention. ... I also will do my utmost for its realization.306 
Also, a delegation of the South Korean news media heads met Kim Jong Il 
and had a twenty-minute interview with him at Pyongyang on August 12, 2000. In the 
interview, Kim Jong Il praised Kim Dae Jung and considered the 2000 summit meeting 
and the Joint Declaration as very significant steps for unification. Also, he expressed his 
regret over criticism by South Korea:  
Kim Jong Il: Both North and South made unification impossible. Both 
governments of the past era share the blame. Both Koreas used unification 
to preserve their political systems. But thanks to President Kim Dae Jung's 
determination, there was the June 15th summit and the situation has 
changed fundamentally. I see that some Southern press organs and 
opposition leaders criticize the 6.15 summit.307 
These interviews show that Kim Jong Il perceived Kim Dae Jung as a 
reasonable leader and a negotiation partner to discuss issues related to security on the 
Korean peninsula.   
b. Kim Jong Il’s Perception of Roh Moo Hyun: The 2007 Summit 
Meeting  
Even though so little is known for certain about how Kim Jong Il 
perceived Roh Moo Hyun, Kim Jong Il’s behavior and Roh Moo Hyun’s impressions 
during the 2007 summit meeting provide hints of his perception of Roh Moo Hyun. The 
acceptance of the second summit meeting meant that Kim Jong Il considered Roh Moo 
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56–61. 
307 Chosun Ilbo, “Kim Jong Il’s Dialogue with South Korean Media Heads,” August 13, 2000, 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200008/200008130358.html (accessed on March 16, 2009). 
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Hyun a partner he could talk with. Zhu Feng said, “By agreeing to the summit, Kim could 
be seen as rewarding Roh’s policy of ‘peace and prosperity.’”308  
On the last day of Roh Moo Hyun’s Pyongyang visit, Kim Jong Il asked 
Roh Moo Hyun to extend his visit by one day. When Roh Moo Hyun said that he would 
have to consult his staff, Kim Jong Il responded, “Can’t a president decide? Presidents 
should be able to decide.”309 This episode shows that Kim Jong Il wanted to continue to 
negotiate with Roh Moo Hyun, which suggests he did not perceive the South Korean 
leader as hostile or inflexible.  
c. Kim Jong Il’s Perceptions of South Korea  
One of the agreements at the 2000 South Korea and North Korea summit 
meeting was Kim Jong-Il’s visit to Seoul.310 South Korean media heads asked a question 
about his visit to Seoul twice during the interview in August 2000 after the summit 
meeting:  
South Korean media (SKM): When are you planning to visit the South? 
Kim Jong Il (KJI): I'll be visiting in an appropriate time and I wish it 
would be sooner. 
SKM: If you are invited to the Sydney Olympics along with President Kim 
Dae-jung, would you accept the invitation? 
KJI: I would prefer to visit Seoul first, as I would play a role of actor in 
Sydney. I'll have to go to Seoul first, as I owe a lot to President Kim…. 
SKM: Will you visit Seoul within this year? (Asking for the second time) 
KJI: You media organization heads are trying to go home with only the 
top news, eh? This autumn, I am going to Russia. Putin eagerly hoped I 
would.... I owe President Kim Dae Jung one so I have to go to Seoul. The 
National Defense Commission and the Japanese Foreign Ministry are 
currently conducting discussions but I haven't received any report yet. If 
                                                 
308 Antoaneta Bezlova, “Far East: Koreas in Win-Win Deal,” Inter Press Service (ISP) News Agency, 
October 5, 2007, http://www.ipsnews.org/news.asp?idnews=39537 (accessed on March 16, 2009). 
309 Norimitsu Onishi, “Pledging Peace, Koreans Agree on Economic Projects,” New York Times, 
October 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/asia/04korea.html (accessed on April 1, 2009). 
310 Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 431. 
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the optic cable to the South starts operation, I will be able to notify things 
that are to be told to the South within a split second.311  
Unfortunately, his return visit to Seoul did not occur. Actually, the second 
summit meeting between South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il was 
held in Pyongyang instead of Seoul in October 2007. The failure of Kim Jong Il to come 
to Seoul did not help the reassurance strategy of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. 
Even though Kim Jong Il expressed his wish to visit Seoul several times, his intention 
and the meaning of “in an appropriate time” were very vague. There was always doubt 
about the effectiveness of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace 
and Prosperity Policy without Kim Jong Il’s reciprocal behavior, especially a visit to 
Seoul.  
Many reasons explain why Kim Jong Il could not visit Seoul. One of them 
was Kim Jong Il’s concerns about the domestic politics of South Korea. Anti-
communism, especially anti-North Korean conservatism, had been the dominant ideology 
in South Korean politics since the Korean War. Also, in the interview with South Korean 
media heads in August 2000, Kim Jong Il said “The Southern government seems to be 
not as influential as I had thought.” 312  Kim Jong Il considered the conservative-
progressive split of domestic politics in South Korea and was concerned about the 
criticism of the strong conservatives in South Korea.  
3. Domestic Politics of South Korea 
Question 9: How did key domestic actors in South Korea perceive the 
reassurance strategy (the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy) offer to North Korea? Did the reassurance strategy generate 
domestic support in South Korea? Was there sufficient domestic support 
to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from 
fully implementing its reassurance strategy?  
                                                 
311 Chosun Ilbo, “Kim Jong Il’s Dialogue.” 
312 Ibid. 
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a. How Were the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy Toward North Korea Perceived? 
Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy received relatively high public support 
during the first and second year of his administration. However, results of later surveys 
asking whether people approved of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy toward North Korea 
or not showed that public support continuously declined (Table 2.10).  
Table 2.10.   Public Opinion on Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy 
 Approve Disapprove no response 
Jun 17, 1998313 76.9 7.1 16.1 
Feb 22, 1999314  70.2315 25.2 4.6 
Feb 24, 2000316 49 25.8 25.2 
Jun 8, 2001317 33.9 43.9 22.1 
As shown in Table 2.10, there were significant differences between 1998 
and 2001. In 2001, the approval rate was only 33.9 percent, which was 10 percent less 
than the disapproval rate. The reason for this decline was twofold. First, public opinion 
declined due to the lack of reciprocity from and provocative actions of North Korea. The 
number of provocative actions of North Korea did not decrease during the Kim Dae Jung 
administration. South Koreans remembered the 1999 and 2002 skirmishes in the West 
                                                 
313 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on June 17, 1998 (1625 sample, + - 2.4% sample error, and 95% 
reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=19980607009 (accessed on 
March 29, 2009).  
314 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 22, 1999 (1017 sample, + - 3.1% sample error, 95% 
reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=19990204007 (accessed on 
March 29, 2009).  
315 It is combination of 30.2% (those who wanted to strengthen the Sunshine policy) and 40.0% (those 
who wanted to maintain the current level of the Sunshine policy).  
316 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 24, 2000 (1062 samples, + - 3.0 sample error, 95% 
reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20000207006 (accessed on 
March 29, 2009).  
317 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on June 8, 2001 (1045 samples, + - 3.0 sample error, 95% 
reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20010601005 (accessed on 
March 29, 2009). 
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Sea and argued that South Korea should retaliate more and build a greater deterrence 
capability. Average South Koreans criticize the lack of reciprocity from North Korea. 
Paik Jin Hyun, a politics professor at Seoul National University, said, “We have seen 
enough symbolism, handshakes and wine toasts. Now we are looking for concrete 
evidence of change, and I don’t think we’ve seen it.”318 
Second, Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy was not implemented with wide 
national consensus. Lee Hong Koo, a former South Korean ambassador to the United 
States between 1998 and 2000, claimed that Kim Dae Jung was “too eager to reach some 
agreement with North Korea and also personally to leave a legacy in that regard.”319 He 
also said that the 2000 summit with Kim Jong Il was too soon and secret without national 
consensus: 
He was soon negotiating a summit with Kim Jong Il, which ultimately was 
held in Pyongyang in June 2000. But he and his closest advisors kept these 
negotiations completely private and secret and out of the regular channels 
of government decision making; they excluded the foreign and unification 
policy bureaucracy and also the elected political leaders in the National 
Assembly. I myself as the ambassador to the United States was kept in the 
dark, and I was becoming increasingly uncomfortable about my 
government’s handling of North Korea policy.320 
Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy was less popular than Kim 
Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy. In 2003, the first year of Roh Moo Hyun’s administration, 
33.9 percent of the voters approved his policy toward North Korea. This was related to 
the scandal of “bribes for summit.”321 In February 2003, Kim Dae Jung admitted that his 
government was involved in a $200 million payment to North Korea before the 2000 
summit meeting and this damaged the credibility of the Sunshine Policy.322 Also, North 
Korea’s nuclear activities since 2002 made the situation unfavorable to the 
                                                 
318 Newsweek, “A Battle for Peace; Skepticism at Home and Abroad Threatens South Korean 
President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy,” April 23, 2001, 34.  
319 KEI, Ambassadors’ Memoir, 138.  
320 Ibid., 138.  
321 Financial Times, “Kim Apology Fuels ‘Bribes for Summit,’” February 15, 2003, 
www.ft.com/northkorea (accessed on April 1, 2009).  
322 Ibid. 
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implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Therefore, as 
shown in Table 2.11, domestic support for the Peace and Prosperity Policy consistently 
declined and, in 2007, it was at 17.8 percent. Also, the disapprove percentage remained 
higher than the approve number after August 2003. It was difficult for Roh Moo Hyun to 
implement his Peace and Prosperity Polity toward North Korea with low domestic 
support.  
Table 2.11.   Public Opinion on Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy 
 Approve Disapprove Neutral No response 
May 31, 2003323 33.9 33.5 16.1 10.4 
Aug 23, 2003324 29.7 41.8 17.2 11.4 
Feb 21, 2004325 24.1 33.7 21.9 20.2 
Feb 19, 2007326 23.8 51.6 16 8.5 
Jun 23, 2007327 17.8 54.7 18.7 8.9 
b. The Sharp Polarization of Korean Society, Inadequate Domestic 
Support and Constraints from Conservatives 
(1) Hairline Victories in the 1997 and 2002 Presidential 
Elections and the Popularity Decline of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun.  Despite the 
consecutive victories by progressive candidates in both the 1997 and the 2002 
                                                 
323 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on May 31, 2003 (1038 samples, + - 3.0 sample error, 95% 
confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20030501005  (accessed on 
March 29, 2009). 
324 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on August 23, 2003 (1097 samples, + - 3.0 % sample error, 95% 
confidence, http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20030801008 (accessed on 
March 29, 2009). 
325 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 21, 2004 (1036 samples, + - 3.0 %  sample error, 
95% confidence) http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20040202016 (accessed 
on March 29, 2009). 
326 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 19, 2007 (1006 samples, + - 3.1 %  sample error, 
95% confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20070202010 (accessed 
on March 29, 2009). 
327 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on June 23, 2007 (1005 samples, + - 3.1 %  sample error, 95% 
confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20070601015 (accessed on 
March 29, 2009). 
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presidential elections, they were hairline victories and it was difficult to implement a 
reassurance strategy towards North Korea by ignoring conservatives. Kim Dae Jung won 
the 1997 presidential election for two main reasons—the conservative candidates’ split 
and support from another conservative leader Kim Jong Pil and his party, the United 
Liberal Democrats (ULD). 328 Lee In Jae, the governor of Gyeonggi province and a 
member of the ruling Party, the Grand National Party (GNP), left the party and ran for 
president on his own and Kim Jong Pil, a leader of the ULD made a pre-election pact 
with Kim Dae Jung and supported his bid for the presidency. Kim Dae Jung won the 
1997 presidential election with 40.3 percent support while the conservative party GNP’s 
leader, Lee Hoi Chang got 38.7 percent of the vote. The third was another conservative 
candidate, Lee In Jae who received 19.2 percent support.329  
The 2002 presidential election was even more competitive. Roh 
Moo Hyun was elected with 48.9 percent of the vote and it was only a 2.3 percent 
difference from the conservative leader, Lee Hoi Chang, who finished in second place.330 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had difficulty in starting the implementation of a 
reassurance strategy toward North Korea with limited public support and strong 
opposition from conservatives who strongly criticized any reassurance strategy toward 
North Korea.   
Furthermore, Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity 
continuously declined during their presidencies. After the 2000 summit meeting, Kim 
Dae Jung’s popularity was about 30 percent from 2001 to the end of his term in 2003. 
Figure 3 illustrates Kim Dae Jung’s popularity surveys conducted by Gallup Korea 
between 1998 and 2003 (Figure 2.7).  
                                                 
328 Economist.com, Country Briefings, South Korea, Political Forces, May 8, 2007, 
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(accessed on April 4, 2009).  
329 William E. Berry, Jr. Global Security Watch—Korea: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: 
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Figure 2.7. Kim Dae Jung’s Popularity (1998–2003)331 
According to the popularity surveys conducted by Gallup Korea, 
Roh Moo Hyun’s overall popularity was lower than 30 percent except during the first six 
months of his presidency. Figure 2.8 includes all the results of popularity surveys 
conducted by Gallup Korea between 2003 and 2007. The popularity decreased 
significantly in 2003 from 59.6 percent in April to 22 percent in December. In January 
2007, Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity was only 13.4 percent. There was some increase due 
to the 2007 summit meeting. However, his popularity fell back to only 22.9 percent in 
December 2007. After September 2003, Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity was generally less 
than 30 percent. Under this circumstance, Roh Moo Hyun could not actively implement 
his Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea.   
                                                 
331 Gallup Korea, Surveys conducted between June 1998 and February 2003, 






















































































































Figure 2.8. Roh Moo Hyun’s Popularity (2003–2007)332  
After the 2007 summit meeting, there was debate over the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL) issue in South Korea. Roh Moo Hyun expressed his idea 
about the NLL to reporters during the discussion of the inter-Korean summit. He said the 
NLL is “a line in the water between the two Koreas for military reasons.”333 According 
to Roh Moo Hyun, “There are people in this country who think the NLL issue is directly 
related to territory. That’s an idea that is sure to mislead the public….Why call a line 
drawn within the same territory a territorial border and have concerns for territorial 
sovereignty?”334 There was a survey questioning whether South Koreans agreed with 
Roh Moo Hyun’s statement about the NLL. The survey showed 59 percent of South 
Koreans did not agree with Roh Moo Hyun’s statement (Table 2.12):   
                                                 
332 Gallup Korea, Surveys conducted between April 2003 and December 2007, 
http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/ (accessed on March 29, 2009).  
333 Lee Min, “Roh Concludes Yellow Sea Line is not a Border,” JoongAng Daily, October 12, 2007, 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2881438 (accessed on April 7, 2009). 
334 Ibid.  
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Table 2.12.   Response to Roh Moo Hyun’s statement about NLL335 






8.9% 23.3% 26.2% 32.8% 8.9% 
Positive: 32.1 % Negative: 59%  
(2) No Majority in the Legislature during the Kim Dae Jung 
and Roh Moo Hyun Administrations.  Kim Dae Jung’s party did not have a majority in 
the legislature during his administration (Table 2.13).  
Table 2.13.   Distribution of National Assembly Seats by Political Party336 
 NCNP (1996) / MDP (2000) 
NKP(1996) / 
GNP(2000) ULD Other Parties 
April 1996 79 139 50 16 
April 2000 115 133 17 8 
The majority party was Grand National Party (GNP) which represented conservatives. 
The GNP was a strong opposition group against the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae Jung had 
difficulty getting any legislation passed by the National Assembly. Furthermore, the 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP)’s popularity decreased. Also, the MDP lost in by-
elections in three constituencies in October 2001.337 Finally, Kim Dae Jung relinquished 
                                                 
335 Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on October 16, 2007 (864 samples, + - 3.3 %  sample error, 95% 
confidence), http://panel.gallup.co.kr/svcdb/condition_content.asp?objSN=20071001008 (accessed on 
April 3, 2009).  
336 Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea, 98, referring to Kim Doh Jong and Kim Hyung Joon, “Analysis 
of the 16th National Assembly Election,” Korea Focus 8, no. 3 (May-June 2000): 2.  
337 Asiaweek, “Three Sixty: The Week: The Rejection-‘Sunshine’ President Kim Dae Jung Has Come 
under a Dark Cloud,” November 9, 2001, 1.  
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his party’s leadership in November 2001 to take responsibility for the defeats and this 
created a lame-duck situation for the rest of his term.338  
Furthermore, Roh Moo Hyun was impeached by the opposition 
parties in March 2004 by a vote of 193 to 2 in the National Assembly.339 The GNP and 
MDP members of the legislature claimed that Roh Moo Hyun violated election laws by 
supporting the Uri party.340 Roh Moo Hyun did not join the Uri Party, but said that he 
would do everything he could legally to support the Uri Party in the April 15 elections.341  
However, the violation of election law was just a plausible excuse for impeachment. The 
fundamental reason for impeachment was the tension between Roh Moo Hyun and the 
opposition party. According to BBC, “The impeachment is the culmination of a row 
between Mr. Roh and the opposition-controlled National Assembly. Analysts say the 
charges against Mr. Roh were relatively minor, and the stand-off has more to do with 
jockeying for the 15 April general elections.”342  
After the impeachment, tens of thousands of South Koreans joined 
candlelight vigils to oppose the decision of the assembly members. 343  Three main 
broadcasting services conducted surveys about people’s opinions on the impeachment. 
Almost 70 percent of South Koreans disapproved of the Roh Moo Hyun’s impeachment 
by the GNP and MDP members.344 This public anger was reflected in the results of the 
April 2004 legislative election. The Uri Party345 became a majority party in the April 
                                                 
338 Choi Hae Won, “Korean President Gives Up Ruling-Party Leadership—Penance for Election Loss, 
Move Clouds Prospects for Economic Program,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2001, A13.  
339 BBC, “South Korean President Impeached,” 12 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
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340 Ser Myo Ja, “Parties Present Bill to Impeach the President,” JoongAng Daily, March 9, 2004. 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2106792 (accessed on April 10, 2009). 
341 Ibid.  
342 BBC, “South Korean President Impeached.” 
343 Samuel Len, “President’s Impeachment Stirs Angry Protests in South Korea,” New York Times, 
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345 The Party name was originally Our Open Party and Changed to Uri Party. “Uri” means Our in 
Korea.  
 130
2004 legislative elections.346 In May 2004, the Constitutional Court declared that Roh 
Moo Hyun’s violation of the election law was not serious enough for him to be 
impeached.347  
However, the Uri Party’s popularity decreased considerably and it 
lost in the next by-election and regional elections. Finally, the Uri Party could not 
maintain its majority status after mass defections in early 2007. On February 7, 2007, 
twenty-three lawmakers left the Uri Party and the GNP became the majority party with 
127 seats.348 In June 2007, the Uri Party had only seventy-three lawmakers after more 
defections. It was less than half of the result of 2004 legislative elections. 349  One 
principle of the Uri Party was continuation of the Sunshine Policy. However, the Uri 
Party could not implement the Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun could not get support 
from the Uri Party for the implementation of the Peace and Prosperity Policy.  
(3) The Fierce Opposition from Conservative Media and 
NGOs.  The domestic politics of South Korea have been deeply divided into 
conservatives and progressives, and supporting and opposing groups about the Sunshine 
Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Generally, progressives are described as 
supporters of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy while 
conservatives have been opponents. The government party and the opposition party have 
debated fiercely on the implementation of those policies. Not only the government and 
parties, but also the media, civil groups, and nongovernmental organizations are deeply 
divided into supporting and opposing groups about the government policy toward North 
Korea. Norman D. Levin and Han Yong Sup said, “The major South Korean actors…are 
sharply divided between supporters and opponents of the sunshine policy. They are 
                                                 
346 Ser Myo Ja, “Open Party Eyeing Majority,” JoongAng Daily, April 15, 2004, 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2122677 (accessed on April 11, 2009).  
347 Min Seong Jae and Jo Kang Su, “President Resumes Power,” JoongAng Daily, May 14, 2004, 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2414437 (accessed on April 10, 2009).  
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equally divided on the effectiveness of the policy in producing changes in North 
Korea.”350 They created a figure351 that shows the division of South Koreas between 
supporters and opponents (Figure 2.9). This division of South Koreas continued during 
Roh Moo Hyun’s presidency.  
 
Figure 2.9. Notional Positions of Major Actors on Sunshine Policy 
The media was divided into two groups. The three major TV 
broadcasting services such as MBC (Moonhwa Broadcasting Company), KBS (Korea 
Broadcasting System), and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System) have generally supported 
the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. The most influential 
progressive newspaper is Hankyoreh Sinmun, which regards “the Sunshine policy as a 
means for reducing the possibility of war and fostering inter-Korean reconciliation.”352 In 
                                                 
350 Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea, 87. 
351 Ibid., 88. 
352 Ibid., 75.  
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the 2000s, many progressive internet news sites such as Ohmynews,353 Pressian,354 and 
Redian355 were established and expressed more progressive perspectives. Even though 
these progressive media all generally supported the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and 
Prosperity Policy, there was strong opposition from the conservative media.    
The three biggest newspapers, Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and 
Donga Ilbo have played a strong role and are influential in conservative circles. Cho-
Joong-Dong is an abbreviation of these three newspapers and symbolizes a strong 
conservative group in Korea. They strongly criticized the Sunshine Policy and the Peace 
and Prosperity Policy and have supported a more hard-line policy toward North Korea 
based on strong deterrent capabilities and the rule of reciprocity. Chosun Ilbo is anti-
Communist and anti-North Korea and criticized the Sunshine Policy “for having 
weakened South Korea’s security, while predicating South Korean policy on the ‘naïve’ 
assumption that North Korea can be enticed to change.”356 Donga Ilbo has expressed 
“strong doubts about the sincerity of Kim Jong Il’s reputed statement that he accepts the 
U.S. military presence in South Korea, while it has warned against revising South 
Korea’s National Security Law until there is evidence of a corresponding change in 
Pyongyang’s attitude.”357 JoongAng Ilbo has also criticized unilateral aid and insisted 
that “reciprocity should be applied to all interactions between the two Koreas.”358 The 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations were constrained from fully 
implementing the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy by these fierce 
opposition newspapers. 
                                                 
353 OhmyNews, www.ohmynews.com. It was established in 2000.  
354 Pressian, www.pressian.org. It was established in 2004. Pressian is a combination of Press and 
Internet Alternative News Media.  
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356 Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea, 73. 
357 Ibid., 74.  
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Peace and Prosperity Policy.    
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On the other hand, after decades of dictatorial rule, civil society 
groups and nongovernmental organizations became important actors in South Korea in 
the 1990s and the 2000s. Levin and Han give brief overviews of the major civic groups 
and NGOs during Kim Dae Jung’s administration by dividing them into the progressive 
and conservative sides of the spectrum.359 On the progressive side of the spectrum, the 
Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC), Citizen’s Coalition for 
Economic Justice (CCEJ), People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), 
Anti-U.S. and Anti-U.S. Military Base NGOs and labor groups such as the Federal of 
Korean Trade Union (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) 
were established in the 1990s and have played important roles in progressive circles.360  
In response to the rise of progressive groups in the 1990s, 
conservative groups were created in the mid-1990s.361 They have emphasized “liberal 
democracy and an open market economy”362 and have supported a more hard-line policy 
toward North Korea. The National Congress of Freedom and Democracy (NCFD), 
Korean Freedom League (KFL), and Korean Veterans Association (KVA) are typical 
conservative groups in South Korea.  For example, the NCFD has opposed the Sunshine 
Policy and insisted on a formal apology “for North Korea’s past terrorist activities and a 
pledge to end its weapons of mass destruction program, missile activity, and other 
threatening behavior.”363  
Consequently, South Korea is deeply divided into supporters and 
opponents of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy in parties, media, 
civil groups and nongovernmental organizations (Table 2.14). The fierce debates between 
these two groups constrained the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations from 
implementing their more progressive approach to North Korea.     
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362 Ibid., 82.  
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Table 2.14.   Positions of Major Actors on the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and 
Prosperity Policy 
Notional Position Support Oppose 
Political 
Orientation Progressives Conservatives 
The Parties MDP, Uri Party GNP 
The Media MBC / KBS / SBS, Hankyoreh 
Sinmun, Ohmynews, Pressian, 
Redian  
Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, 
Donga Ilbo 
Civil Groups and 
Nongovernmental 
Groups 
KCRC, CCEJ, PSPD, Anti-U.S. 
and Anti-U.S. Military Base 
NGOs, Labor Groups such as 
FKTU and KCTU. 
NCFD, KFL, KVA 
The debate between conservatives and progressives shows the 
difference in identity. Conservatives consider North Korea an adversary threatening 
South Korea. Progressives, on the other hand, see North Korea as a brother nation with 
which they should live together to the end. During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
administrations, the progressive perspective increased compared to previous 
administrations and led to an identity shift in the domestic politics of South Korea.  
However, it was not sufficient to make reassurance credible.   
South Korea needed more support from its domestic politics to 
implement reassurance strategies. For the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the 
Peace Prosperity Policy, a series of conciliatory initiatives were required to be taken 
independently of North Korea’s response. The policies could not be maintained without 
support from South Koreans, especially from the military and conservatives. From the 
point of the view of the military, the strategic situation could be dangerous. During the 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, public opinion about the Sunshine 
Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy showed that there was not full support for 
implementation and there was much criticism and a request for immediate reciprocity by 
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the North. Therefore, a domestic consensus in beginning a series of conciliatory actions is 
a prerequisite for implementation of reassurance strategies.  
4. Domestic Politics of North Korea 
Question 10: How did key domestic actors in North Korea perceive Kim 
Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity 
Policy? Did South Korea’s reassurance strategy generate domestic support 
in North Korea for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try to 
prevent North Korea from offering a positive response? 
a. Sungun (Military-First) Politics in North Korea 
Kim Jong Il transformed North Korea “from a party-state system to a 
military-first political system” beginning with the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994.364 
Ilpyong J. Kim said, “During the Kim Il Sung period (1948-1994), the Korean Workers’ 
Party (KWP) played the central role in North Korean politics. However, the role of KWP 
has been gradually diminished while the role of the North Korean military in politics has 
rapidly increased under Kim Jong Il’s leadership.”365 One explanation for the power shift 
from the KWP to the Korean People’ Army (KPA) is “Kim’s suspicions of senior KWP 
cadres of his father’s generation, who are less responsive to his command than younger 
KPA officers. He knows from history that Kim Il Sung took one decade of KWP 
factional struggles to reach the summit.”366  
Kim Jong Il was elected to the first vice chair of the National Defense 
Commission (NDC) in May 1990 and was reelected as the NDC chairman in September 
1998.367 In 1998, North Korea amended its constitution making Kim Il Sung the “eternal 
president” and Kim Jong Il became the supreme leader as the chairman of the NDC, “a 
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position that has functioned as the center of political power in North Korea ever since—
the most powerful position in the government of the DPRK.”368 Ilpyong J. Kim also said, 
“In the communist political system the general secretary of the communist party is 
traditionally most powerful, as is the case in China as well as in the former Soviet Union. 
It was also the case in North Korea prior to the constitutional amendment of 1998.”369  
The power shift from KWP to KPA was clearly shown in formal North 
Korean leadership ranking.370 Military leaders rose to higher positions after the death of 
Kim Il Sung and they made up the largest share of entourage members.371 Furthermore, 
the military had become superior to any other institution in North Korea, especially since 
the amendment of the constitution in 1998. Ilpyong J. Kim concluded, “In fact the 
military is so powerful that is above the state. The military has now become the supreme 
commander of the state, the party, and society, turning North Korea into a military 
garrison state.”372  
For example, after the constitutional change, Cho Myong Rok, the first 
vice chairman of the NDC, was promoted to second to Kim Jong Il from the seventh in 
ranking during the rule of Kim Il Sung.373 He was a fighter pilot in the Korean War and a 
friend of Kim Il Sung.374 In October 2000, Kim Jong Il sent Cho Myong Rok rather than 
a foreign ministry official to the United States. Cho Myong Rok carried a letter from Kim 
Jong Il and met President Bill Clinton on October 10, 2000.375 He was the first North 
Korean official to visit the United States and meet the U.S. president, fifty years after the 
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Korean War began.376 Cho changed to his military uniform to meet President Clinton. 
American officials said, “it is intended to denote that for the first time the powerful North 
Korean military, rather than the country’s far weaker diplomatic corps, had taken center 
stage in the negotiations with the United States.”377 Wendy R. Sherman, a special advisor 
to [Clinton] on Korean affairs, said that Cho’s visit, “conveys a very important message 
to us and the citizens of North Korea…that this effort to improve relations is one shared 
not only by the civilian side, the Foreign Ministry, but by the military as well.”378 
b. Military Turf: Interest in Interfering with the Positive Response 
to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy 
There were two naval skirmishes, one in June 1999 and another in June 
2002. Even though it is not clear whether these activities were planned and executed by 
Kim Jong Il, political elites, high-ranking military elites, or the local military leaders, 
they were implemented by the military against South Korea. Because Kim Jong Il is 
actively involved in the fine points of government policy, there is a high possibility that 
the two naval skirmishes resulted from instructions given by the North Korean leader. 
These kinds of activities were definitely not a positive response to the Sunshine Policy. It 
would have been impossible for North and South Korea to trust each other after these 
bloody conflicts. North Korea did not get any benefit from these skirmishes but became a 
more isolated state.  
In May 2006, North Korea cancelled test runs for train services between 
North Korea and South Korea.379 The reason for the cancellation was not clear, but it is 
believed that the military influenced North Korea’s decision to cancel the test train 
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run.380 According to North Korean media, the North sent the following notice to South 
Korea: “It is our view that it is impossible to conduct the trial operation of a north-south 
train on May 25 as scheduled, given that the military authorities of both sides have failed 
to take any measure for a military guarantee, the south side is creating a very unstable 
situation unfavorable for holding such a national event as the trial train operation as 
evidenced by the pro-U.S. ultra-right conservative forces’ frantic acts of burning the flag 
of the dignified DPRK, recklessly attacking the June 15 forces almost every day and 
pushing the situation in Korea to an extreme phase of confrontation and war as your side 
is aware of these developments.”381 From these kinds of cases, it can be assumed that the 
military played an important role in the decision-making of how to respond to the 
Sunshine Policy offered by South Korea.  
Even though Kim Jong Il was clearly in charge of running the government, 
he needed the support of military to maintain his power. The military also had a strong 
interest in protecting their turf won from the KWP after the death of Kim Il Sung and 
during the succession to Kim Jong Il. Ken E. Gause said, “The military elite (or at least 
the harder-line elements with the high command), fearing a loss of status and the control 
it won from the KWP in the late 1990s, allegedly has moved to block the country’s early 
ventures into capitalism.” 382  Gause explained one interesting theory to describe the 
military’s status:  
According to one theory, Kim decided to declare the existence of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons to counter the military security arguments. The 
military had been arguing: “Why does North Korea have to take a 
conciliatory stance by suggesting the possibility of abandoning nuclear 
weapons when the United States keeps its hostile policy toward North 
Korea unchanged? The regime is still beset with instability because of 
that, which makes it all the more necessary for the military to take action.” 
Therefore, North Korea needed to declare its possession of nuclear 
weapons in terms of saying that it could handle its own security without 
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having to make a compromise to the United States to pacify the military 
before instituting a shift away from the military-first policy.383 
It is clear that the military played a central role in North Korea and it 
would act to protect its “turf.” It prevented North Korea from responding more positively 
toward South Korea’s reassurance strategy. 
5. Alliance Politics of South Korea 
Question 11: How did key allies of South Korea affect the Sunshine 
Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy offered to North Korea? Was 
there sufficient alliance support to make reassurance credible, or was the 
government constrained from fully implementing its Sunshine Policy? 
a. The Kim Dae Jung Administration and the Clinton 
Administration  
In August 1998, United States intelligence agencies announced that they 
detected a secret underground facility at Kumchang-ri in North Korea that they believed 
to be the centerpiece of an effort to revive North Korea’s frozen nuclear weapons 
program. The media reported this as a serious problem.384 The issue resulted in very 
controversial debates over whether the United States should maintain the 1994 Agreed 
Framework. The U.S. Congress considered a cut-off of fuel-oil shipments to North Korea.  
However, it turned out that the United States intelligence agencies made 
mistakes and that the underground site was not for the nuclear weapons program. In late 
August 1998, the United States and South Korea told North Korea that the underground 
facilities did not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, this news did not appear 
as prominently in the main media.385 Later, in May 1999, a group of U.S. inspectors 
visited the suspected underground facilities and reportedly concluded it was “an 
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extensive, empty tunnel complex.”386 The suspected underground facilities threatened the 
collapse of the five-year-old 1994 Agreed Framework. The issue hurt efforts to improve 
inter-Korean relations after the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung and implementation of the 
Sunshine Policy in February 1998.  
However, after the 2000 inter-Korean summit, the relationship between 
the United States and North Korea was improving. President Bill Clinton supported Kim 
Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and wished to promote peace on the Korean peninsula by 
coordinating with Kim’s administration. Yang Sung Chul, a former South Korean 
ambassador to the United States between 2000 and 2003, described the September 2000 
summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Clinton as a very smooth meeting.387 He 
said that “The two presidents were in full agreement over President Kim’s North Korean 
policy, and the atmosphere of their meeting could not have been better.”388 Later, Clinton 
expressed the importance of cooperation with South Korea in dealing with the North 
Korean issue. He said, “Let me emphasize that I believe this process of engagement with 
North Korea, in co-ordination with South Korea and Japan, holds great promise and that 
the United States should continue to build on the progress we have made.”389 
In late 2000, there was the possibility of a summit meeting between 
Clinton and Kim Jong Il. North Korean Marshall Cho Myong Rok visited Washington to 
discuss the summit on October 9-12. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met Kim 
Jong Il during a return visit to Pyongyang on October 23-25. Both visits were 
“preparatory visits” before the summit.390 Clinton pledged to visit North Korea, but the 
summit did not materialize. Reflecting the impending change to a new administration,  
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Clinton announced, “There is not enough time while I am president to prepare the way 
for an agreement with North Korea that advances our national interest and provides the 
basis for a trip by me to Pyongyang.”391  
Stephen Bosworth, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea between 
1997 and 2000, advised Clinton not to go to Pyongyang for the summit meeting with 
Kim Jong Il, “because chances of any breakthrough were slim.”392 Bosworth said:  
When asked by Washington in mid-December for my views, I cautioned 
that a presidential visit to North Korea should be the culmination of a 
successful diplomatic process….If a summit were going to be held, there 
should be a reasonable likelihood that it would lead to a real 
breakthrough….As a practical matter, there was not enough time to lay the 
negotiating groundwork, and the administration reluctantly accepted that 
there could be no U.S.-DPRK (North Korean) Summit.393  
Madeleine Albright described the difficult situations in the lame-duck year 
of the Clinton administration:  
…day by day, week by week, the White House delayed making a final 
decision because of the scheduling chaos created by crisis-driven 
negotiations on the Middle East. As the holidays neared, the President felt 
he had to choose between a trip to North Korea …and a crash effort to 
reach closure with the Israelis and Palestinians. In the final effort to 
sidestep this choice, we invited Chairman Kim to come to Washington. 
North Korea replied that they could not accept the invitation.394 
Clinton’s visit to North Korea, with “the full support of the Kim Dae Jung 
government, was aborted in the end.”395 Clinton recently said he regretted that he did not 
visit North Korea.396 The consequences of a summit meeting between Clinton and Kim 
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Jong Il were not assured. However, as Clinton said, it would have been a possible chance 
to solve the nuclear and missile problems on the Korean peninsula.  
b. The Kim Dae Jung Administration and the Bush Administration 
The first meeting between Kim Dae Jung and George W. Bush in March 
2001 was held when the Bush administration was reviewing the relationship of the 
United States with North Korea. The United States had not expressed its policy toward 
North Korea clearly. However, the Bush administration’s approach to North Korea was 
totally different from the Clinton administration’s. There was an “Anything But Clinton 
(ABC)” tone toward foreign policy in the White House. Therefore, the way that the Bush 
administration perceived Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy changed from Clinton’s.  
Two former U.S. ambassadors to South Korea during the Kim Dae Jung 
administration testified about the changes from the Clinton administration to the Bush 
administration. Bosworth said, “As I told President Kim and my Korean friends, I 
anticipated that after a period of taking stock the Bush administration would eventually 
pick up with North Korea pretty much where Clinton had left off and that the United 
States would continue to support Kim Dae Jung’s efforts to engage with Pyongyang….I 
was obviously very mistaken. The inauguration of George W. Bush, and then the events 
of 11 September 2001, brought a very different U.S. approach to the world and to North 
Korea.”397 Thomas Hubbard, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea between 2001 
and 2004 said: 
The frosty atmosphere that surrounded President Kim Dae Jung’s meeting 
with President Bush in March 2001, when it became clear that the new 
administration would not carry on with President Clinton’s engagement 
policy vis-à-vis the North, graphically displayed these differences to both 
publics and brought home to all of us how hard it is maintain a healthy 
bilateral relationship without a clear sense of common purpose with regard 
to North Korea. Differences over how to deal with the North cast a 
shadow over U.S.-ROK relations that persisted throughout my tenure in 
Seoul and beyond.398 
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Yang Sung Chul, a former South Korean ambassador to the United States 
between 2000 and 2003, watched Kim Dae Jung’s two meetings with Clinton in New 
York in 2000 and with Bush in Washington in 2001 and described the differences. He 
said, “At a minimum, the atmosphere of the two summits…were completely different 
because President Kim was meeting two political personalities whose backgrounds, 
upbringings, experiences, expertise, policy visions, and personal values contrasted 
substantially and even fundamentally.”399  
The Bush administration’s policy review was announced in June 2001. 
The Bush administration added to the agenda for negotiations issues such as the North 
Korean missile program, missile exports, North Korean conventional forces, and its 
human rights record.400 This “raised the bar substantially for any successful negotiations 
with North Korea.”401 Then, there was the September 11 attack that raised terrorism as 
the most significant threat to the United States and U.S. policy toward North Korea 
become less enthusiastic about negotiations with North Korea. In 2002, the Bush 
administration’s policy toward North Korea became clearer. The Bush administration 
completed the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS). 
The NPR “outlined plans to develop conventional and nuclear weapons that would be 
able to attack underground bunkers and specifically mentioned the DPRK as one of the 
seven countries against whom these weapons might be targeted.”402 The NSS called 
explicit attention to U.S. willingness to act preemptively if it deemed it necessary. 
President Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union address, described North 
Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil.” After the Axis of Evil statement, Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy could not be implemented more proactively because tensions increased 
between the United States and North Korea. Kim Dae Jung believed that the Bush 
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administration put obstacles in the way of success of the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae Jung 
expressed this in an interview with CNN in 2006:   
Within the North and South Korean relationship, the Sunshine Policy has 
been successful. But with North Korea and the United States, the 
relationship was better during the Clinton administration as there was 
greater cooperation. 
Since the start of the Bush administration, relations between the two 
countries have worsened. And in the process, that's caused complications 
to the Sunshine Policy.403 
c. The Roh Moo Hyun Administration and the Bush 
Administration 
Differences over North Korea between South Korea and the United States 
continued to exist during the Roh Moo Hyun administration. There were several 
occasions showing the different perspectives and approaches toward North Korea 
between Roh Moo Hyun and Bush. In November 2004, Roh Moo Hyun visited Los 
Angeles on his way to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 
Chile. 404  He expressed his idea view of North Korea during his speech to the Los 
Angeles World Affairs Council. He said that “North Korea’s nuclear weapons pursuit 
cannot be viewed as an instrument to attack…or to assist terrorist groups….North Korea 
will abandon its nuclear weapons if it can discover the hope that its security will be 
assured.”405  
According to Han Sung Joo, the former South Korean ambassador to the 
U.S. between 2003 and 2005, this statement “was sure to cause raised eyebrows and 
disappointment if not outright anger in Washington.”406 Before the Roh Moo Hyun and 
Bush meeting in Chile, Han Sung Joo returned to Washington and explained to the White 
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House staff that “President Roh had profound and genuine concerns about the possibility 
of military conflict breaking out on the Korean peninsula, and his wish was that the North 
Korea nuclear issue would be resolved in a peaceful and mutually beneficial way.”407   
Han Sung Joo described what happened in the summit meeting: 
…we agreed that it would be best for relations between our two countries 
and our ability to deal with North Korea if President Roh’s Los Angeles 
remarks did not become an issue at the forthcoming Santiago summit. As 
it happened, President Bush, who surely must have been briefed about it, 
did not even mention the remark at the meeting, much less question its 
meaning or purpose.  
But, to everyone’s surprise, President Roh did. He did so to explain that 
his remark was intended to rebuke not the policy of the Bush 
administration, but the views expressed by some “ultra hard-line 
commentators” in Washington D.C. To his credit, and to the relief of 
others present, President Bush chose not to prolong that part of the summit 
discussion.408 
Also, Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to Korea between 2005 and 
2008, described the Roh Moo Hyun and Bush summit meeting in Gyeongju in November 
2005 as the “worst-ever ROK-U.S. Summit.” The two sides diverged especially over 
recent U.S. financial sanctions intended to pressure North Korea to stop arms trafficking: 
Roh and his team, keen to build on the September 2005 joint statement—
with its comprehensive vision of a new peace structure for the Korean 
peninsula and Northeast Asia—couldn’t comprehend why the United 
States would put all of this at risk through its crackdown on North Korean 
illicit activities. This disagreement was the backdrop for the worst-ever 
ROK-U.S. summit, held in Gyeongju in November 2005, when Presidents 
Roh and Bush argued for more than an hour over the Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA) case.409  
 
                                                 




After the 2007 inter-Korean summit meeting, Roh Moo Hyun asked 
President Bush to meet Kim Jong Il right away. However, Bush said that the meeting 
would be possible only “after North Korea dismantled its nuclear program and gave up its 
nuclear weapons.”410  
All these episodes show that there were different perspectives toward 
North Korea between South Korea and the United States during the Bush administration. 
Thomas Hubbard emphasized the importance of alliance politics. He said that “I certainly 
learned that I could not deal effectively with South Korea without giving a great deal of 
thought and attention to the problem of North Korea, which still lies at the center of our 
alliance. It was equally apparent to me that U.S. policymakers could not expect to deal 
effectively with the North Korean problem without taking seriously into account the 
needs and concerns of our ally in the South.”411  
The concerns of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations 
were not taken into account seriously enough during the Bush administration. The Bush 
administration perceived the offers of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy to North Korea as naïve and insufficient. Therefore, the Bush administration did 
not offer support to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy towards 
North Korea. As a result, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations were 
constrained from fully implementing the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy. 
6. Alliance Politics of North Korea 
Question 12: How did key allies of North Korea perceive Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy? Did 
the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy generate alliance 
support for North Korea’s reciprocity? Did North Korea’s key allies try to 
prevent North Korea from offering a positive response? 
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a. Perceptions of China and Russia about the Sunshine Policy 
Offered by South Korea 
(1) South Korea’s Normalization with China and Russia.  
China and Russia’s relations have a sensitive nature with the two Koreas, which has 
remained a dilemma for Beijing and Moscow since they established official diplomatic 
relations and increased economic cooperation with South Korea in the early 1990s. South 
Korea rushed to normalize ties with China and the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet 
Union established full diplomatic relations with South Korea on January 1, 1991, after 
Gorbachev’s meeting with the former South Korean President Roh Tae Woo.412 Even 
though it was suggested that a special envoy to do a “distasteful job” be sent, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, felt obligated to go himself to Pyongyang 
because he knew that it would be very difficult to convince North Korea to accept 
normalization with South Korea. 413  Shevardnadze argued that “North Korea would 
benefit from Moscow’s diplomatic relations with Seoul because Soviet officials would be 
able to talk directly with the South on North-South issues, the problem of the U.S. troops 
and nuclear weapons, and any other topics of importance to Pyongyang.”414 
The North Korean foreign minister, Kim Young Nam replied that 
“it would reinforce the division of the country and severely aggravate relations between 
Moscow and Pyongyang.”415 North Korean leaders might have realized that there was a 
change in the balance of power in the post-cold war era. They might have started 
considering a self-reliant nuclear weapons program at that time, too.  
China followed the Soviet Union’s lead in moving toward a normal 
relationship with South Korea. 416  The trade between China and South Korea grew 
tremendously after China opened to market economics and became seven times larger 
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than its trade with North Korea.417 China pushed North Korea to accept the concept of 
the two Koreas being admitted to the United Nations. South and North Korea joined the 
UN General Assembly in 1991. North Korea announced, “It had no choice but to apply 
for UN membership–even though dual membership would be an obstacle to unification–
because, otherwise, the South would join the United Nations alone.”418 North Korea’s 
new relationships with the Soviet Union and China might have made North Korea think 
about its security differently.  
After the normalization of their relations with South Korea in the 
early 1990s, China and Russia wanted to maintain a good relationship with South Korea 
as well as the status quo on the Korean peninsula. China and Russia have strategic and 
economic national interests in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula without 
unexpected change in short term. In this context, China and Russia have supported the 
Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy because they pursue the coexistence 
of the two Koreas and gradual change without the collapse of North Korea and absorption 
of North Korea into South Korea.  
(2) Limited Support for the Sunshine Policy.  Generally 
Speaking, North Korea’s two main allies, China and Russia, supported the Sunshine 
Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy because they wanted to maintain a good 
relationship with South Korea and North Korea both. However, they were not able to 
persuade North Korea to respond positively. The two countries mostly seek to maintain 
the status quo on the Korean peninsula. China and Russia not only improved their 
relationship with South Korea but also maintained diplomatic and strategic relationships 
with North Korea. Therefore, they neither actively cooperated with South Korea to help 
implement the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy, nor strongly 
influenced North Korea to respond positively.  
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Several scholars agree that China prefers stability without big 
change over a short time period. Quansheng Zhao says, “Regarding the issues of Korean 
unification and peace process, it is believed that the prevailing consensus with the Beijing 
leadership is to maintain the status quo.”419 Fei-Ling Wang also argues, “Unsure of the 
consequences of a Korean reunification, China has joined the other three major powers 
and adopted the preservation of the status quo as the guiding principle of its Korea 
policy.”420 Chalmers Johnson argues that China “prefers a structurally divided Korea that 
is unable to play its full role as a buffer between China, Russia, and Japan, thereby giving 
China a determining influence on the peninsula.”421 Also, the Chinese foreign ministry 
expresses its favor for dialogue between two Koreas. For example, after the two Koreas 
announced the 2007 summit meeting in Pyongyang, the Chinese foreign ministry said on 
its official website that, “China consistently supports efforts by the North and South to 
improve bilateral relations and realize reconciliation and cooperation through dialogue. 
We welcome the positive results of the summit and believe it will be conducive to the 
peaceful progress of the Korean peninsula and the stability of the region.”422 
Russia shows a similar passive attitude toward Korean issues. Joo 
Seung Ho explains, “Russia favors a gradual process to Korean unification, and its 
position may be summarized as follows: the two Koreas should pursue a long-term 
peaceful coexistence before they achieve unification; South Korea or the U.S. should not 
attempt to change North Korea’s behavior or seek North Korea’s collapse; Korean 
unification should be achieved through peaceful means; and the two Koreas should 
negotiate for peaceful unification on an equal footing.”423 
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b. China and Russia’s Loss of Leverage over North Korea 
Considering the balance of power in Northeast Asia, some neorealists 
would argue that “the end of the Cold War left North Korea with no choice but to 
internally counteract the sharp deterioration of the external balance of power.”424 North 
Korea has become more isolated and relies more on its own defense. China and Russia 
have lost their leverage to influence North Korea’s policy. One Chinese official says, 
“The North Koreans don’t listen to us…they don’t listen to anyone.”425 It summarizes 
North Korea’s attitude to China and Russia.  
The change of North Korea’s relationship with China and Russia has 
recently been shown. For example, after North Korea’s missile test on July 4, 2006, 
Chinese leaders were frustrated. The United States Assistant Secretary of State 
Christopher Hill said, “I think the Chinese are as baffled as we are by North Korea’s 
actions. China has done so much for that country and that country just seems intent on 
taking all of China’s generosity and giving nothing back.”426 Yan Xuetong, a professor 
of international relations at Bejing’s Tsinghua University, stated “I think that China is 
very unhappy with North Korea, which put it in a very awkward position. China now 
feels it is trapped in a game it can’t win.”427  
Sandip Kumar Mishra, a professor at the Department of East Asian 
Studies, University of Delhi, India, argues “After the North Korean missile tests, it has 
become more obvious that Pyongyang is not ready to listen to anybody in its resolution to 
                                                 
424 C.S. Eliot Kang, “North Korea’s Engagement Motives,” in The Korean Peace Process and the 
Four Powers, ed. ed. Kwak, Tae-Hwan and Joo, Seung-Ho (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003) 65, quoted in 
David Kang’s ‘North Korea: Deterrence Through Danger,” in Asian Security Practice: Material and 
Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 234–
263.  
425 Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 22, Cha’s personal interview, high-level Chinese foreign 
ministry official with Asia portfolio, Washington, D.C., October 1997.  
426 Simon, Elegant, “The Worst of Friends,” in Time, Asia ed., July 24, 2006. 




get direct talks with the United States at any cost.”428 Also, North Korea’s refusal to 
participate in the Six-Party Talks in November 2005 between the two Koreas, China, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States, throws doubt on whether China can play a key role 
in persuading North Korea.429 Paik Hak-soon, a scholar at the Sejong Institute, a North 
Korean think-tank based in Seoul, said, “Chinese policy is striking a very fine balance 
between North Korea and the United States. If China does help, the North Korean 
leadership is determined to go in its own way.”430  
North Korea claimed that it conducted a nuclear test on October 9, 
2006.431 The situations before and after the nuclear test clearly show the limitations of 
China’s and Russia’s leverage with North Korea. North Korea provided information 
about the 2006 nuclear test only thirty minutes before the event. China was very 
concerned about the short notice. Even though there were many speculations and doubts 
about the nuclear test, the United National Security Council condemned North Korea’s 
action.432 China and Russia both denounced it. China said it “firmly opposes” North 
Korea’s conduct and Russian President Putin said “Russia absolutely condemns North 
Korea’s nuclear test.”433  
Consequently, the end of the Cold War has changed the balance of power 
against North Korea. Such factors as the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic 
development of China, and South Korea’s normalization with China and the Soviet 
                                                 
428 Sandip Kumar Mishra, “Does China Still have Leverage?” Korean Times, August 14, 2006, 
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/
opinion/200608/kt2006081418530754060.htm&media=kt (accessed on April 6, 2009). 
429 Mishra, “Does China Still have Leverage?”   
430 Paik, Hak-soon quoted in Carpenter, Christopher, “China Walks a Fine Line with North,” Korean 
Times, August 4, 2006, 
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/
nation/200608/kt2006080418104111990.htm&media=kt (accessed on April 6, 2009). 
431 KCNA, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” October 9, 2006, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. (accessed on April 6, 2009). 
432 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, 
Implications, and U.S. Options,” CRS Report for Congress, December 12, 2006, Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service. 
433 David Stout and John O’Neil, “North Korea’s Claim is Met with Doubt and Anger,” New York 
Times, October 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09cnd-
nuke.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1 (accessed on March 29, 2009).  
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Union in 1991 help explain why North Korea seems to have decided to develop a self-
reliant nuclear deterrence without help from its two Cold War patrons–China and Russia. 
Therefore, China and Russia have lost their leverage over North Korea, especially in 
security issues.  
E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF 
REASSURANCE STRATEGY 
Question 13: Was there any positive response to the Sunshine Policy and 
the Peace and Prosperity Policy from North Korea? Or, was there no 
response or a rejection from North Korea, followed by an increase in 
tensions? 
1.  Positive Response to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy from North Korea 
a. Two Summit Meetings and the Agreements 
The most significant responses to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and 
Prosperity Policy from North Korea were two summit meetings and the agreements 
reached. The 2000 summit meeting was the first inter-Korean summit, ever, since the 
division of the country in 1945. The 2000 Joint Declaration covers the most important 
controversial issues such as the political system of a unified Korea, humanitarian issues, 
mutual trust building, and implementation of the agreements. It shows the overarching 
direction that the two Koreas should take for reconciliation and peace on the Korean 
peninsula (see Appendix D).  
For the six months following the summit meeting, there was significant 
tension reduction between the two Koreas. There were defense ministerial talks, working-
level talks and tensions across the DMZ were reduced. Even though Kim Jong Il did not 
visit Seoul after the first summit meeting, the acceptance of the second summit meeting 
in Pyongyang can be considered as a positive response to the Peace and Prosperity Policy. 
The October 4 Declaration is more practical and substantial than the 2000 Joint 
Declaration and shows the intentions of both sides to implement the agreements and 
provide concrete shape to the plan (see Appendix E).  
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b. Gaesung Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tour 
There were two symbolic results to illustrate the change on the Korean 
peninsula after the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. North Korea’s agreements to 
opening Gaesung and Mt. Geumgang were positive responses to the Sunshine Policy and 
the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Even though the level of interdependence between the 
two Koreas was low, interconnectedness 434  between the two Koreas tremendously 
increased between 1998 and 2007. As evidence of the increase of this interconnectedness, 
there have been significant increases in trade and tourism between South Korea and 
North Korea since 1998. Trade and the interchange of people are two good examples to 
show the increasing interconnectedness and positive development between the two 
Koreas.  
(1) Trade.  First, trade between South Korea and North Korea 
was $222 million in 1998. In 2007, trade between South Korea and North Korea was 
$1,787 billion (Figure 2.10): 
 
Figure 2.10. Trade between South Korea and North Korea435 
                                                 
434 Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 8–9, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain the difference 
between interdependence and interconnectedness. They say, “Where there are reciprocal costly effects of 
transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is 
simply interconnectedness.” 
435 The Ministry of Unification, the Republic of Korea, “Statistics,” http://www.unikorea.go.kr 
(accessed on March 6, 2009).  
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The Gaesung Industrial Complex is a driving force of trade 
between the two Koreas. It is located one hour’s distance from Seoul. The Gaesung 
Industrial Complex Development Project, which combined South Korean capital and North 
Korean labor, was designed to help businesses establish their competitiveness and test the 
possibility of inter-Korean economic cooperation.436 Figure 2.10 illustrates the increase in 
trade between South Korea and North Korea. This is a tremendous improvement of the 
relationship between South Korea and North Korea. It was impossible to imagine that South 
Koreans would work in the North Korean territory before the Kim Dae Jung administration. 
(2) Interchange of People.  In 2007, 159,214 people traveled 
between South Korea and North Korea. In 2005, the number was 88,341 and this number 
was almost as big as the total of 85,400 people who traveled during the sixty years since 
the end of the Korean War (Figure 2.11): 
 
Figure 2.11. Interchange of people between South Korea and North Korea437 (excluding 
tourists to Geumgang Mt, total 1,730,000 until 2007)  
                                                 
436 The Ministry of Unification, the Republic of Korea, “Statistics,” http://www.unikorea.go.kr 
(accessed on March 6, 2009). 
437 Ibid. 
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This major change was because of the tours to Mt. Geumgang and the Gaesung Industrial 
Complex. From November 1998, when the tours to Mt. Geumgang first began, until 2007, 
a total of 1,730,000 people participated in these tours. This number is not included in the 
total of interchange of people (Figure 2.11). For the Mt. Geumgang tour, North Korea 
opened the Jangjeon port where a North Korean strategic Navy base is located. 
2. Continuous Military Tension between the Two Koreas  
a.  Continuous North Korean Provocative Actions 
Even though there has been some economic cooperation and tension 
reduction between the two Koreas, there is continuous political and military tension 
between the two Koreas. The North Korean nuclear threat has never dissipated. Also, 
there have been ceaseless North Korean “provocative actions.”438 During the Kim Dae 
Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations between 1998 and 2007, the provocative 
actions did not significantly decrease.439 Hannah Fischer summarized them, showing that 
North Korea made provocative actions almost every month. 440  Some of the most 
significant actions are as follows441:  
1. June 22, 1998: A North Korean midget submarine was seized after 
it was spotted entangled in South Korean fishing nets off the South 
Korean town of Sokcho, south of the DMZ. When brought to shore 
three days later, the nine crew abroad were found dead from an 
apparent group suicide.  
2. August 31, 1998: North Korea test-fired a new 3-stage Taepoding-
1 missile in an arc over Japan, causing angry reactions from Japan 
                                                 
438 Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions,” 1. Fischer includes the following actions into 
“provocation actions”: “armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; 
hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against 
political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean 
government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and 
nuclear weapons.”  
439 Ibid., 15–33.  
440 Ibid. According to Fisher, there were total 86 provocative cases between April 1998 and March 
2007.  
441 Ibid.  
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and the United States as a provocation that stoked tensions in 
Northeast Asia. Several days later, however, North Korea claimed 
that it used a multistage rocket to successfully launch a satellite 
into orbit for peaceful exploration of space, not a ballistic missile 
as alleged by U.S. and other sources.  
3. December 18, 1998: In a firefight, the South Korean navy sank a 
North Korean semi-submersible high-speed boat some 150 
kilometers southwest of Pusan. The body of a North Korean 
frogman was recovered near the site. The vessel was first spotted 
two kilometers off the port city of You[sic].442 
4. June 1999: Several North Korean ships provoked a nine-day naval 
confrontation off South Korea’s western coast in disputed waters 
on the Yellow Sea—over the disputed sea border known as the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL). 443 On June 15, 1999, when the 
confrontation ended in an exchange of fire, both sides blamed each 
other for starting the firefight. One North Korean torpedo boat 
caught fire and sank with its entire crew on board, while five 
others were heavily damaged. Two of the more modern South 
Korean vessels sustained minor damage. It was the most serious 
naval clash since the end of the Korean War—and the second such 
incident since December 1998. Since the June encounter, North 
Korea asserted that more bloodshed would be “inevitable” unless 
the South Korean intrusion into “our territorial waters is checked.” 
It also called on the U.S. side to renounce the NLL and to 
“withdraw all its ships from the disputed waters.”444 
5. June 29, 2002: A gun battle erupted between South and North 
Korean naval ships on the Yellow Sea. North Korean patrol boats 
allegedly crossed the Northern Limit Line and opened fire on a 
                                                 
442 Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions,” 15–33, referring to Yomiuri Shimbun in Japanese 
[Tokyo], December 19, 1998. The name of the port city is not You but Yeosu.   
443 Ibid., 19. The NLL was drawn by the United Nations Command (UNC) after the Korean War. 
Even though it has been de facto maritime border, North Korea never accepted its validity and often 
violated the NLL. Since the economic difficulty in the 1990s, the number of violations increased. For more 
information, refer to Terence Roehrig, “Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, 
or International Law?” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 194, no. 3 (2008). 
444 Ibid., 18–19, referring to “Five-Point Proposals Set Forth by KA Side,” KCNA in English, July 2, 
1999.  
 157
South Korean patrol boat. Four South Koreans and an 
underdetermined number of North Koreans were killed.445  
6. July 4, 2006: Defying broad international pressure, North Korea 
test-fires six missiles into the East Sea, including a long-range 
Taepodong-2 with the theoretical capacity to reach the continental 
U.S. 
7. October 9, 2006: North Korea announced that it had carried out an 
underground nuclear test. It called the test a “historic event” and 
said that “it will contribute the peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula and in the area around it.”446 
Some conservatives argued that North Korea’s missile test in July 2006 
and nuclear test in October 2006 show the total failure of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine 
Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. One of conservative 
newspapers, Donga Ilbo, said in an editorial:  
The nuclear testing by North Korea proves that the pro-NK Sunshine 
Policy of the government that busied itself covering up for North Korea 
has failed completely. It is now revealed to the light of the day how the 
policy chosen out of ignorance about what the North really is and of the 
fascination of being one nation was unrealistic.  
The 6.15 Joint Declaration that promised a peaceful coexistence of South 
and North Koreas and the Six-Party Talks aimed at encouraging North 
Korea to give up on nuclear weapons all ended up in vapor.447 
b. Limited Reassurance Through Restraint 
There has been very limited reassurance through restraint between the two 
Koreas. In 1989, a proposal for a sixty-two mile “Offensive Weapon-Free Zone” and 
                                                 
445 Six South Koreans were killed and nineteen South Koreans were wounded. South Korea expect 
over thirty casualties of North Koreans. Refer to the Republic of Korea Navy, ROK Navy History,  
http://www.navy.mil.kr/english/sub_guide/sub_data.jsp?menu=3 (accessed on June 16, 2009). 
446 Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions,” 33, referring to KCNA report, “DPRK Successfully 
Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” Pyongyang, October 9, 2006, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.  
447 “State of Emergency, Donga Ilbo, October 10, 2006, 
http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=080000&biid=2006101048748 (accessed on June 20, 
2009).  
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“Limited Deployment Zone” was made by Lim Dong Won, who later became Kim Dae 
Jung’s national security advisor. 448  Lim proposed that “Tanks, mechanized infantry, 
armored troop carriers, and self-propelled artillery would be barred completely from this 
zone, and the number of infantry divisions would be subject to agreed limits.”449 Lim 
said “Given the difficulty of verifying troop numbers, it seems important that cuts in 
major items of equipment proceed in parallel with less verifiable troop reductions.”450 
However, this kind of proposal was neither reciprocated nor did it reduce the tension 
between the two Koreas.  
The two Koreas took only a very small first step to mitigate military 
tension around the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 2004. There was agreement with regard 
to the suspension of propaganda activities and the elimination of propaganda means.451 
The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, says “Owing to this agreement, 
the Inter-Korean propaganda war activities which used to be labeled as war without 
bullets were suspended and there [sic] means were eliminated, resulting in making 
opportunity to support the ROK government reconciliation and cooperation policy.”452  
However, these kinds of restraints were very limited in reducing tensions between the 
two Koreas.  
When adversaries are entangled in an escalating series of threats and 
military deployments, restraint can be important in reducing the likelihood of 
miscalculation.453 Forward deployed forces are serious threats on the Korean peninsula 
and there have been attempts to restrain them. As explained earlier, the DMZ is the most 
heavily militarized area in the world with military forces of the two Koreas. Moon Chung 
In points out that there are two implications of a forward deployment pattern. He says, 
                                                 
448 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 145.  
449 Ibid., quoted in Lim Dong Won, “Conditions for Arms Control between South and North Korea,” 
Chosun Ilbo, October 10, 1989, esp. 4–5.  
450 Ibid., quoted in Lim Dong Won, “Next Steps in Arms Control,” in Restarting the Peace Process in 
the Korean Peninsula,” ed. Kongdan Oh and Craig. S. Coleman, report on a conference sponsored by 
Korea Times, Los Angeles, June 8, 1994. 135–6, published by Korea Times, Los Angeles, September 1994.  
451 The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, 2006 Defense White Paper, 133. 
452 Ibid.  
453 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 35. 
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“One is a high potential for the outbreak of limited or all-out war by default, if not by 
design….The other implication is the potential for conflict escalation to the regional 
theater.”454 To prevent the outbreak of conflict in the DMZ, it is important for the two 
Koreas to pull back and reduce the armed forces around the DMZ.  
There were some positive responses to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace 
and Prosperity Policy from North Korea and they can be interpreted as success of the 
reassurance strategy. However, there was no significant tension reduction on the Korean 
peninsula. Kim Dae Jung believed his Sunshine Policy was a partial success:  
I cannot say the Sunshine Policy achieved perfect success, but it's true it 
obtained excellent results. Above all, the tension between North and South 
Korea has been eased. Before the Sunshine Policy, the situation was that 
people in the South panicked when the United States lost the Vietnam 
War. And they panicked when a North Korean border guard fired a gun. 
People even got ready to flee the country! 
But after the Sunshine policy, there's a much better understanding among 
the people. For example, this time, when North Korea fired its missiles, or 
when there was news that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons, 
the South Korean people didn't really panic. Now, the South Korean 
people have much more knowledge about their counterparts in North 
Korea. And the South Korean people now have a lot more confidence in 
dealing with the North.455 
Consequently, South Korea’s reassurance strategy between 1998 and 2007 
can be categorized as a case of partial success. It led to some positive responses from 
North Korea such as two summit meetings and the agreements and Gaesung Industrial 
Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tour. However, there were continuous North Korean 
provocative actions and limited progress in military restraint, which show that 
reassurance was only partially successful. 
                                                 
454 Moon Chung In, Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula (Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press, 
1996), 48.  
455 CNN.com/Asia, “Kim Dae Jung Talkasia Transcript.” 
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F. OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION 
1. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes 
The outcomes of the hypotheses applied to the two Koreas during the Kim Dae 
Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations are as shown in Figure 2.12: 
IV →  IntV →  DV 
Kim Dae Jung’s 
Sunshine Policy and 











1. Some change in Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
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Figure 2.12. The Outcome of the Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV) 
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There was some change in Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s perceptions of 
Kim Jong Il and North Korea through summit meetings and the other inter-Korean talks 
(IntV 1). Also, there were some changes in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and 
Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea (IntV 2). However, there was limited support in domestic 
politics of South Korea and North Korea was considered a substantial threat to South 
Koreas (IntV 3). Moreover, there was little support in domestic politics of North Korea due 
to the strong power of the military (IntV 4). The United States did not fully support Kim 
Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy (IntV 5). As 
shown in the North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006, China and Russia lost their leverage over 
North Korea in security issues (IntV 6). That is, allies of both South Korea and North 
Korea either did not or could not fully support Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s 
reassurance strategy.  
Therefore, partial changes in the intervening variables—the changes of leaders’ 
perceptions and limited support in domestic politics of South Korea with little support from 
domestic politics in North Korea and alliance politics of the two Koreas—resulted in a 
partial success of reassurance strategy (DV). 
2. Result of Hypotheses 
The conditions of partial success of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s 
reassurance strategies can be explained by the result of the hypotheses.  
Result of hypotheses: 
H1: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy was more 
likely to succeed when it altered their beliefs and perceptions about Kim 
Jong Il and North Korea changed.  
H2: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy was more 
likely to succeed when it altered Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and perceptions 
about Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea. 
H3: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy was less 
likely to succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in South Korea 
towards support for foreign policy change.  
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H4: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy was less 
likely to succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in North Korea 
towards support for foreign policy change.  
H5: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy was less 
likely to succeed when it could not alter alliance (the United States) 
politics of South Korea towards support for foreign policy change.  
H6: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy was less 
likely to succeed when it could not alter alliance (China and Russia) 
politics of North Korea towards support for foreign policy change.  
Consequently, the changes of the leaders’ perceptions provided positive 
conditions for success of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy. 
However, they are not enough for the success of the reassurance strategy. Domestic and 
alliance politics did not offer positive conditions and they were less likely to succeed with 
little support from them. The outcomes of South Korea’s reassurance strategy were 
influenced by two positive variables (leaders’ perceptions of South Korea and North 
Korea) and four negative variables (domestic and alliance politics of South Korea and 
North Korea).  
3. Conclusion 
a. The Possibility of the Success of the Reassurance Strategy 
Toward North Korea 
It is worth asking the counterfactual—would a more fully implemented 
reassurance strategy have worked, or is North Korea too tough a case? Is deterrence 
strategy the only option to avoid war on the Korean peninsula? Or did reassurance 
strategy give North Korea benefits? Decisions to lean on reassurance or deterrence must 
be a function of whether or not North Korea has changed. If it is quite clear that North 
Korea does not give up its greedy motivations, South Korea and the United States need to 
prepare for more deterrence strategies. But, if there is some evidence that North Korea 
shows “not-greedy” and “need-driven” motivations, South Korea and the United States 
should consider reassurance strategies.   
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As Janice Gross Stein suggests, leaders can modify their strategies and 
reassurance strategy to reduce tensions may be useful under changed circumstances. 456 
As we discussed in the previous sections, the political, economical, and psychological 
context has been changing on the Korean peninsula, especially since the end of the Cold 
War, and North Korea’s motivating factors have shifted from “greedy” and “opportunity-
oriented” to partly “need-oriented.” This does not mean that deterrence strategies should 
be ruled out because the context has not totally changed. However, as Janice Gross Stein 
argues, deterrence may not only fail, but provoke violent actions under certain kinds of 
strategic conditions.457 
Therefore, reassurance strategies may be useful in changing the context of 
the relationship, inducing more cooperation, and ultimately avoiding war between the 
two Koreas. Therefore, the best policy options to reduce the tension on the Korean 
peninsula should be reassurance strategies combined with deterrence strategies. However, 
the implementation of a reassurance strategy combined with deterrence does not 
guarantee success. Favorable domestic and alliance politics are necessary conditions for 
success.  
b. The Importance of Domestic and Alliance Constraints 
In the case study, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance 
strategy was limited by domestic and alliance constraints. The implementation of 
reassurance strategy toward North Korea, a state long identified as an enemy, was 
difficult for the South Korean public and the United States government to swallow. A 
cognitive-level perspective is often used to explain the success of reassurance strategy. 
This chapter shows that domestic and alliance political factors can also play roles in 
promoting a favorable environment for the success of reassurance strategy.  
Consequently, a reassurance strategy cannot succeed solely by altering the 
cognitions of the target state’s leaders when domestic and alliance political factors are not 
                                                 
456 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 56. 
457 Ibid, 17. 
 164
favorable. The other leader’s perceptions may include recognition of domestic and 
alliance constraints on the sending side’s government. A combination of change in the 
other leader’s perceptions and favorable domestic and alliance politics is necessary for 
the success of a reassurance strategy.  
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III. CASE II: AN UNSUCCESSFUL REASSURANCE STRATEGY 
CASE (BUSH’S REASSURANCE STRATEGY IN 2007 AND 2008)  
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. An Unsuccessful Reassurance Strategy Case Between the United 
States and North Korea 
The relations between the United States and North Korea remain very hostile and 
no strategy to solve this confrontation has seemed plausible. On July 27, 1953, the 
Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the United 
Nations Command and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, along 
with the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
was established by that agreement.458 The war between the United States and North 
Korea is not officially over. The Armistice Agreement technically still prevents any 
aggressive action between the United States—along with South Korea—and North Korea, 
because no peace treaty has ever been signed. When the Agreement was signed, it was 
only intended as a temporary measure. However, it has been almost 60 years since the 
end of the Korean War.  
The dominant strategy of the United States since 1953 has been deterrence 
through hard power. It has been successful in preventing North Korea from attacking 
South Korea. However, tension still exists and reached a peak when North Korea carried 
out a nuclear test on October 6, 2006. After that test, the Bush administration changed its 
approach to North Korea. Alongside deterrence, a reassurance strategy through 
reciprocity (“Tit-for-Tat”) was implemented by the United States in 2007 and 2008. The 
Bush administration tried to persuade North Korea that the United States would 
normalize relations and offer a security guarantee if North Korea would dismantle its 
nuclear program. However, the results of Bush’s reassurance strategy were not successful. 
                                                 
458 For full context of armistice agreement, refer to 
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKor_VTK_1953_07_27_korean_armistice_ag
reement.pdf (accessed on July 27, 2009). 
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Even though there was some progress toward the dismantlement of North Korea’s 
nuclear program, tension between the United States and North Korea remained high and 
North Korea did not give up its nuclear program. Furthermore, North Korea conducted its 
second nuclear test on May 25, 2009.459  
Consequently, Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 did not achieve any 
tension reduction with North Korea. Therefore, it can be considered as a case of failure of 
reassurance strategy. This chapter investigates the conditions and outcomes of Bush’s 
reassurance strategy toward North Korea in an effort to understand what factors are 
associated with the failure of reassurance strategy. It finds that leaders’ enemy identities 
and the influence of domestic and alliance politics of both the United States and North 
Korea were the most important factors.  
2. Variables  
Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors 
associated with the failure of Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 can be drawn 
in a diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening 
variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). The independent variable is the 
implementation of Bush’s reassurance strategy, and the dependent variable is its success or 
failure.  
There are six intervening variables that influence the dependent variable: (1) Bush’s 
beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea; (2) Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and 
perceptions about Bush and the United States; (3) the domestic politics of the United 
States; (4) the domestic politics of North Korea; (5) the alliance politics of the United 
States; and (6) the alliance politics of North Korea. Also, two condition variables—the 
circumstances and relations between the United States and North Korea and North Korea’s 
motivating factors—are included in the hypotheses. In sum, the hypotheses and variables 
can be drawn as in Figures 3.1 and 3.2:  
                                                 
459 Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, 
May 26, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 10.  
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strategy in 2007 
and 2008) 
→  
1. Bush’s beliefs and perceptions about 
Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
2. Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and perceptions 
about Bush and the United States 
3. Domestic politics of the United 
States  
4. Domestic politics of North Korea 
5. Alliance politics of the United States 







CV 1 → CV 2 
Circumstances and 
relations between 
the United States 






1. Balance of Power
2. Interdependence 
3. Identity  
→




Figure 3.1.   Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)460 
                                                 
460 Van Evera, Guidance to Methods, 7–48. 
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Figure 3.2.   Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the 
Receiving State and CV) 
3. Hypotheses 
The main focus of this dissertation is on the conditions for success or failure of 
reassurance strategy. The hypotheses of this case study are as follows: 
H1: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to 
succeed if it altered Bush’s beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and 
North Korea. 
H2: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to 
succeed if it altered Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and perceptions about Bush and 















H3: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to 
succeed if it altered domestic politics in the United States towards support 
for foreign policy change.  
H4: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to 
succeed if it altered domestic politics in North Korea towards support for 
foreign policy change.  
H5: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to 
succeed if it altered alliance politics of the United States (South Korea and 
Japan) towards support for foreign policy change.  
H6: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to 
succeed if it altered alliance politics of North Korea (China and Russia) 
towards support for foreign policy change. 
If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of Bush’s reassurance strategy 
toward North Korea in 2007 and 2008 would have been influenced by the six intervening 
variables (leader’s perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics each of the United 
States and North Korea). For the full success of its reassurance strategy, the Bush 
administration should have tried to influence Kim Jong Il’s perceptions and the domestic 
politics and the alliance politics of both the United States and North Korea.  
4. Chronology 
A chronological narrative of the Bush administration will help to elucidate the 
main argument. Between 2001 and 2006, the Bush administration implemented a 
coercive strategy, which changed after North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006. 
The Berlin meeting in January 2007 between Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of 
State of the United States, and Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North 
Korea, was a turning point of Bush’s policy from a deterrence and preemptive attack 
strategy to a reassurance strategy (in this case alongside deterrence, as the U.S. 
administration continued efforts to deter North Korea). The Bush administration 
implemented its reassurance strategy mainly through the Six-Party Talks. However, 
Bush’s reassurance strategy resulted in failure, and tensions between the United States 
and North Korea increased. As a result, the Obama administration faced North Korean 
challenges after it took office in 2009 and there was a second North Korean nuclear test 
in May 2009. 
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Table 3.1.   The First Bush Administration and the First Half of the Second Bush 
Administration (2001–2006): Deterrence and Preemptive Attack Strategy  
2001 January 20 George W. Bush took office and U.S. policy toward North Korea was reconsidered. 




James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, 
visited Pyongyang and met Kang Sok Ju, First Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of North Korea. Kelly told Kang that the United 
State had evidence of a uranium enrichment program.  
January 10 North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).461 
2003 
August 
27-29 The first round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
February 
25-28 The second round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
2004 
June 
23-26 The third round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
February 10 North Korea declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense.  2005 
July 26-
August 7 The first phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
                                                 
461 BBC, “N. Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Pact,” January 10, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-




The second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was 
held. The six party members agreed on a “Joint statement of the 
fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 
Agreement)” (see Appendix I).462 
September 
15 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA) in Macao as a questionable primary money laundering 
concern under the Patriot Act because of its corrupt financial 
activities with North Korea. 
November  
9-11 The first phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
July 4 
North Korea test-fired six short- and medium-range missiles and 
one long-range missile. A long-range missile, Taepo-Dong 2, that 
was believed to have theoretical capability to reach the continental 
United States,463 failed after 40 seconds.464  
October 9 North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. 




The second phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was 
held. 
                                                 
462 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth 
Round of the Six-Party Talks,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm (accessed on July 20, 
2009). Also, refer to U.S. Department of State, “Six-party Talks, Beijing China,” 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm and http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm 
(accessed on July 20, 2009). 
463 According to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Taepo Dong was to deliver 1,000 to 1,500 kg warhead to a 
4,000 to 8,000 km range. Refer to Bermudez, “North Korea’s Long-Range Missiles,” Jane’s Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation (2000), 5.  
464 Donald G. Gross, “U.S.-Korea Relations: North Korea Rolls the Dice and Conducts Missile Tests,” 
Brad Glosserman and Sun Namkung, eds., Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East 
Asian Bilateral Relations 8, no. 3 (October 2006):43–54, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0603q.pdf 
(accessed on April 5, 2009).   
465 For the full text of UNSC Resolution 1718, refer to 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement. 
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Table 3.2.   The Second Half of the Second Bush Administration (2007–2008): 
Reassurance Strategy  
January  
16-18 
Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, 
and Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North 
Korea, met in Berlin, Germany.  
February  
8-13 
The third phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
Six party members agreed on steps for phased implementation of 
the September 19, 2005 Agreement (February 13, 2007 
Agreement) (see Appendix J).466   
March  
19-22 
The first phase of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 
On March 19, The United States unfroze North Korean funds to 
reciprocate the positive response from North Korea.  
May 
The Bush administration announced that it agreed to release $25 
million of North Korea’s frozen assets held at Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA) in Macao.  
July  
18-20 
The first phase of the sixth round resumed. A joint statement was 
issued (see Appendix K).467 
September 
27-30  
The second phase of the sixth round was held. “Second-Phase 
Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (October 3, 




The second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was held. Roh 
Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il presented the October 4 Declaration 
(see Appendix D). 
                                                 
466 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Initial Actions for the 
Implementation of the Joint Statement,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm (accessed on July 
20, 2009). 
467 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Press Communiqué of the 
Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 20, 2007,” 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t343875.htm (accessed on July 20, 2009). 
468 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Second-Phase Actions for the 
Implementation of the Joint Statement,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm (accessed on July 
21, 2009). Also, refer to U.S. Department of State, “Six Parties October 3, 2007 Agreement on ‘Second-
Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,’” October 3, 2007, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93223.htm and U.S. Department of State , “Six-party Talks--Second-
phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement,” October 3, 2007, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93217.htm (accessed on July 21, 2009). 
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June 26 
North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program to 
China. President Bush announced that the Trading with the Enemy 
Act would no longer apply to North Korea and notified Congress 
of his intent to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism List after the required 45-day waiting period.  
June 28  North Korea destroyed the cooling tower at the 5MW reactor in Yongbyon. 
July 10-12 
The Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-
Party Talks was held in Beijing. Six party members reached 
consensus on the full and balanced implementation of the 
September 19, 2005 Agreement.469  
July 11 A South Korean tourist at the Mt. Geumgang resort was shot to death by a North Korean guard.  
October  
2-3 
Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang for further talks on the 
verification agreement.  
October 11 
The United States announced an agreement with North Korea on 
the verification measures and removed North Korea from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List.    
October 13 
North Korea lifted its ban on International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspection and announced the continuous disablement 




The Six-Party Talks were held to draft an agreement on 
verification protocol. However, North Korea objected to some of 
the verification measures and refused to make a written 
agreement. The talks concluded with no written agreement.  
                                                 
469 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Press Communiqué of the 
Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 12, 2008” 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t474096.htm (accessed on July 21, 2009).  
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Table 3.3.   The Obama Administration (2009– ) 
April 5 
North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-2 missile that failed. North 
Korea claimed that it was a satellite launch which used peaceful 
rocket technology. 
April 12 
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a 
nonbinding President’s statement on North Korea’s missile 
launch, condemning the action as a violation of a resolution 1718 
banning all missile activities. 
April 14-15 
North Korea declared that it would not participate in the Six-Party 
Talks any more. It asked U.S. and international inspectors to leave 
the country and verification and monitoring activities ended.  
May 25 North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and launched two short-range missiles. 
June 12 
UNSCR 1874 condemning the second North Korean nuclear test 
was adopted by the United Nations Security Council. It called on 
UN members to inspect cargo vessels suspected of carrying 
military material in or out of North Korea.470 




North Korea claimed that it had entered a final phase in uranium 
enrichment. 
                                                 
470 Mary Beth Nikitin, Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Dick K. Nanto, and Larry A. Niksch, 
“North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874,” CRS Report 
for Congress, July 23, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1–2. Also, for the full text, 
refer to United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in 
Strongest TERMS Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions, Resolution 
1874 (2009) Strengthens Arms Embargo, Calls for Inspection for Cargo, Vessels if States Have 
‘Reasonable Grounds’ to Believe Contain Prohibited Items,” June 12, 2009, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm (accessed on July 22, 2009).  
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B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV): THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
REASSURANCE STRATEGY 
1. Coexistence and Security Guarantee 
Question 1: Did Bush’s reassurance strategy communicate the United 
States willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee 
to North Korea? 
a. CVID vs. Security Guarantee 
When the Bush administration implemented its reassurance strategy in 
2007 and 2008, a key issue was always whether the United States accepted coexistence 
with and offered a security guarantee to North Korea. In the Six-Party Talks, North Korea 
kept asking for a security guarantee from the United States and the United States did not 
want to offer a security guarantee to North Korea until North Korea showed clear 
evidence of CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement) of its nuclear 
program. The key problem was that North Korea was unwilling to dismantle its nuclear 
program completely until the United States offered a security guarantee to North Korea 
and normalized relations. The United States was not willing to accept coexistence with 
North Korea, nor would it offer a security guarantee to North Korea if North Korea did 
not give up its nuclear program.  
North Korean leaders repeatedly stated that they were willing to restrict 
their nuclear program if the United States guaranteed the country’s security. When James 
Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, visited Pyongyang in October 
2002, Kang Sok-ju, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Korea, requested a 
security guarantee. Kang said, “If the U.S. recognized North Korea’s system of 
government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere 
in his country’s economic development, Pyongyang would seriously discuss U.S. 
concerns about the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program.” 471  Also, Charles L. 
                                                 
471 Pritchard, “A Guarantee to Bring Kim.” 
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Pritchard recalled an interesting discussion between Kim Jong Il and Madeleine Albright, 
former U.S. Secretary of State in October 2000: 
He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able 
to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could 
accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With the 
appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to 
convince his military that the U.S. was no longer a threat and then be in a 
similar position to refocus his country’s resources.472  
The U.S. response to North Korea’s request for a security guarantee was 
that North Korea should dismantle its nuclear program completely before the United 
States would consider this matter. President Bush said, in a side meeting with his Chinese 
counterpart during the APEC summit in October 2003, that he had a willingness to 
provide a written security guarantee to North Korea if North Korea showed verifiable 
evidence of giving up its nuclear-arms ambitions.473 
b. Agreements and Security Guarantee 
The second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was held on 
September 13-19, 2005. The six-party members agreed on a “Joint statement of the fourth 
round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)” which included the full 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons in North Korea and no aggressive intentions by the 
United States. According to the September 15, 2005 Agreement, the main commitments 
of North Korea and the United States were as follows:  
The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The United 
States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula 
and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or 
conventional weapons.474 
                                                 
472 Pritchard, “A Guarantee to Bring Kim.” 
473 Wall Street Journal, “Bush Offered Security Assurances, But No Treaty, To North Korea,” 
October 20, 2003, A1.  
474 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth 
Round of the Six-Party Talks,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm (accessed on July 20, 
2009).  
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In addition, by the strong request of North Korea, the sovereignty issue 
was included in the September 19, 2005 Agreement: 
The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's 
sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their 
relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.475 
After the 2006 nuclear test, the United States showed its willingness to 
normalize relations with North Korea after dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear 
program in both the February 13, 2007 Agreement and October 3, 2007 Agreement 
which are the agreements to implement the September 19, 2005 Agreement. The 
February 13, 2007 Agreement set up plans for the normalization of U.S.-North Korean 
relations after North Korea shut down and sealed the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. It said, 
“The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral 
issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations.”476 The October 3, 2007 Agreement 
also included a similar sentence with regard to the normalization issue, namely that, “The 
DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their bilateral relations and 
moving towards a full diplomatic relationship.”477  
In December 2007, Bush sent a personal letter to Kim Jong Il. Even 
though it was interpreted by some scholars as evidence of a policy change by the Bush 
administration, the U.S. goal of a complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear 
program had not changed. According to an excerpt obtained by the Associated Press, 
Bush wrote, “I want to emphasize that the declaration must be complete and accurate if 
we are to continue our progress.”478  
                                                 
475 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth 
Round of the Six-Party Talks.” 
476 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Initial Actions for the 
Implementation of the Joint Statement,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm (accessed on July 
20, 2009). 
477 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Press Communiqué of the 
Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks,”  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t343875.htm (accessed on July 20, 2009). 
478 “Bush letter to Kim Jong Il Shows Policy Change,” USA Today, December 6, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-06-bush-letter_N.htm (accessed on July 25, 2009). 
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Consequently, Bush’s reassurance strategy communicated his willingness 
to accept coexistence with and offer a security guarantee to North Korea. However, the 
Bush administration made it clear that the agreement would be possible only if North 
Korea dismantled its nuclear program completely, irreversibly, and verifiably.  
2. The Incentive for Use of Reassurance Strategy 
Question 2: What was the incentive for Bush’s use of a reassurance 
strategy?  
North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and the difficult situation in Iraq 
in 2006, were incentives for Bush’s use of a reassurance strategy. Even though North 
Korea’s nuclear test was a serious threat to the United States, “immediate deterrence”479 
was less necessary because there was no clear evidence of North Korea’s consideration of 
an attack against South Korea or the United States. Therefore, the Bush administration 
implemented a reassurance strategy in the context of “general deterrence.”480  
a.  North Korean Nuclear Test on October 9, 2006  
On September 19, 2005, the Six-Party Talks’ members agreed on a “Joint 
statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)” 
after the second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks on September 13-19, 
2005 (see Appendix I). However, there had been a different U.S. approach to North 
Korea during the talks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Banco Delta 
Asia (BDA) as a primary money laundering concern under the Patriot Act because it 
                                                 
479 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 40. Freedman used the 
definition described by Patrick Morgan. According to Patrick Morgan, immediate deterrence is described as 
“a relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the 
other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it.” Morgan also said, “Immediate deterrence 
involves an active and urgent effort by A to deter in the course of a crisis when the efficiency of any threats 
will soon be revealed by B’s actual behavior.”   
480 Ibid. Compared to immediate deterrence, the possibility of direct engagement is low and deterrence 
depends on the assessment of strategic environment. According to Patrick Morgan, a general deterrence 
situation is “when opponents who maintain armed forces regulate their relationship even though neither is 
anywhere near mounting an attack.”  
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facilitated North Korea’s criminal activities including counterfeiting of U.S. currency.481 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice linked this U.S. enforcement effort to the Six-
Party Talks and the BDA issue became an obstacle to their success. 482  The U.S. 
accusation that the BDA was money laundering for North Korea became North Korea’s 
main reason to boycott the Six-Party Talks, and it refused to discuss the denuclearization 
issue until the United States settled the BDA issue.483 Even though the six party members 
agreed on the September 19, 2005 Agreement, they could not implement it because North 
Korea did not treat denuclearization and the BDA issue separately and kept asking the 
United States to lift the sanctions and treat the BDA issue individually.484 For about one 
year after the September 19, 2005 Agreement, the Six-Party Talks were deadlocked. 
Finally, North Korea conducted a nuclear test on October 6, 2006.485  
The October 9, 2006 nuclear test made clear that Bush’s policy toward 
North Korea neither solved the nuclear problem nor reduced tension with North Korea. 
On October 14, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 to 
condemn North Korea’s nuclear test.486 The Six-Party Talks resumed in December 2006. 
However, those responses to the nuclear test did not resolve the North Korean nuclear 
program issue and tensions rose. The Bush administration became willing to negotiate 
with North Korea. According to Mike Chinoy, President Bush and Condoleezza Rice, the 
Secretary of State, altered their approaches to North Korea: 
                                                 
481 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Room, “Treasury Designated Banco Delta Asia as Primary 
Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act,” September 15, 2005, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2720.htm (accessed on July 28, 2009) and Globalsecurity.org, “U.S. 
Cites Banco Delta Asia for Money Laundering, Other Crimes,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2005/09/sec-050915-usia02.htm (accessed on July 18, 
2009). 
482 Glenn R. Simpson and Gordon Fairclough, “U.S. Focuses on a Macau Bank in Probe into North 
Korea Ties,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2005, A4.  
483 Dick K. Nanto, “North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency,” CRS Report for Congress, June 
12, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2. 
484 BBC, “N Korea Offers Nuclear Talks Deal,” April 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4905308.stm (accessed on August 3, 2009).  
485 Chanlett-Avery and Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test.” 
486 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006),” 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm (accessed on August 5, 2009).  
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But the nuclear test changed everything. Although hard-liners had 
expected a test to be the event which showed that engagement did not 
work and that increased pressure was the only option, Rice—and Bush—
grudgingly reached the opposite conclusion. As David Straub, the former 
head of the State Department’s Korea Desk, observed, “It became the 
moment where she and Bush had to confront the fact that everything they 
had been doing in terms of North Korea did not work.”487  
After the 2006 nuclear test, even some leading Republicans such as 
Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Pennsylvania’s 
Arlen Specter, asked the Bush administration to have bilateral talks with North Korea. 
Specter said, “Let’s talk to them….This issue is serious enough with North Korea, with 
their having nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them, that I think we ought to 
use every alternative, including direct bilateral talks.”488 Former Secretary of State James 
Baker also said, “In my view, it is not appeasement to talk to your enemy.”489  
b. Difficulty in the Iraq War in 2006 
In 2006, at the same time that relations of the United States with North 
Korea were deteriorating, the situation in Iraq was getting worse. The Bush 
administration was focused on developing stability in Iraq and did not want to have an 
additional military confrontation with North Korea. The violence in Iraq was getting 
more severe and became a more serious problem for the United States. After the 
parliamentary elections on December 15, 2005, Iraq’s new parliament and leaders could 
not form a government of national unity and the political situation was still very unstable 
in 2006. The year 2006 started with “one of the bloodiest days since the U.S.-led invasion 
of the country in 2003” with 140 deaths including 5 U.S. troops on January 6, 2006.490 In 
February, the Bush administration asked Congress for an additional $70 billion for Iraq 
                                                 
487 Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2008), 306. 
488 Ibid., 299–300, referring to Transcript, Fox News Sunday, October, 22, 2006.  
489 Ibid., 300, referring to ABC News, This Week with George Stephanopoulos, October 18, 2006.  
490 Nelson Hemandez and Saad Sarhan, “Insurgents Kill 140 as Iraq Clashes Escalate,” Washington 
Post, January 6, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/05/AR2006010500351.html (accessed on August 10, 2009).  
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and Afghanistan.491 On February 22, 2006, insurgents bombed Iraq’s Golden Mosque in 
Samarra, the most revered shrine in Iraq. That action fueled sectarian tensions between 
Shiites and Sunnis and more than 1,000 people were killed over several days.492  
On June 15, 2006, the Pentagon stated that the number of U.S. troops 
killed in Iraq reached 2,500.493 North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October, which 
was also the second-deadliest month of 2006 with 106 deaths of U.S. troops in Iraq.494 
December became the deadliest month of 2006 in Iraq with 112 deaths of U.S. troops.495 
The American death toll in the Iraq War reached 3,000 in December 2006.496 More than 
34,000 Iraqis were killed from violence in 2006.497 The worsening situation in Iraq made 
the United States more anxious to explore a reassurance strategy toward North Korea 
because more tensions and the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula would be 
serious burdens to the Bush administration. American public opinion and Congress did 
not want to have another conflict on the Korean peninsula given the difficult conditions 
in Iraq. 
3. The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy 
Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did the United States offer 
to North Korea during the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008?  
                                                 
491 Ann Scott Tyson and Linton Weeks, “Bush to Seek Extra $90 Billion for Wars, Gulf Coast,” 
Washington Post, February 3, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/05/AR2006010500351.html (accessed on August 10, 2009). 
492 Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebti, “Toll in Iraq’s Deadly Surge: 1,300,” Washington Post, 
February 28, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/27/AR2006022701128.html (accessed on August 10, 2009). 
493 BBC, “US Death Toll in Iraq Hits 2,500,” June 15, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5084068.stm (accessed on August 11, 2009).  
494 icasualties.org, “Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year and Month,” 
http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx (accessed on August 10, 2009).  
495 Ibid. 
496 Reuters, “US Military Deaths in Iraq Reach 3,000,” AlertNet, December 31, 2006, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N31273678.htm (accessed on August 10, 2009).  
497 United Nations (UN) News Center, “Over 34,000 Civilians Killed in Iraq in 2006, says UN Report 
on Rights Violations,” http://huwu.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21241&Cr=iraq&Cr1= (accessed on 
August 10, 2009).  
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According to Janice Stein, two reassurance strategies—reassurance through a 
limited security regime or reassurance through reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat or GRIT)—are 
“more appropriate in the context of general deterrence.”498 The United States tried to 
solve the problem of the North Korean nuclear program both through the Six-Party Talks, 
an example of a limited security regime, and through the principle of “action for action,” 
which is similar to the concept of reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat).  
a. Reassurance Through Limited Security Regimes 
As explained in the previous case study, limited security regimes are 
agreed-upon principles and procedures among adversaries “in an effort to reduce the 
likelihood of an unintended and unwanted war.”499 The Six-Party Talks can be referred 
to as a limited security regime because they aimed to solve the North Korean nuclear 
weapons problem, in other words, to reduce tensions with North Korea.  Even though all 
six members have different approaches, they all shared the principle of the peaceful 
resolution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. The creation of limited 
security regimes is most likely in the context of general deterrence when leaders share a 
common aversion to war and to its consequences.500  
The Six-Party Talks were created because the six participating states—
South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia—shared an 
aversion to war or instability and their consequences on the Korean peninsula. Also, 
limited security regimes “make intentions less opaque and estimation less difficult, and 
they reduce the likelihood of miscalculation.”501 The North Korean nuclear problem is a 
difficult problem to solve because North Korea is the most isolated country in the world. 
Thus, participants expected that the Six-Party Talks could provide valuable information 
to other members and reduce the likelihood of defection. 
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For the United States, the Six-Party Talks became the main effort to solve 
the North Korean nuclear problem after the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002 
and North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. 
Between 2003 and 2007, there were a total of six rounds of the Six-Party Talks. The Six-
Party Talks achieved little progress until the second phase of the fourth round in 
September 2005. Six-party members agreed on “Joint statement of the fourth round of the 
Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)” (see Appendix I).  
b. ReassuranceTthrough Reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) 
The United States used a reassurance strategy through reciprocity (Tit-for-
Tat) after the 2006 nuclear test. Robert Axelrod argues that a Tit-for-Tat strategy is the 
most likely to promote cooperation in a state of anarchy among egoists. 502 Axelrod 
defines Tit-for-Tat as “the policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing 
whatever the other player did on the previous move.” 503  That is, it begins with a 
cooperative move from the sending state; the next move depends on what the receiving 
state did on the previous move. The reassurance strategy of the Bush administration in 
2007 and 2008 always began with a cooperative move by proposing incentives and 
requesting North Korea’s cooperative response in parallel.  
(1) The Transition Point of Bush’s Policy toward North Korea: 
U.S.-North Korea Bilateral Talks in Berlin in January 2007.  The first move of the United 
States was the private bilateral meeting of Christopher Hill with his North Korean 
counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan, the North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 
Berlin, Germany on January 16–18, 2007. This meeting was initiated by Christopher Hill. 
The Six-Party Talks on December 18–22, 2006, had stalled. That night the talks ended, 
Christopher Hill sent his aide Sung Kim, director of the State Department Office of 
Korean Affairs, to the North Korean embassy with the message proposing a bilateral talk 
with Kim Gye Gwan. North Korea responded positively on December 27. Then, 
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Christopher Hill got approval from Secretary Rice and President Bush to engage North 
Korea directly. 504  Don Oberdorfer noted, “This action bypassed the Washington 
bureaucracy, some of whose officials have thrown up roadblocks in the past to meetings 
and agreements with the North.”505  
On January 17, Christopher Hill said, “The United States has made 
it very clear that we have no intention of attacking North Korea. We look forward to 
having a good relationship with a de-nuclearized North Korea.” 506  The Bush 
administration had not wanted to have bilateral talks with North Korea and this January 
meeting was a significant change, even though the United States considered the meeting 
as “preparations for the Six-Party Talks.”507 On the other hand, North Korea viewed the 
meeting as a bilateral negotiation and announced that “The talks took place…in a positive 
and sincere atmosphere and a certain agreement was reached there.”508  
Christopher Hill evaluated the Berlin meeting as “useful” and 
expressed optimism about future prospects. After Hill’s meeting with his Japanese 
counterpart, Keinichiro Sasae, on January 19, 2007, Hill said, “I would say those 
meetings in Berlin were indeed useful. They were very concrete. We discussed some of 
the specific issues we would need to negotiate in the Six-Party Talks. We hope that this 
time we can make some real progress.”509 The Six-Party Talks in December 2006, two 
months after the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, ended with no agreement on 
North Korean disarmament and no date for further talks. However, the third phase of the 
Six-Party Talks was held after the Berlin meeting between Christopher Hill and Kim Kye 
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Gwan on February 8–13, 2007. This was the beginning of the transition in the Bush 
administration’s policy toward North Korea from a deterrence and preemptive attack 
strategy to a reassurance strategy.  
(2) Agreements Based on the Principle of “Action for Action”: 
The September 2005, February 2007, and October 2007 Agreements.  Most agreements 
between the United States and North Korea in regard to North Korea’s nuclear program 
were made through the Six-Party Talks. Those agreements were based on the concept of 
Tit-for-Tat or action for action. In the September 19, 2005 Agreement, “The Six Parties 
agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased 
manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action’.”510 
The main required actions for North Korea were to abandon all nuclear weapons and the 
existing nuclear program and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.  
On the other hand, the actions for the United States in parallel with 
North Korea’s actions were to have no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and no 
intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons. Also, 
the United States and North Korea agreed to “respect each other’s sovereignty, exist 
peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective 
bilateral policies.”511  
The principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action” 
was also emphasized in the February 13, 2007 Agreement, the first phase implementation 
of the September 19, 2005 Agreement. In the February 13, 2007 Agreement, “The Parties 
agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in 
line with the principle of ‘action for action’.” 512 Even though the goal of the Bush 
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administration was the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, it 
accepted the two phase approach of freezing North Korean nuclear facilities in the first 
phase, and dismantling all nuclear facilities in the second phase.  
From the U.S. perspective, this approach of accepting the phased 
dismantlement in the Six-Party Talks was the first initiative of the United States. North 
Korea agreed to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In return, the six party 
members including the United States agreed to the provision of emergency energy 
assistance to North Korea in the initial phase with the initial shipment of emergency 
energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil within 60 days.513 Also, the 
United States promised to normalize relations with North Korea if other steps in the 
agreement were completed. 
Dick K. Nanto says, “The February 2007 Agreement represented a 
clear change in strategy by the United States and other parties to the talks.”514 The former 
South Korea ambassador to the United States, Han Sung Soo, described the change of the 
United States approach toward North Korea in 2007 as “an about-face.”515 He says:  
It would and did decide to negotiate with North Korea on a bilateral basis. 
It decided to reward North Korea for its ‘good behavior,’ that is, for 
freezing, declaring, and dismantling its nuclear weapons, material and 
facilities. But, even without complete dismantlement of the program and a 
full declaration of all nuclear development and transfer activities, the Bush 
administration became willing to provide rewards in the form of lifting 
North Korea from the list of countries that support terrorism; removing 
restrictions on North Korea trade under the Trading with the Enemy Act; 
and providing energy, food, and security assurances.516  
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The February 13, 2007 Agreement was a product of the 
reassurance strategy through reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) implemented by the Bush 
administration and a turning point for American strategy toward North Korea. After 
North Korea’s first positive response to the agreement of February 13, the Bush 
administration responded again cooperatively by announcing that it had agreed to release 
$25 million of North Korea’s frozen assets held at BDA in Macao since March 14, 
2006.517 On June 25, North Korea announced that the BDA issue was resolved and that it 
would carry out the agreement reached on February 13.  
The head of delegation meeting of the sixth round of the Six-Party 
Talks was held in Beijing from July 18–20, 2007, and emphasized the principle of Tit-
for-Tat or action for action in a press communiqué on July 20, 2007 (see Appendix K).518 
It said, “All other parties undertook to fulfill their respective obligations as listed in the 
September 19 Joint Statement and February 13 Agreement in line with the principle of 
‘action for action’.”519  
The second phase of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was 
held on September 27–30, 2007. The six-party members agreed on the October 3, 2007 
Agreement, which dealt with the second phase implementation of the September 19, 2005 
and February 13, 2007 Agreements (see Appendix L).520 The principle of Tit-for-Tat or 
action for action was also emphasized in the October 3, 2007 Agreement. The main 
required actions for North Korea to fulfill were to disable all existing nuclear facilities 
subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 
Agreement, to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in 
accordance with the February 13 Agreement by December 31, 2007, and to not transfer 
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nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. In response to North Korea’s actions, the 
United States agreed to its commitments based on the action for action principle. The 
United States removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and 
terminated application of the Trading with the Enemy Act. According to the October 3, 
2007 Agreement:  
Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the 
designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the 
process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commitments to 
the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK’s actions based on consensus 
reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of 
DPRK-U.S. Relations.521 
(3) The Implementation of the Agreements in 2008.  The 
implementation of the 2007 agreements in the Six-Party Talks started in early November 
2007. The actions of the United States and North Korea were based on the concept of Tit-
for-Tat. In November 2007, the Six-Party Talks members agreed on 11 steps to disable 
the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Eight out of the 11 steps had been completed by early 
2008 (Table 3.4): 
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Table 3.4.   Disablement Steps at Yongbyon, North Korea522 
Step Facility Status as of May 2009 
Discharge of 8,000 spent fuel rods to the 
spent fuel pool 
5-megawatt 
reactor 
6,400 completed as of April 
2009 
Removal of control rod drive mechanisms 5-megawatt reactor 
To be done after spent fuel 
removal is completed 
Removal of reactor cooling loop and 
wooden cooling tower interior structure 
5-megawatt 
reactor 
Tower demolished June 26, 
2008 
Disablement of fresh fuel rods Fuel fabrication facility 
Not agreed to by North 
Korea: consultations held 
January 2009 with South 
Korea on possibility of 
purchase 
Removal and storage of 3 uranium ore 
concentrate dissolver tanks 
Fuel fabrication 
facility Completed 
Removal and storage of 7 uranium 
conversion furnaces, including storage of 
refractory bricks and mortar sand 
Fuel fabrication 
facility Completed 
Removal and storage of both metal casing 
furnaces and vacuum system, and removal 
and storage of 8 machining lathes 
Fuel fabrication 
facility Completed 
Cut cable and remove drive mechanism 
associated with the receiving hot cell door 
Reprocessing 
facility Completed 




Removal of drive mechanisms for the fuel 
cladding shearing and slitting machines 
Reprocessing 
facility Completed 
Removal of crane and door actuators that 
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North Korea delayed the disablement process in the autumn of 
2008 by linking it to U.S. removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism 
List and verification measures. Disagreements over verification procedures led to a halt 
of the verification process.523 In September 2008, North Korea rejected the initial U.S. 
verification proposals and threatened to begin processing plutonium again.524 After two 
months of deadlock, Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang to have further talks on the 
verification agreement on October 2-3, 2008. On October 11, 2008, the United States 
announced an agreement with North Korea on measures to verify the North Korean 
nuclear weapons program and remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism 
List.  
United States officials announced that “North Korea had agreed to 
allow experts to collect samples and conduct forensic tests at all of its declared nuclear 
facilities and at undeclared sites upon mutual consent.”525 Assistant Secretary of State for 
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Paula DeSutter told reporters on October 
11, “All of the elements that we sought…are included in the various documents and 
agreements that they’ve obtained with the North Koreas.”526 Disablement work could 
start again in October 2008 after the United States removed North Korea from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List.527 
However, on November 12, 2008, North Korea said that “it would 
not allow outside inspectors to collect samples at its main nuclear complex to verify its 
account of past activities.” 528 The North Korean Foreign Ministry said that it never 
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agreed to such sampling and it contradicted statements by U.S. officials.529 North Korea 
suspended disablement in December 2008. The Six-Party Talks in December 2008, the 
last of the Bush administration, ended without a full verification protocol. Assistant 
Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, “There was a lot of agreement among a majority 
of the delegations there, but ultimately [North Korea] was not ready.”530 Consequently, 
the incomplete dismantlement of the nuclear program and rejection of sampling measures 
led to the failure of Bush’s reassurance strategy in the end. 
In response to the disagreement on the sampling issue and the 
stalemate in the Six-Party Talks in late 2008, the United States announced the halt of its 
heavy fuel oil shipment on December 12, 2008. Consequently, the United States stopped 
fulfilling its commitments in parallel with North Korea’s non-fulfillment based on the 
principle of Tit-for-Tat or action for action.  
C. CONDITION VARIABLES (CV): CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA AND NORTH 
KOREA’S MOTIVATING FACTORS  
1. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations Between the 
United States and North Korea 
To explore the causal factors between the Bush administration’s reassurance 
strategy and its outcomes, the first step is to understand the circumstances and 
relationships between the United States and North Korea. The values of these condition 
variables affect North Korea’s motivating factors and intervening variables such as 
leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics and alliance politics.  
Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between the 
United States and North Korea over the time period when Bush’s 
reassurance strategy was attempted? 
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a. Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach) 
Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the 
“balance of power” between the United States and North Korea? 
Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence 
the balance of power affected the calculations of either the 
United States or North Korea? 
(1) Balance of Power between the United States and North 
Korea: Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP).  As GNP is used to compare the 
power of South Korea and North Korea in the previous case study, the same method is 
applied to the United States and North Korea. Both GNP at current prices in million U.S. 
dollars and per capita in U.S. dollars show that the balance of power was extremely 
unfavorable to North Korea. First, the GNP of the United States in 2006 was 961 times 
bigger than that of North Korea and 943 and 1071 times bigger in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The average ratio of the GNP of the United States to that of North Korea 
between 2001 and 2008 was 983. The overall balance of power was strongly in favor of 
the United States. GNP at current prices in U.S. dollars is summarized in Figure 3.3: 
 
Figure 3.3.   GNP at Current Prices in U.S. Dollars531 
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(accessed on August 16, 2009). 
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Second, per capita GNP in U.S. dollars show the same results. Per 
capita GNP of the United States was significantly greater than that of North Korea, as 
summarized in Table 3.5:  
Table 3.5.   Per Capita GNP in U.S. Dollars532 
Year U.S. (US $) N. Korea (U.S. $) U.S./N. Korea 
2001 35,469 475 74.67 
2002 35,997 467 77.08 
2003 37,150 470 79.04 
2004 39,374 472 83.42 
2005 41,486 548 75.70 
2006 43,617 577 75.59 
2007 45,422 617 73.62 
2008 45,836 555 82.59 
   Avg. 77.71 
(2) The Impact of Unfavorable Balance of Power to North 
Korea on its Calculations.  North Korea recognizes the unfavorable balance of power. 
Therefore, North Korea has tried to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power and 
gain “asymmetrical” advantage over the United States through its nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile programs.533 Even though GNP showed that the balance of power was 
unfavorable to North Korea between 2001 and 2008, North Korean military forces still 
posed a serious threat to the United States, especially, because of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programs.  
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General Leon J. LaPorte, U.S. Forces Korea commander between 
2003 and 2006, said that “They are making, primarily, their investments in the 
asymmetrical areas. They realize that they can never invest enough money in their navy 
and air force to compete [with U.S. and South Korean forces]. So they are investing in 
asymmetrical capabilities.”534 General LaPorte emphasized in particular his concern over 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. 
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, 
and a second one on May 25, 2009. Even though there is uncertainty about important 
details of the North Korean nuclear tests, those tests showed that North Korea had 
significantly improved its skills for the engineering requirements of plutonium production 
and explosive device design. Several sources estimate that North Korea separated 
plutonium in a range from 30 to 50 kg, which is enough plutonium for approximately five 
to eight weapons, assuming 6 kg per weapon. 535  North Korea might have used 
approximately 5–6 kg of plutonium for each test and it is likely to have 20–40 kg of 
plutonium remaining, enough for approximately three to six nuclear weapons.  
North Korea’s ballistic missile program, including Taepo Dong 1 
and 2 missiles, is a potential threat to the United States. In the absence of reliable data on 
the capabilities of North Korea’s missiles, some American analysts have estimated the 
North Korean threat as potentially quite severe. For example, Steven A. Hildreth says that 
“For the Taepo Dong 1 to achieve greater range its payload would have to be decreased. 
Some analysts speculated that a reduced-payload configuration could deliver a 200 kg 
warhead into the U.S. center and a 100 kg warhead to Washington D.C., albeit with poor 
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accuracy.”536 According to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessments, the Taepo 
Dong 2 has the potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the 
United States.537 The Taepo Dong 2 is believed to be a two-state missile and have “a 
range potential of as much as 3,750 km with a 700 to 1,000 kg payload and, if a third 
stage were added, some believe that range could be extended to 4,000 to 4,300 km with a 
full payload.”538 Some analysts believe that “the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a 700 to 
1,000 kg payload as far as 6,700 km.”539 
Therefore, even though the balance of power between the United 
States and North Korea was in favor of the United States, North Korea’s development of 
nuclear weapons and its ballistic missile program are a serious threat from the U.S. point 
of view. The nuclear test affected the calculation of the United States, especially hard-
liners, in term of the balance of power. The United States considered the nuclear test as a 
negative shift of balance of power. This consideration also influenced the domestic 
politics of the United States. However, North Korea did not see it that way because North 
Korea recognized that the United State is a major nuclear state with thousands of 
weapons and it still had a less favorable balance of power. Thus, even though the North 
Korean nuclear test affected the U.S. perspective of the balance of power, it did not 
change the balance of power between the United States and North Korea.  
The answer for the question of what was the “balance of power” 
between the United States and North Korea is that North Korea had a considerably less 
favorable situation, even though there were asymmetric threats posed by the North 
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Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This situation continued in 2007 and 2008. 
However, it is necessary to consider U.S. perceptions of the 2006 North Korean nuclear 
test because it was considered as a negative shift of the balance of power and influenced 
the domestic politics of the United States. This impact is discussed below. 
b. Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach): No 
Interdependence 
Question 4-b (From the Liberal Approach): What was the level 
of “interdependence” between the United States and North 
Korea? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there 
evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either 
the United States or North Korea?  
Like the previous case study between the two Koreas, Katherine Barbieri’s, 
and Bruce Russett’s and John Oneal’s approaches are used to measure economic 
interdependence between the United States and North Korea. The results show that there 
was almost no interdependence at all. Therefore, it did not affect the calculations of either 
the United States or North Korea.  
(1)  Barbieri’s Model.540  The application of Barbieri’s model 
to the United States and North Korea between 2001 and 2008 shows that there was 
absolutely no interdependence between the two countries. As shown in Table 3.6, the 
trade share of North Korea for the United States was almost zero:  
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Table 3.6.   Trade share of North Korea in the United States541   
Year Trade b/t U.S. & NK
542 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
Total Trade of U.S.543 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
Trade Share of NK in 
U.S. 
2001 0.5 2,375,296 0.00000 
2002 25.2 2,376,541 0.00001 
2003 8.0 2,535,415 0.00000 
2004 25.3 2,928,453 0.00001 
2005 5.8 3,278,187 0.00000 
2006 n/a 3,663,729 n/a 
2007 1.7 3,987,758 0.00000 
2008 52.2 4,349,128 0.00001 
   Avg 0.00001 
As shown in Table 3.7, the trade share of the United States for 
North Korea was also very low and the average between 2001 and 2008 was only 0.3%. 
By Barbieri’s method, these data lead to a calculation of economic interdependence that 
is effectively zero, as shown in Table 3.8:  
                                                 
541 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea, Statistics of  Economy and 
Trade, http://www.mofat.go.kr/economic/economicdata/statistics/index.jsp (accessed on March 8, 2009).  
542 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, “Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade 
Balance) with North Korea,” http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5790.html (accessed on August 
18, 2009), 2006 data is not available.   
543 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, “U.S. Trade in Goods and Services-Balance of 
Payments (BOP) Basis,” http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf (accessed on 
August 18, 2009). 
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Table 3.7.   Trade share of the United States in North Korea544   
Year Trade b/t U.S. & NK (millions of U.S. dollars)
Total Trade of NK 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
Trade Share of U,S. in 
NK 
2001 0.5 4,231 0.00012 
2002 25.2 3,248 0.00776 
2003 8.0 3,300 0.00242 
2004 25.3 4,139 0.00611 
2005 5.8 4,776 0.00121 
2006 n/a 5,010 n/a 
2007 1.7 5,096 0.00033 
2008 52.2 n/a n/a 
   Avg 0.00299 
Table 3.8.   Trade salience, symmetry, and economic interdependence between the 
United States and North Korea   
Year Trade salience Trade symmetry Economic Interdependence 
2001 0.00000  0.99988  0.00000  
2002 0.00029  0.99225  0.00028  
2003 0.00009  0.99758  0.00009  
2004 0.00023  0.99390  0.00023  
2005 0.00005  0.99879  0.00005  
2006 0.00000  1.00000  0.00000  
2007 0.00001  0.99967  0.00001  
2008 n/a n/a n/a 
Average 0.00013  0.99701  0.00013  
                                                 
544 Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy 
Analysis,” CRS Report for Congress, August 26, 2008, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
25 and 43, and for additional information, refer to Mika Marumoto, “Project Report: DPRK Economic 
Statistics Project (March 2009),” US Korea Institute at SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies), 
The Johns Hopkins University,  
http://uskoreainstitute.org/pdf/specialreports/DPRKstat/DPRK_Stats_FullRPT.pdf (accessed on August 18, 
2009).  
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(2) Russett and Oneal’s Method.545  As shown in Table 3.9, 
U.S. trade dependence on its linkages with North Korea has been almost zero. It shows 
that North Korea’s trade dependence on its linkages with the United States was also 
extremely low. Therefore, the Russett and Oneal method as displayed in Table 3.8 shows 
that the measurement of the economic interdependence between the two Koreas was 
almost zero.  





U.S. dollars)  
U.S. GDP 
(millions of 
U.S. dollars)  












2001 0.5 10,075,900 0.000000 23,697 0.000021 
2002 25.2 10,417,600 0.000002 1,636,500 0.000015 
2003 8.0 10,908,000 0.000001 1,657,650 0.000005 
2004 25.3 11,630,900 0.000002 1,675,200 0.000015 
2005 5.8 12,376,100 0.000000 1,801,509 0.000003 
2006 n/a 13,132,900 0.000000 1,945,196 0.000000 
2007 1.7 13,776,472 0.000000 2,051,729 0.000001 
2008 52.2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Avg. 17 11,759,696 0.000001 1,541,640 0.000009 
                                                 
545 Russett and Oneal, “Classical Liberals Were Right,” 275. 
546 Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at 
the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama 
(accessed on August 20, 2009). GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP). 
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(3) No Economic Interdependence between the United States 
and North Korea.  The United States and North Korea were not economically 
interdependent at all between 2001 and 2008. Most of trade between the United States 
and North Korea was U.S. assistance to North Korea.547 For example, in 2006, there was 
no U.S. assistance to North Korea. After the progress in the Six-Party Talks in the fall of 
2007, the United States provided heavy fuel oil in return for North Korea’s freezing and 
disabling nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.548 In May 2008, the United States Agency for 
International Development announced a food assistance plan to North Korea by 
providing 500,000 metric tons (MT) and a U.S. ship delivered 37,000 tons of wheat to 
North Korea on June 30, 2008.549 
The United States could not trade with North Korea under the U.S. 
Trading with the Enemy Act. On June 26, 2008, the Bush administration announced that 
the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act would no longer apply to North Korea and notified 
Congress of its intent to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List 
after the required 45-day notification period to Congress.550 On October 11, 2008, the 
Bush administration removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.551 
The level of economic interdependence between the United States and North Korea had 
been zero. There was very little change as a result of U.S. assistance to North Korea in 
2007 and 2008 even with the progress of the Six-Party Talks. Consequently, economic 
interdependence is not a factor in the relationship between the United States and North 
Korea.  
                                                 
547 Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, “U.S. Assistance to North Korea,” CRS Report for 
Congress, July 31, 2008, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.   
548 Ibid., 5. 
549 Ibid., 3, referring to Washington Post, “U.S. Wheat Begins New Aid to North Korea,” July 1, 2008.  
550 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea: Terrorism List Removal,” CRS Report for Congress, April 15, 
2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 9. 
551 Ibid.  
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c. Identity (from the Constructivist Approach): The Persistence of 
Enemy Identity and Hobbesian Culture 
Question 4-c (From the Constructivist Approach): To what extent 
was there a shared identity between the United States and North 
Korea? Was the degree of shared understanding changing and if 
so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity affected the 
calculations of either the United States or North Korea? 
As mentioned in the previous case study, there was some identity shift 
from Hobbesian enemy to Lockean rival between South Korea and North Korea between 
1998 and 2007. However, between the United States and North Korea, the Hobbesian 
identity has not changed at all. The United States considers North Korea as an enemy in 
terms of nuclear proliferation and terrorist threats. On the other hand, North Korea 
considers the United States as an imperialist threat to its security. These enemy identities 
and Hobbesian culture have persisted and affected the calculations of both the United 
States and North Korea.  
(1) The United States: “Axis of Evil” and Enemy Identity of 
North Korea.  To the United States, North Korea is a potential threat and enemy with its 
missiles and nuclear weapons. Most leaders in the United States have an enemy identity 
of North Korea. During the Bush administration, the concept of an evil actor with an 
enemy identity was intensified. A large majority of public opinion showed that the 
American public considered North Korea as one of the country’s greatest enemies. For 
example, the Gallup polls about American attitudes toward North Korea between 2000 
and 2007 show that Americans had a generally negative impression of North Korea.552 
One question was what their overall opinion of North Korea was—very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?553 Table 3.10 shows that about 76 
percent (mostly unfavorable 37.6% and very unfavorable 37.9%) of the participants have 
unfavorable opinions of North Korea.  
                                                 
552 Jibum Kim, Carl Gershenson, Jaeki Jeong, and Tom W. Smith, “The Polls-Trends: How 
Americans Think about North Korea: 2000–2007,” Public Opinion Quarterly 72, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 
804–821. 
553 Ibid., 806. 
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Nov 13-15, 2000 3 23 41 22 11 1,028 
Feb 1-4, 2001 3 28 37 22 10 1,003 
Feb 4-6, 2002 3 20 38 27 12 1,011 
Feb 3-6, 2003 1 11 38 42 8 1,001 
Mar 14-15, 2003 2 6 33 53 6 1,007 
Feb 9-12, 2004 2 10 42 41 5 1,002 
Feb 7-10, 2005 1 12 38 42 7 1,008 
Feb 6-9, 2006 2 8 38 43 8 1,002 
Feb 1-4, 2007 2 10 33 49 6 1,007 
Average 2.1 14.2 37.6 37.9 8.1 1,007.7 
The next question was whether respondents considered North 
Korea: an ally of the United States; friendly, but not an ally; unfriendly; or an enemy of 
the United States.555 Table 3.11 shows that an average 41.8% of participants considered 
North Korea as an enemy of the United States and an average 35.8% answered that North 
Korea is unfriendly. That is, almost 80% of participants had an enemy image of North 
Korea.  
                                                 
554 Kim et al., “The Polls-Trends: How Americans Think about North Korea,” 806.  
555 Ibid.  
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Table 3.11.   American Enemy Identity toward North Korea556   
Date Ally Friendly, not an ally Unfriendly Enemy 
No 
opinion N 
May 18-21, 2000 6 26 35 24 9 1,011 
Mar 14-15, 2003 2 5 43 46 4 1,007 
Apr 22-23, 2003 2 11 36 45 6 1,001 
Sep 19-21, 2003 5 7 39 44 5 1,003 
Jul 6-9, 2006 2 10 34 47 7 1,007 
May 4-6, 2007 4 17 28 45 6 1,028 
Average 3.5 12.7 35.8 41.8 6.2 1009.5 
Also, according to the Gallup poll conducted on February 1–4, 
2007, 18% of Americans identified North Korea as the United States’ greatest enemy.557 
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech in 2002 influenced American public 
opinion about the perception of North Korea. Relatively few Americans (2%) thought of 
North Korea as the United States’ top enemy in 2001. This figure jumped to 22% in 2005 
and it has continued to remain high (15% in 2006 and 18% in 2007) (Figure 3.4). Lydia 
Saad says, “President George W. Bush may be struggling to rally Americans around his 
Iraq War policies, but he has evidently been more successful at influencing public 
opinion about the United States’ enemies in the world, more generally.”558  
                                                 
556 Kim et al., “The Polls-Trends: How Americans Think about North Korea,” 806 
557 Lydia Saad, “‘Axis of Evil’ Countries Dominate U.S. Perceptions of Greatest Enemy,” February 
22, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/26653/axis-evil-countries-dominate-us-perceptions-greatest-




Figure 3.4.   Trends in Perception of “Axis of Evil” Countries as “Greatest Enemy”559 
American enmity toward North Korea was solidified by material 
facts such as the missile tests and nuclear weapons program. Also, there were many 
examples of North Korea’s past aggressive behaviors such as Pueblo Incident in 1968560 
and Axe Murder Incident in 1976.561 In his study of identity, Jae-Jung Suh says, “It is 
undeniable that there were material realities that lent themselves to such threat 
assessments.” 562  According to Suh, the material factors are one element of identity 
constitution. American identity of North Korea became further consolidated by the 
representational and institutional facts: 
U.S. identity has also been constituted through material acts, 
representational practices, and institutional politics. The experience of 
fighting the Korean War and protecting the South throughout the Cold 
War did much to propel the United States into its role as a defender of the 
free world.  
                                                 
559 Saad, “‘Axis of Evil’ Countries Dominate.”  
560 Refer to USS Pueblo (AGER-2) Veteran’s Association homepage, http://www.usspueblo.org/. 
561 Refer to Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, “The DMZ War Operation Paul Bunyan: 
The ‘Axe Murder Incident’ 18 August 1976 at Panmunjom,” http://www.vfwpost7591.org/opn-PB.html.  
562 Jae-Jung Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Affairs (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 165.  
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As South Korea’s identity was defined as opposite of the North’s, the 
United States was identified in terms of its role in containing the danger of 
communism, of which North Korea constituted an important part during 
and especially after the Cold War. Finally, the U.S. government 
institutionalized measures to politically and economically punish North 
Korea for its transgressions and, in so doing, effectively secure the North’s 
identity as the Other and the United States’ as its opposite.563  
Even though there are several scholars in the United States, such as 
Bruce Cumings, Selig Harrison, Leon Segal and David Kang, who interpret North 
Korea’s identity from different perspectives, such as security dilemma, economic need, 
vulnerability, and need-oriented motivations, the dominant identity of North Korea in the 
United States has been that of the enemy under Hobbesian culture. Bruce Cumings points 
out, “A mimetic American commentary unites diverse opinion on one point: this place is 
a rogue-terrorist-communist-Stalinist-totalitarian-Oriental nightmare, America’s most 
loathed and feared ‘Other.’”564  
(2) North Korea: “Empire of Devil” and Imperialist Enemy 
Identity of the United States.  As a response to Bush’s Axis of Evil speech in the 2002 
State of the Union Address, North Korea called the United States the “Empire of Devil.” 
According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA):  
Though it has the largest number of weapons of mass destruction in the 
world, the U.S. is sharply increasing military expenditure. This clearly 
proves that the U.S. “empire of devil,” is posing a grave threat to the 
world peace and stability.565 
This image of the United States is dominant in the North Korean 
media. The North Korean government believes the United States’ intentions are 
aggressive and considers all military exercises of the United States with South Korea as a 
preparation for an invasion and war with North Korea. The Korean Central News Agency 
(KCNA) always describes the United States as an imperialist and U.S. forces as 
                                                 
563 Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity, 125.  
564 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: The New Press, 2004), viii.  
565 KCNA, “KCNA on U.S. National Defense Budget,” February 8, 2002.   
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“imperialist aggression forces.” North Korea condemns the United States almost every 
day in their news. This has been the constant perspective of North Korea. Here are typical 
examples collected from the KCNA news between 2007 and 2008 when the Bush 
administration attempted to implement its reassurance strategy:     
January 8, 2007: The above-said exercise staged by the U.S. imperialists 
with the mobilization of those strategic bombers from the outset of the 
year clearly indicates that they are set to ignite an adventurous nuclear war 
on the Korean Peninsula.566 
October 16, 2007: The warlike elements of the U.S. imperialist aggression 
forces are nowadays busying themselves deploying warplanes in and 
around South Korea to be ready to go into action against the DPRK, 
according to a military source.567 
Reviewing 2008 KCNA news, there was not much change in the 
rhetoric about the United States, which showed the North Korean identity of the United 
States as an imperialist enemy. Here are some examples:   
January 5, 2008: The U.S. has become all the more frantic in its moves to 
modernize nuclear weapons in the new century as it considers the nuclear 
weapons as an all-powerful means and pins great hope on their use in 
realizing its Asia and world strategies for aggression. It is the intention of 
the U.S. nuclear war mongers to modernize the nuclear weapons so that 
they can be used as conventional weapons in wars.568 
April 18, 2008: The U.S. bellicose forces raised a hue and cry over 
"missile threat" from the DPRK, making nonsensical speculations. This is 
nothing but sophism prompted by a sinister aim to justify their moves to 
establish the missile defense system (MD) and invent a pretext for 
launching a military invasion of it.569 
October 2, 2008: The U.S. is talking about "peace and stability" on the 
peninsula, but it is, in actuality, pursuing confrontation and war against the  
 
                                                 
566 KCNA, “U.S. Imperialist Aggression Forces Commit Air Strike Exercise,” January 8, 2007. 
567 KCNA, “U.S. Forces Deploy Warplanes to Be Ready to Go into Action,” October 16, 2007. 
568 KCNA, “U.S. Measure for ‘Nuclear Reduction’ Termed Hypocritical,” January 5, 2008.  
569 KCNA, “U.S. Reckless Missile Hysteria under Fire,” April 18, 2008.  
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DPRK. All its military actions in Korea are not aimed at preserving 
"peace" but at serving the purpose of rounding off the preparations to 
carry out its policy for invading the DPRK.570 
This kind of language always exists in North Korean media and 
shows the dominant North Korean identity and attitudes toward the United States. In sum, 
it is easy to see the persistency of enemy identity and Hobbesian culture between the 
United States and North Korea. The United States sees North Korea as a member of an 
“Axis of Evil” that has weapons of mass destruction and North Korea views the United 
States as an “Empire of Devil” that constantly looks for a chance to topple the regime.  
There is a shared enemy identity between the United States and North Korea and the 
degree of shared understanding has not changed. This kind of a shared enemy identity 
affected the motivating factors of North Korea as well as all intervening variables of this 
dissertation, such as leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the 
United States and North Korea.  
Consequently, the balance of power remained very favorable to the 
United States but was complicated by the North’s demonstration of nuclear weapon 
potential; there was no economic interdependence; and enemy identities remained 
unchanged. These condition variables (CV1) affected North Korea’s motivating factors 
(CV 2) and other variables such as leaders’ perceptions and domestic and alliance politics 
of North Korea and the United States (IntV).  
2. Condition Variable (CV) 2: North Korea’s Mixed and Uncertain 
Motivating Factors 
Question 5: What were North Korea’s motivations? Was North Korea best 
seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was the 
United States’ perception of North Korea’s motivations?  
Question 6: Did North Korea share an aversion to war with the United 
States? 
                                                 
570 KCNA, “DPRK-Targeted Joint Military Exercises Slammed,” October 2, 2008.  
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Even though there is not much empirical evidence about North Korea’s 
motivating factors, assessment must be made of the kinds of intentions North Korea has 
because it is a fundamental factor in the success or failure of a reassurance strategy. 
Those who advocate a reassurance strategy need to explain their assessments about North 
Korea’s motivating factors.   
a. North Korea’s “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” Motivating 
Factors: Defensive Motive  
The balance of power has shifted against North Korea after the end of the 
Cold War. The possibility of a total war initiated by North Korea has been lower since 
the end of the Cold War. In other words, North Korea has a “not-greedy” and “defense-
oriented” motive. North Korea’s main concern after the end of the Cold War became 
regime survival. North Korea has requested security guarantees and a bilateral peace 
treaty with the United States as a precondition for giving up its nuclear weapons 
development. North Korea has been threatened by the United States, especially since the 
end of the Cold War, and the “Axis of Evil” statement after 9/11. North Korea would 
consider regime survival as a primary reason for seeking a deterrent as long as the United 
States maintains the hard-line policy toward North Korea. 
David Kang argues that North Korea is not a threat. He also states that the 
changing balance of power against North Korea has increased North Korea’s security 
fears.571 He points out the main dilemma of North Korea’s nuclear program issue:  
In a nutshell, the problem is this: the United States refuses to give security 
guarantees to North Korea until it proves it has dismantled its weapon 
program. The North refuses to disarm until it has security guarantees from 
the United States. Hence, stalemate.572  
Two weeks after North Korea’s admission about having an HEU program 
in October 2002, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that the United 
                                                 
571 Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 41–69.  
572 Ibid., 43.  
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States’ hostile policy was the cause of their nuclear program and requested a non-
aggression treaty between North Korea and the United States: 
As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it 
cropped up as the U.S. has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South 
Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with 
those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hostile policy toward it 
in accordance with the strategy for world supremacy…. If the U.S. legally 
assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear 
weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK will be ready to 
clear the former of its security concerns.573 
North Korea’s request for a security guarantee and diplomatic recognition 
as a condition for the disablement of its nuclear program continued. The discussions and 
agreements of the Six-Party Talks showed this. In September 2005, North Korea agreed 
to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for economic aid as well as security 
guarantees and diplomatic recognition in the September 19, 2005 Agreement.  In the 
February 13, 2007 Agreement, North Korea requested normalization of U.S.–North 
Korean relations which meant recognition of its right to exist.  
Based on North Korea’s continuous request for security guarantees and 
normalization of the two countries’ relationship and the unfavorable shift of the balance 
of power, regime survival seems to be the primary motive of the nuclear program and 
other military actions and it illustrates North Korea’s “not-greedy” motivating factors as 
arising from fear and insecurity. However, that may not be a totally correct view of North 
Korea’s motivating factors. North Korea also shows “greedy” and “opportunity-
motivated” motivating factors, given its aggressive actions beyond its borders such as the 
proliferation of WMDs.  
b. North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” Motivating 
Factors: Offensive Motive 
If North Korea had only “not-greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” 
motivating factors, North Korea could implement the previous deals with the United 
                                                 
573 KCNA, “Conclusion of Non-aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called for,” October 25, 
2006. 
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States and make more progress in negotiations. According to Victor D. Cha, even though 
the United States had deals twice offering food, energy, and normalized relations with 
North Korea in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 2005 Agreement in 
return for denuclearization, North Korea continuously made provocative actions after 
reaching agreements.574 A series of North Korean provocative actions in 2009 “can no 
longer be rationalized as an attempt to engage the United States.”575 One evidence to 
show North Korea’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors is its wishes 
to be recognized as a nuclear state.576 Another point of evidence is its cooperation with 
other countries in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).   
(1)  Demand for Recognition as a Nuclear State.  The 
possibility of success of Korea’s reunification under the North’s control has waned 
because the circumstances have been changed by South Korea’s growing economic 
power and better relationships with China and Russia. However, there is no clear 
evidence showing that North Korea has changed its objective to reunify Korea under its 
control. This means that North Korea has not given up its “greedy” and “opportunity-
oriented” motivating factors, even though it is difficult to implement in reality. Therefore, 
under the changed circumstances, North Korea demanded recognition as a nuclear state. 
The continuous provocative actions of North Korea could be efforts to buy time and 
fulfill this changed “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factor.  
North Korea has provoked skirmishes to create tension and take 
advantage of the consequences. This is “coercive bargaining” strategy. According to Cha, 
coercive strategy “derives from the preemptive/preventive logic.”577 He says that “This 
strategy does not advocate all-out war. Rather it utilizes deliberate, limited acts of 
violence to create small crises and then negotiate down from the heightened state of 
                                                 
574 Victor D. Cha, “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s  North Korea Conundrum,” The 
Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (October 2009), 123.  
575 Ibid., 121.  
576 Ibid., 126.  
577 Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 24.  
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tension to a bargaining outcome more to the North’s advantage than the status quo.”578 If 
coercive bargaining is North Korea’s intention, then there is a high chance of violence 
resulting and a low chance of success of negotiation. Cha argues that North Korea wants 
a U.S.-India type deal. He said, “I believe that North Korea wants a deal ultimately, but 
not one that requires full denuclearization on their part….in the course of sometimes 
heated talks, the North Koreans would assert to Hill, the lead U.S. negotiator, that the 
United States should simply accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, much as they 
have done for India and Pakistan.”579 
(2) Proliferation of WMD.  The most fundamental U.S. 
concern of the confrontation with North Korea is the proliferation of WMD and 
technologies to other governments or to terrorist groups.  North Korea’s cooperation with 
Iran and Syria might be motivated by a balancing strategy580 to find allies and get help; 
nevertheless, North Korea’s nuclear program and its proliferation is “a threat to the 
United States—probably much more from possible leakage to terrorists than from direct 
attack—and a serious setback to global nonproliferation, the problem is even more a 
northeast-Asian regional issue.”581 If North Korea was motivated only by “not-greedy” 
and “need-oriented” motivating factors, it would not try to increase the most serious 
threat to the United States and take advantage of the difficult conditions of the United 
States in Iraq.  
There was a correlation between the Middle East and North 
Korea’s strategic calculation. The destabilizing situation and U.S. difficulties in the 
Middle East could provide North Korea with a strategic gain. To the United States, North 
Korean WMD proliferation to the Middle East could be interpreted as a very offensive 
threat to the U.S. security and interests. According to Larry A. Niksch, “If one accepts 
that North Korean leaders genuinely worry about U.S. military or other coercive actions 
                                                 
578 Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 24.  
579 Cha, “What Do They Really Want,” 123.  
580 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43.  
581 James A. Kelly, “Two for Now,” The National Interest 98 (November/December 2008), 28.  
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against them, it then stands to reason that they judge that destabilizing the Middle East 
and complicating U.S. policies and commitments in that region provide an important 
strategic gain for North Korea.” 582  Niksch claims that “Pyongyang’s fear of a U.S. 
unilateral attack obviously receded [in the second half of 2003 and 2004], and Pyongyang 
saw a new opportunity for diplomatic advantage.” 583  When the United States had 
difficulty in Iraq in late 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test and became 
more assertive. 
The cooperation between North Korea and Iran in development of 
long-range missiles and nuclear weapons is a most serious concern of the United States. 
While North Korea and Iran established diplomatic ties in 1973, missile collaboration 
reportedly only began in 1985 under the Islamic revolutionary government, and they 
expanded their relationship in the 1990s.584 As Christina Y. Lin notes, “North Korea’s 
No-dong, Taepo-dong 1, and Taepo-dong 2 missiles were the basis for development of 
Iran’s Shahab 3, Shahab 4, and Shahab 5/6585, respectively.”586 
After North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the 
cooperation on nuclear issues increased and the military relationship between North 
Korea and Iran has become more intense since November 2006.587 According to The 
Daily Telegraph, in November 2006, North Korea invited a team of Iranian nuclear 
scientists to share the results of an underground test to help Iran conduct a similar one in 
                                                 
582 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in North Korea: The Politics of 
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583 Ibid.  
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the future.588 The relationship between North Korea and Iran became closer and they 
expanded their mutual exchanges to other fields.  
For example, on January 19, 2007, North Korea and Iran signed “a 
2007–2009 plan for cultural and scientific exchange.”589 The nuclear programs of both 
countries have become serious problems for the United States, and their increased 
cooperation has intensified threats to the United States. North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment program has been a special concern, especially since the 2002 nuclear crisis. 
North Korea claimed that it had completed experiments to enrich uranium in September 
2009 and assistance from Iran for the uranium enrichment was possible. 590  The 
Economist summarizes the scenario many fear:  
North Korea and Iran are already known to co-operate intensively in 
developing nuclear-capable missiles. So what is to stop them helping each 
other with their nuclear programs? North Korea has plutonium and 
warhead-building skills. A master tunneller, it could also help any country 
wanting to hide its nuclear efforts from satellites. Iran, meanwhile, has the 
uranium-enrichment skills that North Korea previously lacked. Small 
wonder Iran thinks it can enrich on happily.591 
Also, the relationship between North Korea and Syria has raised 
suspicions. In May 2007, North Korea and Syria signed an agreement on friendship and 
scientific cooperation between Kim Il Sung University and University of Damascus in 
Syria.592 North Korea reportedly helped the Syrian nuclear program. Even though there 
was no clear evidence of North Korean assistance to the Syrian nuclear program after the 
Israeli airstrike on September 6, 2007,593 and there was little official commentary from 
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the United States on Syria and North Korea’s nuclear connection,594 North Korea’s role 
in the Syrian nuclear program was suspected. In April 2008, the United States released 
intelligence information saying that the Syrian nuclear reactor was built with assistance 
from North Korea and the Bush administration cut off delivery of heavy fuel oil 
shipments to North Korea.595  
In sum, even though it is not clear if North Korea could attack the 
continental United States, North Korea’s aggressive actions of proliferation of WMD to 
other countries create serious threats to the United States and they constitute North 
Korea’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors.     
c. Mixed Motivations 
As explained in the previous case study, North Korea’s motivating factors 
cannot be determined with certainty. It is true that between 2007 and 2008, when the 
Bush administration implemented the reassurance strategy toward North Korea, 
Pyongyang seemed to have mixed motivations and its strategies differed depending on 
how North Korea interpreted the situation. An unfavorable balance of power in the 1990s 
and early 2000s increased North Korea’s security fears and North Korea continued to 
request a security guarantee from the United States. These fears and requests for a 
security guarantee continued in 2007 and 2008 as shown in the February 13 Agreement 
and October 3 Agreement. This showed North Korea’s “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
motivating factors.  
However, North Korea has also shown its “greedy” and “opportunity-
oriented” motivating factors toward the United States by showing its efforts to be a 
nuclear state and cooperating with other countries, such as Iran and Syria, in the 
development of WMD. When the United States had difficulty in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, 
                                                 
594 Peter Crail, “NK-Syria Nuclear Connection Questionable,” Arms Control Today 37, no. 8 (October 
2007): 35–6.  
595 Crail, “NK-Syria Nuclear Connection Questionable.”  
 215
North Korea conducted its nuclear test and then increased its cooperation on the nuclear 
and missile program with Iran. These actions were motivated by gain, rather than need.  
According to Cha, alongside the demand for recognition as a nuclear state, 
North Korea wanted to receive “regime security assurance” from the United States. Cha 
said, “Thus, what Pyongyang wants is not just a negative security assurance from the 
United States against nuclear attack, but a positive security assurance that it will not 
allow the House of Kim Jong Il-that is, Kim Jong Il and his son, Kim Jong Un, who is set 
to succeed him—to collapse as Pyongyang partially denuclearizes and goes through a 
modest reform process to absorb the economic assistance and opening to the outside 
world that would come with a grand deal.”596 North Korea wants to be a nuclear state 
and receive “regime security assurance” from the United States. This shows that North 
Korea has not only “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors, but also 
“greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, even under the vulnerable 
conditions. Consequently, North Korea has both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motives 
toward the United States. 
d. The United States’ Perception of North Korea’s Motivating 
Factors 
Just as North Korea showed evidence of both “greedy” and “not-greedy” 
motivating factors, the United States’ perception of North Korea’s motivating factors has 
two aspects. Depending on the perceptions of North Korea’s intentions, interested parties 
have been sharply divided between hard-liners and soft-liners. Also, the different 
perceptions make the acceptance of co-existence with North Korea and a clear security 
guarantee the main issues in dealing with North Korea that divide the hard-line approach 
and soft-line approach. North Korea’s nuclear program is interpreted from two different 
perspectives in terms of motivating factors. For example, after the 2002 crisis resulting 
from discovery of a secret uranium enrichment program, hard-liners asserted that North  
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Korea had “the fundamentally unchanged and ‘evil’ intentions.”597 Soft-liners argued 
that North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment program “derives from basic 
insecurity and fears of U.S. preemption.”598  
(1) North Korea’s “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” 
Motivating Factors: Soft-liners’ (the Regionalists) Focus on North Korea’s Insecurity.  
Soft-liners in the United States who support negotiation with North Korea “focus on the 
full scope of the DPRK’s security concerns and [would] provide North Korea with clear 
security assurances in return for its willingness to verifiably dismantle its program.”599 
They are mainly regional experts and Korean scholars. This “regional security” approach 
is related to reassurance strategy because these experts assume that North Korea’s 
behavior is based on its insecurity and vulnerability. They believe that “[North Korea] 
could be persuaded to alter its behavior if its insecurities were addressed.”600 Also, they 
explain that the reasons for all failures of U.S. policy toward North Korea to require it to 
dismantle its nuclear program are due to U.S. failure to provide a security guarantee and 
normalize the relationship.  
David Kang argued that a security guarantee was essential to solve 
North Korean nuclear problem. He said: 
The way to resolve the crisis is by addressing the security concerns of 
North Korea. If the United States genuinely has no intention of attacking 
North Korea or pressuring it for regime change, the administration should 
conclude a nonaggression pact. It is not that surprising that North Korea 
does not believe the Bush administration’s occasional assurances about 
having no intention of using force when the administration refuses to 
formalize those assurances.601 
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Selig Harrison is another leading supporter of this perspective. 
Harrison argues that North Korea will not denuclearize without solving its insecurity 
concerns. He says, “But the harsh reality in dealing with North Korea is that the 
egocentric nuclear policies pursued by the United States will simply not work.”602  
Some U.S. officials also considered North Korea’s “not-greedy” 
and “need-oriented” motivating factors. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was one of primary officials who implemented Bush’s 
reassurance strategy as the head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks. Hill 
believed that reassurance through the Six-Party Talks was the best way to solve the North 
Korean nuclear problem and argued there was high possibility of success. In August 2005, 
one month before the September 19 Agreement, he had an interview with PBS. He 
recognized North Korea’s vulnerability. He said, “This is a country that really needs 
some help, really needs some help in terms of its economy. And I can assure you making 
weapons is not part of that.”603 He also emphasized the important of the Six-Party Talks. 
He said:  
President Bush has made very clear on many occasions that we considered 
the Six-Party Talks the best way to solve this. I mean, this is not a bilateral 
issue with the U.S. Every country there needs to be involved. So we think 
it’s the best, and as long as we’re making progress, I would say we made 
some progress in Beijing, we’ll stick with it.604  
Victor Cha also pointed out that North Korea’s primary concern is 
regime survival. He was director for Asian Affairs in the White House’s National 
Security Council and deputy head of delegation to the Six-Party Talks during the second 
Bush administration. In his testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 
2009, he said: 
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The North wants a special type of “regime security assurance” from the 
United States. This stems from the fundamental reform dilemma that the 
DPRK faces, which I wrote about in Foreign Affairs in 2002: It needs to 
open up to survive, but the process of opening up leads to the regime’s 
demise. Thus, what Pyongyang wants is an assurance from the United 
States that it will not allow the regime to collapse during a reform 
process.605 
In sum, the regionalists and some officials who support a soft-line 
or engagement approach perceive North Korea as a weak and vulnerable state whose 
primary goal is regime survival by achieving a security guarantee from the United States.   
(2) North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” 
Motivating Factors: Hard-liners’ (the Globalists) Focus on North Korean Threat.  On the 
other hand, for hard-liners in the Bush administration who supported containment and/or 
regime change, a possible North Korean attack on the continental United States and 
South Korea continued to be a primary U.S. concern. Furthermore, North Korea’s 
continuous development of nuclear weapons and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and technology from North Korea to other states or non-state actors could be 
serious threats to the United States. For hard-liners, in order to stop North Korean nuclear 
program and prevent proliferation, containment and/or regime change was the best 
solution because North Korea had “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating 
factors. These hard-liners were conservative groups and government officials who 
supported a “global security” approach.606  
They had concerns about proliferation and North Korea is “just one 
of many ‘rogue regimes’ that were unlikely to change, and thus U.S. objectives could 
best be met by preventing proliferation and promoting regime change.”607 They also 
feared the possibility of transfer of North Korean weapons and technology to terrorist 
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groups such as Al-Qaeda. 608 Hard-liners did not support any negotiation with North 
Korea. John Bolton was one of the strong hard-liners. When Bolton, as undersecretary of 
state for arms control and international security, participated in the Six-Party Talks in 
July 2003, he said, “Hundreds of thousands of people [are] locked in [North Korean] 
prison camps, with millions more mired in abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. 
For many in North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare.”609 In 2008, Bolton also described 
the removal of North Korea from the terrorism list as “surrender” and “bending the knee 
to North Korea.”610 According to Bolton’s writing after he left office: 
Delisting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a 
terrorist sponsor represents a classic case of prizing the negotiation 
process over substance, where the benefits of “diplomatic progress” can be 
trumpeted in the media while the specifics of the actual agreement, and 
their manifest inadequacies, fade into the shadows.611  
Consequently, the United States recognized that the balance of 
power had shifted unfavorably to North Korea since the end of Cold War and regime 
survival has been North Korea’s primary goal. At the same time, the United States felt a 
considerable threat from North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. 
e. Aversion to War by the United States and North Korea 
(1) The United States.  The most cogent fear of the United 
States was that a nuclear ballistic missile could strike the continental United States. 
However, there is not only a nuclear threat from North Korea to the United States. The 
cost of war on the Korean peninsula would be extremely high. During the crisis over 
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North Korea’s nuclear program in the spring of 1994, General Luck estimated the 
possible result of a war on the Korean peninsula: 
…on the basis of the experience in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, that due 
to the colossal lethality of modern weapons in the urban environments of 
Korea, as many as 1 million people would be killed in the resumption of 
full-scale war on the peninsula, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans, 
that the out-of-pocket costs to the U.S. would exceed $100 billion, and 
that the destruction of property and interruption of business activity would 
cost more than $1,000 billion (one trillion) dollars to the countries 
involved and their immediate neighbors.612 
David C. Kang introduced estimated calculations of a war on the 
Korean peninsula, which “would cost the United States more than $60 billion and result 
in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties.”613 Any war on the 
Korean peninsula would be a disaster for the two Koreas and a serious burden to the 
United States. South Koreans are seriously concerned about the cost of a war, too.   
In 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned North Korea 
by saying that “We are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts. We’re capable of 
winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the case of the other, and let there be 
no doubt about it.”614 However, another war against North Korea would not appear as 
easy to most Americans as Rumsfeld suggested given the difficult conditions in Iraq in 
2006 and 2007. United States casualties on the Korean peninsula would most likely not 
be accepted by U.S. public opinion.     
Also, the United States would need to consider China if there were 
a major war on the Korean peninsula. Any conflict involving the United States against 
North Korea would likely raise tensions between the United States and China. China 
would not fight directly against the United States as in the Korean War, but it would 
likely support North Korea and tension could escalate. Therefore, even though the United 
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States could win a war against North Korea, it has an aversion to war because the damage 
would be high and reconstruction would take a great deal of time and investments.  
(2) North Korea.  As explained in Chapter II, North Korea had 
an aversion to war against the United States. They recognized that the consequences of 
any serious military action or use of a nuclear weapon would be annihilation of North 
Korea. According to Selig S. Harrison, North Koreans had the trauma of the Korean War, 
which created a “permanent siege mentality.”615 Carter Eckert, director of the Korea 
Institute at Harvard, explained that “virtually the whole population worked and lived in 
artificial underground caves for three years to escape the relentless attack of American 
planes, any one of which, from the North Korean perspective, might have been carrying 
an atomic bomb.”616 This kind of horrific memory of the Korean War became more vivid 
after the 1991 Iraq War.  
The United States showed superior air force power against Iraq in 
1991. North Korea felt the serious vulnerability, especially in air power. In the 1990s, 
North Korean military leaders often expressed their concerns about U.S. air power. When 
North Korean Lt. Gen, Kwon Jung Yong, deputy army chief of staff for strategy, 
disarmament, and foreign affairs met Gen. Edward C. Meyer, former U.S. Army chief of 
staff met in May 1992, he pointed to a map and explained the reasons for its forward 
deployed forces. He said that “You can leapfrog over us, deep into our territory. That is 
why we must keep our forces far forward, to deter you, to make it too costly for you to do 
that. You talk to of equitable redeployments but they wouldn’t equitable unless we are no 
longer threatened by your air force as well as your ground forces.”617 Selig Harrison had 
a chance to talk with First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju in a one-on-one dinner 
on September 29, 1995. When Harrison called attention to arms control and pullbacks of 
troops from DMZ, Kang mentioned the North Korean military’s concerns about the 
superior U.S. air power. According to Harrison, “he held up a knife, drew it across his 
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throat, and said, ‘My military friends will do this to me if I even mention such a thing. 
Unless, of course, you are prepared to withdraw your forces, especially your air 
forces.’”618 In sum, the Korean War experience and the demonstration of the superior 
U.S. air power in 1991 Iraq War brought an aversion to war to the North Koreans.  
D. INTERVENING VARIABLES (INTV): LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS, 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND NORTH KOREA 
1. Bush’s Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea 
Question 7: How did Bush perceive Kim Jong Il and North Korea? Was 
there evidence that common psychological biases led Bush to misperceive 
Kim Jong Il? Or, was reassurance implemented in a way that was 
sufficient to overcome Bush’s cognitive barriers to change his image of 
Kim Jong Il and North Korea?  
a. Dualism: Good vs. Evil  
Bush’s unfavorable perception of Kim Jong Il was well-known from his 
2002 statements like “Kim Jong Il is a pygmy” and “I loathe Kim Jong Il.” The 
Washington Post’s Bob Woodward, in his book Bush at War, describes his interview at 
the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas in August 2002, when he asked Bush about 
North Korea, “The President sat forward in his chair. I thought he might jump up he 
became so emotional about the North Korean leader. ‘I loathe Kim, Jong Il’ Bush shouted, 
waving his finger in his air. ‘I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving 
his people.’”619  
Based on this perception, Bush and his administration believed that 
containment and/or regime change was the preferred way to solve the North Korean 
problem. This perspective was based on dualism or a Manichean (black and white) view 
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of the world. The Bush administration believed that “Good” should win over “Evil” and 
“Good” cannot accept “Evil.” This position became stronger after September 11. Bush’s 
dualistic understanding and perception of the world and North Korea were expressed 
many times. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush described North Korea as part 
of an “Axis of Evil”: 
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction, while starving its citizens….States like these, and their 
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of 
the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a 
grave and growing danger.  
They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the 
United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic….I will not wait on events, while dangers gather, I will not 
stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.620 
Then, Bush strongly believed that “Evil” exists and “Good” should 
overcome it. He said, “We've come to know truths that we will never question: Evil is 
real, and it must be opposed.”621 North Korea’s evil identity had been established during 
the Cold War and persisted after its end.622 North Korea’s bad reputation and notorious 
actions justified Bush’s perception of North Korea as evil and North Korea’s provocative 
actions in 2007 and 2008 strengthened its evil image. Consequently, based on Bush’s 
belief that the world was divided into good and evil camps, the president had an image of 
North Korea as evil.  
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b. Some Changes in Bush’s Statements, but Few Changes in 
Bush’s Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea in 2007 and 
2008 
President Bush’s statement in November 2006 was a first sign of some 
changes in his perceptions of North Korea. After his meeting with Roh Moo Hyun during 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, Bush said he would 
be willing to meet with Kim Jong Il if he gave up his nuclear weapons program.623 
According to Chinoy, “It was an offhand comment—not a serious policy position—but 
the implication was that Bush, who had never disguised his loathing for Kim and his hope 
that the ‘evil’ regime would disappear, was open to ending decades of hostility, and 
perhaps even to a face-to-face meeting.”624 Bush told reporters, “We want the North 
Korean leaders to hear that if it gives up its weapons—nuclear weapons ambitions—that 
we would be willing to enter into security arrangements with the North Koreans, as well 
as move forward new economic incentives for the North Korean people.”625 This sign of 
changes in Bush’s statements was more obvious in 2007.  
When the Bush administration implemented the reassurance strategy in 
2007, there were also some changes in Bush’s statements about North Korea. Bush was 
satisfied with the February 13, 2007 Agreement. Bush praised the agreement by saying 
that “These talks represented the best opportunity to use diplomacy to address North 
Korea’s nuclear program.”626 Chinoy explained the change in Bush’s approach to North 
Korea in 2007: 
For the President, the deal represented yet another major turnaround. Since 
taking office, Bush had insisted there would be no bilateral negotiations 
with a regime he loathed, and that North Korea would never be 
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“rewarded” for bad behavior; the administration’s previous stance at the 
six-party talks had reflected this hard-line view…. 
Now, underscoring the failure of its preference for coercion, threats, 
sanctions, and talk of pre-emptive strikes, Bush had signed on to a deal 
whose outline had been established in Hill’s unprecedented bilateral 
[talks] with Kim Gye Gwan in Berlin.627 
Also, there were some changes in Bush’s statements about Kim Jong Il. 
Bush called Kim Jong Il “Mr. Chairman” several times. Surprisingly, in December 2007, 
Bush sent a letter to Kim Jong Il staring with “Mr. Chairman” and signed it 
“Sincerely.”628 In Meltdown, Chinoy tells the inside story how Bush decided to send a 
letter to Kim Jong Il.629 It was Christopher Hill’s idea to take a letter from Bush to Kim 
Jong Il because Hill felt it was necessary to engage Kim Jong Il directly for the success of 
negotiation.630 One former senior State Department official emphasized the necessity to 
engage with Kim Jong Il: “This is a guy who is obviously in charge and prepared to do 
some unconventional things. If you want a deal with North Korea on matters of deep 
sensitivity and vital interests, we will have to engage with him.”631  
According to a Senior State Department official, the letter said, “I want to 
emphasize that the declaration must be complete and accurate if we are to continue our 
progress.”632 Some argued that the letter showed a significant change in Bush’s policy 
toward North Korea. According to Derek Mitchell, an Asia expert at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, “The letter is evidence that U.S. policy toward North 
Korea has changed ‘at least 150 degrees’ from early in the Bush administration.”633 He 
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said, “Kim Jong Il is someone who Bush famously loathed. He’s quoted as saying he 
loathes Kim Jong Il and called him a pygmy, and the attitude was that you don’t talk to 
evil, you end it.”634  
However, these changes in Bush’s statements did not mean that Bush had 
changed his overall perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. The Bush letter was 
sent for a domestic political purpose. In early December, the December 31 deadline of the 
October 3, 2007 Agreement was likely to slip and Bush needed to show both 
conservatives and liberals that the Bush administration “will not roll back its 
requirements or accept less than a full declaration of the North’s nuclear program.”635 
Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said, “I think a presidential 
letter is a fairly restrained version of direct communication and appropriate to the stage of 
the negotiation. I think it’s better to be written than for the president to jump on a plane to 
Pyongyang.”636  
Therefore, even though there were some changes in Bush’s statements 
along with the implementation of reassurance strategy in 2007, there was no evidence of 
significant change in Bush’s personal perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. 
Even though Bush’s policy toward North Korea certainly changed, there 
were some examples to show that Bush’s perception of Kim Jong Il did not change. In 
February 2008, Bush said that he had no intention to form personal relations with Kim 
Jong Il. At a press conference at the White House, Bush said: 
Here’s what I learned. I learned that it’s important to establish personal 
relations with leaders even though you may not agree with them–certain 
leaders. 
Now, I'm not going to have a personal relationship with Kim Jong Il, and 
our relationships are such that that’s impossible. But U.S.-Russian 
relations are important. 
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It’s important for stability. It’s important for our relations in Europe.637 
Also, when South Korea’s new president, Lee Myung Bak visited Camp 
David in April 2008, Bush’s firm and short answer to the question about the possibility of 
a meeting with Kim Jong Il showed very clearly that he did not have any intention to 
meet Kim Jong Il:  
Question:….And what will you do, President Bush–do you have any 
intention to meet with both President Lee and Chairman Kim in order to 
resolve this issue? 
President Bush: No. As to the latter point, no I don’t.638 
Even though the United States had committed itself to negotiations for the 
eventual normalizations of relations through the 2007 agreements, Bush was not ready to 
meet Kim Jong Il. This shows that there were only very limited changes in Bush’s 
perceptions of Kim Jong Il. In sum, Bush perceived Kim Jong Il as evil until the end. 
Bush’s implementation of reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 and North Korea’s 
response were not sufficient to overcome his cognitive barriers to changing the image of 
Kim Jong Il and North Korea. There was little prospect for the success of Bush’s 
reassurance strategy without a more fundamental change of Bush’s perceptions of Kim 
Jong Il and North Korea. Even though Bush changed his policy toward North Korea, 
Bush himself remained skeptical and failed to change his perceptions of Kim Jong Il and 
North Korea.  
2. Kim Jong Il’s Perception of Bush and the United States 
Question 8: How did Kim Jong Il perceive Bush’s reassurance strategy? 
Was there evidence that common psychological biases led Kim Jong Il to 
discount those reassurance strategies? Or was reassurance implemented in 
a way that was sufficient to overcome Kim Jong Il’s cognitive barriers to 
changing his image of the United States? 
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Just as Bush perceived Kim Jong Il as evil, Kim Jong Il hated Bush intensely. 
South Korean monitors of the North’s propaganda machinery observed that George W. 
Bush “has been bombarded by the most North Korean invective and labeled with by far 
the greatest number of insulting epithets.”639 Here are examples used by North Korea to 
describe Bush: “human trash,” “political idiot,” “the world’s worst violator of human 
rights,” and so on.640 However, not many speeches or statements by Kim Jong Il are 
available.  
Therefore, this author used North Korea’s state-run media, such as the Korean 
Central News Agency (KCNA), as a primary tool to understand the thinking of Kim Jong 
Il and other leadership toward Bush and the United States. Mostly, the North Korean 
position came in the form of remarks and articles attributed by the KCNA to Kim Jong Il. 
The KCNA also covers the statements of spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in North 
Korea, Rodong Sinmun, the main North Korean newspaper, and interviews with North 
Korean government officials and so on. In Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis, Chinoy says:  
With its bombast and overheated rhetoric, North Korea’s state-run media 
is often dismissed as meaningless propaganda and all too often not taken 
seriously by journalists and others following the situation. During my 
research, however, I spent many hours poring over Pyongyang’s official 
pronouncements. It became increasingly clear that stripped of the 
verbiage, they were also a valuable tool to understanding the thinking of 
the North Korean regime.641   
Also, based on testimonies of those who met Kim Jong Il, such as Madeleine 
Albright and Konstantin Pulikovsky, 642 there is good reason to believe Kim Jong Il 
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“micromanages every detail of government business.”643 Kim Jong Il definitely controls 
the state-run media. Therefore, an official news agency of North Korea can be interpreted 
as reflecting what Kim Jong Il thought about Bush and the United States.  
To know whether there were changes in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Bush and 
the United States, the articles are divided into three periods:  
(1) 2005-2006: between the September 19, 2005 Agreement and the 
February 13, 2007 Agreement;  
(2) 2007: between the February 13, 2007 Agreement and the October 3, 
2007 Agreement; and  
(3) 2008: the implementation of the 2007 agreements.  
The news on the Six-Party Talks was rare and brief in the KCNA, yet there were 
many complaints against the United States in each period. The continuous complaints 
show that there were few changes in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Bush and the United 
States and that Kim Jong Il mistrusted the United States. 
a. 2005–2006: Complaints About the BDA Issue Between the 
September 19, 2005 Agreement and the Nuclear Test in 2006 
The tone of Kim Jong Il and other North Korean leaders’ positions toward 
the September 19, 2005 Agreement and their perceptions of the United States were 
reflected in the statements of the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in North Korea 
released by the KCNA the following day. Even though the six parties agreed “to take 
coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line 
with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action,’”644 North Korea 
wanted the United States to take action first. Also, North Korea was not sure about the 
intention of the United States. According to the statement of the North Korean Foreign 
Ministry:  
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The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s 
dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs, a physical 
guarantee for confidence-building. This is our just and consistent stand as 
solid as a deeply rooted rock. We have so far shaped our policies towards 
the U.S. hardliners and will do so in the future, too.  
One should wait and see how the U.S. will move in actuality at the phase 
of “action for action” in the future but should it again insist on “the 
DPRK’s dismantlement of nuclear weapons before the provision of 
LWRs,” there will be no change in the nuclear issue between the DPRK 
and the U.S. and its consequences will be very serious and complicated. If 
the U.S. opts for reneging on its promise, we will go ahead without an 
inch of deflection along the road indicated by the Songun line, our faith 
and signpost.645 
During the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on September 22, 2007, 
North Korean delegates continued to emphasize the U.S. commitments by saying that 
“The DPRK will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if its relations with 
the U.S. are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and it is not exposed to the U.S. 
nuclear threat any longer. What is most essential is, therefore, for the U.S. to provide 
light water reactors to the DPRK as early as possible as evidence proving the former’s 
substantial recognition of the latter’s nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose.”646 One 
month after the September 19, 2005 Agreement, North Korea started complaining about 
the actions of the United States. The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in North Korea 
said “The United States, however, has been careless in its words and deeds quite contrary 
to the spirit of the statement in a little over one month since the publication of the 
statement. This makes us doubt the U.S. will to implement the statement.”647 
After the U.S. Department of Treasury’s designation of BDA as North 
Korea’s money-laundering bank and its declaration of sanctions against North Korea, the 
rhetoric of North Korean news articles became more belligerent:  
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646 KCNA, “DPRK’s Stand on Solution to Nuclear Issue Reiterated,” September 28, 2005.  
647 KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM. Refers to Issue of Participation in 5th Six-Party Talks,” 
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It is not hard to guess that the U.S. Department of Treasury’s decision on 
sanctions against the trade companies of the DPRK is not a simple issue 
related to economic relations but a link in the whole chain of the carefully 
prearranged provocative and hostile moves of the U.S. to stifle the DPRK.  
The U.S. armed invasion of other countries has always been accompanied 
by its persistent racket for sanctions against them. The U.S. freezing of the 
properties of the DPRK companies did not come by chance….Dialogue 
and sanctions can never go together.648 
The chief of the North Korean mission at the United Nations sent a letter 
to the UN secretary general and the president of the UN General Assembly on October 28, 
2005, to criticize the United States again. It said: 
The U.S., however, is only insisting on the CVID defying the principle of 
simultaneous action agreed upon by the six parties, and busy staging a 
smear campaign against the DPRK, pulling it up over the “human rights 
issue” and “illegal deals” and other baseless issues. This behavior 
diametrically runs counter to the spirit of the joint statement, a joint 
product of the six parties, and makes the DPRK to doubt whether the U.S. 
is willing to implement the joint statement or not.649 
On November 8, 2005, North Korea made its complaint over Bush’s 
statement about North Korea and expressed its mistrust of the U.S. commitments to the 
Six-Party Talks:  
According to foreign press reports, on Nov. 6 Bush, revealing again his 
inveterate rejection of the DPRK during his tour of Brazil, malignantly 
slandered our supreme headquarters with such unspeakable vituperation as 
“tyrant” and the like…. 
These remarks…deprive us of any trust in the negotiators of the U.S. side 
to the six-party talks who claim to be have been mandated by him. We 
will never pardon whoever dares speak ill of our supreme headquarters in 
any case.650 
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North Korea’s belligerent expressions and signs of its mistrust of the 
United States continued in the news, and the tensions between North Korea and the 
United States were escalating. North Korea argued that the September 19, 2005 
Agreement had not been implemented because the United States imposed sanctions 
against North Korea. Almost every day, news from the KCNA criticized the actions of 
the United States. Here is one news example showing North Korea’s perception of Bush 
and the United States: 
December 20, 2005: The Bush administration painted the DPRK as a 
“lawless state” and a “criminal state,” not content with labeling it a “rogue 
state.” This smear campaign is aimed at creating an environment for 
implementing its hard-line policy towards the DPRK according to its 
premeditated “scenario.” Once the U.S. said that the DPRK is a sovereign 
state and it respects the sovereignty of the DPRK. However, the reality 
proves that this was nothing but a ruse to deceive the international 
community and buy time for stifling the DPRK militarily.651 
Based on this kind of news reports after the September 19, 2005 
Agreement, it is clear that North Korea perceived the United States as an enemy, not a 
trustworthy negotiation partner, and it had doubts of the sincerity of the United States in 
implementing the September 19, 2005 Agreement. This was a reflection of Kim Jong Il’s 
perception of Bush and the United States, and led to a rapid downturn in relations 
between North Korea and the United States. After all the rhetoric, the escalation resulted 
in the missile test in July 2006 and the first North Korean nuclear test that October. North 
Korea claimed that the nuclear test was “entirely attributable to the U.S. nuclear threat, 
sanctions and pressure.”652 Tension was at its peak at this time.     
b. 2007: Complaints About U.S. Policy and Military Actions 
Between the February 13 Agreement and the October 3 
Agreement 
After confrontations between North Korea and the United States in 2006, 
the year 2007 showed some positive results in the Six-Party Talks, such as the February 
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13 and the October 3 agreements. However, there was no positive news from the KCNA 
related to the 2007 agreements. News about the 2007 agreements was usually very insipid 
and short without any affirmative statements.  
On the other hand, news about the United States included strong 
complaints and expressed doubts. According to most KCNA news related to the 
relationship with the United States in 2007, North Korea kept criticizing the U.S. policy. 
Here are some examples of North Korea’s claims. According to a Rodong Sinmun article 
of February 8, 2007, North Korea claimed that “The U.S. is the chief violator of the 
NPT,” and criticized the U.S. position toward Japan and Israel.653 The article goes on:  
While shutting eyes to and supporting the development and possession of 
nuclear weapons by pro-U.S. forces and its allies from the standard of 
unilateralism and prejudice, it styles itself a “nuclear judge,” kicking up a 
row of pressure on those countries incurring its displeasure by pulling 
them up over their “nuclear issues.” This is really the height of sarcasm.654  
When the Six-Party Talks were held in February 2007, North Korea 
continued to criticize the United States; “The Bush administration, advertising ‘the 
building of a powerful U.S.’, is pursuing the policy of strength, a leftover of the Cold 
War era, in its hare-brained military adventures to put the world under its control by force 
of arms.”655  
Also, North Korea often made strong complaints about the U.S.-South 
Korea joint military exercises and stated that “Dialogue and saber-rattling cannot go 
together.”656 Here are a couple of examples:  
March 20, 2007: “RSOI” and “Foal Eagle” joint military exercises 
projected by the U.S. to stage in south Korea are a preliminary war, a  
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nuclear test war, designed to make a surprise preemptive attack on the 
DPRK, and they are the criminal behavior going against the aspiration and 
demand of the people for peace.657 
July 5, 2007: The U.S. reckless military actions make the DPRK skeptical 
about whether the U.S. is truly willing to seek a negotiated settlement of 
the nuclear issue and improve the DPRK-U.S. relations. The U.S. 
administration clarified more than once that it would not invade the DPRK 
by force of arms, while talking about the resumption of the six-way talks. 
If this is true, the U.S. should stop the military actions threatening the 
DPRK.658 
In sum, even though there was some progress in the Six-Party Talks in 
2007, there was no change in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Bush and the United States 
based on this analysis of North Korea’s state-run media. North Korea still condemned the 
U.S. policy and military actions.  
c. 2008: Continuous Complaints About U.S. Policy and Military 
Actions 
North Korea continued to make complaints about U.S. policy and military 
actions in 2008. According to KCNA news: 
March 4, 2008: The U.S. kicked off the nuclear war maneuvers against its 
dialogue partner though it has talked about a “peaceful solution of the 
nuclear issue” and the “establishment of a peace-keeping mechanism on 
the Korean Peninsula.” This is a clear indication that the U.S. is invariably 
sticking to its hostile policy to stifle the DPRK by force. Such nuclear 
threat and blackmail do not work on the DPRK but will only put a brake 
on the process of the denuclearization of the peninsula.659 
Also, there was a strong condemnation of Bush’s statement in March 2008. 
According to KCNA news:  
At a recent press conference Bush carelessly termed the DPRK and other 
countries “rogue states” and asserted that the U.S. missile shield to be built 
                                                 
657 KCNA, “U.S. Nuclear Hysteria Going against Dialogue and Peace Assailed,” March 19, 2007.   
658 KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Slams U.S. Arms Build-Up behind Scene of Dialogue,” July 5. 2007, 
referring to Rodong Sinmun, July 4, 2007.  
659 KCNA, “Spokesman of Foreign Ministry Lambastes Joint Military Exercises,” March 4, 2008. 
 235
in Europe is not targeted against countries in the region but it is aimed to 
contain the “missile threat” from such countries as North Korea….Bush's 
labeling the DPRK as “rogue state” revealed his chronic hostile attitude 
towards the DPRK. 
However, when the United State and North Korea started negotiations for 
implementing the 2007 agreements in April 2008, some positive news appeared. After the 
April 22–24 negotiations between North Korean officials and the delegation of U.S. 
nuclear experts in Pyongyang, the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “The 
negotiations proceeded in a sincere and constructive manner and progress was made 
there.”660 Also, when the Bush administration declared that the United States will take 
North Korea off the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and exempt it from the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “The DPRK 
appreciates and hails this as a positive measure.”661  
However, overall news in 2008 still showed a belligerent attitude and 
doubt toward the United States. While it appreciated the removal of North Korea from 
the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, North Korea expressed its doubts about the United 
States’ policy and requested the total withdrawal of hostile policies toward it. The 
statement of the spokesman went on, “The measure taken by the U.S. to lift the major 
sanctions which it has applied against the DPRK, listing it as an enemy state for more 
than half a century, should lead to totally withdrawing its hostile policy toward the DPRK 
in all fields in the future. Only then can the denuclearization process make smooth 
progress along its orbit.”662  
Overall, statements in the state-run news agency showed North Korea did 
not trust the United States and placed an emphasis on the U.S. need to keep its 
commitments. Consequently, there was no change in North Korea’s perception of Bush 
and the United States in 2007 and 2008. Kim Jong Il did not fully trust Bush’s 
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reassurance strategy due to the legacy of the animosity and its interpretation of U.S 
policy and military actions toward North Korea. Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 
2008 was not sufficient to overcome Kim Jong Il’s perceptions or change his image of 
Bush and the United States.  
3. Domestic Politics of the United States 
Question 9: How did domestic politics of the United States perceive 
Bush’s reassurance strategy offer to North Korea? Was there sufficient 
domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government 
constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy? 
The domestic politics of the United States were divided into hard-liners and soft-
liners who had totally different perceptions of Bush’s reassurance strategy toward North 
Korea. These different perceptions were expressed in the U.S. Congress and by the U.S 
government and reflected both a partisan divide between the Republicans and Democrats 
and a government divided between the Department of Defense and the Department of 
State. Internal division in the Bush administration was one of the biggest obstacles to the 
success of the administration’s reassurance strategy. 
The shift of Bush’s approach toward North Korea from hard-line to soft-line in 
2007 was made possible through the rise of soft-liners and departure from the 
government of influential hawks. However, there was a lack of interagency consensus 
between hard-line agencies and soft-line agencies. Also, hard-liners strongly expressed 
their opposition to any soft-line approach toward North Korea through articles and papers. 
Those hard-liners who left office were still influential. As a result, domestic support was 
not sufficient to make the reassurance strategy credible. The Bush administration was 
constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy due to a lack of full support 
from domestic politics.  
a. The Rise of Soft-liners and the Fall of Hard-liners in 2007 After 
Democratic Congressional Victories in November 2006  
The role of Congress was important for implementing the reassurance 
strategy because Congress had a right to refuse to approve any proposal for U.S. aid to 
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North Korea. Because of the voters’ disappointment in the Bush administration’s 
handling of the war in Iraq, the November 2006 congressional elections resulted in a 
change in the legislative branch that gave control of Congress to the Democrats. The 
election led to the rise of soft-liners and the fall of hard-liners within the administration. 
After the Democrats’ victory in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, the Department of State played a more active role in the implementation 
of policy toward North Korea. According to Chinoy: 
For Rice and Hill, the election and the changed balance of power within 
the administration provided a new opportunity to wrest control of North 
Korea policy from those who had for so long sought to block real 
negotiations, and to win support for a new approach from a weakened 
President Bush.663    
The influence of many hard-liners such as Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, UN Ambassador John Bolton, and Assistant 
Secretary for Arms Control Robert Joseph weakened and some left the administration.664 
Donald Rumsfeld resigned within days, although many believed he was fired. John 
Bolton chose to resign because there was low possibility of his confirmation by the 
Senate. Another hard-liner, Robert Joseph, was planning to resign early in the following 
year. Therefore, as Chinoy says, “The right-wing hard-liners who had dominated the 
Bush administration for so long were in retreat.”665 
As a result, the February 13, 2007 Agreement was made under this 
different situation in Washington. The influence of hard-liners had been reduced 
significantly. According to the explanation of Chinoy: 
Now, in a situation reflecting the changed balance of power in 
Washington, Rice was able to bypass the bureaucracy altogether. Hill dealt 
with the secretary of state, who dealt directly with the president. The hard-
liners were again cut out of the action until after a decision was made. 
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When they found out, they were furious, but with no support from Rice or 
Bush, they could do little to derail the process.666 
Following the rise of soft-liners, there was a retreat from the U.S. assertion 
in 2002 that North Korea was developing a highly enriched uranium program and success 
in reaching the February 13 Agreement in the Six-Party Talks. The six-party members 
were able to reach the February 13 Agreement because of the changed circumstances in 
the United States.667 Hill indicated a significant change from the administration’s earlier 
claims. On February 22, 2007, he said: 
We have information…that North Korea made certain purchases of 
equipment highly consistent with HEU…it’s a complex program, it does 
require more equipment than we know they have purchased, and a variety 
of techniques we don’t know they have worked out. But we need to know 
why they purchased aluminum tubes from Germany and elsewhere—tubes 
we know fit the Pakistani-designed centrifuges we know they purchased. 
If the tubes do not go to an HEU program, fine, we can discuss that later 
on [in the six-party talks process.]668 
While still expressing suspicions, Hill’s comments expressed greater uncertainty and 
were less accusatory than previous administration rhetoric.  
b. Constraint from the Opposition of Hard-liners 
One of problems in the implementation of reassurance toward North 
Korea in 2007 and 2008 was the opposition of hard-liners and lack of interagency 
consensus. The declaration of the September 19, 2005 Agreement and the declaration of 
BDA as North Korea’s money-laundering bank happened in the same week. The 
implementation of the September 19, 2005 Agreement stalled almost immediately. There 
was not much cooperation between the Departments of State and Treasury. Chinoy ended 
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his book Meltdown: the Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis by saying that, 
“As the Bush administration entered its final months, the internal battle for control of 
North Korea policy, which began within days of the president taking office in 2001, 
showed no sign of ending.”669 
Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 met with strong 
conservative criticism. The conservatives had a view that past agreements with North 
Korea had failed and North Korea had been rewarded for its bad behavior without 
ensuring the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. North Korea’s missile 
and nuclear tests appeared to prove the conservatives’ view that the path of negotiation 
was futile and North Korea would only respond to pressure. The hard-line group was led 
by neoconservatives like Vice President Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, non-proliferation 
specialists such as John Bolton and Robert Joseph in the State Department, conservative 
congressmen, conservative media and think tanks, the Department of Defense, and so on. 
According to Chinoy, “Privately, [Hill] complained to friends that negotiating with the 
North Koreans was often less fraught than dealing with hard-liners in Vice President 
Cheney’s office and elsewhere in the administration.”670 
(1) The Opposition from Neoconservatives.  The rise of the 
North Korea and Syria nuclear cooperation issue was one example to show that Bush 
administration’s hard-liners, so-called neoconservatives, were the main domestic hurdle 
to implementing the reassurance strategy. A series of classified intelligence briefings 
about North Korea’s nuclear connection with Syria were provided to members of 
Congress in late April 2008.671 The timing of the information release was suspicious to 
the soft-liners. The information, such as a photograph of a senior official from North 
Korean with the director of Syria’s nuclear agency, had already been acquired from the 
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Israeli intelligence community almost a year before Israel’s airstrike on September 6, 
2007. 672  Furthermore, the officials who gave the briefing acknowledged that the 
information did not make it possible to determine with confidence whether the Syrian site 
was actually going to be used for nuclear weapons development. However, the suspicion 
about North Korea’s connection with a Syrian nuclear program seriously damaged any 
soft-line approaches toward North Korea in 2008. 
The former U.N. ambassador, John Bolton, was one of the 
strongest opponents to Bush’s reassurance strategy to North Korea and he continued to 
try to influence Bush’s reassurance strategy. He criticized the February 13, 2007 
Agreement in the Six-Party Talks as a “charade” and brought the division of the Bush 
administration to light.673 Bolton said in a highly publicized book published in 2007: 
Analytically, so similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework that Clinton 
administration alumni praised it, this deal let North Korea escape from the 
corner where we had put them by Resolution 1718’s sanctions and our 
Treasury Department’s aggressive efforts to impose tough economic 
pressure on the DPRK for its illicit money-laundering. The February 13 
agreement is what Powell would have loved to try in 2001 before Bush 
pulled him back from ‘leaning too far forward’ on his skis.674  
In addition, Bolton made remarks aiming at Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, “The people who want to make this deal with North Korea are in 
denial about what North Korea is up to.”675 Even though Bolton’s objections to the 
agreement with North Korea were dismissed by Bush, Dick Cheney praised them at a 
conference of conservatives.676 The primary purpose of all these efforts of hard-liners 
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was to generate “political pressure on President Bush to pull back from the accord Hill 
had been seeking to negotiate.”677 To some degree, they achieved their purpose.    
Bolton’s statements against Bush’s reassurance strategy and hard-
liners’ sharp criticism continued in 2008. Bolton declared that the 2007 agreements were 
“to accept on faith, literally, North Korean assertions that it has not engaged in significant 
uranium enrichment, and that it has not proliferated nuclear technology or materials to 
countries like Syria and Iran.”678 When the United States removed North Korea from the 
state sponsors of terrorism list in October 2008, Bolton criticized the action, “By taking 
them off the terrorism list, you remove one of the legitimizers of the other sanctions. For 
North Korea, that was important, because it makes them look like more of a normal 
nation.”679 Bush administration officials needed to cite a long list of punitive restrictions 
to North Korea in order to fend off this kind of criticism after their removal of North 
Korea from the list. Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the Department of State, said, 
“North Korea remains subject to numerous sanctions resulting from its 2006 nuclear test, 
its proliferation activities, its human rights violations and its status as a Communist 
state.”680 In sum, the implementation of the reassurance strategy was constrained by the 
opposition from neoconservatives in 2007 and 2008.   
(2) The Opposition from Conservative Congressmen.  Even 
though Congress could not lead U.S. policy toward North Korea, help from Congress was 
absolutely necessary for the executive branch to implement any policy because Congress 
could impede or support it. The North Korean Human Rights Act (PL 108-333) was 
passed in October 2004.681 Under the Act, the office of the special envoy for human 
rights in North Korea was created and was to report to the Congress. The Act drew 
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attention to the poor human rights conditions in North Korea and reports required by the 
North Korean Human Rights Act strengthened the voice of conservative hard-liners. 
According to the report of Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. special envoy for human rights in North 
Korea, North Korea is “one of the worst abusers of human rights in the world today.”682    
The human rights conditions in North Korea in 2007 and 2008 
were horrific. According to 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “The 
government’s human rights record remained poor, and the regime continued to commit 
numerous serious abuses.”683 Based on the poor human rights conditions in North Korea, 
many conservative hard-liners would not support the Bush administration’s reassurance 
strategy in 2007 and 2008. Then, the North Korean Human Rights Act became an 
obstacle to the implementation of Bush’s reassurance strategy. North Korea kept arguing 
that the Act was evidence of a hostile U.S. policy and interference into its sovereignty. 
For example, here is a summary of one Rodong Sinmun article condemning the human 
rights approach:  
The imperialists consider the “human rights” offensive as important 
leverage in carrying out their strategy for world supremacy…in essence, 
intended to force other countries and nations to introduce the “model of 
human rights” of Western style in a bid to Westernize and Americanize 
the world. The danger of the offensive lies in that it is used as a lever for 
openly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and infringing 
upon their state sovereignty and a prelude to the war of aggression against 
other countries.684  
The implementation of the 2007 agreements through the Six-Party 
Talks was hampered by the opposition from conservative U.S. congressmen who favored 
a more hawkish approach to North Korea. For example, some conservatives in Congress 
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were not happy with the February 13, 2007 Agreement with North Korea. 685 
Conservative Republican Senator Sam Brownback from Kansas placed a hold on the 
nomination of Hill’s deputy, Kathleen Stephens, to become the next U.S. ambassador to 
South Korea, to express his protest of Hill’s negotiation with North Korea.686  
Another typical example of the opposition against any soft-line 
approach to North Korea was Republican Senator John McCain, a member of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and the 2008 Republican presidential candidate. After the 
2006 North Korean nuclear test, he highly criticized Clinton’s 1994 Agreed Framework 
as a failure. He said, “The Koreans received millions and millions in energy assistance. 
They’ve diverted millions of dollars of food assistance to their military.”687 He added 
that “The worst thing we could do is to accede to North Korea’s demand for bilateral 
talks….When has rewarding North Korea's bad behavior ever gotten us anything more 
than worse behavior?”688 Most Republican congressmen shared similar perceptions and 
attitudes towards to North Korea which continued in 2007 and 2008.  
The North Korean Human Rights Act is an example of how 
Congress complicated the Bush administration’s reassurance strategy toward North 
Korea. Congressional members, especially conservative hard-liners, were unwilling to 
change the Act to support Bush’s shifted policy toward North Korea.     
c. Bush’s Low Popularity in 2007 and 2008 
With low popularity ratings in 2007 and 2008, the Bush administration 
had difficulty in implementing a reassurance strategy toward North Korea. Bush’s 
popularity continuously declined during his presidency and his popularity rating was 
about 30 percent in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 3.5). It was 50-60 points lower than the 
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approval rating at the beginning of his presidency in 2001 and 2002. When Bush left 
office in January 2009, his final approval rating was 22 percent, the lowest rating ever.689  
Difficult situations in Iraq and the economy were the main reasons for the low popularity. 
The CNN polling director, Keating Holland, said, “Lame-duck presidents presiding over 
unpopular wars or struggling economies have gotten low approval ratings in the past. By 
contrast, lame ducks like Ronald Reagan, Dwight Eisenhower, and Bill Clinton had 
robust approval ratings in their final years in office, but each one was presiding over good 
economic times and a country at peace.” 690  The Bush administration needed more 
support from the public to continuously implement reassurance strategies and overcome 
strong conservative objections. Bush’s low popularity ratings showed that there was not 
full support in domestic politics for the implementation of his reassurance strategy. 
 
Figure 3.5.   George W. Bush Quarterly Job Approval Averages 
In sum, Bush’s reassurance strategy to North Korea might have been 
implemented under the rise of soft-liners. However, there was strong opposition from the 
hard-liners who perceived Bush’s reassurance strategy as appeasement or a reward for 
North Korea’s bad behavior. Also, Bush’s popularity declined significantly in 2007 and 
2008. The wide division between soft-liners and hard-liners and low popularity led to 
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insufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible. As a result, the Bush 
administration was constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy.  
4. Domestic Politics of North Korea 
Question 10: How did key domestic actors in North Korea perceive 
Bush’s reassurance strategy? Did Bush’s reassurance generate domestic 
support in North Korea for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try 
to prevent North Korea from offering a positive response? 
Another serious obstacle to the success of Bush’s reassurance strategy remained 
the uncertain domestic politics of North Korea. The most important reasons for the 
uncertainty stemmed from the succession issue and the deteriorating economy. Kim Jong 
Il had strengthened the power of the military to hold control of North Korea after the 
death of his father Kim Il Sung. In 2007 and 2008, there seemed to be a greater need to 
get support from the military to consolidate his power under increasingly unstable 
conditions. The unstable situation in North Korea without significant progress in the 
relationship with the United States in 2008 strengthened the power of the military. 
Therefore, the military became the key institution for political stability, and its skeptical 
view about the development in the relationship with the United States prevented North 
Korea from offering a positive response to Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2008. 
a. The Military as the Key Domestic Actor Under “Sungun 
(Military-first)” Politics and Its Interference with Positive 
Responses to Bush’s Strategy 
As explained in the previous case study between the two Koreas, Kim 
Jong Il strengthened the power of the military under the Sungun (military-first) politics 
after the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. The declaration of the revised 1998 North Korean 
constitution is evidence of that change. As Gause describes the change:  
Under the banner of ‘military-first politics,’ the adulation that was once 
reserved for the party has shifted to the military, and its presence can be 
felt in every aspect of political and social life. The profound nature of this 




used to place his stamp on the regime, where the state presidency was for 
all intents abolished and all real power shifted to the National Defense 
Commission (NDC).691   
According to Article 100 of the 1998 North Korean Constitution, the NDC 
is “the highest military leading organ of the State power and an organ for general control 
over national defense.”692 In reality, the NDC is the highest institution in North Korea. 
Therefore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s official title has been chairman of the NDC 
since September 1998.  
There are several examples to show that the North Korean military plays 
an important role. Kim Jong Il has promoted military leaders to higher positions and 
visited various places, including factories, with military officers. In April 2007, Kim 
Yong Chun, the former chief of the general staff, was promoted to vice chairman of the 
NDC. Also, Kim Kyok Sik, a former general, was promoted to chief of the general staff 
of the North Korean People’s Army. According to the analysis by the South Korean 
government, the shuffle is part of Kim Jong Il’s efforts to strengthen Sungun (Military-
First) policies.693  
A September 2008 analysis of senior North Korean officials who 
accompanied Kim Jong Il on his inspections of various facilities between January and 
August 2008, found General Hyon Chol Hae, the 74-year-old deputy director of the 
general political department of the North Korean People’s Army accompanied Kim Jong 
Il most frequently, on 32 occasions.694 Other military leaders such as Ri Myong Su, the 
director of the administrative department of the NDC, Kim Jong Gak, the first vice- 
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director of the general political department of the North Korean People’s Army, and Kim 
Kyok Sik, the chief of the general staff of the North Korean People’s Army, ranked high 
in the analysis.695  
When the tensions between the two Koreas were high in November 2008, 
North Korean Lt. Gen. Kim Yong Chol, a top policy maker at the NDC visited the 
Gaesung Industrial Complex to try to pressure South Korea over cross-border propaganda 
leaflets by threatening closure of the Complex. 696 Kim Yong Chol threatened South 
Korea by asking questions like “How long would it take for the South Korean firms to 
pull out?” and saying that “There is no need to talk about this anymore when we already 
have our rules set out.” 697 This visit showed that the military is deeply involved in 
economic activities as a decision maker in North Korea.  
The important role of the military in North Korea in 2007 and 2008 was 
confirmed in the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009. On April 9, 2009, Kim 
Jong Il was reelected as chairman of the NDC. The following day, North Korean 
newspapers released photos of all 12 members of the NDC.698 Up to that point, North 
Korea had released only the photos of the chairman and vice chairman. This was the first 
time to show all its members. According to GlobalSecurity.org, “The photographs are 
noteworthy because hithterto [sic] the Central Intelligence Agency had only noted six 
members of the NDC, not 12. The National Defense Commission was bolstered by the 
addition of one more vice chairman and four additional members, each of whom  
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previously had dealings with military affairs.” 699  The release of the photos of all 
members of the NDC can be interpreted as the strengthening of the NDC and expansion 
of military power.700    
Keith Luse, a staff member for East Asia in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and Sigfriend Hecker of the Center for International Security and 
Cooperation at Stanford University, visited North Korea in February 2008. They 
provided a report about the status of the disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facility at 
Yongbyon to the members of Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States 
Senate. According to Luse, disablement is difficult because of the North Korean military. 
He concluded his report by emphasizing that point: 
There are other issues and questions regarding dismantlement and 
eventual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons inventory. Is the 
North Korean military resisting Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) efforts 
to substantively engage with the United States and the other five 
countries? Chairman Kim’s best efforts to orchestrate a balance among 
competing interests within the North, may be a ‘‘stretch too far’’ for North 
Korean military hardliners. Declaring and discarding the jewel of their 
arsenal will be difficult for those viewing it as the ultimate deterrent.701 
Power in North Korea had shifted to the military since the death of Kim Il 
Sung in 1994. The North Korean military interfered when the Bush administration 
implemented a reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008. The North Korean military acted 
as the key player in the decision making process for North Korea.  
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b. Kim Jong Il’s Need for the Military’s Support: Political and 
Economic Reasons  
Kim Jong Il needed to get more support from the military in 2007 and 
2008 because of political and economic reasons. Politically, North Korea was in an 
uncertain position, especially in 2007 and 2008 after Kim Jong Il’s health problems 
became an issue. The succession issue automatically caught the attention of the world. 
Economically, North Korea continued to struggle and there seemed no hope of progress 
in the short term. Despite economic difficulty, North Korea did not decrease its military 
expenditure. Kim Jong Il needed to persuade the military to divert the budget for 
economic reforms. But, hardliners in the military did not support it and they blamed the 
economic difficulty on the threat from the United States.  
(1) Political Reasons: Kim Jong Il’s Health Problem and the 
Succession Issue.  Even though not much was known about Kim Jong Il’s health or his 
possible successor, it is obvious that Kim Jong Il had a serious health problem in 2007 
and 2008 and it raised questions about the uncertain succession after he dies. According 
to Chinese officials, Kim Jong Il visited the “People’s Liberation Army Hospital 301,” 
for tests about diabetes. Chinese doctors consulted Japanese experts and very specialized 
Western medications were shipped. 702  Reports about Kim Jong Il’s failing health 
followed afterwards. In September 2008, Kim Jong Il did not attend the military parade 
for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of North Korea’s founding, and then “rumors 
swirled that Kim Jong Il was gravely ill.”703 A French doctor who treated Kim Jong Il, 
François-Xavier Roux, confirmed that Kim Jong Il had a stroke.704 Donald Gregg, a 
former ambassador to South Korea said, “[Kim’s ill health] has put a blanket over 
creative thinking in North Korea.”705 
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It is imperative for Kim Jong Il to preserve the support and 
preeminence of the military in order to consolidate power for his successor. Stephan 
Haggard and Marcus Noland observed in early 2008: 
Succession is the weak point in any authoritarian regime and it is not at all 
evident that a dynastic heir is being groomed; none of the three sons who 
have been mooted as possible candidates appears today to be a credible 
successor. The Korean Workers Party has atrophied; unlike in China, one 
party does not have the coherence or command to manage the succession 
on its own. The military appears to be the key institution, indicated most 
clearly by the fact that Kim Jong Il continues to lead North Korea from his 
position as chairman of the National Defense Commission and continues 
to emphasize “military-first” politics.706  
Yosef Bodansky also said, “According to PRC and Russian senior 
officials, Kim Jong Il recently began to consolidate a ‘collective leadership’ comprised of 
the upper-most military and security leaders. They are expected to consolidate the reign 
of Kim’s successor and preserve the support and preeminence of the North Korean 
defense and security sectors.”707 Consequently, Kim Jong Il needed to get support from 
the military to consolidate his power for his successor. To stabilize the political situation 
in North Korea is more important to him than offering any positive response to the 
United States which can result in opposition from the military.  
(2) Economic Reason: Need for Economic Reform.  Another 
reason Kim Jong Il sought military support other than the continuation of his power and 
succession to his son was to ensure economic reform. Gause says, “If any meaningful 
reforms are to take hold in North Korea, the defense budget will have to bear some of the 
cutbacks.”708 Under deteriorating economic conditions, the defense budget has been a 
serious burden to North Korea. Economic conditions in North Korea did not improve in  
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2007 and 2008. In March 2007, the World Food Program estimated that “North Korea 
was one million metric tons short of grain and faced calamity unless additional aid was 
forthcoming.”709  
To make matters worse, international aid had fallen since North 
Korea’s nuclear test and grain prices were skyrocketing in 2007. In March 2008, the 
United Nations estimated that North Korea had a 1.6 million metric tons grain 
shortfall.710 As Haggard and Noland described, “Although other estimates—including 
ours—come to less alarming conditions, there can be little doubt that the balance between 
the demand and supply of grain in 2008 was at its most precarious point since the 1990s 
famine.”711 They also said, “Hunger-related deaths—possibly reaching the low tens of 
thousands—occurred in 2008.”712 
There is no definitive data about North Korea’s defense budget 
because North Korea does not announce its actual budget. Various sources calculate 
differently how North Korea spends for its military. However, it is clear that North Korea 
has spent a significant portion of its national budget for defense even under the 
economically difficult conditions. According to KCNA news, North Korea announced at 
the 6th meeting of the 11th session for the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009 that 
it had spent 15.8 percent of its total national budget for national defense in 2008, and it 
planned to spend the same 15.8 percent of the total state budgetary expenditure of 2009 
for defense, though it did not announce the actual amount.713  
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According to South Korean analysis, “North Korea’s actual 
military expenditures exceed 30 percent of its gross national income (GNI).” 714 The 
Ministry of National Defense of South Korea argues that, in addition to the state budget, 
another source of income is through independent military accounts, such as “the defense 
industry, the exports of arms, and business set up within the military to bring in foreign 
currency,” which should be taken into consideration.715 In sum, even though the actual 
military expenditure is vague, the available data gives a clue to how important military 
power is in North Korea.  
However, continuous high spending for defense does not help Kim 
Jong Il’s economic reform plan. Reading the statements of news from North Korea and 
noting the increased number of Kim Jong Il’s visits to economic facilities, it appears that 
Kim Jong Il in 2007 and 2008 tried economic reform. For the success of his economic 
reform and regime survival, the military’s assistance is very important. Hardliners in the 
military feared that more economic engagement with the outside world would mean risky 
choices in terms of regime survival. They believed that North Korean economic difficulty 
is caused by the offensive strategy of the United States. Kim Jong Il cannot ignore those 
opinions and secure his leadership. Kim Jong Il needs the military not only to secure his 
power but also to implement economic reform. Support for the nuclear program might be 
the only way for Kim Jong Il to get the military’s agreement to cuts in other areas. 
In sum, facing this unstable political and economic situation in 
North Korea, Kim Jong Il focused on the consolidation of his power. Therefore, Kim 
Jong Il was constrained in offering a full positive response to Bush’s reassurance strategy. 
5. Alliance Politics of the United States 
Question 11: How did key allies of the United States affect Bush’s 
reassurance strategy to North Korea? Was there sufficient alliance support 
to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from 
fully implementing its reassurance strategy? 
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a. South Korea 
South Korea’s different approaches toward North Korea by the Roh Moo 
Hyun administration in 2007 and the Lee Myung Bak administration in 2008 impacted 
the outcome of Bush’s reassurance strategy. A comparison of 2007 and 2008 shows the 
importance of alliance politics in the implementation and outcome of reassurance strategy.     
(1) The Bush Administration and the Roh Moo Hyun 
Administration in 2007.  Roh Moo Hyun pursued a reassurance strategy toward North 
Korea following Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy after he took office in 2003. The Bush 
administration shifted its policy toward reassurance approaches in 2007. Therefore, in 
2007, the Bush and Roh Moo Hyun administrations pursued similar approaches to North 
Korea. As a result, there were several signs of gradual rapprochement between the United 
States and North Korea such as the February 13 Agreement and October 3 Agreement. 
Also, Roh Moo Hyun had a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il in October 2007.  
Between 2003 and 2006, the United States and South Korea had 
totally different perspectives on strategy toward North Korea. North Korea’s overall 
response to the United States was negative during that time. For example, North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and tensions were continuously escalating on the Korean 
peninsula except in September 2005 when the Six-Party Talks came to an agreement. 
Finally, North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006. After the nuclear test, Roh Moo 
Hyun met the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and resisted an aggressive 
response to North Korea. Roh Moo Hyun told Rice, “You Americans keep on saying you 
want this resolved diplomatically, but you are always putting up more hurdles.”716 Roh 
Moo Hyun complained about U.S. unwillingness to resolve the BDA investigation and to 
talk directly with North Korea.717 
This difference in perspective between the United States and South 
Korea changed in 2007. The first example to show how South Korea helped the United 
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States in the implementation of Bush’s reassurance strategy was the February 13, 2007 
Agreement. In the Six-Party Talks in February 2007, South Korea wanted to advance the 
talks and was willing to help reach the agreement. After the Berlin meeting in January 
2007, Christopher Hill met Kim Gye Gwan with confidence that “a deal with North 
Korea was within reach.”718 However, Kim Gye Gwan demanded a huge amount of 
heavy fuel oil and electricity—two million tons of oil and two million kilowatts of 
electricity.719 Hill said after several meetings with Kim Gye Gwan, “If we don’t reach a 
six-party agreement today, there is no Berlin. What was agreed at Berlin is off.”720 The 
Six-Party Talks were close to collapse. South Korea did not want to see this happen. 
South Korean diplomat Chun Yung Woo met privately with Kim Gye Gwan to persuade 
him to agree to more for more return. Mike Chinoy reported the story behind the 
February 13 Agreement:  
But the key to breaking the deadlock came from the initiative by South 
Korea’s negotiator Chun Yung Woo, a tough and canny diplomat who had 
spent time at the IAEA. Meeting privately with Kim Gye Gwan, Chun told 
the North Korean that if he wanted more fuel oil, Pyongyang would have 
to agree to do more. The two men mapped out a deal under which North 
Korea would get 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for freezing Yongbyon.  
But if Kim agreed to disable the reactor and declare all its programs, the 
North would receive 450,000 tons more in 50,000 ton tranches, plus the 
equivalent of 500,000 tons of oil in electricity and other assistance, to be 
delivered as they implemented their side of the bargain.721 
In the end, what Chun Yung Woo initiated worked out and the 
February 13 Agreement was reached. South Korea then immediately signaled its 
willingness to accelerate economic and diplomatic engagement with North Korea and 
strongly supported the Bush administration’s reassurance strategy in 2007. Under the 
warmer conditions after the February 13 Agreement, the Roh Moo Hyun administration 
tried to have a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il and, finally, there was a summit meeting 
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in October 2007. It would have been difficult to have the summit meeting after the 2006 
nuclear test without the progress made in the Six-Party Talks. Bruce Cumings argued that 
the 2007 summit meeting between the two Koreas was possible due to the change of 
relationship between Bush and Kim Jong Il. He says, “The real basis for the summit lies 
in the entirely unexpected warming of relations between President George W. Bush and 
Kim Jong Il, manifest in the 13 February agreement on denuclearization, the origins of 
which remain murky.”722 
The summit meeting was originally to be held on August 2007, but 
was delayed by a flood in North Korea. The improved relationship between the two 
Koreas helped the Six-Party Talks to move forward. The summit meeting plan helped the 
Six-Party Talks members to reach the October 3 Agreement. Several days before the 
summit meeting, the Six-Party Talks reached the second phase of implementing the 
September 19, 2005 Agreement. During the summit meeting, Kim Jong Il showed strong 
confidence in Kim Gye Gwan and allowed him to brief Roh Moo Hyun on the North’s 
view of the six-party process.723 
(2) The Bush Administration and the Lee Myung Bak 
Administration in 2008.  Lee Myung Bak was inaugurated in February 2008 and declared 
a “denuclearization, opening, and 3000 dollars” policy. If North Korea were to 
denuclearize and open, South Korea would provide assistance in order to raise the per 
capita income of North Korea to $3,000 within 10 years. This approach was totally 
different from that of the previous administrations. Compared to the Kim Dae Jung and 
Roh Moo Hyun administrations’ reassurance strategy to North Korea, the biggest 
difference in the “denuclearization, opening, and 3000 dollars” policy was more 
reciprocity, but not a step-by-step approach. Lee Myung Bak proposed that if North 
Korea first gave up its nuclear weapons, South Korea would provide more assistance and 
                                                 
721 Chinoy, Meltdown, 324. 
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investment. 724  The Lee Myung Bak administration did not support the 2000 Joint 
Declaration and October 4, 2007 Declaration of the previous administrations.   
Also, Lee Myung Bak put the ROK-U.S. alliance rather than inter-
Korean relations as his top priority. Lee Sang Hyun said, “In contrast to his predecessor, 
President Lee identifies the restoration of a robust ROK-U.S. alliance as his top priority 
and argues that inter-Korean relations can only develop if the alliance remains strong.”725 
In addition, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) won the majority of seats in 
elections in April 2008 and supported Lee Myung Bak’s approaches to North Korea.  
This approach, however, has proved more difficult than expected. 
After the inauguration of Lee Myung Bak, there was an escalation of tension between the 
two Koreas in 2008. The key to Lee Myung Bak’s policy was the resolution of the 
nuclear crisis in advance. North Korea responded with vitriol. This policy has been 
stymied by strong criticism from North Korea. According to KCNA news:  
The anti-north confrontational nature of Lee and the ruling conservative 
forces was brought to light when they advocated the so-called “no-nukes, 
opening and bringing the per capita income to 3000 dollars” as their 
“policy towards the north.” The above-said piffle is nothing but a very 
absurd and ridiculous jargon as they cried out for the North's “complete 
nuclear abandonment” and “opening” as preconditions for the 
improvement of the north-south relations.  
This is little short of an anti-reunification declaration as it is aimed at 
sacrificing the interests of the Korean nation to serve outside forces, 
pursuing confrontation and war and driving the north-south relations to a 
collapse.726 
Lee Myung Bak made a speech to the new National Assembly on 
July 11, 2008 and confirmed that “the two summit declarations—and the extensive 
                                                 
724 Lee Sang Hyun, “ROK-U.S. Strategic Alliance and Inter-Korean Peace Initiative: Can They be 
Comparable?” Korean and World Affairs 32, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 132. 
725 Ibid., 133.  
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Hysteria Blasted,” April 1, 2008.  
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goodies promised in the October 2007 statement in particular—were subject to 
Pyongyang’s compliance with all existing North-South agreements.” Furthermore, a 
South Korean tourist was shot and killed in the early morning the same day by one or 
more of the North’s soldiers.727 Lee Myung Bak heard about the incident several hours 
before the speech. Even though he did not mention the incident in the speech, the 
relationship between the two Koreas became extremely hostile and the Mt. Geumgang 
tour was suspended. The response to Lee Myung Bak’s speech from North Korea was 
bellicose and North Korean news media started calling Lee Myung Bak a traitor. 
According to Rodong Sinmun, “Traitor Lee’s ‘policy speech’ fully revealed his stance 
against reunification and for confrontation.” 728 
Furthermore, North Korea blamed South Korea for the Mt. 
Geumgang tourist incident and claimed that “The South side should be held responsible 
for the incident, make clear apology to the north side and take measures against 
recurrence of the similar incident.”729 As a result, there have been fundamental changes 
in the relations between the two Koreas since the inauguration of South Korean president 
Lee Myung Bak.  
One month after the shooting incident, President Bush visited 
South Korea and had a summit meeting with Lee Myung Bak in August 2008. They 
agreed to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks and 
further expand the cooperation between the United States and South Korea. 730  Lee 
Myung Bak emphasized the complete denuclearization of North Korea: 
And as to what kind of behavior North Korea will take, what’s most 
important is - number one is that we must have a denuclearization of 
North Korea. So I will be patient; I will be consistent; and I will do my 
best. And I have faith and I am confident that we will be able to move on  
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to the verification process and move on to the next phase of that. And we 
will try to do our best to make it complete, and I believe that North Korea 
must faithfully cooperate in the verification process.  
So, regardless of what North Korea has in mind, I believe it’s important 
for the rest of the members of the six-party talks to continue pursuing our 
objective. And at times we might have to wait; at times we might be 
difficult, but we will be consistent.731  
President Bush also agreed with the Lee Myung Bak’s statements 
and emphasized the importance of the Six-Party Talks: 
I know this: That the six-party talks are the best way to convince them to 
give up their weapons. I know there’s a framework in place that will make 
it easier for those of us who care about this issue to work together to send 
a common message to the North Korea leader: You have a choice to make. 
You can verifiably do what you say you're going to do, or you'll continue 
to be the most sanctioned regime in the world.  
We have put out a step-by-step process to-as a way forward for the North 
Korean leader. This isn't a U.S. proposal; this is a five-party proposal.732 
The goal of two presidents was the same; the complete 
denuclearization of North Korea. However, reading their speeches carefully, there are 
slight differences in their approach to achieving the same goal. Even though Bush 
considered more step-by-step approaches based on the Tit-for-Tat concept, Lee Myung 
Bak wanted to solve the North Korean nuclear problem at once. He requested the 
complete denuclearization of North Korea as a precondition for providing any reward to 
North Korea.  
As a result, contrary to the two presidents’ common goal and high 
expectations for North Korea’s response, North Korea ignored South Korea and wanted 
to talk directly with the United States rather than join the Six-Party Talks in 2008. 
Unfortunately, there have been no Six-Party Talks since September 2007. Even though 
                                                 
731 “The President’s News Conference with President Lee Myung Bak of South Korea in Seoul,” 
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the United States wanted to implement its reassurance strategy based on the Tit-for-Tat 
and action-for-action principle through the Six-Party Talks framework, North Korea 
wanted to talk directly with the United States in 2008 due to the deteriorated relationship 
with South Korea.  
In sum, the deteriorated relations between the two Koreas could 
not help the United States pursue its reassurance strategy by implementing all agreements 
made in 2007 with North Korea through the Six-Party Talks framework. Furthermore, the 
deteriorated relation could not generate North Korea’s positive reciprocity.  
(3)  The Importance of Alliance Politics in the Implementation 
of the Reassurance Strategy toward North Korea between 1998 and 2008.  To understand 
the importance of alliance politics in the implementation of the reassurance strategy 
toward North Korea, it is useful to compare the main strategy of the United States and 
South Korea toward North Korea between 1998 and 2008 and North Korea’s responses. 
Strategy toward North Korea between South Korea and the United States between 1998 
and 2008 is summarized in Table 3.12. The previous case study of Kim Dae Jung and 
Roh Moo Hyun administrations’ reassurance strategy and the U.S. policy toward North 
Korea during that time is included in the comparison.  
In terms of the reassurance strategy perspective, the years 2000 
and 2007 witnessed the implementation of reassurance strategy by both South Korea and 
the United States. This led to some positive responses from North Korea in both years. 
There were 2000 and 2007 summit meetings between the two Koreas. As the products of 
the summit meetings, the 2000 Joint Declaration and the October 4, 2007 Declaration 
were presented respectively. Also, in 2000, a summit meeting between Clinton and Kim 
Jong Il was considered.  
Between 2001 and 2006, the relationship between the United 
States and North Korea was hostile. Finally, there was a nuclear test in 2006. The 
situation changed in 2007. Both the February 13 and October 3 agreements through the 
Six-Party Talks were made in 2007 and relations both between the United States and 
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North Korea and between South Korea and North Korea improved. However, the 
improved relationships changed in 2008. The relations between South Korea and North 
Korea became more hostile. This situation did not allow the implementation of the 2007 
agreements and led to the collapse of the Six-Party Talks and North Korea’s ongoing 
nuclear program in 2008. 
Table 3.12.   Strategy Toward North Korea between South Korea and the United States 

















































Consequently, when the United States and South Korea pursued 
the reassurance strategy together, there were some positive responses from North Korea. 
These examples show the impact of alliance politics and its importance between the 
United States and South Korea in the implementation of reassurance toward North Korea.  
b. Japan’s Opposite Position  
Japan did not support Bush’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea at 
all. The response to the February 13, 2007 Agreement proved Japan’s unsupportive 
position. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to join other participants of the 
Six-Party Talks in providing aid to North Korea.733 The abduction issue remained the 
most important issue in Japan and Abe could not offer any conciliatory gesture to North 
Korea given domestic political pressure. Mike Chinoy quotes Chris Nelson’s explanation 
of Japan’s situation, “Even if you assumed that Kim Jong Il can look sincere on this 
tragedy, how can Prime Minister Abe or his successors, be satisfied with whatever 
Pyongyang comes up with? And even if the government of Japan is satisfied, how can it 
convince the public and the media?”734    
The response of Japan to Bush’s action to take North Korea off the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List showed how Japan perceived Bush’s reassurance strategy. 
Japan was really upset when Bush took North Korea off the terrorism list. Family 
members of the abductees condemned the U.S. decision.  Teruaki Masumoto, a brother of 
one of the eight Japanese who were kidnapped said, “I think it is an act of betrayal.”735 
Sakie Yokota whose daughter was kidnapped 31 years ago said, “Why did the United 
States remove North Korea from the list when it is clear to anyone’s eyes that the North 
Korea is a terrorism-assisting country?”736 Politicians and government officials in Japan 
could not neglect their opinions.  
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Also, Japanese officials warned that the U.S. removal of North Korea from 
the State Sponsors of Terrorism List would damage the relationship between Japan and 
the United States. For example, Kyoto Nakayama, special advisor to Prime Minister 
Yasuo Fukuda on the kidnapping, said in an interview with AFP, “If the U.S. moves 
while completely ignoring the abduction issue, you can expect that relations between 
Japan and the United States will not improve.”737  
In October 2008, Japanese leaders showed their strong opposition to the 
U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Prime 
Minister Taro Aso claimed that the North Korean kidnapping issue was still important 
leverage in the Six-Party Talks.738 Shoichi Nakagawa, a Japanese finance minister, said 
“he doubted that Japanese officials had been fully consulted beforehand,” even though 
the U.S. State Department announced that President Bush and Secretary of State Rice had 
spoken with their Japanese counterparts.739 Japan continued to request that the Japanese 
kidnapping issue should be solved before Japan provided any assistance to North Korea. 
Japan has not provided its share of the energy assistance under the October 3, 2007 
Agreement, which amounts to 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.740  
North Korea’s attitude to Japan had been very bellicose and in 2008, it 
became more hostile. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced 
that North Korea would not consider Japan as a member of the Six-Party Talks. The 
spokesman said: 
It is the assertion of Japan that it will not fulfill any commitment related to 
its economic compensation under the agreement reached at the six-party 
talks unless there is progress in the solution of the “abduction issue” 
between the DPRK and Japan. 
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It is the ulterior intention of Japan to bar the denuclearization of the 
peninsula from coming true and put spurs to its moves to turn itself into a 
military power under the pretext of the nuclear issue. Such country has 
neither justification nor qualification to participate in the talks. On the 
contrary, it only lays a hurdle in the way of achieving the common 
goal.741  
Japan’s request to deal with its kidnapping issue in the Six-Party Talks 
was met with a hostile response by North Korea. Also, Japan’s opposition to Bush’s 
reassurance, such as the removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism 
List, could not help generate North Korea’s reciprocity. Rather, it provoked North 
Korea’s bellicose actions. Consequently, Japan gave priority to the kidnapping issue over 
Bush’s reassurance strategy which reduced the chances for reassurance to succeed. 
6. Alliance Politics of North Korea 
Question 12: How did key allies of North Korea perceive Bush’s 
reassurance strategy? Did Bush’s reassurance strategy generate alliance 
support for North Korea’s reciprocity? Did North Korea’s key allies try to 
prevent North Korea from offering a positive response? 
After the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the Bush administration implemented a 
reassurance strategy to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through the Six-Party 
Talks with the assistance from China and Russia because the Bush administration judged 
that it lacked sufficient leverage unilaterally to compel North Korea to give up its nuclear 
programs. China and Russia, as key allies of North Korea, had consistently insisted on 
the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea, and had not supported pressure or 
sanctions intended to cause regime change because they believed that it could lead to 
increase of tensions or war on the Korean peninsula. As a result, generally speaking, they 
supported Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 because they believed that 
dialogue and engagement were better ways than containment and isolation for the 
peaceful denuclearization of North Korea. 
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Therefore, China and Russia did not prevent North Korea from offering a positive 
response. At the same time, China and Russia had some national interests and limitations 
so that they could not strongly push North Korea to dismantle nuclear weapons 
completely. As shown by the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests, China and 
Russia did not have strong leverage to control North Korea’s behavior in 2007 and 2008, 
and North Korea acted assertively in its security issues. North Korea considered its 
nuclear program under its Juche (Self-reliance) ideology as the top security issue.  
a.  China’s Ambivalence: Tensions Between Support for Bush’s 
Reassurance Strategy and Consideration of North Korea as an 
Ally 
(1)  China’s Support for Bush’s Reassurance Strategy in 2007 
and 2008.  Basically, China and the United States had very different views of the North 
Korean nuclear issue. Daniel Pinkston, a Northeast Asia expert at the International Crisis 
Group observed, “Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to 
change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative 
view of sanctions and pressure tactics.”742 China, as the host nation of the Six-Party 
Talks, supported Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 because the Bush 
administration tried to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue. China 
had wanted to be involved in the North Korean nuclear issue from the beginning of the 
Six-Party Talks in 2003 as the “chief mediator” and “honest broker.”743 David Kang 
explained China’s intentions: 
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that “Dialogue is vital to 
maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and China is willing to 
work with all parties toward an early, peaceful solution to the issue.” 
Without Chinese support, sanctions or other hard-line policies are unlikely 
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to become effective. One key question is the extent of Chinese influence 
on North Korea.744  
There were several main reasons, such as border stability, the 
avoidance of war, and an improving relationship with the United States, for China to 
want to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and engagement rather 
than through a containment and isolation policy. First, the top priority for China was to 
maintain stability along the Chinese-North Korean border. China did not want to see any 
regime collapse in North Korea or war on the Korean Peninsula because those situations 
would cause hundreds of thousands of refugees to flow across the border into China. This 
was already a problem for China.  
Second, another priority for China was to keep North Korea as a 
non-nuclear state. If North Korea had a nuclear weapon, there would be the possibility 
that Japan as well as South Korea, even Taiwan, would want to develop their own nuclear 
programs. These situations also would be serious threats to China’s security. Third, from 
the Chinese perspective, the Six-Party Talks gave China an opportunity to improve its 
relationship with the United States. Ralph Cossa claimed that “the North Korean nuclear 
crisis was ‘a gift from Kim Jong Il’ to advance U.S.–Chinese cooperation.”745  
Therefore, the February 13 Agreement and October 4 Agreement 
in 2007 were achieved with strong support from China. Christopher Hill said in his 
interview with ABC on February 13, 2007, “This whole six-party process has done more 
to bring the U.S. and China together than any other process I’m aware of.”746 In sum, 
China supported Bush’s shift to reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008, after the restart of 
the Six-Party Talks. 
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(2)  China’s Consideration of North Korea as an Ally.  Even 
though China supported Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008, China was the 
most important ally of North Korea. China has played an important role on the Korean 
peninsula as North Korea’s ally because of historic, political, and economic reasons. 
China fought in the Korean War for North Korea. Even though it is difficult to measure 
China’s influence on North Korea, and it is limited on the nuclear issue, it is clear that 
China is willing to be a main actor. Also, if China helps North Korea economically and 
militarily, North Korea will remain in its present status.  
Even though China has been ambiguous about its commitment to 
North Korea in case of military conflict, there is still the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. 747  Harrison explains the treaty 
between North Korea and China:  
While China has shifted to a more symmetrical posture in its dealing with 
the two Koreas, its new posture remains conspicuously asymmetrical in 
one critical aspect. Article 2 of the Sino-North Korean “Mutual Aid and 
Cooperation Friendship Treaty” declares that the two signatory nations 
guarantee to adopt immediately all necessary measures to oppose any 
country or coalition of countries that might attack either nation.748  
Even though the security situation after the end of Cold War has 
changed, and the meaning of treaty can be interpreted differently, this statement in the 
treaty obviously shows the relationship between North Korea and China. Any military 
action against North Korea cannot be taken without considering the mutual treaty 
between North Korea and China. 
Also, China did not want to push for strong economic sanctions 
against North Korea. China expressed its displeasure and supported U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1718, which passed on October 14, 2006, five days after North 
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Korea’s first nuclear test.749 China was angry and called the test a “flagrant and brazen” 
violation of international opinion and it supported a punitive response.750 Liu Jianchao, a 
spokesman for China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry said on October 19 that “U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1718 was balanced and all parties should implement it strictly within 
the established guidelines.” 751 At the same time, Liu emphasized the peaceful 
denuclearization of North Korea through dialogue in the Six-Party Talks. Liu said that the 
important information he sent to North Korea was that “its nuclear test was wrong and 
that the international community opposes it. The DPRK should return to six-party talks as 
soon as possible.”752 Also, he added, “Sanctions are not our aim. Our aim is to accelerate 
the reopening of six-party talks and resolve the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully through 
dialogue.”753  
However, China did not rigorously implement the resolution, and 
many experts had doubts of China’s economic sanctions against North Korea. Jayshree 
Barjoria said, “China has too much at stake in North Korea to halt or withdraw its support 
entirely.” 754  Mark Manyin said, “Trade [between North Korea and China] in heavy 
weapons systems such as missiles generally are not recorded, complicating any 
assessment of 1718’s arms embargo.”755 Actually, trade between North Korea and China 
in general increased by 13 percent in 2007 and 41 percent in 2008. Also, Chinese exports 
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to North Korea rose by 13 percent and 46 percent respectively in those years (Table 
3.13).756  
Table 3.13.   China’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 2006–2008757   
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
Year China’s Imports 
China’s 
Exports Total Trade 
China’s 
Balance 
2006 467.718 1,231.886 1,699.604 764.168 
2007 581.521 1,392.453 1,973.974 810.932 
2008 754.045 2,033.233 2,787.278 1,279.188 
This evidence shows that China considered North Korea as an 
important ally and viewed dialogue rather than pressure or sanctions as the best way to 
solve the North Korea nuclear problem. However, China had limited leverage over North 
Korea, especially on the nuclear issue.  
(3)  China’s Limited Leverage over North Korea.  Even though 
China has been the key ally of North Korea since the Korean War, its influence has been 
reduced, especially on the North Korean nuclear issue. A high-level Chinese foreign 
ministry official said in Victor Cha’s interview in 1997 that “The North Koreans don’t 
listen to us…they don’t listen to anyone.”758 As a result, even though China consistently 
protested North Korea’s nuclear test, it could not prevent the 2006 North Korean nuclear 
test. There was no prior consultation about the test. North Korea notified China less than 
an hour before the test. North Korea had been claiming that its nuclear program was for 
its self-defense and based on its Juche ideology. The KCNA announced, “The nuclear 
test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100 percent. It marks a 
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historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA and people that have wished 
to have powerful self-reliant defense capability.”759 
Actually, in terms of their security interests and ideologies, China 
and North Korea have moved apart, especially since the end of the Cold War. Li 
Kaisheng explains the difference:  
In the eyes of many North Koreans, China is marching firmly down the 
capitalist road, while many Chinese think that North Korea’s “military 
first” policy and dynastic succession are not within the realm of socialism. 
Under these circumstances, the so-called socialist alliance now exists 
nowhere but in people’s imaginations. Fundamentally, these changes 
reflect the fact that the interests of the two countries have shifted 
dramatically.760  
Kaisheng adds that “The most fundamental interest of North Korea 
is the survival of its dynastic regime; therefore, it does not desire reforms or openness. 
Furthermore, it sometimes seeks to unify its people by creating international tensions, 
including producing nuclear weapons ‘to maintain its security.’” 761  Andrei Lankov, 
associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul also says, “North Korea’s leaders are 
in no hurry to introduce any reforms.” 762 These analyses seemed true regarding the 
relationship between China and North Korea, especially in 2007 and 2008. In sum, even 
though China was an important ally of North Korea, China did not have strong leverage 
over North Korea for it to give up nuclear weapons and give positive responses to the 
United States.  
Furthermore, not only has China lost leverage to influence North 
Korea, but also China’s concern about a nuclear North Korea was an issue. China seemed 
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to have a serious concern about U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state. Even 
after the six-party members agreed the February 13 agreement, Gary Samore argued that 
“China’s biggest concern seems to be that the February agreement signals an American 
surrender to North Korean nuclear weapons.”763 Samore also stated: 
Having complained for years that the Bush administration was demanding 
too much, the Chinese now say they fear Washington is secretly prepared 
to accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state. Pointing to the example 
of India, one senior Chinese official complained that the U.S. 
nonproliferation policy is weak and inconsistent: “Washington strongly 
opposes proliferation before a nuclear test, but once a test has been 
conducted, the U.S. accepts the country as a nuclear power.”764  
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) perfectly described the 
relationship between China and North Korea as a “dilemma”:  
China continues to face a tough choice between applying greater pressure, 
which could trigger North Korea's collapse, or doing too little to deter the 
regime from developing atomic weapons--an outcome that would raise the 
even-more-frightening spectre of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.765  
Consequently, China supported a more reassurance-oriented 
strategy toward North Korea and welcomed the Bush administration’s shift in 2007 and 
2008. China and the United States had the common goal of the denuclearization of North 
Korea. However, China as an important ally of North Korea had its own national interests 
and could not completely support the position of the United States. Furthermore, China 
was not able to fully use its leverage over North Korea, especially on the nuclear issue. 
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b.  Russia’s Ambivalence: Tensions Between Support for Bush’s 
Reassurance Strategy and Russia’s Limited Leverage over North 
Korea 
(1) Russia’s Limited Support for Bush’s Reassurance in 2007 
and 2008.  Russia, like China, showed similar attitudes to Bush’s reassurance strategy in 
2007 and 2008 because Russia wanted to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea 
through dialogue rather than containment and isolation.766 There are several reasons, 
similar to China’s, why Russia demonstrated positive views of Bush’s reassurance 
strategy. First, Russia feared that North Korea’s sudden collapse or war on the Korean 
peninsula would endanger the security of Russia. Russia was concerned about the 
possible refugee flow across the border caused by the unstable situations along the 
Russian-North Korean border. Second, Russia showed much concern about North 
Korea’s nuclear program. If North Korea became a nuclear state, Russia would more 
likely face nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia because Japan and South Korea might 
want to develop nuclear programs. Such a situation would bring instability and extra 
burdens to Russia.767  Third, the Six-Party Talks gave Russia an opportunity to maintain 
its power in Northeast Asia by becoming involved in the North Korean nuclear issue with 
other great powers.  
There are some examples to show that Russia wanted to solve the 
nuclear problem through the Six-Party Talks and supported the shift of the Bush 
administration in 2007. Russia played an important role in solving the BDA problem. 
North Korea asked the United States to unfreeze and transfer $25 million held in the 
BDA, but it was difficult to find a solution in the United States since “for four months a 
bureaucratic and political knot had held up this transfer.”768 Ultimately, the Far Eastern 
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Commercial Bank (Dalkombank) in Vladivostok received money from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York that had been sent from the Banco Delta Asia.769 Then,  
 
 
Dalkombank eventually transferred the money to North Korea. On June 23, 2007, the 
Russian Finance Ministry announced the completion of the transfer of funds from the 
BDA to North Korea through Dalkombank.770  
Russia was the only member of the Six-Party Talks, besides the 
United States, that supplied heavy fuel oil to North Korea under the February 13 
Agreement and continued to ask other members to carry out their obligations when the 
talks almost stalled in late 2008.771 When South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myoung 
Hwan visited Moscow in September 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
stated, “We generally share the approaches and opinion that there should be measures to 
prevent breaks [in the six-party process]. We should leave behind the current phase and 
get back to implementation by all the countries of the agreements reached based on the 
principle of action for action.”772   
Also, in April 2008, Christopher Hill admitted that U.S.-Russian 
cooperation on the North Korean nuclear problem was very important. He mentioned 
Russia’s significant role “in working out the outline of the future Northeast Asian 
security mechanism based on, among other things, Russian experience with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and in being instrumental in 
the practical aspects of future denuclearization.”773 
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However, Bush’s reassurance strategy did not generate Russia’s 
full support for North Korea’s reciprocity because of the deteriorated relations between 
Russia and the United States and Russia’s dilemma between supporting Six-Party Talks 
and bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States in 2007 and 2008. First, 
the relationship between Russia and the United States had deteriorated in 2007 and 2008. 
Even though the United States and Russia found some common ground on North Korean 
nuclear issues in the Six-Party Talks, there were always sources of tensions between them. 
A Congressional Research Service report noted, “Relations between the United States 
and Russia appeared to reach a nadir in 2007-2008 with Putin’s increasingly harsh 
criticism of the United States, sharp disagreements over Kosovo’s independence, the 
proposed U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, and 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008.” 774  The Russian-Georgian conflict of 
August 2008 was “the most serious source of tensions between Russia and the United 
States since the end of the Cold War.”775 The deteriorated relationship between Russia 
and the United States did not help the progress of Bush’s reassurance strategy toward 
North Korea and North Korea’s positive response. In sum, under the deteriorated 
circumstances between Russia and the United States in 2007 and 2008, Russia could not 
strongly ask North Korea to respond positively to Bush’s reassurance strategy.  
Second, even though Russia supported the Six-Party Talks, Russia 
understood the importance of the bilateral talks between the United States and North 
Korea. Russia believed that the important motivating factor of North Korea’s nuclear 
program was regime survival and that the United States’ security guarantee was essential. 
Therefore, Russia supported the “collective security assurance” plan to provide North 
Korea with a security guarantee as well as bilateral talks between the United States and 
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North Korea.776 However, the bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea 
reduced the role of Russia in the Six-Party Talks. 
Russia basically welcomed Bush’s reassurance strategy toward 
North Korea in 2007 because Russia wanted to solve the North Korean nuclear problem 
through dialogue and a collective security mechanism. However, there was limited 
support because the relationship between Russia and the United States had tensions in 
2007 and 2008 caused by different views on other areas such as U.S. missile defense, 
NATO expansion, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia.  
(2) Russia’s Limited Leverage over North Korea.  Russia has 
significantly lost its leverage over North Korea since the end of the Cold War and such 
trends continued in 2007 and 2008 because of economic and political reasons. Dick K. 
Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery point out, “Russian reforms and the end of the Cold 
War greatly reduced the priority of the DPRK in the strategy of Russian foreign 
policy.”777 Russia’s refusal to host the Six-Party Talks showed that even though Russia 
has an important interest on the Korean peninsula, Russia did not consider it as a top 
priority issue and that Russia did not need to play an active role. When Kim Jong Il asked 
President Putin to host the meeting, Putin refused “because of continuing Chinese efforts 
to mediate between the United States and North Korea.”778  
China has become a more important actor than Russia since the 
Cold War. Russia has a fundamentally different political system since 1991 and has had 
economic problems since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Russia has been unwilling 
to provide generous economic benefits to North Korea. In 1991, the Soviet Union also 
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established diplomatic relations with South Korea over protests from North Korea.779 
Recent statistics show that North Korea is not an important partner for Russia. According 
to Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “In 2008, North Korea ranked 107th among 
Russia’s sources of imports (below Jamaica and Ghana) and 92nd in terms of markets for 
Russian exports (below the Virgin Islands and Gibraltar). The increasing volume of 
Russian mineral fuel exports to the DPRK has moved Russia past Japan, Germany, and 
Thailand to become North Korea’s third largest trading partner.”780  
The comparison between Russia’s merchandise trade with North 
Korea between 2006 and 2008 (Table 3.14) and China’s trade during the same period 
(Table 3.13) shows that the role of China had increased significantly. While trade 
between North Korea and China in general increased by 13 percent in 2007 and 41 
percent in 2008, trade between North Korea and Russia decreased by 24 percent in 2007 
and 31 percent in 2008 (Table 3.14):  
Table 3.14.   Russia’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 2006–2008781 
(millions of U.S. dollars)  
Year Russia’s Imports 
Russia’s 
Exports Total Trade 
Russia’s 
Balance 
2006 20.076 190.563 210.639 170.487 
2007 33.539 126.068 159.607 92.529 
2008 13.519 97.005 110.524 83.486 
Russia’s role in the North Korean nuclear issue was also restrained 
by political reasons. Even though Russia supported continuous Six-Party Talks to solve 
the North Korean nuclear problem, Russia’s role in the Six-Party Talks has been limited 
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by bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea, especially in 2008. Joseph 
Ferguson explained Russia’s dissatisfaction with the progress of the Six-Party Talks in 
the early 2008. He said, “It is not only the obstreperous behavior of Pyongyang that is 
said to have been wearing on Russian negotiators, but more so the fact that the recent 
series of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea have essentially 
sidelined the other players, especially Russia and Japan.”782 Ferguson also analyzed the 
role of Russia in East Asia during the second quarter of 2008 and concluded that Russia 
lost both leverage over North Korea and its role in the Six-Party Talks. According to 
Ferguson:  
No matter what happens in Korea, it is clear by now that Russia is playing 
little to no political role, which I suppose is better than playing a spoiler’s 
role, as many accuse them of doing in Iran. The Kremlin’s inability to gain 
a larger role has surely vexed them, but the process of the Six-Party Talks 
now seems almost bilateral (also to Japan and South Korea’s chagrin).783  
When the Six-Party Talks almost collapsed in late 2008, Russia’s 
efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks by persuading all members to have meetings and 
implement the 2007 agreements failed. In sum, Russia lost its leverage over North Korea 
and it could not persuade North Korea’s reciprocity. However, there is also not much 
evidence showing that Russia prevented North Korea from offering a positive response.  
Consequently, both China and Russia perceived Bush’s 
reassurance strategy implemented through the Six-Party Talks in 2007, as a correct 
decision to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, and supported it. However, they 
were unwilling to pressure North Korea to the full extent possible, especially China, due 
to fear of the negative implications. In sum, Bush’s reassurance could not generate 
China’s and Russia’s full support for North Korea’s reciprocity because they had limited 
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leverage over North Korea. Therefore, the U.S. efforts to solve the North Korean problem 
through the Six-Party Talks could not lead to success. 
 
E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF 
REASSURANCE STRATEGY 
Question 13: Was there any positive response to Bush’s reassurance 
strategy from North Korea? Or, was there no response or rejection from 
North Korea, followed by an increase in tensions? 
There were some positive responses from North Korea in 2007 and 2008 to 
Bush’s reassurance strategy. The two agreements in the Six-Party Talks on February 13 
(the first phase action) and October 3, 2007 (the second phase action) to implement the 
September 19, 2005 Agreement and the following actions such as the completion of eight 
disablement steps at Yongbyon out of 11 total steps are good examples. However, the Six 
Party Talks on December 8–12, 2008 ended in a stalemate. The 2007 agreements ended 
with just a statement of good intentions without substantial actions or denuclearization of 
North Korea. Furthermore, tension has increased since late 2008 and North Korea 
conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, Memorial Day in the United States. It 
appears that Bush’s reassurance strategy for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program in 2007 and 2008 was a total failure.   
1. Rejection from North Korea on Verification Protocol 
The breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in December 2008 came from North 
Korea’s objection to some of the verification measures and its refusal to make a written 
agreement. After Christopher Hill’s visit to North Korea in October 2008, U.S. officials 
asserted that North Korea had made a verbal agreement on two key issues: “potential 
access to facilities not included in Pyongyang’s nuclear declaration and permission for 
inspectors to take environmental samples from facilities to determine how much 
plutonium had been produced.”784 The United States removed North Korea from the 
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State Sponsors of Terrorism List based on the agreement. However, in December 2008, 
North Korea rejected the verbal agreement and balked at agreeing to any written plan. 
After the talks on December 8–12, 2008, Christopher Hill said that the talks failed 
“because North Korea was not ready to reach a verification protocol with all the 
standards that are required.”785 He also said, “The North Koreans don’t want to put into 
writing what they are willing to put into words.”786  
The primary issue of disagreement was sampling, which “allows inspectors to 
analyze materials, equipment, or the environment around facilities to gather information 
about substances of relevance to a nuclear program.” 787  Even though U.S. officials 
seemed to believe that sampling as a verification measure had been agreed to, North 
Korea asserted that “it is only required at this point to carry out the limited verification 
steps agreed in writing with United States in October 2008, which did not include 
sampling provisions.”788  
Also, North Korea claimed that the verification measures were not included in the 
2007 agreements. Peter Crail said, “North Korea asserted that it was not obligated to 
address verification at all at the point in the negotiations because six-party agreements in 
October 2007 outlining the sequence for the current phase of North Korea’s 
denuclearization did not require concluding a verification protocol.” 789  North Korea 
insisted that sampling was a “third phase” step which could be reached after the other 
five members completed their commitments in the 2007 agreements such as shipments of 
one million tons of heavy fuel oil.790 
In response to North Korea’s refusal to accept the verification protocol, the 
United States halted energy assistance to North Korea. Sean McCormack, a Department 
                                                 
785 Kessler, “N. Korea Doesn’t Agree.” 
786 Steven Lee Myers, “In Setback for Bush, Korea Nuclear Talks Collapse,” New York Times, 
December 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/world/asia/12korea.html (accessed on October 3, 
2009).  
787 Crail, “Six-Party Talks Stall.” 
788 Ibid.  
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid.  
 279
of State spokesperson, said, “there is an understanding among the parties…that fuel oil 
shipments will not go forward absent progress.”791 North Korea responded to the halt of 
energy assistance with a threat to slow the speed of disablement. There has been no 
progress since the stalemate in December 2008. Rather, the situation has gotten worse 
and North Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests in 2009. 
2. North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests in 2009 
Tension escalated since the stalemate of the Six-Party Talks in late 2008 and 
continued after the end of Bush’s presidency. Barack Obama has not proposed any 
radically new approach to North Korea since Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 
2008. Obama recognized Bush’s shift in 2007. Obama said in September 2008, “When 
we re-engaged—because, again, the Bush administration reversed course on this—then 
we have at least made some progress, although right now, because of the problems in 
North Korea, we are seeing it on shaky ground.”792  
During the early period of the Obama administration, there were North Korea’s 
April 5, 2009 launch of a Taepo Dong-2 and May 25, 2009 nuclear test. Even though 
these activities were conducted during the Obama administration, they demonstrated that 
the Bush administration’s efforts in 2007 and 2008 to prevent North Korea from 
continuing its nuclear program had resulted in failure. Some scholars argue that the 
United States should temporarily accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Charles 
Armstrong said:  
The goal of these talks must go beyond the elimination of Pyongyang’s 
nuclear arsenal. We may already be past the point of North Korea giving 
up its nuclear deterrent, and for the time being will have to live with a 
nuclear North Korea. But ultimately, viewing North Korea purely through 
the lens of nuclear non-proliferation is a mistake, North Korea’s 
belligerence, including its nuclear weapons program, is the result of its 
ongoing conflict with the U.S., not a cause. Therefore the goal of dealing 
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with Pyongyang should be to eliminate of the root cause of the current 
crisis: the state of war.793 
According to the KCNA, North Korea claimed that the second nuclear test was 
successful and the purpose of test was for self-defense and protection of sovereignty and 
socialism:  
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully conducted one 
more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to 
bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way as requested 
by its scientists and technicians.794 
On June 12, 2009, the United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea’s 
second nuclear test and unanimously passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, 
which puts in place a series of sanctions on several types of activities and calls on UN 
members to inspect cargo vessels suspected of carrying military material in or out of 
North Korea.795 In September 2009, besides conducting the nuclear test, North Korea 
claimed that it was “in the ‘concluding stage’ of tests to enrich uranium.”796   
Consequently, Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 eventually did not 
succeed in achieving its denuclearization objectives. Rather, there was a significant 
increase of tension in early 2009. Therefore, Bush’s reassurance strategy can be 
categorized as a case of failure of reassurance strategy without tension reduction or the 
completion of dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program.  
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F. OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION 
1. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes 
In this case study, there were no changes in leaders’ perceptions of both the 
United States and North Korea. Also, there was no support from domestic politics and 
either no support or only limited support from alliance politics of both the United States 
and North Korea. In sum, all six intervening variables were not favorable to the success 
of reassurance strategy. Therefore, the outcomes of the hypotheses applied to the case of 
the United States and North Korea during the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008 can 
be summarized as follows (Figure 3.6):  
IV → IntV →  DV 
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Figure 3.6.   Hypotheses and Their Outcomes (IV, CV, IntV, and DV) 
2. Results of Hypotheses 
The conditions of failure of Bush’s reassurance strategy can be explained by the 
result of the hypotheses.  
Result of hypotheses: 
H1: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was less likely to 
succeed when it could not alter Bush’s beliefs and perceptions about Kim 
Jong Il and North Korea. 
H2: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was less likely to 
succeed when it could not alter Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and perceptions 
about Bush and the United States. 
H3: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was less likely to 
succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in the United States 
towards support for foreign policy change.  
H4: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was less likely to 
succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in North Korea towards 
support for foreign policy change.  
H5: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was less likely to 
succeed when it could not alter alliance politics of the United States 
(South Korea and Japan) towards support for foreign policy change.  
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H6: Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was less likely to 
succeed when it could not alter alliance politics of North Korea (China and 
Russia) towards support for foreign policy change, though in this case 
more because the allies lacked leverage than because of any opposition to 
a positive response. 
Consequently, all intervening variables provided negative conditions for success 
of Bush’s reassurance strategy. Because leaders’ perceptions, domestic and alliance 
politics of the United States and North Korea did not offer any positive conditions for 
success, Bush’s reassurance strategy was less likely to succeed. Also, it is worth 
considering the primary reasons for these negative conditions. The persistence of enemy  
 
 
identity and Hobbesian culture between North Korea and the United States are the main 
factors to influence leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of North 
Korea and the United States. 
3. Conclusion 
a.  Importance of Knowing the Circumstances Between the Sending 
and Receiving States and the Motivating Factors of the Receiving 
State  
The main difference between hard-liner and soft-liner approaches toward 
North Korea is an assumption about the intentions and nature of North Korea. However, 
North Korea’s intentions are not clear because it has both “greedy” and “not-greedy” 
motivating factors. Yet, it is important to understand the “not-greedy” motivating factors 
for the implementation of reassurance strategy. Not only capability, but also motivation, 
is a very important factor for knowing your enemy and yourself.  
The circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states 
from various perspectives—realist, liberal, and constructivist—should be considered to 
understand the motivating factors because they affect the formation of the motivating 
factors. In this case study, it is seen that one perspective is not likely to adequately 
explain the relationship between the circumstances and relations and the motivating 
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factors. Even though there is no economic interdependence between the United States 
and North Korea, the balance of power and identity are important factors in North 
Korea’s motivating factors. Also, the circumstances and relations between the sending 
and receiving states influence leaders’ perceptions and domestic and alliance politics. 
Both the unfavorable balance of power toward North Korea and mutual enemy identities 
of the United States and North Korea are related. Therefore, it is important to understand 
the context of the relationship in order to comprehend the motivating factors and 
possibility of success of the reassurance strategy. 
The United States has been focusing more on North Korea’s “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors than on its “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
ones. The consideration of North Korea’s “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating 
factors is necessary for knowing the enemy and improving policymaking. Domestic and 
alliance politics of the United States have been more likely to support the view that North 
Korea has only “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. In sum, Bush’s 
reassurance strategy failed because of the lack of consideration of the “not-greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors of North Korea by his administration, and by 
important actors in domestic and alliance politics.  
b. Importance of Leaders’ Perceptions, Domestic Politics, and 
Alliance Politics of the Sending and Receiving States 
Prospects for a reassurance strategy must be viewed in the context of 
individual, domestic, and international factors of both sending and receiving states. The 
case study of the Bush administration’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 toward 
North Korea shows that the cognition of leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics 
of both the United States and North Korea did not alter; therefore, Bush’s reassurance 
strategy ended in failure. The mutually preoccupied enemy images of the United States 
and North Korea affected the cognition of leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics, 
which are difficult to alter in a short time period. In the case study, the implementation of 
the reassurance strategy was constrained by domestic and alliance politics. The 
implementation of the reassurance strategy was met by a rise in opposition from domestic 
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politics and alliance politics. Therefore, to implement a reassurance strategy successfully, 
it is important to know how to make the opponents of the reassurance strategy from 
domestic politics and allies accept its necessity.  
Also, domestic and alliance politics of the receiving state are important 
factors for the success of a reassurance strategy. The domestic conditions of North Korea 
in 2008 made it less likely to respond positively to Bush’s reassurance strategy. China 
and Russia, as allies of North Korea, could not fully support Bush’s reassurance strategy 
because of their limited leverage over North Korea. With almost everything working 
against it, it is not surprising that reassurance failed in this case.  
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IV. CASE III: A SUCCESSFUL REASSURANCE STRATEGY 
CASE (GORBACHEV’S REASSURANCE STRATEGY)  
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. A Successful Reassurance Case Between the Soviet Union and the 
United States 
The end of the Cold War has been a very attractive subject for study because not 
only was it not expected but ambiguity still exists as to its causes. There have been 
vigorous debates about the American role in ending the Cold War. Some scholars, 
politicians, and defense decision makers believe that the strong deterrence strategy of the 
United States, especially the Reagan administration’s hard line policy, led to the end of 
the Cold War. Former Vice President Dan Quayle claimed, “We were right to increase 
our defense budget.”797 The columnist Tom Wicker also noted that Reagan’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) and military buildup “seemed to impress the Soviets as a 
challenge that they might not be able to meet.”798  
Others argue that Gorbachev’s unilateral initiation of reassurance strategies to 
search for an accommodation with the United States ended the Cold War.799 Furthermore, 
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein argue that Reagan’s hard-line foreign policy 
was counterproductive. They say, “The Carter-Reagan military buildup did not defeat the 
Soviet Union. On the contrary, it prolonged the Cold War.” 800 While scholars have 
argued about the role of the Reagan administration’s policy in the end of the Cold War, 
this outcome is almost impossible to explain in any simple way because it involved so 
many intertwined causal factors.  
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Although the causes of the end of the Cold War remained debated, two historical 
developments that can be clearly recognized are the implementation of a reassurance 
strategy by Gorbachev and positive responses from the Reagan administration. U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s can be divided into two distinct periods. 
There was a strategy change from the 1981-1985 period of deterrence-dominant strategy to 
the 1985-1989 period of negotiation-dominant strategy, a change that resulted from 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy is a good example of 
successful reassurance strategy because it induced the shift in national security policy 
from the first Reagan administration to the second. Gorbachev tried to persuade the 
United States that the Soviet Union had no intentions to attack the United States. He 
wanted to reduce tensions and avoid war through that reassurance strategy. Finally, 
tensions and the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States were 
reduced significantly by the end of the Reagan presidency.   
This chapter explores the incentives for use and the conditions of success of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy including the causes of change in U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union from a deterrence strategy to acceptance of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. 
It argues that changes in Gorbachev’s and Reagan’s perceptions, domestic politics, and 
alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States were all associated with the 
changes in U.S. strategic policy and the success of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy.  
2. Variables  
Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors 
associated with the success of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy can be drawn in a 
diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening variables 
(IntV) and dependent variable (DV). The independent variable is the implementation of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy and dependent variable is its success or failure.  
There are six intervening variables that affect the dependent variable: (1) 
Gorbachev’s beliefs and perceptions about Reagan and the United States; (2) Reagan’s 
beliefs and perceptions about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union; (3) the domestic politics of 
the Soviet Union; (4) the domestic politics of the United States; (5) the alliance politics of 
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the Soviet Union; and (6) the alliance politics of the United States. Also, two condition 
variables—the circumstances and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
and the United States’ motivating factors—are included in the hypotheses. The hypotheses 
and all variables can be drawn as in Figures 4.1 and 4.2: 
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Figure 4.1 Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)801 
                                                 
801 Van Evera, Guidance to Methods, 7–48. 
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Figure 4.2 Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the Receiving 
State and CV) 
3. Hypotheses 
The main focus of this dissertation is on the conditions that lead to success or 
failure of reassurance strategy. The hypotheses of this case study are as follows: 
H1: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it 
altered Gorbachev’s beliefs and perceptions about Reagan and the United 
States. 
H2: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it 

















H3: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it 
altered domestic politics in the Soviet Union towards support for foreign 
policy change.  
H4: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it 
altered domestic politics in the United States towards support for foreign 
policy change.  
H5: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it 
altered alliance politics of the Soviet Union towards support for foreign 
policy change.  
H6: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it 
altered alliance politics of the Soviet Union towards support for foreign 
policy change. 
If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of Gorbachev’s reassurance 
strategy would have been influenced by the six intervening variables (leader’s 
perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the 
United States).  
4. Chronology 
A chronological narrative of the Gorbachev period will help to elucidate the main 
argument and hypotheses with their various variables. The main events show that there 
was a shift in national security policy from the first Reagan administration to the second. 
Therefore, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was a successful case of reassurance 
strategy.  
Table 4.1 The First Reagan Administration (1981–1985) before Gorbachev: 
Intensification of the Cold War and Military Build Up  
January 20 Reagan was sworn in as the 40th president of the United States after the landslide victory over Jimmy Carter.  
1981 
March 30 Reagan was shot in the chest in front of a Washington hotel in an assassination attempt by John Hinckley, Jr.  
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June 8 
In a speech to the British House of Commons, Reagan said, “the 
march of freedom and democracy…will leave Marxism-Leninism on 




Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev died. Yuri Andropov 
succeeded.  
March 8 Reagan denounced the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” in the speech to the National Associate of Evangelicals.  
March 23 Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  
September 1 Soviet military shot down South Korean commercial flight KAL 007, killing 269 passengers, including 61 Americans. 
October 25 U.S. troops invaded Grenada to oust Marxists who had overthrown the government.  
November 
2-11 
NATO forces conducted Able Archer 83, a military exercise testing 
chain-of-command procedures for nuclear weapons; the CIA reports 
that Soviet officials feared it was the start of a surprise nuclear attack.
November 
20  
ABC television aired The Day After, dramatizing the impact of 
nuclear war on a single town in Kansas. 
1983 
November 
23 American Pershing II missiles are deployed in West Germany. 
January 16-
17 
Reagan called for a return to arms talks with the Soviet Union. 
Reagan met at White House with Suzanne Massie and sent her to 
Moscow as intermediary.  
February 9-
13 Andropov died and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko. 
1984 
November 6  Reagan won reelection with 59 percent popular vote (525 electoral votes).  
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Table 4.2 Gorbachev and the Second Reagan Administration (1985–1989): 
Gorbachev’s Reassurance Strategy and Reagan’s Acceptance  
March     
10-11 Chernenko died. Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader.
April Gorbachev announced a temporary moratorium on INF missile deployment.  
August Gorbachev imposed a unilateral nuclear test moratorium to the end of the year.  
1985 
November 
19-21 Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time in Geneva.  
January 15 Gorbachev unveiled a proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free world by 2000. 
January  Gorbachev extended the nuclear-testing moratorium to the end of March 
February 25 
- March 6  
The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) was held in Moscow and announced the fundamental 
principles (see Appendix M).  
March  Gorbachev extended the nuclear-testing moratorium to August. 
April 26 Soviet nuclear disaster occurred at Chernobyl. 
August 13 Reagan called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down. 
August 18 Gorbachev extended the nuclear-testing moratorium to the end of the year.  
August 30 Soviets detained American reporter Nicholas Daniloff in response to American arrest of a Soviet diplomat on spying charges.  
September 
28-30 
U.S. and Soviet officials announced a deal for Daniloff’s release. 
Shortly afterward, the White House announced that Reagan and 
Gorbachev would meet again soon in Reykjavik.  
1986 
October   
11-12 
At Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev discuss dramatic cutbacks in 
missiles and nuclear weapons, but no agreement was reached. 
1987 February 28 
Gorbachev announced Soviet Union was willing to try to conclude 
a treaty limiting intermediate-range missiles in Europe, without 
insisting that it be part of a larger agreement.  
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May 27-28 
In East Berlin, Gorbachev persuaded Eastern European leaders to 
approve new military doctrine in which Warsaw Pact is considered 
a strictly defensive alliance.  
May 28 
West German teenager Matthias Rust flew Cessna plane through 
Soviet air defenses to Moscow; Gorbachev responded by shaking 
up Soviet military command. 
June 12 Reagan, in West Berlin, delivered a speech calling on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.” 
September 7 With Soviet acquiescence, Erick Honecker made his first visit to West Germany. 
December 
8-10 
Reagan and Gorbachev held a summit in Washington, concluded 
INF Treaty. 
May 27 U.S. Senate ratified INF Treaty. 
May 29-
June 1 
Reagan visited Moscow, said his description of the Soviet Union as 
an “evil empire” was from “another time and another era.” 
November 8  Bush won the presidency. 
1988 
December 7 
At United Nations, Gorbachev announced troop reductions and 
held brief meeting at New York’s Governor’s Island with Reagan 
and Bush. 
Table 4.3 Gorbachev and the Bush Administration (1990–1991): Gorbachev’s 
Reassurance Strategy and Bush’s Acceptance  
February 4 Massive pro-democracy demonstrations were held in Moscow and elsewhere. 
1990 
June 1-3 Gorbachev and Bush had a summit meeting in Washington.  
July 31 The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed.  
August    
19-21 
Hard-liners in the Soviet leadership launched the August coup and 





Gorbachev resigned as a president of the Soviet Union, which 
officially ceased to exist.  
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B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV): THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
REASSURANCE STRATEGY (GORBACHEV’S REASSURANCE 
STRATEGY) 
1. Coexistence or Security Guarantee 
Question 1: Did Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy communicate its 
willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to the 
United States? 
a. Gorbachev’s Willingness for Coexistence 
Gorbachev tried to communicate the Soviet Union’s willingness to accept 
coexistence at every opportunity. Gorbachev wanted to reform the Soviet Union. For the 
success of his reforms, he communicated that his policies toward the United States were 
based on the concept of peaceful coexistence and that he would seek to reassure the 
United States of his benign intentions. Gorbachev emphasized the importance of 
coexistence and tried to communicate his willingness to accept coexistence consistently. 
When Gorbachev met Vice President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State George 
Schultz, and Ambassador Arthur Hartman in the Kremlin on March 13, 1985, he 
expressed his willingness to accept coexistence with the United States. Gorbachev said: 
The USSR has no expansionist ambitions….The USSR has never intended 
to fight the United States and does not have any intentions now. There 
have never been such madmen in the Soviet leadership, and there are none 
now. The Soviets respect your right to run your own country the way you 
see fit….As to the question of which is the better system, this is something 
for history to judge.802  
In the same month of 1985, Gorbachev sent his first letter to Reagan and 
reemphasized his acceptance of coexistence with the United States: 
Our countries are different by their social systems, by the ideologies 
dominant in them. But we believe that this should not be a reason for 
animosity. Each social system has a right to life, and it should prove its 
advantage not by force, not by military means, but on the path of peaceful 
                                                 
802 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold 
War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 338.  
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competition with the other system. And all people have the right to go the 
way they have chose themselves, without anybody imposing his will on 
them from outside.803  
Reagan responded warmly and sent Congressman Thomas P. (“Tip”) 
O’Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Moscow. Gorbachev then expressed 
his acceptance of peaceful coexistence to O’Neill. Gorbachev said, “A fatal conflict of 
interest between our countries is not inevitable. There is a way out, namely, peaceful 
coexistence, the recognition that each nation has the right to live as it wishes. There is no 
other alternative.”804 In 1986, Gorbachev reiterated, peaceful coexistence must “become 
the supreme and universal principle of interstate relations.” 805  Gorbachev also 
emphasized that he had no intention to attack any allies of the United States. He said, 
“Never, under any circumstances, will our country begin military operations against 
Western Europe unless we and our allies are attacked by NATO! I repeat, never!”806  
When Reagan visited Moscow between May 29 and June 1, 1988, 
Gorbachev proposed to the United States a joint proscription of military force based on 
the concept of coexistence. His proposal stated:  
…the two leaders believe that no problem in dispute can be resolved, nor 
should it be resolved, by military means. They regard peaceful coexistence 
as a universal principle of international relations. Equality of all states, 
noninterference in internal affairs, and freedom of sociopolitical choice 
must be recognized as the inalienable and mandatory standards of 
international relations. (Emphasis added)807  
                                                 
803 Leffler, For the Soul, 377.  
804 Mikhail Gorbachev, On My Country and the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 
181; Reagan to Gorbachev, April 4, 1985, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State, USSR, box 39, 
RRPL, quoted in Leffler, 378. 
805 Political Report of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, February 
25, 1986, FBIS, March 28, 1986, O 33, O 29, quoted in Leffler, 389. 
806 Gorbachev, Perestroika, 203.  
807 Memorandum of Conversation, May 29, 1988, box 3, End of Cold War Collection, NSA, quoted in 
Leffler, 418–9 and Washington Post, “Gorbachev’s ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ Draft; Final Text,” June 2, 1988, 
A24.  
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In December 1988, in his United Nations address, Gorbachev emphasized again 
“peaceful coexistence” and each country’s “freedom of choice” of social system.”808  
b. The Meaning of Gorbachev’s Coexistence  
Gorbachev’s concept of coexistence reflected the recognition of the 
economic problems that had developed under socialism in the Soviet Union. He believed 
that peaceful coexistence was necessary to implement his reforms. Peaceful coexistence 
had been used by previous Soviet leaders and the meaning changed depending on the 
leader and the situation. Some scholars analyzed the concept of Gorbachev’s meaning of 
coexistence by comparing it with Khrushchev’s or Brezhnev’s.  
According to William H. Luers, Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence had 
the notion that “while the United States and the Soviet Union should not go to war or 
interfere in one another’s internal affairs, the rest of the world was free game; the ‘class 
struggle’ and ‘ideological struggle’ would intensify to hasten the inevitable triumph of 
socialism. And war, although not ‘inevitable,’ still was a means of bringing about the end 
of capitalism.”809 George Kennan analyzed Khrushchev’s address and concluded that 
“So long as the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continue to hold that 
truth is what is useful to the interests of the Party that people should believe, regardless of 
how preposterous or absurd this may be in the light of objective evidence…even those 
people in other parts of the world who might most earnestly wish for coexistence as Mr. 
Khrushchev has defined it will have to put restraints on their hopes and expectations.”810  
Later, the concept of peaceful coexistence was used to justify the Brezhnev Doctrine that 
required “‘socialist’ states to stay ‘socialist.’” 811  According to Jack F. Matlock, Jr., 
“‘Peaceful coexistence was supposed to apply only to ‘states with different social 
                                                 
808 Address by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 43rd U.N. General Assembly Session, December 7, 1988, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/1988-1107.Gorbachev.pdf (accessed on October 
28, 2009).   
809 William H. Luers, “Gorbachev Cleans up a Cliché Khrushchev’s ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ Was a 
Ruse,” Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1988, 8.  
810 George F. Kennan, “Peaceful Coexistence,” Foreign Affairs 38, no. 2 (January 1960): 190.  
811 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random 
House, 2004), 307. 
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systems.’ This allowed ‘socialist states’ to follow a different principle in relations with 
each other, such as invading a neighbor to ‘preserve socialism.’”812     
In contrast, Gorbachev’s “peaceful coexistence” had a different meaning 
because it was not a form of class struggle or ideological struggle followed by revolution 
or war. It was to be understood as a factor of different circumstances. Gorbachev 
considered capitalism as a rival to compete against not an enemy to eliminate. Luers says, 
“The certitude and ideological arrogance of Khrushchev is muted. Gorbachev is a true 
believer but he does not daily preach the triumph of communism. In fact, much of his 
book and his daily message to the Soviet people is that socialism is a mess and needs 
fixing.” 813  Gorbachev thought that peaceful coexistence with the United States was 
necessary to focus on his reform and make Soviet socialism stronger.    
Consequently, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was implemented with 
the continuous expression of Gorbachev’s willingness to accept coexistence with the 
United States to implement his reforms and win in the competition against capitalism.  
2. Incentives for Use of Gorbachev’s Reassurance Strategy  
Question 2: What was the incentive for Gorbachev’s use of a reassurance 
strategy?  
Gorbachev faced external and internal difficulties when he took office. When he 
decided to accept the position of General Secretary in March 1985, he said, “We can’t go 
on living like this.”814 To overcome those difficulties, he needed to start a reassurance 
strategy through arms control rather than a deterrence strategy through arms buildup. 
Externally, the primary concern was the nuclear threat. The increased tension with the 
United States during the first Reagan administration raised the possibility of war, 
especially nuclear war. These circumstances brought Gorbachev to embrace “new 
                                                 
812 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 298. 
813 Luers, “Gorbachev Cleans up.” 
814 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its 
Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 187. Also, see Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a 
New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991, updated ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 111.   
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thinking (novoye mishleniye)” in foreign policy. The Chernobyl accident confirmed his 
beliefs about the dangers of nuclear war. Also, the difficult situation in Afghanistan 
motivated him to consider a reassurance strategy. The Soviet Union could not continue 
that war and needed to consider a new solution. 
Internally, a difficult economic situation was another incentive. Also, the Soviet 
Union had social problems such as corruption. Gorbachev introduced perestroika 
(restructuring) for the economic and social development of the Soviet Union. For the 
success of perestroika, Gorbachev needed to reduce the burden of defense and improve 
the relationship with the United States. Gorbachev acknowledged those problems, which 
he described as “an avalanche of problems.”815 He wrote in his memoirs: 
On taking office as General Secretary in 1985 I was immediately faced 
with an avalanche of problems. It was vital to change our relationship with 
the West, particularly the United States, and to bring the costly and 
dangerous arms race to an end. We needed to withdraw from the 
damaging and costly war in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union faced 
tremendous internal problems. The process of reform required new 
leadership and courage. Long term problems needed to be addressed as 
soon as possible.816 
a. External Problems: The Nuclear Threat and Difficulty in 
Afghanistan 
Gorbachev reevaluated the nuclear threat and concluded that nuclear war 
could not be won and the arms race would increase tension rather than bring stability. 
Gorbachev argued that his peace proposals were motivated by his understating that world 
peace could only be achieved by mutual understanding and reciprocity, especially 
cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the 27th Party Congress 
from February 25 to March 6, 1986, Gorbachev pointed out his view on security issues 
such as the nuclear threat. Gorbachev gave a report at the Party Congress which 
contained the following statements: 
                                                 
815 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Bantam Book, 1997), 219. 
816 Ibid. 
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The policy of all-out struggle and military confrontation does not have a 
future….The arms race, like nuclear war itself, cannot be won….We must 
follow a path of co-operation to create a comprehensive system of 
international security….Therefore, security is a political problem, and it 
can be solved only by political means.817   
The Chernobyl nuclear accident on April 26, 1986, was a significant event 
that allowed Gorbachev to really experience a nuclear radiation disaster. Gorbachev’s 
beliefs about the necessity of arms control, especially the reduction of nuclear weapons, 
became more consolidated. Gorbachev said, in a televised address, that “what an abyss 
will open if nuclear war befalls mankind. For inherent in the nuclear arsenals stockpiled 
are thousands upon thousands of disasters far more horrible than the Chernobyl one.”818 
On May 5, Gorbachev also told the Politburo that “In one moment, we felt what a nuclear 
war is.”819 Also, on May 28, in a secret speech at the Foreign Ministry, Gorbachev 
solicited all possible efforts of the diplomats to “stop the nuclear arms race.”820 David E. 
Hoffman pointed out, “Gorbachev, who in January called for the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons, suddenly was faced with a real-time, catastrophic example of what the 
world might be like after a nuclear explosion, and it was even more frightening than he 
could have guessed.”821  
The difficult situation in Afghanistan was another incentive for his 
reassurance strategy. On November 13, 1986, Gorbachev told the Politburo:  
We must not waste time! We have been fighting for six years! Some say, 
if we continue the same way, it may be going on for another 20 or 30 
years. And this is what’s going to happen. People have raised the question: 
are we going to stay there forever? Or should we end this war? If we don’t 
it will be a complete disgrace. Our strategic goal is to wrap up the war in 
one, maximum two years, and pull out the troops.822 
                                                 
817 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 237–8.  
818 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 252.  
819 Ibid.  
820 Ibid.  
821 Ibid., 247.  
822 Ibid., 274.  
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Before Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985, the number 
of Soviet troops killed in action in Afghanistan was more than 9,000 and about 230,000 
troops were wounded or ill.823 During the first two years after Gorbachev took office, the 
situation in Afghanistan had not improved. From May 1985 to December 1986, 2,745 
soldiers died and more than 100,000 troops were wounded.824 In the 27th Party Congress, 
Gorbachev described the war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.”825  
Gorbachev needed a new approach to change this situation. His beliefs 
about the nuclear threat and the difficulties in Afghanistan inspired him to adopt and 
implement “new thinking (novoye mishleniye).” Fundamentally, this concept recognized 
the importance of peaceful coexistence and pursued a more cooperative approach, such as 
arms control, rather than a competitive one of the arms race to reduce the nuclear threat. 
Peter Zwick summarized Gorbachev’s “new thinking”: 
1. Peaceful coexistence must continue in a “civilized” and “polite” 
manner. 
2. The USSR can no longer seek to preserve its security solely through 
military power. Political means must also be employed.  
3. There is nothing to be gained from a military conflict with the United 
States.  
4. Traditional nuclear deterrence theories must be replaced by nuclear 
disarmament. 
5. There is little chance for socialist transformation in the West; if it does 
occur it will probably be peaceful. 
6. A comprehensive system of international security based on mutual 
security achieved by political agreement must replace the current system 
of security based on military competition.826  
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 301
Gorbachev reemphasized the motives behind his reassurance strategy 
through “new thinking” in his book, Perestroika. Gorbachev said, “Soviet leaders are 
vigorously seeking to translate this new thinking into action, primarily in the field of 
disarmament. This is what prompted the foreign policy initiatives we have honestly 
offered the world.”827 Gorbachev continued to express his aversion to nuclear war and 
the necessity of arms control in his speeches. In his address to the International Forum in 
1987, Gorbachev said, “We made ourselves face the fact that the stockpiling and 
sophistication of nuclear armaments means that the human race has lost its immortality. It 
can be regained only by destroying nuclear weapons.”828 Gorbachev also explained that 
the reason for his reassurance strategy was to avoid the dangerous situation in the world 
with the possibility of war, especially nuclear war. Gorbachev said, “…the Soviet 
leadership came to the conclusion that the situation in the world was too dangerous to 
allow us to miss even the slightest chance for improvement and for more durable peace. 
We decided to try by persuasion, setting an example and demonstrating common sense, 
so as to reverse the dangerous course of events.”829 
Also, in his speech at a dinner in honor of Margaret Thatcher, he said, 
“deterrence is a policy of blackmail and threats…[which] means subordination of politics 
to the interests of militarism.”830 In sum, external problems such as the nuclear threat and 
the difficulties in Afghanistan provided Gorbachev with incentives to consider a 
reassurance strategy because international stability and peace were necessary for 
Gorbachev to achieve his primary goal of making the Soviet Union better through reform.  
                                                 
827 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: 
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b. Internal Problems: Economic Stagnation and Political Problems  
In addition to external problems, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was 
motivated by internal problems. Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet Union had serious 
economic and political problems and that tensions with the United States would not help 
solve them. Gorbachev thought that Soviet Communism was in danger because the 
Soviet economy was in such a bad condition. For the success of economic recovery, he 
thought it was necessary to shift resources from defense to the civilian economy. A 
continuous arms race would have been a burden to economic recovery. Matlock pointed 
out that “Gorbachev was eager for progress in controlling arms since it was plain that the 
Soviet economy was suffering from the overwhelming burden of military spending.”831 
Gorbachev expressed his idea in the meeting with President Reagan at Reykjavik, Iceland. 
“Our goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race. If we do not accomplish it,…[w]e 
will be pulled into an arms race that is beyond our capabilities, and we will lose it, 
because we are at the limits of our capabilities.”832  
Gorbachev wanted to make agreements on arms control that would enable 
him to reduce defense spending and use the monies for economic development. 
Gorbachev said, “If we don’t back down on some specific, maybe even important issues, 
if we won’t budge from the positions we’ve held for a long time, we will lose in the 
end….We will be drawn into an arms race that we cannot manage. We will lose, because 
right now we are at the end of our tether.”833  
Gorbachev believed that Soviet politics should focus on internal problems 
rather than external problems. He recognized that socialism was in danger because Soviet 
internal politics were in bad shape. Continuous involvement abroad was a burden to 
revitalizing socialism. As Leffler explains, “Gorbachev’s concern was revitalizing 
socialism at home, not spreading it abroad.”834 Leffler also points out, “…to make reform 
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work at home, he needed to reassure the United States that the Kremlin was not seeking 
to take advantage of local strife and regional disputes to expand Soviet influence.”835 
The Chernobyl nuclear accident showed not only the danger of nuclear 
weapons but also the internal problems within the Soviet system. Nobody knew what to 
do after the accident. The information was not reported to leadership. Some basic steps, 
such as issuing protection gear to emergency personnel, making announcements to the 
people and arranging evacuation of the population were not executed. Gorbachev’s 
emphasis on reform grew significantly after the Chernobyl accident. In a secret speech at 
the Foreign Ministry on May 28, Gorbachev urged the diplomats to push the effort to 
“stop the nuclear arms race.” 836  And, at the Politburo meeting on July 3, 1986, 
Gorbachev said: 
Chernobyl happened and nobody was ready—neither civil defense, nor 
medical departments, not even the minimum necessary number of 
radiation counters. The fire brigades don’t know what to do! The next day, 
people were having weddings not far away from the place. Children were 
playing outside. The warning system is no good! There was a cloud after 
the explosion. Did anyone monitor its movement?837   
Consequently, Gorbachev recognized and wanted to solve external and 
internal problems. For that, a reassurance strategy toward the United States was necessary. 
Gorbachev believed that the success of reassurance could achieve security and create an 
opportunity to solve the Soviet economic and political problems. Gorbachev revealed his 
incentives in his memoirs. He said, “Fate had decided that, when I became head of state, 
it was already obvious that there was something wrong in this country….The reason was 
apparent even then—our society was stifled in the grip of a bureaucratic command 
system. Doomed to serve ideology and bear the heavy burden of the arms race, it was 
strained to the utmost.”838 
                                                 
835 Leffler, For the Soul, 409. 
836 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 252, referring to Mikhail Gorbachev, Gody Trudnykh Reshenii [Years of 
Difficult Decisions] (Moscow: Alfa-print, 1993), 46–55.  
837 Chernyaev, My Six Years, 66. Also see V Politburo, 61–66.  
838 Gorbachev, Memoirs, xxxiv.  
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3. Implementation of Reassurance Strategy 
Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did the Soviet 
Union offer to the United States during the Gorbachev era? 
Gorbachev implemented his reassurance strategy through all five reassurance 
methods identified by Stein—restraint, norms of competition, irrevocable commitment, 
limited security regimes and reciprocal strategy like GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in 
Tension Reduction). However, GRIT, restraint, and irrevocable commitment at summit 
meetings were the most significant and the other two strategies are included within those 
three. 
a.  Reassurance Through Reciprocity: GRIT (Graduated 
Reciprocation in Tension Reduction) 
The main idea of Charles Osgood’s GRIT is that a sending state 
implements continuous conciliatory actions to a receiving state, even without immediate 
reciprocation, as a way to eventually convince the other side that it is possible to reduce 
tensions and avoid war. Despite rejections from the United States in the early stages of 
Gorbachev’s tenure, Gorbachev continued his reassurance strategy. The typical examples 
of Gorbachev’s GRIT strategy were unilateral nuclear weapons moratoriums and their 
continuous extension.  
Gorbachev’s continuous announcements of nuclear-related moratoriums 
between 1985 and 1987 are good examples of reassurance through restraint. They are 
also examples of reassurance through GRIT because the series of actions were publicly 
announced in advance and carried out, regardless of the United States’ reciprocation or 
lack of it. Even though the Reagan administration kept ignoring Gorbachev’s actions and 
rejecting his demands, Gorbachev extended his nuclear testing moratorium in January, 
March, and August 1986, and January 1987. 839  Gorbachev’s unilateral nuclear 
moratoriums and their extensions are summarized in Table 4.4. 
                                                 
839 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT, 1985-89: Did Arms Control Succeed because of 
Unilateral Actions or in Spite of Them?” Contemporary Security Policy 15, no. 1 (April 1994):68–79.  
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Table 4.4 The Unilateral Nuclear Moratorium and Its Continuous Extension.840  
Year Month Major Unilateral Actions 
April Gorbachev announced a temporary moratorium on INF missile deployment. 
1985 
August Gorbachev imposed a unilateral nuclear test moratorium to the end of the year. 
January Gorbachev extended a test moratorium to the end of March. 
March Gorbachev extended the test moratorium to August. 1986 
August Gorbachev extended the test moratorium to the end of the year. 
1987 January Gorbachev extended the test moratorium until the next U.S. nuclear test (which was held in late February) 
The first case was Gorbachev’s announcement of a moratorium on 
deployments of further SS-20 missiles until November 1985. Gorbachev made an 
announcement in April 1985 and invited reciprocation from the United States by saying 
that that he would continue a moratorium “if the United States would stop placing 
Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe.” 841 By making an announcement before 
acting, Gorbachev gave the United States time to evaluate his intention. The United 
States rejected the offer because the Reagan administration wanted to “modernize its 
nuclear armoury to strengthen its bargaining position in arms control talks or future 
crises,” 842  and they believed that “Gorbachev wanted to freeze a ten-to-one Soviet 
advantage in this class of weaponry.”843  
                                                 
840 Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT, 1985-89,” 78 and Appendix. 
841 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 116.  
842 Alan R. Collins, “GRIT, Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War,” Review of International Studies 
24 (1998): 204.  
843 Ibid.  
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The more significant case was a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, 
announced in April 1985. After that, Gorbachev extended the testing moratorium four 
times. However, the Reagan administration did not reciprocate Gorbachev’s actions 
because American officials believed that the Soviet Union did not need to test for a while 
after recent tests, and there was difficulty in detecting low-yield underground tests.844 
Also, American officials remembered that Khrushchev broke an earlier test moratorium, 
even though President John Kennedy had halted testing.845 Therefore, the United States 
continued its test program. The Soviets abandoned their moratorium after a U.S. nuclear 
test in February 1987. 
However, Gorbachev’s persistence with a unilateral nuclear moratorium 
was not a total failure. It was a significant turning point in the Soviet-U.S. relations. 
According to Matthew Evangelista, the first signal was the unilateral test moratorium and 
on-site monitoring. Evangelista points out, “Yet this initiative marked the beginning of a 
turning point. The Soviet unilateral test moratorium continued for 19 months without U.S. 
reciprocation, making the point (especially to Soviet domestic critics) that it was not 
necessary for the USSR to keep pace with the United States in every dimension of their 
security competition.”846  
Gorbachev’s unilateral nuclear moratorium did begin to change both the 
Reagan administration’s and American public’s perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet 
Union. It also began to influence alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman said, “Gorbachev’s initiative did 
succeed in promoting a peaceful image of the Soviet Union among the American public 
and among U.S. allies, as well as among a few Reagan administration officials.”847 In 
sum, Gorbachev’s first implementation of reassurance strategy was the nuclear 
                                                 
844 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 116.  
845 Ibid.  
846 Mattew Evangelista, “Turning Points in Arms Control,” in Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, 
Causation, and the Study of International Relations, eds., Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 84.  
847 Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World 
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 121.  
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moratorium. Even though it did not result in an immediate positive response from the 
United States, it provided a reason for a new evaluation of Gorbachev and Soviet policy 
in the United States. 
b.  Reassurance Through Restraint 
Gorbachev also implemented his reassurance strategy through restraint. 
The examples of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy through restraint were the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift to a defensive military doctrine. 
(1) The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.  Gorbachev started a 
review of Soviet policy in Afghanistan in April 1985. Then, he announced a partial 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 1986. In April 1988, the Soviet Union and the 
United States signed the UN-mediated Geneva accords, which called for the complete 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989.848   
As explained earlier, the difficulties in Afghanistan were an 
incentive for Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. It was very costly to stay. At the same 
time, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan showed the United States that there was no 
Soviet intention to be expansionist. Gorbachev expressed his intention by saying: 
“Afghanistan could not be considered a socialist country. There were too many non-
socialist characteristics: a multi-party system, tribalism, capitalists, and clerical 
elements.”849 As Andrew Kydd argues, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan “served 
both to reduce Soviet threat to the West and to demonstrate a lack of territorial 
ambitions.” 850  The second summit meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986 further 
influenced Gorbachev’s calculations. Sarah E. Mendelson observes, “Moreover, 
according to several sources, after the summit at Reykjavik, Gorbachev and his advisors 
                                                 
848 Richard K. Herrmann, “Regional Conflicts as Turning Points,” in Ending the Cold War: 
Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations, ed. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard 
Led Lebow (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 62.  
849 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
376.  
850 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 230.  
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came to the conclusion that the United States would not entertain seriously to the idea of 
new political thinking until a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was complete.”851 In 
sum, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan showed that the Soviet Union did not have 
intentions to expand its influence. 
(2) The Shift to a Defensive Military Doctrine.  Gorbachev’s 
change in Soviet military doctrine from offensive to defensive was another example of 
his reassurance strategy. Gorbachev’s announcements of a defense-oriented military 
doctrine are summarized in Table 4.5.The change of the military doctrine was significant 
because it “was the foundation of all the assumptions, goals and preparations of the 
sprawling Soviet defense machine, from frontline troops to the General Staff, from 
research institutes to arms factories.”852  
Table 4.5 Announcement of Defensive Military Doctrine853  
Year Month Major Unilateral Soviet Actions 
1986 February The Soviet Union announced ‘reasonable sufficiency’ principle. 
1987 May 
The Soviet Union promulgated a ‘defensive defense’ doctrine. 
The Soviet Union revealed the defensive Warsaw Pact military 
doctrine.854 
1988 December Gorbachev announced conventional arms/troop reductions in a UN speech.  
January The Soviets announced cuts in defense budget. 
1989 
January At CSCE, Shevardnadze promised to provide the West with data on Soviet forces. 
                                                 
851 Sarah E, Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet 
Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” World Politics 45, no. 3 (April 1993): 356. Mendelson’s interviews: 
Sergey Akhromeev (former chief of the Soviet armed forces, 1984-88, and former senior military advisor to 
Gorbachev, who joined the summit) on January 3, 1991 and Vadim Zagladin (former director, Information 
Department, Central Committee) on December 12, 1990.  
852 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 271. 
853 Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT,” 78 and Appendix. 
854 Voitech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw 
Pact, 1955-1991 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 563–64. 
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Several steps made clear the shift in doctrinal emphasis. First, in 
February 1986, Gorbachev announced that Soviet military forces would be based on the 
principle of “reasonable sufficiency,”855 which meant that “Soviet conventional forces 
should be structured so as to defeat an invasion but not to carry out large-scale offensive 
action.” 856  Gorbachev wrote in Perestroika, “We believe that armaments should be 
reduced to the level of reasonable sufficiency, that is, a level necessary for strictly 
defensive purpose.” 857  Marshal Akhromeyev, the chief of the General Staff, gave a 
lecture on the new doctrine at the Academy of the General Staff in Moscow. 
Akhromeyev announced, “We are prepared to dismantle the mechanism of military 
confrontation with the United States and NATO in Europe.”858 It was a shock to the 
officers. Akhromeyev later said, “While I was speaking, there was absolute silence in the 
hall. The faces reflected incomprehension, bewilderment and alarm.”859  
Even though Gorbachev knew of the complaints from the military, 
he approved the new military doctrine in December 1986. Gorbachev said, “We should 
not become like the generals, who are trying to scare us. They are already hissing among 
themselves: what kind of leadership do we have? ‘They are destroying the defense of our 
country.’ They say that Ogarkov860 is very upset. To him it is just give, give more. 
Cannons should be longer!”861 In a meeting with leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries on 
May 27, 1987, Gorbachev unveiled the defensive doctrine, and a written statement was 
released the following day. At the meeting, Gorbachev revealed his idea for the Warsaw 
Pact’s military doctrine. According to a written statement after the Warsaw Pact meeting 
in East Berlin released on May 28, 1987, the main sentence was that “The military 
                                                 
855 Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT,” 73.  
856 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 291.   
857 Gorbachev, Perestroika, 204.  
858 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 271.  
859 Ibid.  
860 Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was removed as chief of the General Staff in September 1984. He still 
remained in the defense ministry and continued to claim the need to provide advanced technology to the 
military.   
861 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 275.  
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doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is strictly defensive, and starts from the 
point of view that, under current conditions, the use of military force to solve any 
controversial issue is unacceptable.”862 In sum, the changed military doctrine showed the 
defensive intentions of the Soviet Union. 
The withdrawal from Afghanistan was followed by more Soviet 
troop reductions in other countries. Gorbachev made an announcement of significant cuts 
in Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and Mongolia in a UN speech on December 8, 1988. 
Gorbachev said: 
Today, I can report to you that the Soviet Union has taken a decision to 
reduce its armed forces. Within the next two years their numerical strength 
will be reduced by 500,000 men….By agreement with our Warsaw Treaty 
allies, we have decided to withdraw by 1991 six tank divisions from East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to disband them….Soviet 
forces stationed in those countries will be reduced by 50,000 men and 
their armaments, by 5,000 tanks….By agreement with the government of 
the Mongolian People’s Republic a major portion of Soviet troops 
temporarily stationed there will return home.863  
Also, Gorbachev made an announcement of force cuts in the Nordic region in November 
1989. In sum, the Soviet force reductions in Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and the Nordic 
region showed that the Soviet Union did not have intentions to expand its influence to 
other countries in line with its non-offensive defense posture.  
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift to a 
defensive military doctrine can also be interpreted as part of larger GRIT strategy. Even 
though it is not clear that Gorbachev was cognizant of the GRIT strategy, he followed the 
                                                 
862 Mastny and Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? 563–64. Also, refer to Parallel History Project on 
Cooperative Security (PHP), “Pubic Statement on the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact,” 
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=19204&navinfo=15697 (accessed on 
November 30, 2009). 
863 Associated Press, “The Gorbachev Visit; Excepts from Speech to U.N. on Major Soviet Military 
Cuts,” New York Times, December 8, 1988,  http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/08/world/the-gorbachev-
visit-excerpts-from-speech-to-un-on-major-soviet-military-cuts.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed on 
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main elements of GRIT.864 For example, when he took actions, the series of actions were 
publicly announced in advance. Along with the announcement of actions, Gorbachev 
included an explicit invitation for the United States to reciprocate. The announced series 
of actions were carried out regardless of the reciprocity of the United States. Gorbachev 
showed his intention to reduce the Soviet capability for retaliation. The act of 
reciprocation by the adversary was rewarded with an incremental increase in cooperation, 
such as Gorbachev’s UN speech in 1988 after the ratification of INF treaty by the United 
States. Finally, even though nuclear weapons were Gorbachev’s main concerns, his 
initiatives were diversified in the spheres of action and geographical location.  
c. Reassurance Through Irrevocable Commitment: Summit 
Meetings 
Gorbachev also implemented his reassurance strategy through summit 
meetings. They are examples of reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment 
because Gorbachev tried to reassure the United States of his benign intentions by making 
proposals at summit meetings. Once offered, such proposals could not easily be taken 
back. Summit meetings created an opportunity for the leaders and public of the Soviet 
Union and the United States to understand each other.  
There were five summits between Gorbachev and Reagan: first in Geneva 
in November 1985, second in Reykjavik in October 1986, third in Washington in 
December 1987, fourth in Moscow in May 1988, and a fifth in New York in December 
1988. The first summit in Geneva provided opportunities for Gorbachev and Reagan to 
get to know each other. The first invitation for a summit meeting had been made by 
Reagan. Reagan wanted to invite Gorbachev to the United States to “convince him that 
America was a country of peaceful intent, and furthermore a flourishing democracy 
worthy of emulation.”865 Gorbachev wanted to have a summit meeting because “While  
 
                                                 
864 For the main elements of GRIT, refer to Deborah Welch Larson’s summary of Charles Osgood’s 
GRIT. Refer to Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” International 
Organization, 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 32. 
865 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 125.  
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Gorbachev knew that the meeting in Geneva would not produce an arms control 
agreement, he was looking for reassurance that Reagan was a man he could do business 
with.”866    
However, the second summit was initiated by Gorbachev, who made a 
proposal. After Gorbachev extended the nuclear testing moratorium on August 18, 1986, 
Gorbachev decided to invite Reagan to Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland.867 Gorbachev’s 
advisors such as Chernyaev, a national security advisor, and Akhromeyev, the chief of 
the General Staff, were more cautious and offered some guidelines for what Gorbachev 
should do. However, Gorbachev rejected those guidelines and insisted on more dramatic 
proposals. Gorbachev responded that “Our main goal now is to prevent the arms race 
from entering a new stage. If we don’t do that, the danger to us will increase.”868    
The second summit in Reykjavik was significant because Gorbachev 
showed his commitment to induce a positive response from the Reagan administration 
and understand the different positions between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Gorbachev’s top agenda item for the Reykjavik meeting was “liquidation of nuclear 
weapons,” which was mentioned repeatedly by Gorbachev.869 As Gorbachev planned, he 
made dramatic proposals to Reagan. Gorbachev proposed a “50 percent reduction in what 
he called ‘strategic offensive arms,’” “deep cuts in the giant land-based missiles,” and the 
elimination of “all medium-range missiles in Europe, including the Pioneers and the 
Pershing IIs.”870 When U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and other U.S. officials got 
together at the first break, U.S. arms negotiator Paul Nitze said, “This is the best Soviet 
proposal we have received in 25 years.”871 However, Gorbachev and Reagan could not 
sign any agreement because of their different perspectives on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI). 
                                                 
866 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 155.  
867 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 258–259.  
868 Ibid., 260.  
869 Ibid. 
870 Ibid., 261.  
871 Ibid., 262.  
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Gorbachev’s strategy was to release the discussions to the world in the 
case of failure to convince the Reagan administration.872  Gorbachev said, “If Reagan 
does not meet us halfway, we will tell the whole world about this. That’s the plan. If we 
fail, then we can say—Look, here’s what we are prepared to do!”873 Also, the Politburo 
demanded that “if the Americans rejected the agreements, a compromise in the name of 
peace, we would denounce the U.S. administration and its dangerous policies as a threat 
to everyone around the world.”874 However, Gorbachev did not follow the plan at the 
press conference.  Gorbachev said: 
My intuition was telling me I should cool off and think it all over 
thoroughly. I had not yet made up my mind when I suddenly found myself 
in the enormous press conference room. About a thousand journalists were 
waiting for us. When I came into the room, the merciless, often cynical 
and cheeky journalists were waiting for us. I sensed anxiety in the air. I 
suddenly felt emotional, even shaken. These people standing in front of 
me seemed to represent mankind waiting for its fate to be decided.875 
Gorbachev made rather more optimistic comments to the journalists, “We 
have already reached accord on much. We have come a long way.” 876  In sum, 
Gorbachev’s proposal at Reykjavik was an example of his reassurance strategy through 
irreversible commitment. He had committed the Soviet Union to willingness to make 
deep cuts in the nuclear weapons that most concerned the Reagan administration.  
                                                 
872 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 262.  
873 Ibid., 260.  
874 Ibid., 268.  
875 Ibid., referring to Gorbachev Press Conference, October 14, 1986, BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, SU/8389/A1/1.  
876 Ibid.  
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C. CONDITION VARIABLES (CV): CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
UNITED STATES’ MOTIVATING FACTORS  
1. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations between the 
Soviet Union and the United States 
Circumstances and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
comprise the first step to explore the causal mechanism between Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy and its outcomes, because it affected motivating factors of the 
United States, (CV 2) as well as intervening variables (IntV), such as leaders’ perceptions, 
and domestic and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. The general 
question about circumstances and relations between the two parties is as follows:  
Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States over the time period when Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy was attempted? 
a. Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach): Unfavorable to 
the Soviet Union 
Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the 
“balance of power” between the Soviet Union and the United 
States? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there 
evidence the balance of power affected the calculations of either 
the Soviet Union or the United States? 
(1) Balance of Power between the Soviet Union and the United 
States.  There were vigorous debates in the 1980s about the balance of power between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, especially about the military balance. Reagan and 
other conservatives perceived the military balance had begun to favor the Soviet Union in 
the early 1980s. In the first State of the Union address on February 19, 1981, Reagan 
requested an increase in defense spending to respond to what he described as an 
unfavorable military balance: 
I believe that my duty as President requires that I recommend increases in 
defense spending over the coming years. I know that you’re all aware -- 
but I think it bears saying again -- that since 1970 the Soviet Union has 
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invested $300 billion more in its military forces than we have. As a result 
of its massive military buildup, the Soviets have made a significant 
numerical advantage in strategic nuclear delivery systems, tactical aircraft, 
submarines, artillery, and anti-aircraft defense. To allow this imbalance to 
continue is a threat to our national security.877 
Reagan shared this perception with other conservative officials in 
his administration. Since 1981, the Pentagon had published Soviet Military Power. It 
assessed, until 1986, that the military balance was unfavorable to the United States. 
According to Soviet Military Power in 1981: 
To support the continuing growth and modernization of the armed forces, 
the Soviet Union over the past quarter century has increased military 
expenditures in real terms, devoting an average of 12-to-14 percent of its 
Gross National Product each year to the Soviet military. The estimated 
dollar costs of Soviet military investment exceeded comparable U.S. 
spending by 70 percent in 1979. The defense sector is the first priority of 
Soviet industrial production.878  
Congress initially supported Reagan’s requests for increased 
defense.879 John Collins of the Congressional Research Service was requested by eight 
legislators, five Democrats and three Republicans, to compare the military balance 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1985, he concluded, in U.S.-Soviet 
Military Balance 1980–1985, that “the United States still lags behind the Soviet Union 
after having spent $1 trillion since President Reagan took office in 1981.” 880  The 
American public also believed that the Soviet Union was militarily superior to the United 
States in the early 1980s, but also felt the vast increase in U.S. defense spending had 
                                                 
877 C-SPAN.org, “President Ronald Reagan’s Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
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878 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
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879 Ibid., 188.  
880 New York Times, “Soviet Found Ahead in Arms,” July 28, 1985, A9, referring to John M. Collins, 
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restored U.S. military strength against the Soviet Union by the mid-1980s.881 In sum, the 
dominant perspective in the United States during the first Reagan administration was that 
Soviet military spending had surpassed that of the United States.  
Also, conservatives in the United States estimated that the Soviet 
Union had gained superiority in the ability to deliver nuclear warheads. Many outside 
experts disputed this perspective. They believed the nuclear balance remained essentially 
one of parity, because even after any plausible first strike neither side could escape 
devastation in a nuclear war. Critics of the administration also argued that United States 
had a qualitative edge in conventional military capability. Barry Posen and Stephen Van 
Evera described claims of Soviet military superiority as a myth built on “the ‘Games the 
Pentagon Plays’—false measures that support Pentagon arguments for preferred 
policies.”882 They pointed out three games to mislead the public: 
In the “Numbers Game,” ….Areas of Western numerical or qualitative 
superiority was ignored….The only question that really matters—“Can the 
United States carry out its strategy?”—is not asked…. 
In the “Trend Game,” alarming trends are presented without baseline 
figures or explanations. Thus, we often hear that the U.S. Navy has fallen 
from 1000 ships to less than 500; it is not explained that the Navy shrank 
because many ships built for World War II were finally scrapped in the 
1960s and 1970s and because the Navy shifted from smaller to larger 
ships, so it now builds fewer ships of larger tonnage…. 
In the “Go It Alone Game,” Soviets and American forces are compared 
head to head, as if the United States had no allies and the Soviet Union no 
other enemies.883 
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In addition, while the United States could count on its European 
allies, many experts believed that Moscow could not expect the forces of Warsaw Pact 
countries to remain loyal. Stephen Walt argued that as the power that appeared more 
threatening, the Soviet Union had provoked more balancing behavior against it. 884 
Therefore, from Walt’s perspective, the United States already enjoyed considerable 
advantages in the early 1980s. Walt showed the distribution of capabilities in 1982 
between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies by comparing 
population, gross national product (GNP), size of armed forces, and defense expenditure 
(Table 4.6). Walt believed the bottom row most accurately reflected likely alignments, 
and it showed the United States and its allies ahead on every traditional measure of 
military power. 
Table 4.6 Ratios of Capabilities between the American and Soviet Alliance 
Networks885 
Coalitions Population GNP Size of Armed Forces Defense $ 
(U.S.+ Allies) /  
(U.S.S.R + Allies) 2.25 3.26 0.99 1.17 
(U.S.+ Allies + PRC) /  
(U.S.S.R + Allies + India) 1.81 3.30 1.32 1.30 
(U.S.+ Allies + PRC) /  
(U.S.S.R + Allies) 4.08 3.52 1.49 1.32 
By the mid-1980s, as the Reagan defense buildup had bolstered U.S. capabilities and 
critics had pointed out reasons to discount earlier claims of a Soviet advantage, there was 
not as much rhetoric claiming the military balance favored the Soviets.  
Hence, by the time Gorbachev initiated reassurance, U.S. leaders 
did not seem to fear that the United States would be responding from a position of 
weakness. Even the Pentagon’s annual report, Soviet Military Power, announced that the 
military balance was no longer unfavorable to the United States after 1987. The Soviet 
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Military Power published in 1987 stated, “Increased U.S. defense spending has narrowed 
these differentials, but in critical areas such as R&D, the Soviet costs continue to exceed 
those of the U.S. [emphasis added].”886 In the 1988 Soviet Military Power, the Pentagon 
announced that “In 1987, as a result of the continued growth of the U.S. outlays, 
primarily for procurement, the annual difference in the cost of the military programs was 
virtually eliminated [emphasis added].”887 
(2) Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP).  Soviet 
thinking also evolved, but in the direction of perceiving the Soviet Union as the party 
facing an unfavorable balance. Even though the hard-liners and old thinkers in the Soviet 
Union believed that military power was a primary factor in security and foreign policy, 
the new thinkers recognized that the balance of power had become unfavorable to the 
Soviet Union because of the decline of Soviet economic power. Wohlforth pointed out 
that “The lodestar of the new thinking was de-emphasis of the importance of military 
power.”888 Gorbachev, as the leader of the new thinkers, strongly believed that military 
power was not the main key to Soviet security and foreign policy. Therefore, a broader 
perspective on power that includes the economic foundations of power and the 
perceptions of power in the Soviet Union and the United States is needed to understand 
the balance of power that affected the calculations of the Soviet Union and the United 
States as a whole.  
Military power is only one element of power; economic power 
became more important in understanding change in the balance of power between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. William Wohlforth concluded, “Only in the 
comparisons of military forces could the Soviets claim parity with the United States or 
between socialism and capitalism. If overall economic capabilities were truly to be taken 
as the main determinant of a state’s global position, then Moscow would have to accept a 
                                                 
886 Molly Moore, “U.S., Soviets Equal in Military Spending; Pentagon’s Purchase of Weapons Cited,” 
Washington Post, April 30, 1988, A18. 
887 Ibid.  
888 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 269.  
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world political status on a par with Japan.”889 As in the previous case studies, both 
estimates of GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. dollars and estimates of per capita 
income in U.S. dollars show the balance of power between the two states. In this case, the 
balance of power was unfavorable to the Soviet Union.  
First, data on GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. dollars 
show that the GNP of the United States in 1981 was 3.43 times bigger than that of the 
Soviet Union and the gap was not decreasing. In 1990, the GNP of the United States was 
still 3.74 times bigger. The average ratio of the United States versus the Soviet Union in 
GNP between 1981 and 1990 was 3.76. Power cannot be measured precisely by this 
number, but it does suggest that the balance of power was favorable to the United States. 
GNP at current prices in U.S. dollars is summarized in Figure 4.3:   
 
Figure 4.3 GNP at Current Prices in U.S. Dollars890 
                                                 
889 William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 272.  
890 Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at 
the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama 
(accessed on November 2, 2009) 
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Second, estimates of per capita GNP in U.S. dollars show the same 
results. The United States’ per capita GNP was much greater than that of the Soviet 
Union between 1981 and 1990, as summarized in Table 4.7:  
Table 4.7 Per Capita GNP in U.S. Dollars891 
Year U.S. (U.S. $) USSR (U.S. $) U.S./USSR 
1981 13,323 3,388 3.93  
1982 13,860 3,556 3.90  
1983 14,702 3,646 4.03  
1984 16,314 3,415 4.78  
1985 17,269 3,297 5.24  
1986 17,909 4,023 4.45  
1987 18,933 4,582 4.13  
1988 20,367 5,056 4.03  
1989 21,421 5,223 4.10  
   Avg. 4.29 
(2) The Impact of Unfavorable Balance of Power to the Soviet 
Union on the Calculations of the Soviet Union and the United States.  Gorbachev 
recognized that the Soviet Union could neither maintain the expensive military 
competition against the United States, nor change the balance of power between the 
Soviet Union and the United States by significant economic development in a short time. 
Matthew Evangelista suggests that Gorbachev’s calculations of the balance of power led 
to the reassurance strategy toward the United States. Evangelista argues: 
                                                 
891 Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at 
the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama 
(accessed on November 2, 2009). 
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Gorbachev could afford neither to match SDI nor to maintain the 
expensive nuclear arsenal necessary to defeat it. His only alternative was 
to agree to nuclear reductions and hope that the United States would never 
use its Star Wars shield in combination with its offensive nuclear 
sword.892  
On the other hand, even though the balance of power was 
unfavorable to the Soviet Union, Soviet nuclear weapons represented a serious threat to 
the United States. When Reagan visited the North American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD) in 1979, he was shocked to discover that “the United States lacked any 
defense against even one incoming Soviet missile.” 893  In his autobiography, An 
American Life, Reagan tells how the Strategic Directive Initiative (SDI) was born: 
Early in my first term, I called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our 
military leaders—and said to them: Every offensive weapon ever invented 
by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it; isn’t it possible 
in this age of technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that 
could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they emerged from 
their silos? They looked at each other, then asked if they could huddle for 
a few moments. Very shortly, they came out of their huddle and said, 
“Yes, it’s an idea worth exploring.” My answer was, “Let’s do it.”894 
Reagan’s calculations had not changed that much and were consistent with his 
longstanding ideas. Even though Reagan recognized the disadvantageous economic 
situation of the Soviet Union, the Soviet nuclear threat was a primary security concern. 
Therefore, even though the first Reagan administration perceived 
the military balance had begun to favor the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, the answer 
for the question of what was the “balance of power” between the Soviet Union and the 
United States is that the Soviet Union was in a less favorable position in terms of balance 
of power. Furthermore, the balance of power was becoming more unfavorable to the 
Soviet Union with the vast increase of U.S. defense spending. This situation affected 
Gorbachev’s calculations and Gorbachev implemented the reassurance strategy toward 
                                                 
892 Evangelista, “Turning Points in Arms Control,” 99.  
893 Ibid., 164.  
894 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 547.  
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the United States. However, Soviet nuclear weapons were still serious threats to the 
United States, meaning nuclear arms control would be an important factor in the outcome 
of reassurance.  
b. Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach): No 
Interdependence 
Question 4-b (From the Liberal Approach): What was the level 
of “interdependence” between the Soviet Union and the United 
States? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there 
evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either 
the Soviet Union or the United States?  
As in the two previous case studies, Katherine Barbieri’s and Bruce 
Russett and John Oneal’s approaches are used to measure economic interdependence 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The two models show that there was no 
economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1981 
and 1989.  
(1)  Barbieri’s Model. 895   As shown in Table 4.8, the trade 
share of the Soviet Union in the United States was very low. The average trade share of 
the Soviet Union for the United States between 1981 and 1990 was 0.5%. As shown in 
Table 4.9, the trade share of the United States for the Soviet Union was also low. The 
average trade share of the United States and the Soviet Union was 3.4%. During the 
Gorbachev period, between 1985 and 1990, the average trade share of the United States 
for the Soviet Union was about the same, 3.2%. As shown in Table 4.10, economic 
interdependence was extremely low between 1981 and 1990. The average economic 
interdependence between 1981 and 1990 was only 1.3%. Economic interdependence in 
1986 and 1987 was especially low. It was about 0.8%.  
                                                 
895 Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 36–7. 
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Table 4.8 Trade share of the Soviet Union for the United States896   
 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Year Trade b/t U.S. & USSR Total Trade of U.S. 
Trade Share of USSR for 
U.S. 
1981 3,051.56 507,395 0.006014 
1982 3,098.96 467,386 0.006630 
1983 2,577.69 470,607 0.005477 
1984 4,212.60 559,311 0.007532 
1985 3,107.78 575,027 0.005405 
1986 1,977.96 604,587 0.003272 
1987 2,097.37 677,123 0.003097 
1988 3,683.92 779,252 0.004728 
1989 5,483.10 857,230 0.006396 
   Avg.    0.005395 
Table 4.9 Trade share of the United States for the Soviet Union897   
 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Year Trade b/t U.S. & USSR Total Trade of USSR 
Trade Share of U.S. for 
USSR 
1981 3,051.56 85,977.7 0.035492 
1982 3,098.96 81,250.8 0.038141 
1983 2,577.69 79,465.3 0.032438 
1984 4,212.60 86,393.7 0.048760 
                                                 
896 Barbieri, Katherine, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins. Correlates of War (COW) Project Trade Data 
Set Codebook, Version 2.0, http://correlatesofwar.org, (accessed on May 8, 2009).  
897 Ibid.  
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Year Trade b/t U.S. & USSR Total Trade of USSR 
Trade Share of U.S. for 
USSR 
1985 3,107.78 98,236.5 0.031636 
1986 1,977.96 94,988.7 0.020823 
1987 2,097.37 100,612.8 0.020846 
1988 3,683.92 111,094.2 0.033160 
1989 5,483.10 117,618.8 0.046618 
   Avg.    0.034213 
Table 4.10 Trade salience, symmetry, and economic interdependence between the 
Soviet Union and United States 
Year Trade salience Trade symmetry Economic Interdependence 
1981 0.01461  0.97052  0.01418  
1982 0.01590  0.96849  0.01540  
1983 0.01333  0.97304  0.01297  
1984 0.01916  0.95877  0.01837  
1985 0.01308  0.97377  0.01273  
1986 0.00825  0.98245  0.00811  
1987 0.00804  0.98225  0.00789  
1988 0.01252  0.97157  0.01216  
1989 0.01727  0.95978  0.01657  
Average 0.01357  0.97118  0.01316  
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(2) Russett and Oneal’s Method.898  As shown in Table 4.11, 
trade dependence of the Soviet Union and the United States was very low. As a result, 
economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States was low and 
the average between 1981 and 1990 was less than 0.1 %. In short, interdependence was 
not a factor in this case.  























1981 3,051.56 906,864 0.003365 3,105,400 0.000983 
1982 3,098.96 959,948 0.003228 3,229,500 0.000960 
1983 2,577.69 993,048 0.002596 3,508,800 0.000735 
1984 4,212.6 938,264 0.004490 3,902,600 0.001079 
1985 3,107.78 914,118 0.003400 4,187,500 0.000742 
1986 1,977.96 1,126,234 0.001756 4,427,700 0.000447 
1987 2,097.37 1,295,133 0.001619 4,702,100 0.000446 
1988 3,683.92 1,442,175 0.002554 5,063,900 0.000727 
1989 5,483.1 1,501,939 0.003651 5,441,700 0.001008 
Avg. 3,255 1,119,747 0.002962 4,174,356 0.000792 
                                                 
898 Russett and Oneal, “Classical Liberals Were Right,” 275. 
899 Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at 
the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama 
(accessed on October 20, 2009). GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP). 
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c. Identity (from the Constructivist Approach): Rise of a New 
Identity 
Question 4-c (From the Constructivist Approach): To what extent 
was there a shared identity between the Soviet Union and the 
United States? Was the degree of shared understanding changing 
and if so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity 
affected the calculations of either the Soviet Union or the United 
States? 
There was an identity shift from enemy (Hobbesian culture) to rivalry 
(Lockean culture) between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s.  This 
means they recognized each other as sovereign states and agreed to coexist. Hobbesian 
culture is based on “the kill or be killed logic.” However, in a Lockean culture, “the live 
and let live logic” is dominant.900  Also, regarding the nuclear issue, the Soviet Union 
and the United States began to have a shared collective identity because both recognized 
the danger of nuclear war. To avoid nuclear war, the Soviet Union and the United States 
needed to change from an “other” or “enemy” identity to a “collective” identity. A shared 
Lockean culture and new collective identity between the Soviet Union and the United 
States affected the calculations of security interests and state behaviors of the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 
(1) Rise of New Identity in the Soviet Union toward the United 
States: From Hobbesian Culture (Enemy) to Lockean Culture (Rival).  The biggest 
difference between the new thinkers and the old thinkers was their consideration of 
identity toward the United States. Gorbachev and other new thinkers considered the 
United States a rival and even a partner that the Soviet Union needed to cooperate with to 
solve the nuclear threat. On the other hand, the old thinkers in the military and the KGB 
saw the United States as an enemy threatening the Soviet Union. The new thinkers gained 
power under Gorbachev’s leadership and this led an identity shift in the domestic politics 
of the Soviet Union.  
                                                 
900 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 279.  
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The main character of Lockean culture is the recognition of the 
coexistence of states. As explained in section II in this chapter, Gorbachev emphasized 
the importance of sovereignty. In 1987, Gorbachev published Perestroika to explain his 
willingness to accept coexistence with the United States. Gorbachev wrote: 
We openly say that we reject the hegemony-seeking aspirations and global 
claims of the United States. We do not like certain aspects of American 
politics and way of life. But we respect the right of the people of the 
United States, as well as that of any other people, to live according to their 
own rules and laws, customs and tastes.901 
Gorbachev emphasized that an image change was necessary for 
better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States: 
We certainly do not need an “enemy image” of America, neither for 
domestic nor for foreign-policy interests. An imaginary or real enemy is 
needed only if one is bent on maintaining tension, on confrontation with 
far-reaching and, I might add, unpredictable consequences. Ours is a 
different orientation.902 
Gorbachev believed that the Soviet Union would not give up 
socialism, but he disavowed any intension to impose the system on others. According to 
Gorbachev:  
Speaking so, I would like to be clearly understood that though we, the 
Soviet people, are for socialism…, we are not imposing our views on 
anyone. Let everybody make his own choice: history will put everything 
in its place.903  
In addition, the shift from Hobbesian culture to Lockean culture 
meant a rise of a new collective identity in the Soviet Union toward the United States. 
According to Wendt:  
                                                 
901 Gorbachev, Perestroika, 12.  
902 Ibid., 216–217.  
903 Ibid., 37.  
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In Lockean culture states identify with each other’s survival, so that “death 
threats” to one are seen as threats to all, but this does not extend to 
identification with each other’s security more generally because in many 
respects it is still a self-help culture.904 
The Soviet Union identified and recognized the “death threats” 
from a nuclear war to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States. The advent of 
Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” is a typical example to show the rise of a new collective 
identity in the Soviet Union. It became the foundation of Soviet foreign policy based on 
the recognition of security threats not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the world as a 
whole, including the United States. According to Robert G. Herman, Gorbachev’s “new 
thinking” had three main ideas:  
First, the existence of the “security dilemma,” wherein measures taken by 
one side to enhance its security are invariably perceived by a would-be 
rival as undermining its own, means that security must be mutual or 
common and cannot be pursued unilaterally.  
Second, resort to force or threats of force is neither an efficacious not a 
legitimate way to resolve interstate conflicts. To ameliorate the security 
dilemma and the pressures propelling states to eschew diplomatic 
solutions, strategies of reassurance must replace or at least supplement 
those based on deterrence threats. [emphasis added]  
And last, class values should be subordinated to “universal human values.” 
Adoption of this idea amounted to a repudiation of Marxism-Leninism’s 
Manichaean worldview of irreconcilable interests between capitalism and 
socialism and thus paved the way for a new international order based on 
shared values.905  
The first idea, the recognition of the security dilemma between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, was one of the main reasons for the rise of a new 
collective identity. The Soviet Union realized that “aggressive Soviet foreign policies 
                                                 
904 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 337.  
905 Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution 
and the End of the Cold War,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity in World Politics, 
ed., Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 271–272, fn.1.    
 329
contributed to Western hostility.” 906  The second idea, the necessity of diplomatic 
solutions, meant that the Soviet Union’s policy toward to the United States moved away 
from the force-oriented strategy under its Hobbesian culture. The third idea, “universal 
human values,” meant that the Soviet Union recognized the conflict with the United 
States not only as the threat to “Self,” but also to “Other,” the United States and to the 
rest of the world. It implied that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States was important in order to protect universal human values. In sum, acceptance of 
coexistence and a more collective identity due to the danger of nuclear war rose in the 
Soviet Union under the Gorbachev leadership.  
(2) Rise of a New Identity in the United States toward the 
Soviet Union: From Hobbesian Culture (Enemy) to Lockean Culture (Rival).  Just as the 
Soviets changed the identity of the United States from simply that of enemy (Hobbesian 
culture), a new identity rose in the United States. In the Soviet Union, even though the 
elite-level identity change was obvious, it was difficult to track the identity changes at the 
mass-level. However, in the United States, both the elite- and mass-level identity changes 
were palpable. Reagan invited Gorbachev to the United States several times before the 
first summit meeting in Geneva. The invitation showed Reagan’s intention to reduce the 
tensions between two countries through negotiation and cooperation. Jack Matlock 
reported, “As his diary entries show, President Reagan was nearly convinced that he 
should accept Gorbachev’s invitation to meet in Moscow. If Secretary Shultz had agreed, 
he almost certainly would have done so.”907 Reagan exchanged letters with Gorbachev 
numerous times, and they had a total of five summit meetings. All these actions were 
based on the recognition of the Soviet Union as a sovereign state rather than an enemy to 
destroy. 
Also, the changes in the mass-level were reflected in numerous 
surveys. Alan Richman said that those survey measures show that “Americans” attitudes 
toward the USSR have changed from deep pessimism and hostility in the early 1980s, in 
                                                 
906 Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” 76.  
907 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 125.  
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the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to one of cautious optimism entering 
the 1990s.”908 The change of American pubic identity toward the Soviet Union, from 
enemy to rival, was obvious in the polls. Roper has asked questions909 about public 
identity toward the Soviet Union on a five-point scale ranging from “close ally” to 
“enemy.” As shown in Table 4.12, there was significant change from enemy identity to 
rival identity.  
Table 4.12 American Identity toward the Soviet Union910 





Jun 1982 1% 3% 10% 40% 40% 6% 
Jun 1983 1 2 8 43 41 5 
May-Jun 1984 1 2 4 40 49 4 
Dec 1985 1 2 9 42 40 6 
May 1987 -- 4 13 44 32 7 
May 1988 1 6 16 40 30 8 
Jul 1989 1 15 27 34 14 9 
Jul 1990 2 20 31 23 10 13 
                                                 
908 Alvin Richman, “Changing American Attitude toward the Soviet Union,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 55, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 135. 
909 Ibid., 143. The questions are like this: “...tell me if you believe the country [the Soviet Union] has 
acted as a close ally of the U.S., has acted as a friend but not close ally, has been more or less neutral 




In 1984, about 49 percent of respondents had considered the Soviet 
Union an “enemy” of the United States. Also, 40 percent termed it “unfriendly.”911 A 
total of 89 percent had a negative identity toward the Soviet Union. However, there were 
significant changes in 1989 and 1990.  Those who rated the Soviet Union as “enemy” 
were only 14 percent and 10 percent in 1989 and 1990, respectively.  
In addition, according to an ABC News poll taken two weeks 
before the 1990 summit, 73 percent of Americans had a favorable image of Gorbachev. It 
was more favorable than Reagan’s. It showed the significant change of the views of the 
American public toward the Soviet Union.912 Despite these American identity changes, 
most Americans still thought that the possibility of disputes or war with the Soviet Union 
existed. As Wendt said, in Lockean culture, “relative military power is still important 
because rivals know that others might use force to settle disputes, but its meaning is 
different than it is for enemies because the institution of sovereignty changes the ‘balance 
of threat.’”913 Even though most Americans perceived that the Soviet Union was no 
longer an enemy or a serious threat, the Soviet Union was still widely seen as “a 
formidable rival for influence in various parts of the Third World.”914 Consequently, 
there was identity change in the United States from Hobbesian culture to Lockean culture 
in the late 1980s.  
2. Condition Variable (CV) 2: The United States’ Mixed and Uncertain 
Motivating Factors 
Question 5: What were the United States’ motivations? Is the United 
States best seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What 
was the Soviet Union’s perception of the United States’ motivations?  
Question 6: Did the Soviet Union and the United States share an aversion 
to war? 
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a. The United States’ “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” 
Motivating Factors: Offensive Motives 
U.S. defense policy in the Reagan years appeared to some to convey 
offensive motivations. The Reagan administration raised military expenditures by 51 
percent for the 1980-1985 years. 915  They planned to spend $1.6 trillion on defense 
between 1981 and 1986 to strengthen military forces.916 In the first defense guidance, the 
Reagan administration indicated it wanted to prepare to fight a nuclear war as a “protracted” 
war, not an all-out totally destructive war.917 Richard Halloran explained: 
The new nuclear strategy calls on American forces to be able to “render 
ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet-allied) military and political power 
structure.” But it goes on to require the assured destruction of “nuclear and 
conventional military forces and industry critical to military power.” 
Those forces must be able to maintain, “through a protracted conflict 
period and afterward, the capability to inflict very high levels of damage” 
on Soviet industry.918 
Several new nuclear weapons, such as MX intercontinental missiles, 
Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, B-1 bombers and cruise missiles were 
developed during this period.919 In the end, the defense budget increased from $171 
billion to $229 billion, roughly 34 percent in real 1982 dollars.920 This was “the largest 
increase in American defense spending since the beginning of the Cold War.”921 
The United States carried out extensive war exercises which the Soviets 
interpreted as evidence of “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. 
During a massive three-carrier battle group exercise code-named FLEETEX 83-1, a 
group of at least six navy planes from the U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Midway flew over 
                                                 
915 Richman, “Changing American Attitude,” 235. 
916 Daniel S. Papp, Loch K. Johnson, and John E. Endicott, American Foreign Policy: History, 
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Zelyony Island in the Kuril archipelago, which is Soviet territory. The Soviets protested 
the flyover of Zelyony Island to the American Embassy in Moscow.922 Also, the KGB 
analyzed all communications 923  during the exercise and claimed that the “Reagan 
administration was continuing preparations for nuclear war.”924 The NATO exercise, 
Able Archer, on November 2–11, 1983, was implemented to train “procedures for a full-
scale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict.”925  
According to the Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical Tables, there 
were continuous budget increases during the two Reagan administrations (Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13 Defense Budget, 1976–1989926 
Year Defense Budget (million dollars) Percentage of GDP 
1980 133,995 4.9 
1981 157,513 5.2 
1982 185,309 5.7 
1983 209,903 6.1 
1984 227,413 5.9 
1985 252,748 6.1 
1986 273,375 6.2 
1987 281,999 6.1 
1988 290,361 5.8 
1989 303,559 5.6 
                                                 
922 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 65. 
923 Jerry Whitworth, the senior chief radioman, who had been spying for the Soviet Union since 1976, 
delivered paper copies of the messages and tape recordings of his observations to the KBG through a ring 
led by John Walker, a navy veteran. 
924 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 67–68, referring to Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: 
Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency, from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 
1995), 472. 
925 Ibid., 94.  
926 White House Office of Management and Budget, “The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical 
Tables,” 51–52, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/hirs of st.pdf (accessed on November 
11, 2009). 
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Consequently, the development of offensive weapons and military 
exercises, and the consistent increase of the defense budget during the first and second 
Reagan administrations implied that the United States had not given up its “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors.   
b. The United States’ “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” 
Motivating Factors: Defensive Motive 
Even though there was some evidence of “greedy” and “opportunity-
oriented” motivating factors, such as the development of weapons and the defense budget 
increase, the Reagan administration did not have only offensive motives. They felt threats 
mostly from the Soviet conventional military power and nuclear weapons.   
(1) Conventional Military Forces.  The United States and 
NATO allies worried about the Soviet conventional military power. The U. S. fear of a 
Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe had been a primary rationale for the 
development of U.S. military power in Europe since the post-war period.927 The United 
States was reluctant to show any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy 
due to the fear of Soviet conventional military forces. According to Matthew Evangelista, 
“the U.S. and NATO have been reluctant to pursue Soviet initiatives that could reduce the 
threat of ballistic missiles, emphasizing the threat rather than prospects of alleviating 
it.” 928  Evangelista also observed, “…throughout the fifteen years of MBFR 929 
negotiations in Vienna the United States insisted that the Soviet Union was superior in 
most important indices of conventional military power (even though anyone could see 
that the Soviet forces suffered one fundamental weakness: their main task was military 
occupation of an involuntary alliance of potentially hostile neighbors).”930  
                                                 
927 Matthew Evangelista, “Exploiting the Soviet ‘Threat’ to Europe,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
43, no. 1 (January/February 1987): 14–18.  
928 Ibid. 16,  
929 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks. For more information, refer to CFE Chronology: 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/chron.htm.   
930 Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, 304.  
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The insecurity of the United States and NATO allies due to Soviet 
conventional forces was from the lack of transparency and data on those Soviet forces. 
Evangelista pointed out, “One of the main stumbling blocks in the negotiations 
themselves was the question of the degree of numerical disparity between NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces; the Soviets would not present sufficient data to convince the West 
that its estimates were too high.”931 
(2) The Strategic Directive Initiative (SDI).  Even though SDI 
was seen as offensive and the most threatening program to the Soviet leadership, it was a 
good example to show the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the 
United States because the Soviet military threat, especially a nuclear threat, was a serious 
threat to the United States. Reagan claimed that SDI was “a purely defensive 
strategy.”932 Reagan’s idea about SDI was initiated by the probable consequences of 
nuclear war against the Soviet Union. On December 22, 1982, Regan asked to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff: “What if we began to move away from out total reliance on offense to 
deter a nuclear attack and moved toward a relatively greater reliance on defense?”933 
Reagan wrote in his diary on February 11, 1983, about the motivation of SDI: 
So far the only policy worldwide on nuclear weapons is to have a 
deterrent. What if we tell the world we want to protect our people, not 
avenge them; that we’re going to embark on a program of research to 
come up with a defensive weapon that could make nuclear weapons 
obsolete?934  
Two weeks after Reagan described the Soviet Union as an evil 
empire, he made an extraordinary proposal, SDI, to protect the United States from any 
attack by the Soviet Union. SDI was the most significant example of Reagan’s military 
buildup. Some $26 billion was spent on research.935 
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The SDI concept rejected the theory of nuclear deterrence and 
asserted the need as well as the technical feasibility to defend the American homeland.936 
Reagan’s plan was based on the idea that “it was better to ‘protect than avenge.’”937 
However, the SDI plan was supported by those who believed that “it could serve 
deterrence.”938 The Soviet Union was disturbed by SDI, and later, Gorbachev would 
agree to no arms reductions without changes in SDI. 
Reagan repeated his “not-greedy” intentions and emphasized the 
importance of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Reagan recalled: 
I wanted to let them know that we realized the nuclear standoff was futile 
and dangerous and that we had no designs on their 
territories….Somewhere in the Kremlin, I thought, there had to be people 
who realized that the pair of us standing there like two cowboys with guns 
pointed at each other’s heads posed a lethal risk to the survival of the 
Communist world as well as the free world. Someone in the Kremlin had 
to realize that in arming themselves to the teeth, they are aggravating the 
desperate economic problems in the Soviet Union, which were the greatest 
evidence of the failure of Communism.939 
In 1982 and 1983, before Gorbachev became the Soviet leader, 
Reagan expressed his intentions to talk with Soviet leaders. Reagan said, “We do not 
insist that the Soviet Union abandon its standing as a superpower or its legitimate 
national interests.”940 Reagan’s letter to Yuri Andropov also showed his intentions: 
You and I share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of 
stability in the world. I believe we can fulfill that responsibility but to do 
so will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore 
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predecessors have made better progress when communicating has been 
private and candid. If you wish to engage in such communication you will 
find me ready. I await your reply.941  
On February 11, 1984, right after the death of Andropov on 
February 9, Reagan wrote a letter to express his hope to elicit cooperation. Reagan said, 
“We do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people.”942 In a 
subsequent letter in April, Reagan expressed his intentions again, “I want you to know 
that neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the 
Soviet people….Our constant and urgent purpose must be…a lasting reduction of 
tensions between us. I pledge to you my profound commitment to that end.”943  
In March 1985, Vice President George H. W. Bush met the new 
Soviet leader, Gorbachev, and expressed the benign intentions of the United States. Bush 
stressed that “neither the American government nor the American people has hostile 
intentions toward you.”944 Those who worked in Reagan’s administration testify that 
Reagan did not have “greedy” intentions toward the Soviet Union. Casper Weinberger, 
the most hawkish person in the Reagan administration, said in 2002, “What he [Reagan] 
needed, what he needed and we were in full agreement on, was to restore our military 
deterrent capability—to get a capability that would make it quite clear to the Soviets that 
they couldn’t win a war against us.” 945  Richard Pipes also said that Reagan had 
emphasized “the importance of compromise with the Soviet leadership” when he drafted 
and showed him NSDD-75.946 Frank Carlucci, who served as Reagan’s national security 
advisor and defense secretary, said, “I don’t think he ever thought of it in terms of 
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bankrupting the Soviet Union or forcing it to collapse. He just saw it as a lousy system, 
and if we could negotiate them into some common sense, they’d change their system.”947 
When James Mann asked West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl whether Reagan had 
intended to topple or bankrupt the Soviet regime, Kohl replied that “No. I don’t think so. 
But he did think that the Soviet Union was simply living above its means.”948  
Consequently, Reagan had “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
motivating factors from the danger of nuclear war against the Soviet Union. He wanted to 
“talk, reduce tensions, promote change in the Soviet Union, discourage Soviet 
adventurism, and, most of all, avoid nuclear war.”949 
c. Mixed Motivations 
The United States wanted to win the competition against the Soviet Union. 
It sought the victory of capitalism over communism. The increase of the military budget 
and development of offensive weapons were part of efforts to expand capitalism and win 
over communism. This shows the “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors 
of the United States. However, this did not mean conquering the Soviet territory or 
forcibly changing the Soviet regime. On the other hand, the military buildup in the United 
States did not guarantee protection from the Soviet military threat, especially from 
nuclear weapons. Also, Soviet conventional forces threatening Western Europe were a 
serious threat to the United States and provided the United States with “not-greedy” and 
“need-oriented” motivating factors.  
Therefore, the United States seemed to have mixed motivating factors 
toward the Soviet Union. Even though there was not a complete change, there was some 
change in motivating factors of the United States from more “greedy” ones in the first 
Reagan administration into more “not-greedy” ones in the second Reagan administration. 
This change helped improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
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d.  The Soviet Union’s Perceptions of the United States’ Motivating 
Factors 
(1) The United States’ “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” 
Motivating Factors: The Hard-liners’ Focus on Threat.  The development of offensive 
weapons, a series of military exercises, the increase of military budgets, and the pursuit 
of SDI by the Reagan administration were serious threats to the Soviet Union and 
interpreted as evidence of “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. These 
perceptions were common among Soviet hard-liners such as the Soviet military, KGB, 
and communist party leaders.  
For example, the Soviet Union was panicked about the deployment 
in Europe of the Pershing II, which could fly at nearly Mach 8 with high-precision 
guidance systems and reach Moscow in six minutes.950 Hoffman said, “The Pershing IIs 
were so worrisome that builders of the Moscow antiballistic missile system were urged to 
alter it to detect and intercept them.”951 Oleg Gordievsky, who was the KGB’s second-
ranking official in the London office and secretly worked for Britain, said in an interview 
with Hoffman that the Soviet leaders “knew they would be the first to die, and don’t want 
to die.”952 Also, the KGB may have misinterpreted the planned exercise, Able Archer ’83, 
as “a real alert.”953 
Conservatives in the Soviet Union considered the shipments of the 
Stinger missiles to mujahideen in Afghanistan as an aggressive and hostile action by the 
United States. According to Mendelson’s interviews with Georgii Arbatov, director of the 
Institute of U.S.A. and Canada (hereafter ISKAN) and Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director 
of ISKAN, “American foreign policy in general, and specially toward Afghanistan, made 
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it more difficult—not easier, he contended—for Soviet foreign policy to change in an 
accommodationist direction.”954 Arbatov claimed that “the arms buildup under Reagan 
did much to fan the flames of the conservatives in the Soviet Union.”955  
Another example was Soviet perceptions of SDI. When Reagan 
made a speech about missile defense in March 1983, Andropov asserted that Reagan was 
“inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of 
winning it.”956 Dmitry Mikheyev argued that SDI threatened the survival of the Soviet 
Union. According to Mikheyev: 
The Soviet leadership is facing a painful dilemma. If SDI proceeds, the 
Party might lose the new technological race—and the ability to carry on its 
political struggle under the umbrella of the nuclear threat. The alternative 
is to restructure radically the Soviet socioeconomic system, by unleashing 
market forces and giving up the Party’s monopoly on the economy and 
information. Both scenarios involve grave political risks, fraught with the 
potential of ultimate political defeat.957  
The pursuit of SDI by Reagan was seen by Gorbachev as evidence 
of Reagan’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. Even though 
Reagan claimed that SDI was a defensive program, Gorbachev believed that SDI was “a 
cover for an offensive, maybe even first strike, strategy.”958  These different perspectives 
on SDI were obstacles to reaching agreements in the first two summit meetings in 
Geneva and Reykjavik, respectively. The dialogue between Gorbachev and Reagan 
during the Geneva summit shows the difference: 
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Gorbachev: If the goal was to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an 
arms race in another sphere? 
Reagan: These are not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these are 
weapons that destroy nuclear missiles. 
Gorbachev: Let’s ban research, development, testing and deployment of 
space weapons, then cut off offensive arms by 50 percent. 
Reagan: Why do you keep speaking about space weapons? We certainly 
have no intention of putting something into space that would threaten 
people on Earth.959 
Gorbachev believed that the United States would not depend 
exclusively on SDI because it could not provide perfect protection for the United States. 
Also, nuclear arms reductions combined with SDI would increase the vulnerability of the 
Soviet Union because SDI would be more effective if there were fewer numbers of 
warheads.960 Peter Zwick said, “In effect, the United States would have a ‘first strike’ 
capability, which means that the U.S. could launch a nuclear attack against the USSR and 
defend against any retaliation. That, in a nutshell, is why Gorbachev opposes SDI.”961  
Gorbachev also expressed his concerns about SDI in Perestroika. 
He wrote: 
We are against SDI, because we are for complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons and because SDI makes the world ever more unstable, because 
the consequences would be unpredictable. Instead of promoting security, 
SDI destroys the remnants of what might still serve security.962 
The Soviet Union, especially conservative hard-liners, believed 
that the United States posed a serious threat to its security, and did have “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors.  
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(2) The United States’ “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” 
Motivating Factors: The Reformers’ Focus on Insecurity.  From the perspective of 
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” about foreign policy, the Cold War was no longer a struggle 
between capitalism and communism. The Soviet Union and the United States could 
become common victims of nuclear war. Gorbachev recognized the insecurity of the 
United States. Therefore, Gorbachev emphasized that the United States could not achieve 
any security without the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wrote in Perestroika, “For all the 
contrary nature of our relationship it is obvious that we can do nothing in terms of 
securing peace without the U.S., and without us the U.S. also will accomplish 
nothing.”963  
Later, in 1987, Gorbachev’s attitude to SDI also changed. He 
announced the unlinking of SDI from the negotiations on INF in Europe. Therefore, the 
INF treaty could be signed after that. According to Alan R. Collins, there were three 
reasons for this change:  
First, Reagan seemed to see the project as a purely defensive system; he 
even offered to sell it to the Soviet Union when it became available. 
Second, the 1983 version appeared technologically impossible, and a point 
defense that could cheaply be overwhelmed appeared the most likely 
outcome of the SDI. Finally, SDI seemed to be Reagan’s ‘pet’ project, and 
another president would not be so attached to it.”964  
Gorbachev’s acceptance of SDI as a defensive system meant that he recognized that SDI 
was initiated by Reagan’s insecurity about nuclear war, which demonstrated the “not-
greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the United States.  
Also, Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet conventional force was 
a serious threat to the United States and West Europe. Gorbachev announced major 
reductions in East Europe in a 1988 UN speech to show his sincerity and reduce the main 
threat to the United States and West Europe. Under Gorbachev, these kinds of  
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perceptions were shared with progressive soft-liners and reformers who acknowledged 
that the United States had an aversion to nuclear war. Without their help, Gorbachev 
could not have implemented his policy.  
e. Aversion to War by the Soviet Union and the United States 
The Soviet Union and the United States, especially the two leaders, 
Gorbachev and Reagan, shared an aversion to war, especially nuclear war. For example, 
the joint statement after the Geneva summit in 1985 said, “…a nuclear war cannot be 
won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the 
U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of 
preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to 
achieve military superiority.”965 Gorbachev and Reagan repeatedly voiced their aversion 
to war after the first summit in Geneva.  
(1) The Soviet Union.  Gorbachev and the Soviet people 
remembered the horrific experience of World War II. Gorbachev remembered from his 
childhood experience that war meant horror and trauma. In his memoirs, Gorbachev 
shared his horrific experience of when he was twelve years old in the spring of 1943: 
…we children roamed through the countryside in search of trophies and 
came to a remote stretch of forest between Provolnoye and the 
neighboring village, Belaya Glina. There we stumbled upon the remains of 
Red Army soldiers, who had fought their last battle there in summer 1942.  
It was an unspeakable horror: decaying corpses, partly devoured by 
animals, skulls in rusted helmets, bleached bones, rifles protruding from 
the sleeves of the rotting jackets. There was a light machine-gun, some 
hand grenades, heaps of empty cartridges. There they lay, in the thick mud 
of the trenches and craters, unburied, staring at us out of black, gaping 
eye-sockets. We came home in a state of shock966 
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Gorbachev’s images of war were widespread in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev said, “I was 
fourteen when the war ended. Our generation is the generation of wartime children. It has 
burned us, leaving its mark both on our characters and on our view of the world.”967  
When Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, he 
remembered the desperation of war and believed that nuclear war should not occur.  He 
said, “Never before has such a terrible danger hung over the heads of humanity in our 
times….The only rational way out of the current situation is for the opposing forces to 
agree to immediately stop the arms race—above all, the nuclear arms race.”968 In his first 
letter to Reagan, Gorbachev expressed his view that the Soviet Union and the United 
States shared an aversion to nuclear war. He said that they were “not to let things come to 
the outbreak of nuclear war which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for 
both sides.”969 Gorbachev also said in 1986, “In the atomic-cosmic era, world war is an 
absolute evil.”970 
Gorbachev and the Soviet people got a reminder of what nuclear 
war would be like from the explosion at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl on April 26, 
1986. Gorbachev said, “It is another sound of the tocsin, another grim warning that the 
nuclear era necessitates a new political thinking and a new policy.”971 Akhromeyev, chief 
of the General Staff, pointed out the enormous impact of Chernobyl on the entire 
country’s view of nuclear danger. Akhromeyev said, “After Chernobyl, the nuclear threat 
stopped being an abstract notion for our people. It became tangible and concrete. The 
people began to see all the problems linked with nuclear weapons much differently.”972  
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(2) The United States.  The aversion to war, especially nuclear 
war, against the Soviet Union was palpable in the United States. First, Reagan had a 
strong aversion to nuclear war and had doubts about the utility of nuclear weapons. Many 
administration officials believed that Reagan had wanted reductions in nuclear weapons 
since his first term. Jeffrey W. Knopf said, “Most former administration officials I 
interviewed contend that Reagan wanted sharp reductions in nuclear weapons from day 
one.”973 Knopf also pointed out, “Reagan himself claims that, soon after he took office, 
as he learned the number of fatalities that a nuclear war would cause, ‘My dream, then, 
became a world free of nuclear weapons.’”974 There were many significant statements by 
Reagan showing his anti-nuclear views from the beginning of his first term. For example, 
former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., also said, “During his first 
press conference as president, on January 29, 1981, Reagan stated that he was in favor of 
negotiating to achieve ‘an actual reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons’ on a basis 
that would be verifiable.”975  
Two weeks after Reagan described the Soviet Union as an evil 
empire, he made an extraordinary proposal, the Strategic Directive Initiative (SDI), to 
protect the United States against any attack by the Soviet Union. Reagan explained that 
he conceived of the SDI “to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by 
strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate 
the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. 
Our only purpose…is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.”976 After 
Regan watched a preview of the ABC movie, The Day After in October 1983, he said, “It 
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is powerfully done and left me greatly depressed.”977 Reagan thought that those who 
claimed a nuclear war “winnable” were crazy.978  
In the State of the Union Address in January 1984, after his 
reelection, Reagan declared again his aversion to nuclear war. He said, “A nuclear war 
cannot be won and must never be fought.”979 Richard Crockatt pointed out that “Reagan 
signaled a historic turn toward a more conciliatory posture toward the Soviet Union in a 
speech of January 1984, well before Gorbachev came to power, promoted by a growing 
horror at the possibility of nuclear war.”980  
Second, the aversion to nuclear war in the American public was 
apparent. The American peace movements were typical examples to show that. The 
nuclear freeze movements originated with a proposal in 1980 by a young disarmament 
researcher, Randall Forsberg, and their consequences were a big surprise. Forsberg was 
not motivated by an actual war, but “by the increased threat of war associated with the 
U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the SALT II arms control agreement that had already been 
negotiated with the Soviet Union, and by Carter’s Presidential Directive 59 that made 
plans for a first strike nuclear war.”981 The main reason for massive support of the 
nuclear freeze was the sharing of this threat from nuclear war. The danger of nuclear war 
led to the formation of collective identity in the United States.  
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D. INTERVENING VARIABLE (INTV): LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS, 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS OF THE SOVIET 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 
1. Gorbachev’s Perceptions of Reagan and the United States 
Question 7: How did Gorbachev perceive Reagan and the United States? 
Is there evidence that common psychological biases led Gorbachev to 
misperceive Reagan? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was 
sufficient to overcome Gorbachev’s cognitive barriers to change his image 
of Reagan and the United States?  
a.  Gorbachev’s Perception Change of Reagan and the United States 
According to Matlock, Gorbachev’s perceptions of Reagan and the United 
States were more distorted than those of Reagan toward Gorbachev before the Geneva 
summit meeting. Matlock describes the Soviet leader’s initial image of his counterpart as 
follows:  
He suspected that Reagan was interested only in stringing him along with 
sweet talk and no substance, using the meeting as cover for an American 
drive to secure military supremacy. He was still being advised that any 
real agreement with Reagan would be impossible, and that the only 
prudent course for the Soviet Union was to continue its confrontational 
policies until U.S. allies woke up to the dangers and pressed Reagan or his 
successor to act more rationally.982  
Gorbachev had strong hostility to SDI. When he met with leaders of the Warsaw Pact on 
October 22, 1985, he said, “They are planning to win over socialism through war or 
military blackmail….Its military nature is obvious….Its purpose is to secure permanent 
technological superiority of the West, not only over the socialist community, but over 
[the U.S.] allies as well.”983  
However, Gorbachev changed his perception of Reagan through the 
summit meetings. Gorbachev met Reagan for the first time in Geneva on November 19, 
1985. Gorbachev was eager to reach an agreement on arms reductions and wanted 
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Reagan to give up SDI. Gorbachev considered SDI an offensive measure to threaten 
Soviet security.984 Even though Gorbachev and Reagan could not reach any agreement, 
they became acquainted with each other and each formed a positive impression. 
Gorbachev came away believing that there was a possibility to improve relations with the 
United States through negotiations with Reagan.985  
Gorbachev remembered how he felt a connection with Reagan at their first 
meeting in Geneva. Gorbachev said, “Somehow, we extended a hand to each other, and 
started talking. He speaks English, I speak Russian he understands nothing, and I 
understand nothing. But it seems there is a kind of dialogue being connected, a dialogue 
of the eyes.”986 However, Gorbachev still expressed his suspicion about the United States 
in the Politburo meeting in September 1986. Melvin P. Leffler summarized Gorbachev’s 
worries based on Chernyaev’s comments:  
He felt he was being tested, squeezed. The Americans “were using our 
sincere desire to disarm [as a tool against us].”987 When the Politburo met 
again on 4 September, Gorbachev poured forth his spleen. The Americans, 
he said, wanted to exhaust the Soviet Union, to keep the Kremlin trapped 
in regional imbroglios, like the one in Afghanistan. They yearned for 
superiority and sought to intimidate. Their aim, he suspected, was to 
undermine perestroika. They did “not want to let us increase the 
dynamism of our system.” They must not be permitted to gain 
superiority.988 
One month later, there was the second summit meeting. Even though the 
Reykjavik summit meeting on October 11–12, 1986, did not reach any agreement, 
Gorbachev considered the Reykjavik meeting as a turning point. According to 
Gorbachev: 
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And still Reykjavik marked a turning point in world history. It tangibly 
demonstrated that the world situation could be improved….At Reykjavik 
we became convinced that our course was correct and that a new and 
constructive way of political thinking was essential.989 
Gorbachev believed that the United States was not aggressive toward the 
Soviet Union. He wrote in Perestroika:  
I will never accept the claim—whatever anyone might tell me—that the 
American people are aggressive toward the Soviet Union. I cannot believe 
that. There are, perhaps, some individuals who are pleased that there is 
tension, confrontation or intense rivalry between our countries. Perhaps 
some people do gain something from it. But such a state of things does not 
meet the larger interests of our peoples.990 
Gorbachev visited Washington on December 8–10, 1987 and signed the 
INF treaty with Reagan. Gorbachev believed that Reagan had changed his attitude toward 
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs, “It seemed to me that during my visit 
Reagan re-appraised many things and succeeded in overcoming some of his own 
stereotypes and misconceptions.”991 
Finally, during Reagan’s visit to Moscow on May 29-June 1, 1988, 
Gorbachev perceived Reagan as a partner to “do business with” rather an enemy against 
which to “fight a battle.” Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs: 
“Mr. Gorbachev deserves most of the credit as the leader of this country,” 
President Reagan replied….For me, Ronald Reagan’s acknowledgement 
was one of the genuine achievements of his Moscow visit. It meant that he 
had finally convinced himself that he had been right to believe, back in 
Reykjavik, that you could “do business” with the changing Soviet 
Union—the hopeful business of preventing a nuclear war.992  
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In sum, Gorbachev changed his perceptions of Reagan and the United 
States from an enemy to a partner, almost a friend, through their personal contacts. This 
was possible because Gorbachev had an open-minded character.   
b. Gorbachev’s Open-minded Leadership Style 
Gorbachev’s reform and changes in the relationship with the United States 
and Europe were possible because Gorbachev had an open-minded leadership style. 
When Archie Brown asked Zdeněk Mlynář993 whether Gorbachev had an open mind, 
Mlynář replied, “Yes, he’s open-minded, intelligent, and anti-Stalinist.” 994  This 
perspective was correct. Victor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the Institute of the USA 
and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Science (ISKAN), pointed out that Gorbachev was 
more interested in policy debate than previous leaders: 
He likes to set up competing explanations and hear them out. Gorbachev 
likes different proposals while Brezhnev and even Andropov wanted to 
hear only their style, their points of views reiterated. They wanted fully 
consistent proposals. Gorbachev likes to be able to compare. When people 
realize this, then there was a switch. People wrote much more open and 
critical assessments of matters.995       
Valerii Sidorov, former aide to Alexander Yakovlev and Evgenii Primakov, also said, 
“…every meeting with the intelligentsia. It is always a two-sided conversation. And 
Gorbachev tends to listen more.”996  
In addition, Gorbachev had more open-minded views on the West than 
any other Soviet leaders. Gorbachev visited Western countries such as Italy, France, 
Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the 1980s and those visits gave him much 
broader perspectives. Robert D. English believes, Gorbachev’s visits to European 
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countries “had an enormous impact on his intellectual evolution.”997 Gorbachev was 
shocked by the openness, better functioning of society and higher standards of living in 
Europe than in the Soviet Union. Quoting Gorbachev, English reports, “Having met 
people ranging from German students and French farmers to Italian workers, the 
‘openness and relaxed, free, and critical discussion’ he encountered ‘shook my faith in 
the superiority of socialist democracy.’”998  
As a result of his exposure to the West and openness to debate, Gorbachev 
did not have psychological biases or cognitive barriers to changing his image of Reagan 
and the United States. In the end, he did change his image of Reagan and the United 
States.  
2. Reagan’s Perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union 
Question 8: How did Reagan perceive Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy? 
Is there evidence that common psychological biases led Reagan to 
discount those reassurance strategies? Or was reassurance implemented in 
a way that was sufficient to overcome Reagan’s cognitive barriers to 
changing his image of the Soviet Union? 
Reagan missed the signs of Gorbachev’s difference from previous Soviet leaders 
at the early stage of the Gorbachev period. As David Hoffman pointed out, that was from 
Reagan’s “deep anti-communism and his long-held ideas about the Soviet system” and 
“lack of good intelligence.” 999  However, Reagan changed his perception of Soviet 
leaders as Gorbachev implemented a reassurance strategy. Gorbachev was a different 
leader from other previous Soviet leaders. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador to the 
United Nations, said Reagan for years believed that Soviet leaders “weren’t reliable 
people, that they were aggressive and expansionist and dangerous. Those were his views, 
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and he maintained those views, I think—until the Gorbachev era.” 1000 According to 
Kirkpatrick, Reagan changed his thinking because of Gorbachev.1001  
Reagan’s attitude toward the Soviet Union actually started changing in 1984 
before Gorbachev came into power, and this initial shift in attitude was eventually 
confirmed by Gorbachev’s policies. Therefore, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was 
sufficient to overcome any remaining cognitive barriers to changing Reagan’s image of 
the Soviet Union. When Reagan met the president of Yugoslavia, Mika Spiljak, at the 
White House on February 1, 1984, he discussed the intentions of the Soviet Union. 
Reagan expressed his change in perceptions toward to the Soviet Union in his diary. He 
wrote: 
He believed that coupled with their expansionist philosophy they are also 
insecure & genuinely frightened of us. He also believes that if we opened 
them up a bit their leading citizens would get braver about proposing 
change in their system. I’m going to pursue this.1002 
This paragraph is significant because it shows that Reagan considered the “not-
greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the Soviet Union and pursuit of a new 
approach as a result.   
a. Reagan’s Perception Change of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union 
The 1985 selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union 
contributed to changes in Reagan’s perception about Soviet leaders and the U.S. 
perception of the Soviet Union.  
(1) Reagan’s Doubts Early in the Gorbachev Era.  In 1985, 
Reagan believed that all Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, were alike because the 
Soviet monolithic communist system could not change.1003 Reagan said that “I can’t 
claim that I believed from the start that Mikhail Gorbachev was going to be a different 
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sort of Soviet leader. Instead, as this note in my diary five weeks after he became general 
secretary of the Communist Party indicates, I was wary.” 1004  Reagan met U.S. 
Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Harman and wrote in his diary on April 19, 1985: “He 
[Hartman] confirms what I believe that Gorbachev will be tough as any of their leaders. If 
he wasn’t a confirmed ideologue he never would have been chosen by the Polit beaureu 
[sic] [Politiburo].”1005  
Shortly before the first summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in 
Geneva in November 1985, Reagan dictated his thoughts to his secretary. The comments 
show Reagan still thought about Gorbachev in traditional terms. As Matlock summarized 
it, the president commented: 
He is (as are all Soviet General Secretaries) dependent on the Soviet 
Communist hierarchy and will be out to prove to them his strength and 
dedication to Soviet traditional goals.” So far so good, I thought as I read. 
Subsequently, the president acknowledged that Gorbachev did not “want 
to undertake any new adventures” but would “be stubborn and tough about 
holding what he was.” He believed that Gorbachev’s major goal would be 
“weaning our European friends away from us” by “making us look like a 
threat to peace.1006   
Reagan wrote also about his thoughts on arms control with the 
Soviet Union. According to Matlock, “As for arms reduction, he believed that Gorbachev 
wished to ‘reduce the burden of defense spending that is stagnating the Soviet economy,’ 
and that it ‘could contribute to his opposition to SDI’ since ‘he doesn’t want to face the 
cost of competing with us.’” 1007 Reagan also had suspicions of the Soviet military. 
Reagan wrote, “…the Soviets are planning a war. They would like to win without it and 
their chances of doing that depend on being so prepared we could be faced with a 
surrender or die ultimatum.”1008  
                                                 
1004 Regan, An American Life, 614.  
1005 Regan, Reagan Diaries, 317.  




In the early years of the Gorbachev era, Reagan believed that the 
Soviet Union had not changed much and Gorbachev was not different from any other 
former Soviet leaders. However, Reagan’s skeptical perceptions of Gorbachev changed 
as they increased their interchanges. 
(2) Reagan’s Changes of Perception Regarding Gorbachev and 
the Soviet Union.  Through summit meetings, Reagan came to consider Gorbachev as a 
pragmatic leader with whom he could make agreements. James Mann concluded that one 
explanation for “Reagan’s determination to do business with Gorbachev” was his 
firsthand contact with Gorbachev.1009 After the first meeting in Geneva in November 
1985, Reagan shared his first impression with his old friend, George Murphy. Reagan 
said, “At the same time, he is practical and knows his economy is a basket case. I think 
our job is to show him he and they will be better off if we make some practical 
agreements, without attempting to convert him to our way of thinking.”1010  
Also, the summit in Reykjavik give Reagan an opportunity to 
understand how desperately Gorbachev wanted to limit Soviet military spending and 
reduce tensions with the United States. Before the summit in Reykjavik, the Reagan 
administration had not prepared for a substantive discussion on arms control and was not 
sure what Gorbachev wanted to do. Hoffman introduced some examples of how little the 
Reagan administration prepared for the Reykjavik meeting. Hoffman said:  
A Soviet specialist at the State Department wrote a two-page memo that 
opened: “we go into Reykjavik next week with very little knowledge of 
how Gorbachev intends to use the meeting.” [National Security Advisor] 
Poindexter wrote “talking points” that he gave to Reagan, including 
“anticipate no substantive agreements per se,” and “meeting is in no sense 
a substitute or a surrogate for a summit.”1011  
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Reagan was became convinced of Gorbachev’s sincerity and began 
to change his perception of the Soviet Union during his second term. He became the 
“leading dove of his administration.”1012  
Reagan received a question from a reporter during his European 
trip in June 1987 on how he perceived Gorbachev. The reporter said, “Do you trust him?” 
Reagan answered that “Well, he’s a personable gentleman, but I cited to him a Russian 
proverb…, Doveryai no proveryai. It means trust but verify.” 1013  Reagan’s answer, 
Doveryai no proveryai, reflected Reagan’s perception of Gorbachev in 1987. First, 
Reagan thought that Gorbachev was perhaps not like previous Soviet leaders. Reagan 
was persuaded that “Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader from his 
predecessors, one with whom you could do business.”1014 Second, Reagan wanted to 
confirm Gorbachev’s sincerity to continue talks and reduce tensions between the two 
countries. Reagan acknowledged the possibility that Gorbachev was a trustful leader, but 
also raised skepticism about how Gorbachev would show his sincere intentions to ease 
the tensions with the United States. 
Reagan’s perceptions changed more after the signing of the INF 
treaty on December 8, 1987. Reagan acknowledged that, “our people should have been 
better friends long ago.”1015 During Reagan’s fourth summit with Gorbachev in May 
1988, ABC correspondent Sam Donaldson asked, “Do you still think you’re in an evil 
empire, Mr. President?” Reagan’s answer was “no” without any hesitation.1016 Reagan 
said, “I was talking about another time and another era.”1017 This answer was significant 
to show that Reagan’s perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union totally changed. 
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According to Hoffman, “The moment marked the end of Reagan’s cold war.”1018 Reagan 
thought that Gorbachev was a leader different from previous Soviet leaders and there had 
been a “profound change” in the Soviet government.1019  
On December 7, 1988, Reagan and George H. W. Bush met 
Gorbachev after Gorbachev’s historic speech at the United Nations. Reagan wrote in his 
diary, “I think the meeting was a tremendous success. A better attitude than at any of our 
previous meetings. He sounded as if he saw us as partners making a better world.”1020 
b. Cognitive Barriers Did Not Prevent Reagan from Changing His 
Views  
The interchanges like the summit meetings between Reagan and 
Gorbachev are not enough to explain Reagan’s perceptional change regarding Gorbachev. 
For example, James Mann compared Nixon’s perception with Reagan’s after their 
meetings with Gorbachev. Nixon met Gorbachev in July 1986. Nixon described him as a 
leader with a “steel fist.” Nixon said, “Brezhnev used a meat axe in his negotiations, 
Gorbachev uses a stiletto. But beyond the velvet glove he always wears, there is a steel 
fist…In essence, he is the most affable of all the Soviet leaders I have met, but at the 
same time without question the most formidable because his goals are the same as theirs 
and he will be more effective in attempting to achieve them.”1021 However, contrary to 
Nixon who had cognitive barriers, Reagan had a more open mind and felt that Gorbachev 
was different from other Soviet leaders through their summit meetings.  
Even before Reagan meet Gorbachev, he wanted to eliminate nuclear 
weapons and acknowledged that it was impossible without the Soviet Union. For 
example, when Vice President George Bush participated in Chernenko’s funeral, he 
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delivered Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev to invite Gorbachev to the United States.1022 
Reagan said, “I would like to invite you to visit me in Washington at your earliest 
convenient opportunity….I want you to know that I look forward to a meeting that could 
yield results of benefit to both our countries and to the international community as a 
whole.”1023 Mann explained that Reagan had a desire to talk to the Soviet leadership 
before Gorbachev became a general secretary. Mann says, “Reagan personally 
emphasized during the National Security Council’s final discussion of NSDD-751024 that 
he wanted nothing in the document that would stand in the way of ‘compromise and quiet 
diplomacy’ with Soviet leaders.”1025 Through his first term, Reagan learned that the 
Soviet Union felt a strong threat from the United States. Reagan said, “Three years had 
taught me something surprising about the Russians. Many people at the top of the Soviet 
hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn’t have 
surprised me, but it did.”1026 
In addition, one of most important figures who influenced Reagan’s 
perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union was Suzanne Massie,1027 who taught 
Reagan the saying Doveryai no Proveryai (Trust but Verify). Reagan’s meetings with 
Suzanne Massie show that Reagan had an open mind to learn about the Soviet Union. 
Reagan wanted to do business with the Soviet leadership and eventually changed his 
antipathy toward the Soviet Union. The tragic Chernobyl accident also affected Reagan’s  
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perception of the Soviet Union. Massie gave Reagan her impressions from her visit after 
the Chernobyl accident. Shultz, who attended the meeting between Massie and Reagan 
recalled:  
There were shortages of everything, and people now realized they had to 
turn to free enterprise. Chernobyl was of great symbolic importance, she 
felt: it showed that Soviet science and technology were flawed, that the 
leadership was lying and out of touch, that the party could not conceal its 
failures any longer. Chernobyl means ‘wormwood,’ a reference to 
bitterness and sorrow from the Book of Revelation. There are many 
biblical allusions in Russia now.1028  
Consequently, the personal interaction between Gorbachev and Reagan 
played an important role in the relations of the two countries. Matlock observed: 
We can only be astonished that, over the historically brief period from 
1985 to 1988, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev managed to find a 
common language, to build, step by frequently faltering step, a foundation 
of respect and trust, and on that basis to forge a common purpose that 
allowed them to transform the political landscape of the entire world. This 
happened because Gorbachev was different from the Soviet leaders he 
succeeded, and Reagan was different from the false image many of his 
critics—and some of his supporters—fashioned of him.1029  
The respect and trust between leaders of the sending and receiving states is a necessary 
condition for the success of reassurance strategy. 
3. Domestic Politics of the Soviet Union 
Question 9: How did key domestic actors in the Soviet Union perceive 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy offer to the United States? Did the 
reassurance strategy generate domestic support in the Soviet Union? Was 
there sufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was 
the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance 
strategy? 
The key domestic actors in the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1989 can be 
divided into hard-liners and soft-liners. Generally speaking, soft-liners were the new 
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thinkers such as Gorbachev’s close advisors Yevgeny Velikhov, Alexander Yakovlev, 
and Georgii Arbatov who were supporters for Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, while 
the old thinkers, mainly from the military-industrial complex, opposed it. Some scholars 
described the debate between hard-liners and the soft-liners as “a conflict between 
‘diplomacists’ who believe that progress can only be achieved through accommodation, 
and ‘unilateralists’ who believe that only Soviet military power can guarantee Soviet 
strategic gains.”1030  
Over time, the old thinkers and unilateralists declined in influence and Gorbachev 
consolidated his power. Then, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy 
without strong opposition from the old thinkers. Eventually, the old thinkers pushed back, 
leading to the coup attempt that facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. By then, 
however, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy had already succeeded in convincing the 
United States that the Cold War was over.  
a. Key Domestic Actors: Opponents 
(1) Resistance to Gorbachev’s Reassurance Strategy.  
Gorbachev’s power rested on the three conservative institutions of the Soviet military, the 
Communist Party, and the KGB. Gorbachev needed to maintain ties to them. When 
Gorbachev became general secretary, those institutions had supported his reforms and 
changes because they hoped that economic reforms could help strengthen Soviet power 
by upgrading intelligence and the military. However, Gorbachev had realized that the 
reform of the military was necessary for reform in the Soviet Union. Matlock described 
this problem and pointed out, “Gorbachev’s dilemma was that he could not avoid 
impinging on the military’s prerogatives if he was to revitalize the economy, nor could be 
avoid a change in Soviet military doctrine if he was to relieve international tension so as 
to permit more attention to domestic reform.”1031 
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As Gorbachev implemented his security policy, the military and 
some members of the Communist Party came to have anxiety and disagreement over his 
reassurance strategy, especially about unilateral military reductions. That is, they became 
opponents of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States. Anatoly 
Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States between 1962 and 1986, said, “Our 
military command, as well as some members of the political leadership, were decidedly 
unhappy about Gorbachev’s zeal in making deep concessions in order to achieve 
agreements with Washington.”1032 When Gorbachev changed the Warsaw Pact military 
doctrine from an offensive to a defensive one, after the Berlin meeting in 1987, Soviet 
military leaders expressed their opposite opinions to the military chiefs of staff of other 
European nations at a session in Moscow. Soviet Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov said, 
“the only way to definitively crush an aggressor is by executing decisive attacks…we 
cannot under any circumstances agree to unilateral reductions.”1033 Mann pointed out 
that “Those words seemed aimed at Gorbachev.”1034  
As historian Robert England indicated, it was extraordinarily hard 
to make changes “in an ossified, militarized Party-state system,” especially given the 
latent power of the hard-liners. 1035  Despite resistance from opponents, such as the 
military and party members, Gorbachev kept on with his reassurance strategy.   
(2) Decline of the Opposition against Gorbachev and Positive 
Response from the United States.  The decline of the opponents of Gorbachev started at 
the leadership level in the early stage of Gorbachev’s rule. Graeme Gill pointed out the 
significance. Gill said, “Within Gorbachev’s first two years new members accounted for 
five of eleven full Politburo members, six of eight candidate Politburo members, and nine 
of twelve central committee secretaries—an unprecedented turnover for a new Soviet 
                                                 
1032 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Times Books, 1995), 631, quoted in Mann, 
Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 174–175.  
1033 Mann, Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 175, referring to Mastny and Byrne, eds., A Cardboard 
Castle, 559–60.  
1034 Ibid.  
1035 Hoffman, Dead Hand, 183, referring to English, Russia and the Idea, 172–173.  
 361
regime.”1036 Also, hard-liner Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the chief of the general staff, was 
removed in September 1984.1037 Gorbachev’s leading opponent within the Party was 
Yegor Ligachev. He was forced to move from his position in charge of party ideology to 
that in charge of agriculture. 1038  Another opponent, former foreign minister Andrei 
Gromyko was also forced to retire.1039 
Gorbachev believed that he could not achieve his aims unless he 
won over these opponents who did not want to follow his reforms. There were several 
occasions that Gorbachev could use to exploit to win over opponents. After the 
Chernobyl incident in April 1986, Gorbachev emphasized the changes in personnel. 
Anatoly Adamishin, a deputy foreign minister recalled, “Chernobyl showed to Gorbachev 
that there was a level of officials who cheated him, who didn’t tell him the truth, so he 
decided to change the upper middle levels [of government].”1040  
A nineteen-year-old West German bank trainee, Mathias Rust, 
flew from Finland to Moscow and landed near Red Square in 1987 without being tracked 
or stopped by Soviet air defenses.1041 Rust’s illegal flight and the poor response from 
Soviet defense forces had a great impact on the Soviet military. Gorbachev was in Berlin 
for the Warsaw Pact meeting and told leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, “This is even 
worse than Chernobyl.”1042 When the first Deputy Minister of Defense, Pyotr Lushev, 
briefed Gorbachev, Gorbachev was furious at military leaders. When Lushev said that the 
duty officers “were unprepared to operate in non-standard circumstances,” Gorbachev 
responded, “And then how are we going to operate in combat conditions, when non-
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standard situations occur?” 1043 Gorbachev replaced about 150 generals and colonels, 
including the head of the Air Defense Forces, considering them responsible for the event. 
Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov resigned.1044 In this way, Gorbachev strengthened his 
own power, which was necessary for implementing his reassurance strategy. 
Consequently, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance 
strategy with reduced opposition. Gorbachev said, “But fine, at least everyone here, and 
in the West, will know where power lies. It is in the hands of the political leadership, the 
Politburo. This will put an end to gossip about the military’s opposition to Gorbachev, 
that he’s afraid of them, and they are close to ousting him.”1045 Matthew Evangalista 
concluded:  
Through his control of the domestic agenda and relying upon the authority 
of his position as top communist leader in an extremely hierarchical 
system, Mikhail Gorbachev was able to implement, without substantial 
domestic opposition, the ideas that brought the Cold War to an end.1046 
b. Key Domestic Actors: Supporters and Change from Above 
Even though there was strong resistance from the militarized party-state 
system to Gorbachev’s ideas, there was widespread support from Gorbachev’s inner 
circle of advisors and the broader professional class they represented. Gorbachev 
designated reformers as his close advisors, which increased the ability of people in the 
professional class to influence the Soviet policy toward the United States. Some reform-
minded actors gained control of greater political resources and access under the lead of 
Gorbachev and his advisors. In sum, Gorbachev’s leadership and the connection between 
his inner circle advisor group and a growing professional class created a domestic base of 
support for reassurance strategy toward the United States.   
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(1) Gorbachev’s Inner Circle Advisor Group.  There were 
several important figures in Gorbachev’s inner circle advisor group who were fatigued by 
the country’s stagnation and hoped to see reform in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev 
replaced his foreign minister Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze. Gromyko, 
who had held the post for twenty-eight years, was a typical old thinker and saw the world 
from the Hobbesian perspective. Gorbachev wanted to change the confrontational 
perspective and selected Shevardnadze. Gorbachev’s selection of Shevardnadze, his 
personal friend, was a surprise to everybody including Shevardnadze, who said it was 
“the greatest surprise of my life.”1047 Gorbachev wanted to assign a foreign minister with 
a fresh mind and “bring foreign policy under his direct control.”1048 Also, Gorbachev 
believed in reform of the military-industrial complex and appointed Lev Zaikov, a 
Leningrad party official, to oversee it. Gorbachev said that “There are many obstacles in 
this area of work. We need to fix things here.”1049 
Gorbachev needed a military advisor who could understand his 
reassurance strategy and help implement it without opposition from the military. Sergei 
Akhromeyev, the chief of the General Staff, was another important figure in Gorbachev’s 
inner circle of advisors who fulfilled Gorbachev’s need. According to Hoffman, 
“Akhromeyev was above reproach by the military elite for his long service to the country, 
and he gave Gorbachev the cover and legitimacy he needed to attempt a radical farewell 
to arms.” 1050  As a military advisor, he had worked a lot with Gorbachev on the 
implementation of the reassurance strategy through arms control negotiations, withdrawal 
of troops from Afghanistan, change of military doctrine, and so on.  Akhromeyev was the 
only top military officer who was not forced to leave after Rust’s flight crossed the 
border.1051 
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(2) Professional Class: Epistemic Communities (Specialist 
Networks) and the Intelligentsia.  The rise of New Thinking and its influence on Soviet 
foreign policy was not a product of Gorbachev alone. Soviet reform-minded professionals 
in epistemic communities and the intelligentsia class played important roles. The term, 
epistemic community, refers to like-minded technical experts within a particular field. In 
the Soviet Union, the relevant epistemic communities comprised reform-minded experts 
on international relations and arms control. They have been called “specialist 
networks”1052 by Robert G. Herman and “epistemic communities” by other scholars such 
as Peter M. Haas, 1053  Matthew Evangelista, 1054  Emanuel Adler, 1055  and Sarah 
Mendelson. 1056  The most prominent figures in the epistemic communities were: 
Alexander Yakovlev, head of a prestigious think tank, the Institute of World Economy 
and International Relations; Yevgeny Velikhov, deputy director of the Kurchatov 
Institute of Atomic Energy; and Georgii Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of 
the U.S.A. and Canada.1057  
In studies of the influence of expert knowledge on policy, many 
scholars have found that leadership style in the Soviet Union played a critical role. As 
Mendelson pointed out, “Specialists could change the terms of political discourse, but 
they needed sponsorship, institutionalization, and regular channels for communicating 
with the leadership, such as expert commissions or scientific councils.”1058 In short, it 
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depends on “whether there is a good match between the leadership’s interests and the 
specialists’ advice.”1059 Mendelson argues that implementation and influence of ideas 
depend on three factors: “(1) the type of access an epistemic community has to the 
political leadership; (2) the degree to which an idea proposed by the community is salient 
to the leadership; and (3) the ability of the leadership to control political resources in 
order to place controversial ideas on the policy agenda and to empower the 
community.”1060 Mendelson used the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
as an example to show how the epistemic community was supported by Gorbachev and 
supported him. 
Robert G. Herman emphasized the role of “specialist networks” to 
explain how New Thinking ideas were constructed in the Soviet Union and how it 
became the basis of state policy in the 1980s. According to Herman, “New Thinking was 
a collaborative effort, the result of intellectual give-and-take within these expert 
groups….Specialist networks quite literally provide the bridge between the emergence of 
new ideas and identities and their prospective adoption by the political leadership.”1061 
After Herman interviewed dozens of Soviet specialists1062 and researched previously 
classified memoranda (zapiski), he concluded that Soviet policy in the late 1980s was the 
product of both specialist networks and the Gorbachev leadership. He argued that “the 
momentous turn in Soviet international policy was the product of cognitive evolution and 
policy entrepreneurship by networks of Western-oriented in-system reformers coincident 
with the coming to power of a leadership committed to change and receptive to new ideas 
for solving the country’s formidable problems.”1063 
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The support from the professional class was not limited to the 
epistemic communities. In addition to the epistemic communities on international 
relations and arms control, there was broad support from urban, middle-class 
professionals. The professional class who had “professional and economic interests in 
changing the system” promoted the implementation of reforms and supported 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. 1064  Jack Snyder pointed out that one of factors 
“promoting the emergence of the reforms is the strengthening of the constituency that 
naturally favors it, the cultural and technical intelligentsia.” 1065  Snyder stated, “the 
intelligentsia has been steadily growing in size and independence as natural result of the 
gradual modernization of the economy and social structure.”1066 
Gorbachev wanted to reform the Soviet Union and appointed 
reformists as his close advisors. Also, Gorbachev and his advisors communicated with 
the epistemic communities and the intelligentsia and used their knowledge to help guide 
reform, including the reassurance strategy. Snyder observed, “Gorbachev is trying to 
empower new constituencies, working through new institutions and transforming old 
ones.”1067 The convergence of interests between Gorbachev and the professional experts 
from epistemic communities and the intelligentsia group provided supportive domestic 
politics for Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States. Therefore, 
changes from above were possible in the Soviet Union.  
4. Domestic Politics of the United States 
Question 10: How did key domestic actors in the United States perceive 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy? Did Gorbachev’s reassurance generate 
domestic support in the United States for reciprocity? Did powerful 
domestic actors try to prevent the United States from offering a positive 
response? 
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There were two groups in the United States—opponents and supporters of 
Reagan’s reciprocity to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. They had two competing 
perspectives on the Soviet Union: the opponents emphasized the aggressive character of 
the Soviet Union that hoped to expand its influence, and the supporters of Reagan’s 
reciprocity stressed the danger of nuclear weapons and the arms race. The disagreement 
between Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz, 
is a good example of controversy between opponents and supporters.  
In the end, opponents like Weinberger could not prevent the Reagan 
administration from offering positive responses to the Soviet Union. There was the rise of 
supporters with backing from ordinary citizens shown in the nuclear freeze movement. 
Also, Reagan was popular and could persuade conservatives to accept his response to the 
Soviet Union.   
Therefore, the Reagan administration could show positive responses to the Soviet 
Union without strong opposition in domestic politics. The freeze movement started in the 
early 1980s and created political circumstances favorable to arms control. In contrast to 
the Soviet Union where reassurance strategy started from top, in the United States, the 
rise of soft liners and supporters for arms control emerged from the bottom in domestic 
politics.    
a. Resistance to Reagan’s Positive Response from Opponents    
There were strong opponents among the conservative hard-liners who 
were against any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Mann pointed 
out that there were three constituencies: (1) leading American intelligence and defense 
officials; (2) the political right; and (3) realists who were very critical of Reagan and 
opposed any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy.1068 Mann said that 
there were “three separate but overlapping constituencies, each of which had played a 
powerful role in influencing American policy during the Cold War.”1069  
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(1) Intelligence and Military.  The Reagan administration’s 
policy toward the Soviet Union depended on intelligence and the military because 
Reagan and his aides obtained information about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union from 
them. According to Hoffman, “The Central Intelligence Agency devoted about 45 percent 
of its analytical manpower to the Soviet Union.” 1070  The CIA’s first assessment of 
Gorbachev, titled “Gorbachev, the New Broom,” described Gorbachev as “the most 
aggressive and activist Soviet leader since Khrushchev.”1071 William Casey, the director 
of the CIA, attached a very skeptical cover note to the assessment. He wrote that 
Gorbachev and those around him “are not reformers and liberalizers either in Soviet 
domestic or foreign policy.” 1072  Hoffman said, “He could not have been more 
wrong.”1073 The CIA briefing paper for the first summit meeting in Geneva in 1985 said 
Gorbachev had “little expectation of any major substantive breakthrough on arms control 
or regional issues.”1074  
Defense Secretary Weinberger was another typical figure among 
conservative opponents. According to Matlock, even though Reagan thought meetings of 
American and Soviet military officers would be a good idea, they could not be 
implemented for several years “because of rivalries in Washington.”1075 Matlock said, 
“Secretary Weinberger did not like the idea and refused to approve any high-level 
military contacts unless and until he personally met the Soviet minister of 
defense….Weinberger himself did not want to be seen talking to Soviet military 
leaders.”1076  
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There are other examples of military leaders objecting to some of 
the measures discussed by Reagan and Gorbachev. After Reykjavik, Admiral William 
Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told Reagan, “he and the other chiefs were upset by 
the idea of doing away with ballistic missiles.” 1077  Nelson Ledsky, a staff aide at 
Reagan’s National Security Council said, “Reykjavik scared everyone. It was seen as a 
scary proof that Ronald Reagan might do something terribly reckless.”1078 A booklet, 
Soviet Military Power, published by the Pentagon, claimed that “the Soviets also have 
two ground-based lasers that are capable of attacking satellites in various orbits. These 
systems suggest that the Soviets are willing to use space for military purposes that are 
more ominous than those for which it has been used thus far.”1079 Hoffman criticizes the 
propaganda piece:  
This was a gross exaggeration; neither LE-1 nor the Terra-3 lasers could 
attack anything….The Soviets had not given up hope, but the glossy 
Pentagon booklet took old failures and hyped them into new threats.1080 
These kinds of information influenced Reagan’s view of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union 
in 1985 and 1986.  
When Gorbachev made a proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free 
world in January 1986, the general response from the administration was skeptical. 
According to Shultz, Richard N. Perle, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, told the White 
House Senior Arms Control Group: 
The president’s dream of a world without nuclear weapons—which 
Gorbachev had picked up—was a disaster, a total delusion. Perle said the 
president would direct his arms controllers to come up with a program to  
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achieve that result. The Joint Chiefs’ representative agreed with Perle. 
They feared the institutionalization and acceptance of the idea as 
policy.”1081  
Gates, deputy CIA director, said that Gorbachev’s proposal to get rid of all nuclear 
weapons in the world was “tactically a clever stroke” but “did not change any basic 
Soviet position.”1082 
Reagan’s July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev proposing eventual 
elimination of ballistic missiles, followed by discussion of the complete elimination of all 
strategic offensive weapons at the summit meeting in Reykjavik, became a big issue to 
the military. The military leaders were angry because there had been no consultation with 
them. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., spoke for the 
other service chiefs on this issue. He said, “The unanimous answer was that from a 
national security perspective it was completely unacceptable. The chiefs were quite 
disturbed.” 1083 After serious thought for several days, Crowe spoke up at the White 
House National Security Planning Group meeting October 27, 1986. He said, “Mr. 
President, we are concluded that the proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles in 10 years 
time would pose high risks to the security of the nation.”1084 
Even two weeks before the third summit meeting between 
Gorbachev and Reagan in Washington, Gates still failed to grasp the intention of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Gates said, “We will see no lessening of their weapons 
production. And, further, Soviet research on new, exotic weapons such as lasers and their 
own version of SDI continues apace.”1085 In sum, military leaders and defense officials 
believed that Gorbachev was not different from previous leaders and expressed their 
concern about the limiting of missiles and nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. 
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(2) The Political Right.  The political right, which had 
supported Reagan from the beginning of his political career, became critical of Reagan. 
There are many examples showing the resistance of those on the political right. The 
Daniloff case is one. George Will strongly criticized the administration. He wrote, “The 
administration believes that Gorbachev wants to end the arms race so he can raise his 
people’s standard of living….The administration partakes of national vanity of believing 
that if Soviet leaders just see our supermarkets and swimming pools, they will see the 
folly of trying to win an arms race with a nation this rich.”1086 Will wrote in April 1987, 
“Reagan seems to accept the core of the catechism of the antinuclear left, the notion that 
the threat to peace is technological, not political—the notion that the threat is the 
existence of nuclear weapons, not the nature of the Soviet regime.”1087 One of the most 
outspoken conservative columnists, Charles Krauthammer said, “Mr. Gorbachev, your 
iron teeth are showing.”1088 Also, when Reagan assigned Howard Baker as the White 
House chief of staff, William Safire, New York Times columnist said, “The 
Russians…now understand the way to handle Mr. Reagan: Never murder a man who is 
committing suicide.”1089 According to James Mann, “By the spring of 1987, Reagan 
found that he would have to work harder to overcome the mistrust of the conservatives—
and indeed, they remained deeply critical of Reagan for the remainder of his time in the 
White House.”1090  
(3) Realists.  The third group who criticized Reagan’s meetings 
with Gorbachev was the group of officials who had run American foreign policy during 
the Nixon and Ford administrations. For example, Nixon and Kissinger opposed 
Reagan’s diplomacy with Gorbachev. They said, “Because we are deeply concerned 
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about this danger, we, who have attended several Summits and engaged in many 
negotiations with Soviet leaders, are speaking out jointly for the first time since both of 
us left office.”1091 After Kissinger talked about the agreement with Shultz in 1987, he 
said, it “undoes forty years of NATO.”1092 Kissinger also said, “Many Europeans are 
convinced a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten 
Europe while sparing the United States.”1093  
Reagan faced opposition from three groups—the military and the 
intelligence community, the political right, and realists—who influenced American 
policy toward the Soviet Union and strongly opposed Reagan’s positive response to 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. As Hoffman pointed out, “Reagan’s circle was riven 
by disagreement, and there was no consensus that this [Gorbachev] was a man they could 
do business with.”1094 
b. Rise of Supporters for Arms Control and Changes in Reagan’s 
Policy toward the Soviet Union 
Despite the lack of information about Gorbachev and the conservative 
hard-liners’ opposition to Reagan’s positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance 
strategy, Reagan changed both his perceptions of Gorbachev and his policy toward the 
Soviet Union. Reagan not only listened to soft-liners but also tried to persuade hard-liners 
to provide support. Also, there was public support for arms control in the United States. 
The freeze movement had an impact on the Reagan administration’s change in policy 
toward the Soviet Union.  
(1) Reagan’s Persuasion.  Reagan helped generate domestic 
support for reciprocity and persuaded hard-liners. For example, in the spring of 1985, the 
unratified SALT II treaty became an issue because the United States needed to retire one 
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of its submarines to launch a new one in order to not exceed the limit specified by the 
SALT II treaty. 1095  Despite objections from civilian officials in the Department of 
Defense, Reagan decided to decommission the old submarine while also trying to mollify 
the objectors.1096 According to Matlock, “However, he tried to appease the hardliners in 
the Defense Department by describing Soviet treaty violations in his public statement and 
promising ‘appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet non-compliance.’”1097 
Reagan’s often used phrase, “Trust, but verify,” was intended to 
get support from domestic politicians, especially from hard-liners, in the United States. 
According to Matlock:   
Reagan’s favorite phrase, “Trust, but verify,” was directed not only at 
Gorbachev—to explain why we needed reliable verification of 
agreements—but also at those in his own administration who, like 
Weinberger, persisted in opposing realistic negotiation with the Soviet 
Union. If Gorbachev had understood this better, he would not have been 
so annoyed at Reagan’s repeated use of it.1098 
The Berlin Wall speech in June 1987 had a similar intention. 
Reagan spoke the famous sentence, “Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this 
wall.”1099 This sentence demonstrated Reagan’s discredit of the Communist system. At 
the same time, Reagan could persuade the American public and especially hard-liners of 
his working with Gorbachev. According to Mann, “The Berlin Wall speech was, in a real 
sense, the political prerequisite for the president’s subsequent efforts to work with 
Gorbachev in easing the tensions of the Cold War.”1100  
There are many examples showing how Reagan approached 
conservative hard-liners with his personal communication skills despite their 
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condemnation of Reagan’s response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. When there 
was strong opposition to the INF treaty from the conservatives, Reagan did not ignore 
their opinions, but cajoled them. According to Frank Carlucci, U.S. Secretary of Defense 
from 1987 to 1989, “He had a marvelous facility with the right wing. Periodically, he 
would invite them into the White House, into the Roosevelt Room, and he would come in 
and shake everybody’s hand, and tell a joke or two, and leave the dirty work to the rest of 
us.” 1101  When the Nixon administration veterans complained about Reagan’s policy 
toward the Soviet Union, Reagan tried to avoid bitter confrontation. Reagan had a secret 
meeting with Nixon to get support for his overtures to Gorbachev on April 27, 1987.1102 
Reagan assigned Henry Kissinger as chairman of a bipartisan commission on Central 
America and suggested he participate in the inauguration of South Korea’s new president, 
Roh Tae Woo in 1988 to represent the administration.1103 According to Mann, “The 
result of these efforts was to defuse the opposition. Some of the conservatives continued 
to criticize Reagan’s treaty, but without the passion or venom they were able to summon 
on other issues.”1104  
Reagan had the capability to communicate with those who had 
different opinions. Matlock also said, “He disliked direct confrontation with cabinet 
members, particularly old friends like Weinberger. He also understood that he would 
need the acquiescence, if not the active support, of the hard-liners in his administration if 
he was to implement a positive agenda with the Soviet Union.”1105 In sum, Reagan’s 
communication skill played a significant role when Reagan developed relations with the 
Soviet Union because it helped him cajole hard-liners to accept his policy.  
(2) The Rise of Supporters.  Reagan knew that there were 
different perspectives about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union in his administration— 
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Weinberger, Casey, Ed Meese on the conservative hard-line side and Shultz and 
McFarlane on the progressive soft-line side. He needed to resolve the dispute and choose 
one side. Reagan wrote in his autobiography: 
George Shultz and Cap Weinberger were having one of their disputes over 
policy. Cap was not as interested as George in opening negotiations with 
the Russians and some of his advisors at the Pentagon strongly opposed 
some of my ideas on arms control that George supported, including my 
hope for eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world.  
Cap had allies among some of my more conservative political supporters, 
who let me know they thought Schultz had gone soft on the Russians and 
they wanted me to fire him—an idea, I told them, that was utter nonsense.  
Meanwhile, Bud McFarlane, who also sometimes differed with Cap and 
angered him by claiming the Pentagon could modernize its forces 
effectively at substantially lower cost than Cap was asking for, sided with 
George. Bill Casey and Ed Meese line up in Cap’s camp in favoring an 
even harder line toward the Russians….1106  
Reagan also wrote in his diary of which side he was going to 
support. According to Reagan, “‘Actually George is carrying out my policy. I’m going to 
meet with Cap and Bill and lay it out to them. Won’t be fun but has to be done.’ I didn’t 
disagree with Weinberger that the Russians were an evil force in the world and 
untrustworthy, but I didn’t think that meant we shouldn’t talk to them.”1107  
In the fall of 1987, there was a decline of conservative hard-liners 
in the Reagan administration. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the most powerful 
hardliner who wanted to expand defense spending and develop new weapons systems, 
resigned in October 1987.1108 Although Weinberger explained that he wanted to resign 
because his wife was in poor health, his position in the administration and Congress had 
been limited under the improved relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
                                                 
1105 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 115.  
1106 Reagan, An American Life, 605–606.  
1107 Ibid., 606.  
1108 Mann, Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 255.  
 376
Union. Mann said, “…members of Congress had grown increasingly skeptical of his 
incessant pleas for more money and weaponry.” 1109  Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Richard Perle who strongly opposed arms control agreements with Soviet Union also 
resigned several months after the resignation of Weinberger.1110 Frank Carlucci became 
defense secretary and Colin Powell became the deputy national security advisor. Also, 
William Casey died of a brain tumor and William Webster replaced him as the new CIA 
director. Mann pointed out that these changes in the senior ranks of the Reagan 
administration were a power shift to Shultz’s camp. Mann said, “Now, for the first time, 
Shultz was the unchallenged leader of Reagan’s foreign policy team. Where previously 
the Reagan administration had bogged down in fractious disputes over how to deal with 
the Soviet Union, the new team of Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, and Webster worked together 
in relative harmony.”1111 Reagan’s assignment of the moderate Howard Baker as his 
White House chief of staff was also a sign of the decline of conservative hard-liners.1112  
(3) Public Support: The Rise of the Freeze Movement in the 
Early 1980s and Reagan’s Popularity.  In the early 1980s, there was already an extensive 
citizens’ campaign on nuclear arms issues (the freeze movement) that affected the 
Reagan administration. During the first Reagan administration, the freeze movement 
generated electoral incentives and a shift in elite and congressional coalitions for a 
change in Reagan’s foreign policy, mainly military and nuclear policy.1113 
A portion of the American public continued to request the pursuit 
of an arms control policy with the Soviet Union. As a result, the freeze movements which 
started in the first Reagan administration, had an impact on the second Reagan 
administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Even though Reagan wanted arms 
reductions and recognized the rise of the freeze movement in America during his first 
term, there was no acceptance of the freeze proposal. However, the administration 
                                                 
1109 Mann, Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 255. 
1110 Ibid., 256.  
1111 Ibid.  
1112 Ibid.  
1113 Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation, 199–246.  
 377
learned that the public would applaud any move to negotiate arms control, setting the 
stage for policy change in the second term. As explained earlier, those who supported 
negotiations with the Soviet Union rose in the bureaucracy, although not because of the 
freeze movement. Also, Reagan could be more flexible on his policy toward the Soviet 
Union after re-election. As Goldstein and Freeman pointed out, “Reagan for his part had 
a virtually free hand in foreign policy after his re-election victory.”1114  
The American public clearly supported Reagan’s positive response 
to Gorbachev. An ABC poll taken the day Gorbachev left for home after the Washington 
summit in December 1987 showed that 76 percent of Americans considered Gorbachev’s 
visit as a positive step to better a relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union and supported Reagan’s policy.1115 Gorbachev also recognized the importance of 
public opinion in the United States to induce the positive response from the Reagan 
administration. According to Matlock, “his moves had to concentrate more on 
influencing public opinion in the West than on addressing the real concerns of his 
negotiating partners.”1116 
Reagan’s job approval ratings in the second term between 1985 
and 1989 were higher than that of the first term between 1981 and 1984. Reagan’s initial 
job approval rating was as high as 60 percent in early 1981 and 68 percent after the 
attempted assassination on March 30, 1981. However, Reagan’s job approval rating had 
dropped to 49 percent by the end of 1981 and continued to fall. During 1982, it stayed in 
the 40 percent range and he finally received a 35 percent job approval rating, the worst of 
his administration, in 1983. Ratings improved in late 1983 and Reagan’s job approval 
rating moved back above 50 percent in 1984 (Figure 4.4).  
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After Reagan was reelected “in the largest electoral vote landslide 
in U.S. history” 1117  in November 1984, polls showed Reagan’s job approval rating 
soared. In 1985, it stayed in the 60 percent range. It marked a 68 percent job approval 
rating in May 1986, which tied for the highest job rating of the Reagan administration in 
May 1981. Because of the Iran-Contra affair, Reagan’s job approval rating plummeted to 
47 percent in December 1986 and stayed low throughout 1987.  In 1988, it moved back 
above 50 percent and reached 57 percent in mid-November and 63 percent in December 
1988.1118 As shown in Figure 4.4, the second Reagan administration enjoyed a higher job 
approval rating. When Reagan had his own troubles from the Iran-Contra affair and low 
popularity from the late 1986 to 1987 before the Washington summit, Reagan could not 
give any positive signs to Gorbachev. However, except for this period, the higher job 





































































Figure 4.4 Reagan’s Job Approval: Yearly Average, 1981–19891119 
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Consequently, Reagan could overcome the resistance of the 
opponents to a positive response toward Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, such as 
Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Snowcroft, by his personality and relatively 
high popularity. James Mann had an interview with Anatoly Adamishin, the Soviet 
deputy foreign minister. Adamishin said, “Other leaders, like [Vice President George 
H.W.] Bush, had to cater to political forces. But Ronald Reagan could overcome the 
resistance of the hawks.”1120 This observation was correct. Without Reagan’s efforts to 
persuade conservative hard-liners and a strong base of public support, it would have been 
difficult to respond to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. 
5. Alliance Politics of the Soviet Union 
Question 11: How did key allies of the Soviet Union affect Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy to the United States? Was there sufficient alliance 
support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government 
constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy? 
Alliance politics of the Soviet Union need to be understood from two levels—
leaders and ordinary people. Leaders of Warsaw Pact countries did not fully support 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States. On the other hand, ordinary 
people supported it and had strong zeal for reforms in the late 1980s. Leaders accepted 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, at least in words. Furthermore, they could not 
constrain Gorbachev from implementing his reassurance strategy because ordinary 
people in Warsaw Pact countries did not follow their leaders. Rather, ordinary people in 
Warsaw Pact countries supported Gorbachev more than their own leaders. This bottom 
up support helped Gorbachev implement his reassurance strategy toward the United 
States.  
a. Gorbachev and Leaders of Warsaw Pact Countries  
(1) The End of the Brezhnev Doctrine and Defensive Warsaw 
Pact Military Doctrine.  Gorbachev told Warsaw Pact leaders of two distinctive changes 
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in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. The first was the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine’s 
“assertion of the Soviet Union’s right to intervene with force in Eastern Europe,”1121 and 
the second the change in the Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine from offensive to defensive. 
These changes were based on Gorbachev’s new thinking: “The greatest enemy of the 
Soviet interests in Europe was the Soviet imperial system itself.”1122 
First, Gorbachev decided to meet the leaders of the Warsaw 
Pact1123 countries right after he became the general secretary in 1985 to present the 
different Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact countries, which was the end of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev thought that “relationships with these countries were 
badly in need of revitalizing.”1124 The leaders of Warsaw Pact countries who attended the 
meeting were Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Nicholae Ceausescu of Romania, Erich 
Honecker of the German Democratic Republic, Janos Kadar of Hungary, Gustav Husak 
of Czechoslovakia, and Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland. 
In the meeting, Gorbachev emphasized the sovereignty and 
independence as well as the responsibility of each country. He said, “In essence, however, 
our statement at this meeting signified a shift to new relations, a rejection of the Brezhnev 
doctrine, which had never been officially proclaimed but which had in fact defined the 
USSR’s approach towards its allies.”1125 This policy was maintained and Gorbachev kept 
his word later when there were social and political changes in Eastern Europe that finally 
led to the end of the Cold War  
The second significant change of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy 
to the leaders of Warsaw Pact countries was the new Warsaw Pact military doctrine, 
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which changed it from offensive to defensive. Gorbachev met with leaders of Warsaw 
Pact countries in Berlin on May 27, 1987. 1126 A written statement followed: “They 
[Warsaw Pact countries] do not regard any individual government or group of people as 
their enemy.”1127 This new doctrine was interpreted as a disadvantage to leaders of the 
Warsaw Pact countries. James Mann said, “For Eastern European leaders such as 
Honecker, this new doctrine meant that they were less able than in the past to justify 
repressive policies at home. How could they justify a hard line on the basis of an external 
threat if there was no longer an enemy?”1128  
In sum, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy related to the Soviet 
allies was expressed by the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the change of the Warsaw 
Pact treaty to a defensive one. These changes created tensions between Gorbachev and 
the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. However, those leaders could not strongly 
oppose the changes.  
(2) Tensions between Gorbachev and the Leaders of the 
Warsaw Pact Countries.  There were tensions under the surface between Gorbachev and 
leaders of Warsaw Pact countries because “Their own power had long been based on 
maintaining the same control over dissent and political opposition as the Soviet Union 
had established.”1129 The leaders of Warsaw Pact countries worried that Gorbachev’s 
reform would lead to changes in leadership and rule in their countries. However, they 
could not reject Gorbachev’s new approach directly. In 1985, even though the leaders of 
all these Warsaw Pact countries had absolute power within their own territories, they 
were influenced by the Soviet Union. As Matlock observed, “Soviet ‘allies’ were not a 
problem for Gorbachev in 1985. The countries of the Warsaw Pact were controlled at that 
time by Communist Parties that, with the occasional exception of the Romanian, were 
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conditioned to do Moscow’s bidding.” 1130  Therefore, they could not show strong 
opposition to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy.  
However, there were many signs of tensions between Gorbachev 
and the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. There was a bitter joke circulating in 
Prague in 1987, saying that it was now Czechoslovakia’s turn to send “fraternal 
assistance” to the Soviet Union, a reference to the 1968 Soviet invasion.1131 Gustav 
Husak, the 74-year-old Czechoslovakian president had “anxiety and confusion” about 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy because the words used in the 1968 “Prague spring” 
such as “reform, liberalization, and democratization” had now appeared in the Soviet 
Union.1132   
Erick Honecker, the East German leader, was a good example of 
the tensions between Gorbachev and leaders in Eastern Europe. Honecker made clear that 
he had no intention to support Gorbachev’s glasnost policy in 1987. Honecker and his 
aides controlled the East German press to block coverage of political change in the Soviet 
Union. Frank Herold, who served from 1984 to 1988 as a correspondent for the East 
German Communist Party organ Neues Deutschhland, said, “I only covered science, 
sports and fine arts, no politics at all.”1133 All the other leaders of the Warsaw Pact 
countries had fears of the impact of Gorbachev’s ideas and took similar positions to 
Honecker’s.1134  
However, even though there were tensions between Gorbachev and 
the leaders in the Warsaw Pact countries, they did not have enough leverage to constrain 
Gorbachev from implementing his reassurance strategy because the Warsaw Pact 
countries had serious economic and political problems and the ordinary people did not 
support their leaders. The ordinary Eastern Europeans supported Gorbachev rather than 
their own leaders.   
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b. Support from the Warsaw Pact Countries 
(1) Problems of East Europe.  Even though most leaders in 
Eastern Europe worried about the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms on their own power, 
they had already lost their legitimacy because of economic problems and poor political 
leadership in the 1980s. Solidarity, the first non-Communist-controlled trade union in 
Poland, started in the early 1980s. It had a significant impact on other parts of Eastern 
Europe. It provided not just an example of trade union protests by workers, but a well-
organized mass movement of most ordinary people demanding their rights and 
liberalization.1135 The Polish military and police arrested the union leaders and imposed 
martial law in December 1981. However, the repression failed, and in the end, 
Solidarity’s ideas won and led to political change “by winning the sympathies of almost 
ten million members, about one-third of the population.”1136 Significantly, the Soviet 
Union had not intervened to repress the Solidarity movement, which was “a living 
refutation of the party’s claim of representation.”1137 
The other Warsaw Pact countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, had similar economic and political problems and 
followed a similar track. Steven W. Hook and John Spanier said, “The lesson [in Poland] 
was not lost on other parts of Eastern Europe, where the struggle by Solidarity served as 
an inspiration and a precursor of greater challenges to come.”1138  
(2) The Ordinary People’s Support for Gorbachev.  After 
Gorbachev came into power in 1985, the Brezhnev Doctrine ended and non-intervention 
of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe was officially announced. The ordinary Eastern 
Europeans demanded their rights more vigorously and supported Gorbachev rather than  
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their leaders. The sign, “Gorbachev is with us,” on a shop window in Prague in late 1989 
showed the sweeping change and support of ordinary people for Gorbachev in Eastern 
Europe.1139  
The East German case is a good example of the ordinary people’s 
support for Gorbachev. Even though Honecker and other leaders in East Germany tried to 
block the political changes begun in the Soviet Union, they could not isolate ordinary 
East Germans. James Mann interviewed Bettina Urbanski, who in 1987 was serving as 
the editor in charge of socialist countries for the East Berlin newspaper Berliner Zeitung. 
Urbanski said “Gorbachev had a very strong echo within the East German population. 
The more we moved towards reform, the more restrictive the [East German] government 
became, both internally and externally in insisting on the wall.”1140  
In June 1987, young East Germans gathered near the Berlin Wall 
to catch the sounds of three nights of open-air rock summer concerts outside the 
Reichstag building, about 200 yards from the Berlin Wall. Violence escalated and there 
were skirmishes between protesters and police. Surprisingly, some of the young East 
Germans shouted, “Gorbachev! Gorbachev!” 1141  When Gorbachev joined a gala 
celebration in October 1989, the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the East German 
state, ordinary people ignored Honecker and shouted “Gorbachev! Perestroika! Help 
us!”1142 The repressed demands for reform and liberalization among the ordinary people 
in Eastern Europe were more dynamically expressed when Gorbachev came into power 
and declared the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. For that reason, most ordinary people in 
Eastern Europe supported Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, especially the end of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. Dramatic changes in East Europe at the end of the Cold War were 
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possible because ordinary people had strong demands for liberalization and hopes for 
change. The support from those ordinary people who wanted reform helped Gorbachev 
carry out his reassurance strategy toward Europe and the United States. 
6. Alliance Politics of the United States 
Question 12: How did key allies of the United States perceive 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy? Did Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy 
generate alliance support for U.S. reciprocity? Did key allies try to prevent 
the United States from offering a positive response? 
The relationship of the Soviet Union with key allies of the United States in 
Europe, especially leading NATO members such as Britain, West Germany, and France, 
showed positive improvement during the Gorbachev era. In most NATO countries, there 
were anti-nuclear movements and public pressures to stop the arms race, with the focus 
on halting the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Europe. These 
pressures influenced governments in Europe. Also, Gorbachev believed that “key 
European countries could be used to ‘moderate’ American policy.”1143 Gorbachev met 
leaders of those countries and explained his reassurance strategy and received general 
support for U.S. reciprocity. Therefore, there were no key allies that tried to prevent the 
United States from offering a positive response. European governments had some 
reservations about the INF Treaty, but aside from this issue they generally encouraged the 
United States to respond positively to Gorbachev.  
a. The Nuclear Protest Movement and the Missile Debate Among 
NATO Members 
As the United States and its allies moved toward deployment of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces to counter the Soviet SS-20s in the early 1980s, there 
were strong anti-nuclear protests in many West European countries. Lawrence S. Wittner 
said, “In nearly every West European country, antinuclear groups mushroomed into mass 
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movements, and were supported by social-democratic political parties.” 1144  Allied 
leaders were influenced by the nuclear protest in their own countries. Although they did 
not support the movement, they could not ignore it. As James Mann observed, “The 
British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl, and 
the French prime minster, Francois Mitterrand, all voiced concern about the implications 
of removing American missiles from Europe.”1145  
However, they could not maintain these positions because of domestic 
pressure. Leaders in NATO countries expressed their concerns about public pressure to 
the Reagan administration. Weinberger recalled that “as more and more of the 
demonstrations were held…more and more defense ministers urged that more be 
done.” 1146  The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
Kenneth Adelman, said, “West European governments were nervous about their public, 
scared to death.” 1147  According to Wittner, “The West German government warned 
George Shultz that there must be ‘a real negotiation’ over the missiles, ‘not just a 
show.’”1148 Also, European countries were not supportive of Reagan’s SDI dream.1149 
Thatcher and Mitterrand thought that SDI brought more domestic pressures.  
As a result, the protest movements and public pressures on governments of 
NATO allies influenced the Reagan administration. As Matlock put it, “Reagan could not 
take his allies for granted. Although governments in the key European NATO countries 
had resisted public pressure to stop the deployment of INF missiles and had swallowed 
some doubts about Reagan’s willingness to negotiate, all were under domestic pressure to 
show more ‘flexibility’ in dealing with the Soviet Union.” 1150  As a result, Reagan 
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proposed a “‘zero-zero option’ whereby the United States would not deploy any of its 
Pershings or cruise missiles if the Soviets dismantled all of their intermediate-range 
missiles, which had a maximum range of 1,500 miles.”1151 U.S. defense officials initially 
embraced the proposal because they expected the Soviets to reject it. Later, Gorbachev 
accepted the proposal and it led to the signing of the INF treaty in 1987. 
In sum, governments in the key European NATO countries were under 
domestic pressure from the anti-nuclear movement. The United States was also 
influenced by that movement and the Soviet Union tried to exploit the situation to stop 
the deployment of INFs to Europe. Therefore, the nuclear freeze movement and its 
European counterparts in the early 1980s generated positive circumstances for 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy and U.S. reciprocity in the late 1980s. At least, the 
NATO allies could not encourage the United States to promote the arms race against the 
Soviet Union.    
b. Gorbachev’s Meetings with Leaders of Key Allies of the United 
States 
Gorbachev believed that the roles of allies of the United States were 
important for the success of his reassurance strategy and tried to generate support from 
key allies of the United States. For example, when Gorbachev met Margaret Thatcher and 
Helmut Kohl, he asked them to push Reagan to accept his approaches, and they actually 
pressed Reagan to negotiate with Gorbachev on nuclear issues.  
(1) Britain.  Britain, a key ally of the United States, perceived 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy as a sincere approach that was different from that of 
previous Soviet leaders. Margaret Thatcher recognized that Gorbachev was a different 
kind of Soviet leader after she met him on December 16, 1984, before Gorbachev took 
office. Thatcher said, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together…we should 
both do everything we can to see that war never starts again, and therefore we go into the 
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disarmament talks determined to make them succeed.” 1152 Gorbachev wanted to get 
support from Thatcher to influence Reagan’s reciprocity. Jim Kuhn, Reagan’s personal 
assistant, recalled that Prime Minister Thatcher had a big impact on Reagan when she 
visited Camp David in December 1984 several weeks after Reagan’s reelection. 1153 
Thatcher asserted her view that “We can do business together” to Reagan.1154 She said 
Gorbachev was more open than his predecessors, yet that he rejected the SDI. 1155 
Gorbachev asked Thatcher to relay his ideas about the SDI, “Tell your friend President 
Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons.”1156 
Thatcher met Gorbachev for the second time during her visit to 
Moscow between March 23 and April 1, 1987. Gorbachev pointed out the danger of 
nuclear war and Thatcher responded with her strong belief in nuclear deterrence for peace. 
However, the meeting gave Thatcher an opportunity to realize the change in the Soviet 
Union. Thatcher said, “the ground was shifting underneath the communist system.”1157 
Gorbachev believed that Thatcher could convey his thoughts to Washington. Thus, 
whenever Gorbachev had a chance to talk with Thatcher, he asked her to inform 
Washington about his sincerity. Thatcher’s views were taken into account by the Reagan 
administration.    
(2) West Germany.  West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
pressed Reagan to meet Gorbachev because the tensions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union prevented West Germany from developing closer economic ties with 
Eastern Europe. Horst Teltschick, Kohl’s foreign policy advisor said, “Our main interest 
was to get the second Reagan administration back to a summit with the Soviets, because 
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we had learned that [West] Germany’s room for maneuver was dramatically restricted by 
this stalemate between the two superpowers. We felt that when they started the summits, 
we would get a new chance to develop our relations with the Central Europeans.” 1158  
However, Kohl was hesitant to fully support the outline of an arms 
control agreement in 1987. Even though Kohl gave his assent to the Soviet-American 
agreement to cut back or eliminate nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, he wanted to 
keep West Germany’s Pershing 1A missiles.1159 Reagan suggested privately to Kohl to 
eliminate these missiles and finally Kohl yielded.1160 Matlock recalled, “We made it 
clear to Kohl and Genscher that they weren’t going to queer this agreement.”1161 The 
elimination of the objection by West Germany was important for the agreement between 
Reagan and Gorbachev. In 1986, skeptical Kohl had made an analogy between 
Gorbachev and the Nazi propagandist Goebbels. By two years later, he had changed his 
views. As Mann reports: 
In 1988, there was a growing awareness on Gorbachev’s part that he 
needed Western help,” recalled Kohl. “He told me that he had to find a 
suitable partner. It was not to be expected that the Americans would help 
him. The Europeans might, and the strongest role among the Europeans 
was played by the Germans.1162 
Kohl visited Moscow on October 24, 1988. He wanted to develop 
the West German relationship with the Soviet Union and expressed his support for 
Gorbachev’s policy. Kohl told Gorbachev:  
War and violence have ceased to be a means of politics, and to think 
otherwise is to head for the destruction of mankind. In the context of 
glasnost, we must also establish a completely new kind of personal 
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contact. I would welcome an active personal dialogue with you—we could 
exchange letters, telephone each other and send personal envoys.1163 
Gorbachev was very satisfied with the summit meeting with Kohl. 
Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs, “I must admit that I was impressed by Mr Kohl’s 
approach, both from the personal and business points of view. I believed that, in the new 
emerging international climate, personal ‘compatibility’ and understanding of your 
partner’s motives would become increasingly important in world politics.”1164  
Gorbachev made a return visit in June 1989. He was impressed by 
the public support in West Germany. Gorbachev said: 
And I will never forget our encounter with the citizens of Bonn in the 
Town Hall Square. We were literally overwhelmed by manifestations of 
goodwill and friendship, the cheering crowds expressing their support and 
solidarity. I remember some of the slogans people were shouting: ‘Gorbi! 
Make love, not walls!’ ‘Please, Gorbachev, stay the course!’1165 
As a result, Gorbachev was inspired by the impression that West Germany really 
supported his reassurance strategy toward the United States and Europe. Because of 
Gorbachev’s popularity with Western European publics and his good relations with 
Western European leaders, the alliance politics of the United States supported reciprocity 
of Soviet reassurance.  
E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF 
REASSURANCE STRATEGY 
Question 13: Was there any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance 
strategy from the United States? Or, was there no response or rejection 
from the United States, followed by an increase in tensions? 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy is a case of success because there were a series 
of positive responses from the United States, and consequently significant tension 
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reduction between the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev rated his 
reassurance strategy a high success when he left office. Gorbachev said, in his address to 
the Soviet citizens on December 25, 1991, that one of his achievements was no threat of a 
world war. He said, “We live in a new world: An end has been put to the ‘Cold War,’ the 
arms race and the insane militarization of our country, which crippled our economy, 
distorted our thinking and undermined our morals. The threat of a world war is no 
more.” 1166  As Gorbachev interpreted it, the Cold War was over because he had 
implemented a reassurance strategy and the United States had shown a series of positive 
responses to his strategy. Consequently, Gorbachev’s reassurance between 1985 and 
1989 can be categorized as a success with positive responses from the Reagan 
administration and tension reduction between the two countries.   
There had been rejections from the United States at the beginning of Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1986. When Gorbachev announced the 
moratorium on the further deployment of INF in 1985 and the unilateral moratorium on 
nuclear tests and its extension from August 1985 to the end of 1986, he called for positive 
responses, such as the resumption of talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty 
from the United States. However, the Reagan administration rejected Gorbachev’s 
demands and the United States conducted some 20 tests during the Soviet moratorium 
period.1167  The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test since 1985 on February 26, 
1987, and Gorbachev ended the Soviet Union’s 19-month unilateral moratorium.1168  
However, there were more positive responses by the Reagan administration to 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy starting in 1987 onwards. The relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union changed significantly. The Reagan administration 
adopted “a much more accommodationist approach”1169 to the Soviet Union. Negotiation 
is the typical step for a positive response to a reassurance strategy. Reagan suggested that 
“the United States would seek to reduce the cost of national security ‘in negotiations with 
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the Soviet Union’.”1170 The United States showed its positive responses at the summit 
meetings. Even though Reagan could not have any talks with the Soviet leaders during 
his first term, he had five meetings with Gorbachev between 1985 and 1988, more than 
any other American president. These included: the Geneva summit in November 1985, 
the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, the Washington summit in December 1987, the 
Moscow summit in May-June 1988, and brief one-day meetings in New York in 
December 1988.1171  
In the third summit in 1987, Reagan signed the INF Treaty, which was a 
significant arms control achievement for Gorbachev and the most significant positive 
response from Reagan. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to destroy about 1,500 nuclear 
warheads of the Soviet Union that could reach Western Europe and about 350 of the 
United States deployed in Europe.1172 The Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20s and the 
United States did likewise with its Pershing missiles and removed its ground-launched 
cruise missiles (GLCMs). Former Secretary of State George Shultz considered the INF 
Treaty as a turning point for the end of the Cold War: 
The INF Treaty…was a watershed agreement, not only because of its 
terms but also because it showed that large-scale reductions in nuclear 
weapons were possible: the United States and the Soviet Union could 
work out a complex problem of great importance.1173  
The INF Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 93 to 5 on May 27, 
1988 and it was “the first time since the beginning of the Cold War—not merely reducing 
number of weapons, but eliminating them and agreeing to enforce the ban.” 1174  In 
addition, progress toward the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) began during 
the second Reagan administration and the treaty was signed in July 1991.1175 
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After the Washington summit, Reagan made a return visit to Moscow from May 
29 to June 1, 1988. During his visit, Reagan said that his description of the Soviet Union 
as an “evil empire” was from “another time and another era.”1176 On May 31, Reagan 
and Gorbachev attended the official signing ceremony for an agreement on prior 
notification of ICBM and SLBM flight tests signed by Shevardnadze and Shultz (see 
Appendix N).1177 Reagan suggested “a co-operation and exchange program for 1989 and 
1990, including an annual school exchange of 1,000 pupils from 100 Soviet and 
American schools.”1178 Gorbachev accepted his suggestion and signed the program. Also, 
Reagan and Gorbachev exchanged the ratification documents for the INF treaty on June 1. 
Gorbachev interpreted the INF treaty as “the first step” to remove all nuclear 
weapons.1179 Gorbachev’s continuous implementation of a reassurance strategy and the 
change from rejection to a positive response from the United States helped end the Cold 
War.  
F. OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION 
1. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes 
The outcomes of the hypotheses applied to the Soviet Union and the United States 
during the Gorbachev time between 1985 and 1989 are as follows (Figure 4.5). All of the 
intervening variables changed and provided favorable conditions for the success of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States. Gorbachev changed his 
perceptions of Reagan and the United States (IntV 1). Reagan also altered his perceptions 
of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union through summit meetings (IntV 2). Also, both 
Gorbachev and Reagan had open minds without psychological biases. Domestic politics 
of the Soviet Union and the United States supported Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy 
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and the acceptance of the United States, respectively (IntV 3 and 4). There was support 
from the Warsaw Pact countries, especially from the ordinary people for Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy (IntV 5). Lastly, leaders of key allies of the United States in Europe 
pushed Reagan to accept Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Also, the nuclear protest 
movement in Europe showed pubic demands to stop arms race (IntV 6). In sum, the 
supportive conditions from changes in all of six intervening variable led to the success of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy (Figure 4.5).   
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Figure 4.5 Hypotheses and Their Outcomes (CV, IV, IntV, and DV) 
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2. Results of Hypotheses 
The conditions of success of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy can be explained 
by the results of the hypotheses.  
Results of hypotheses: 
H1: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was more 
likely to succeed when it altered his beliefs and perceptions about Reagan 
and the United States. 
H2: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was more 
likely to succeed when it altered Reagan’s beliefs and perceptions about 
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. 
H3: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was more 
likely to succeed when it altered domestic politics in the Soviet Union 
towards support for foreign policy change.  
H4: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was more 
likely to succeed when it altered domestic politics in the United States 
towards support for foreign policy change.  
H5: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was more 
likely to succeed when it altered alliance politics of the Soviet Union 
(Warsaw Pact countries) towards support for foreign policy change.  
H6: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was more 
likely to succeed when it altered alliance politics of the United States 
(NATO countries) towards support for foreign policy change. 
Consequently, all intervening variables provided positive conditions for success 
of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Because leader’s perceptions and domestic and 
alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States offered positive conditions for 
success, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed. 
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3. Conclusion 
a. The Importance of Leader’s Perceptions, Domestic Politics, and 
Alliance Politics of the Sending and Receiving States 
To understand the conditions for success or failure of a reassurance 
strategy, it is necessary to consider both the sending and receiving state. Many 
explanations about the end of the Cold War and the roles of Gorbachev and Reagan are 
not convincing because they focused only one side. However, Gorbachev’s reassurance 
strategy, Reagan’s positive response, and domestic and alliance politics of the Soviet 
Union and the United States must be considered as a whole. As Matlock said, “No 
country can ensure its own security without regarding the security of others.”1180  
As shown in the previous case studies, any reassurance strategy must be 
analyzed in the context of individual, domestic, and international factors of both the 
sending and receiving states. The case study of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy 
between 1985 and 1989 toward the Reagan administration shows that the cognition of 
leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United 
States altered; as a result, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy induced a positive response 
from the Reagan administration.  
In the case study, both Gorbachev and Reagan changed their perceptions 
of each other. As Matlock put it, “Once Gorbachev started the reform process, Reagan 
recognized that it was in the American interest to encourage it.”1181 Gorbachev and 
Reagan became good partners in 1988 and 1989. Also, the implementation of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was supported by domestic and alliance politics of both 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Domestic and alliance politics of the United 
States were important factors for the success of reassurance strategy. The domestic 
conditions in the United States made it more likely to respond positively to Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy. Gorbachev and Reagan understood that it was important to have 
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support from both opponents and supporters in domestic politics. Matlock rates the two 
leaders high in their capability to persuade their opponents. According to Matlock:  
Obviously, it was important to the new general secretary not to seem weak 
or incompetent to those who put him in office. But the sentiment Reagan 
ascribed to Gorbachev applied to Reagan as well: he, too, was determined 
not to seem weak to his more hard-line supporters. They understood this 
and played on it to head off negotiations or slow them down. After Reagan 
began his direct interaction with Gorbachev he exhibited progressively 
less concern on this score than he had earlier.1182  
Leaders in Warsaw Pact countries showed limited support for 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, yet ordinary people strongly supported it. At the same 
time, ordinary West Europeans supported the nuclear freeze movement and leaders were 
influenced by that. As a result, NATO countries supported Gorbachev’s reassurance 
strategy and did not prevent the United States from offering positive responses. In sum, to 
implement a reassurance strategy successfully, it is important to know how to alter a 
leader’s perceptions and make the opponents from domestic politics and allies accept the 
reassurance strategy. 
b.  The Importance of Intelligence 
In retrospect, if there had been additional accurate intelligence in the 
Soviet Union and the United States, the relationship between the two countries could 
have been better sooner. Despite enormous intelligence efforts during the Cold War, there 
was still a lack of understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Hoffman said, “As the Harvard professor observed in 1983, ‘The United States cannot 
predict Soviet behavior because it has too little information about what goes on inside the 
Soviet Union; the Soviets cannot predict American behavior because they have too much 
information.’” 1183  The best method to get useful intelligence information is to have 
personal contacts. 
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For the first couple of years of the Gorbachev period, the Soviet Union 
and the United States did not have meetings of military leaders, government officials and 
regional experts.1184 The U.S. intelligence apparatus made enormous mistakes in judging 
Gorbachev and other new leaders and their new approaches in the Soviet Union. When 
Gorbachev took office, the United States did not have enough intelligence about 
Gorbachev. Hoffman pointed out “This was a moment when Reagan could have used 
fresh and penetrating insights into Gorbachev’s thinking and life experiences….And just 
when the United States could have used some good human intelligence about the new 
leader in Moscow, the CIA suffered a series of blinding catastrophes.”1185  
When Gorbachev declared the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine to European 
Countries in 1985, American intelligence did not catch his sincerity. Also, when the 
Warsaw Pact military doctrine was released, after the Berlin meeting in May 1987 
between Gorbachev and leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, American intelligence did 
not recognize it, either. James Mann said, “American intelligence agencies did not learn 
about this aspect of the Warsaw Pact gathering until several years later. It turned out to be 
an important step toward ending the Cold War.”1186 Hoffman also pointed out, “…the 
superpowers often wrongly judged each other’s intentions and actions. They engaged in 
deceptions that only deepened the dangers.” 1187  Later, the Soviet Union could 
communicate its sincere intentions through personal contacts and exchange of people. 
The United States could, as well, recognize the changes of the Soviet Union from face-to-
face meetings.  
In conclusion, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 
is a good example of a successful reassurance strategy caused by changes in leaders’ 
perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Gorbachev’s persistence in demonstrating restraint and offering 
concessions, as called for by GRIT, was especially important in bringing about changes 
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in the key intervening variables. Just as important was President Reagan’s willingness to 
be persuaded that Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader. With supportive 
domestic and alliance environments, the two leaders were able to set in motion the end of 
the Cold War.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Deterrence has historically been the main strategy states use to reduce the 
possibility of war. However, as Janice Gross Stein argues, “Under certain kinds of 
strategic conditions, deterrence may not only fail, it may provoke the action it is designed 
to deter because it intensifies the pressure on the challenger to act.” 1188  Deterrence 
strategy can also be ineffective or irrelevant when the receiving state misinterprets or 
ignores the intentions of the sending state.1189 Reassurance is an alternative strategy that 
can be used as either a substitute for or a complement to deterrence. Its goal is to avoid 
the risks that deterrence will prove provocative or ineffective. Reassurance involves 
taking actions to show the sender’s benign intentions to the receiving state.  
However, compared to deterrence strategy, reassurance strategy has less attracted 
scholars’ and policymakers’ attention. Therefore, the situations in which reassurance is 
an appropriate strategy and the necessary conditions for the success of reassurance 
strategy have not been studied enough. This dissertation has tried to address these gaps 
through the use of a case study method involving “structured, focused comparison.”1190 
The comparison of the three case studies—a partial success case of South Korea toward 
North Korea (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and 
Prosperity Policy), a failure case of the United States toward North Korea (Bush’s 
reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008), and a success case of the Soviet Union toward 
the United States (Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy)—leads to several conclusions.  
Those conclusions are as follows: First, reassurance is an appropriate strategy 
when the receiving state has “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motives. Therefore, it is 
very important to investigate the motivating factors of the receiving state. Second, the 
incentives for use of a reassurance strategy can be found in the sending state’s needs 
under internally or externally difficult situations. And, third, the necessary conditions for 
the success of a reassurance strategy are not found in any one theory, one level of 
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analysis, or one party, but in an eclectic and broad approach including leaders’ 
perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending state and the 
receiving state.  
A. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
1. Patterns of Success and Failure of Reassurance Strategy  
This dissertation systematically analyzed the conditions affecting the success or 
failure of reassurance strategy. The same six hypotheses were applied to three case 
studies. If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of the reassurance strategy would 
be influenced by the six intervening variables (leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, 
and alliance politics of the sending and receiving states). The dissertation hypothesized 
that the six intervening variables combine to produce the dependent variable (DV), the 
success or failure of a reassurance strategy. In other words, if the reassurance strategy 
triggers appropriate changes in the intervening variables, it would lead to the success of 
the reassurance strategy.  
In Case I, there were some changes in leaders’ perceptions of South Korea and 
North Korea. Also, there was limited support from domestic politics of South Korea. 
However, there were no sufficient changes in the domestic politics of North Korea and 
the alliance politics of the two Koreas. As a result, reassurance strategy had only partial 
impacts on the intervening variables. These resulted in a partial success of the 
reassurance strategy.  
While all six variables changed in Case III, there were no changes in Case II. In 
Case II, there were neither changes in leaders’ perceptions, nor support from domestic 
and alliance politics of either the United States or North Korea. It was impossible for 
Bush’s reassurance strategy to be successful under those circumstances. On the contrary, 
in Case III, Gorbachev and Reagan changed their perceptions of one another. Also, 
domestic and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States became 
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supportive of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. These changes led to the success of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy by inducing positive responses from the United States. 
That is, the obvious difference between the failure (Case II) and the success (Case III) 
was whether or not the six intervening variables changed. The outcomes of the three case 
studies focusing on the six hypotheses relating to the intervening variables (IntV) are 
summarized in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1. Patterns of Success and Failure of Reassurance Strategy 
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For more details, it is useful to compare the answers of each research question in 
the three case studies. Each variable in the framework has related questions to allow 
investigation of the causal connections among variables. The following section shows all 
questions and answers from the three case studies and compares them to form a 
conclusion. 
2. Summary of Questions and Answers Related to the Variables 
There are a total of 13 questions to identify the relationships among variables. 
Each case study has attempted to answer each question. Some answers are similar across 
the cases, but generally speaking, answers are different in each case. Those different 
answers help clarify the causal relationships among the variables.  
a. Independent Variable (IV): The Implementation of Reassurance 
Strategy (the Sending State) 
There are three questions related to the independent variable (IV)—the 
acceptance of coexistence, the incentives for use, and the type of reassurance strategy. 
Reassurance strategy contains the concept of coexistence because it is based on the idea 
that there is no malignant intention to attack. However, there are differences in the three 
cases. The incentives for use of reassurance strategy are similar because all three cases 
are based on recognition that there were some limitations and difficulties with traditional 
deterrent and coercive strategies. Also, there were differences in the type of reassurance 
strategy employed in the three case studies. There is a correlation between the intensity of 
the reassurance strategy (IV) and the outcome of the reassurance strategy (DV).  
(1) Reassurance and Coexistence.  The first question, whether 
the sending state’s reassurance strategy communicates its willingness to accept co-
existence, is relevant to the outcome of reassurance strategy. For example, in Case III, the 
Soviet Union and the United States could develop their relations because they accepted 
and communicated the concept of coexistence. On the contrary, even though South Korea 
and the United States showed their willingness to accept coexistence with North Korea, 
there were limitations and suspicions. South Korea could not offer a security guarantee to 
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North Korea without the assistance of the United States. Moreover, it was difficult for 
South Korea, especially its hard-liners, to accept communist North Korea as another 
legitimate state with which to coexist. The United States also could not offer a security 
guarantee to, or accept coexistence with North Korea without the complete 
dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. In sum, the level of acceptance of 
coexistence is closely related to the outcome of reassurance strategy. The communication 
of willingness to accept coexistence in each case study is summarized in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2. Question 1: Reassurance and Coexistence 
Answers 
Question 1 Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
Did the sending state’s 
reassurance strategy 
communicate its willingness 
to offer a security guarantee to 
or accept coexistence with the 
receiving state?  
Yes,  
but there were 
limitations because 
it was difficult to 
offer a security 















the United States. 
(2) Incentives for Reassurance Strategy.  The sending state’s 
leader starts the reassurance strategy because of the state’s own need. The leaders do not 
start from the beliefs about or perception of the other leader or state. All three case 
studies show that the sending state has its own difficulty when initiating reassurance 
strategy. For example, in Case I, Kim Dae Jung began reassurance strategy during the 
East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The cost of Korean unification or North 
Korean collapse was estimated to be extremely high. In Case II, Bush’s hard-line policy 
toward North Korea did not work and there was a North Korean nuclear test in 2006. In 
addition, there was difficulty in Iraq in 2006. In Case III, the Soviet Union had difficulty 
in Afghanistan and there were political problems and economic stagnation when 
Gorbachev took power in 1985. As shown in Table 5.3, these difficult situations provided 
incentives for the use of reassurance strategy.  
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Table 5.3. Question 2. Incentives for Use of Reassurance Strategy 
Answers 
Question 2 Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
What was the incentive for the 
use of a reassurance strategy?   
- Economic 
difficulty and 
expected high cost 
of unification or 
North Korean 
collapse 
- North Korea’s 
nuclear test on 
October 9, 2006 
and the difficult 
situation in Iraq 
in 2006 
- Nuclear threat 





Also, the leader’s recognition of those difficulties is necessary. 
Moreover, under the situation when it is difficult to change the other side with hard 
power and there is an aversion to war, leaders start considering a reassurance strategy. 
Even though there are still doubts and suspicions about the intention of the receiving state, 
the sending state’s leaders implement a reassurance strategy in an attempt to solve their 
own problems. In sum, the incentive for use of a reassurance strategy results from the 
need for change initiated by the internal or external difficulties of the sending states. With 
continuous tension and the possibility of war, it is difficult to solve those problems. 
Therefore, the incentives of reassurance strategy are related to the goal of reassurance 
strategy, which is to reduce tensions and avoid war. When reliance solely on a deterrence 
strategy cannot achieve this objective, and it is difficult to win a war without significant 
damage, reassurance strategy emerges. 
(3) Types of Reassurance Strategy and Their Level of 
Commitment to Produce Change.  As explained earlier, according to Stein, there are five 
general ways to implement a reassurance strategy: (1) reassurance through restraint; (2) 
reassurance through norms of competition; (3) reassurance through irrevocable 
commitment; (4) reassurance through limited security regimes; and (5) reassurance 
through reciprocity strategies such as Tit-for-Tat or GRIT. Some of those involve greater 
risk or cost for the sending state, but because of this they send a stronger signal of intent 
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to change the relationship with the other side. Each case study shows differences in how 
the state leaders implemented reassurance strategy (Table 5.4):  
Table 5.4. Question 3. Types of Reassurance Strategy 
Answers 
Question 3 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
What kind of reassurance 
strategy did the sending state 
















































For example, in Case III, Gorbachev implemented his reassurance 
strategy mainly through GRIT, restraint, and summit meetings, but his actions included 
elements of all five reassurance strategies. The unilateral nuclear moratorium and its 
continuous extension in 1985 and 1986 were not only an example of reassurance through 
restraint but also a part of GRIT. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the 
change of military doctrine were similar examples.  
However, in Cases I and II, there were limitations on the use of 
reassurance. In Case I, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun implemented their reassurance 
strategies through summit meetings and inter-Korean talks. However, there were 
limitations. Summit meetings were held only once for each president and Kim Jong Il did 
not visit Seoul. Inter-Korean talks resulted in agreements on many things, yet a lot of the 
agreements were not put into practice. Moreover, there was neither reassurance through 
significant restraint nor through reciprocity. Also, South Korea could not fully attempt to 
reassure through the development of norms of competition in areas of disputed interests 
such as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. In Case II, the Bush 
administration implemented the reassurance strategy only through the Six-Party Talks 
and Tit-for-Tat. The other methods, such as restraint, norms of competition, irrevocable 
commitment and GRIT, were not considered seriously after the Six-Party Talks and Tit-
for-Tat failed to produce significant progress.  
In sum, although all three cases involved the implementation of 
reassurance strategy, there were some differences in terms of the levels of commitment 
and positive intentions they conveyed. Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was the most 
proactive in implementation. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategies 
were not as proactive as Gorbachev’s. Bush’s reassurance strategy was the least bold. 
These different levels of commitment resulted in different outcomes of the reassurance 
strategies in the end. The more persistent and potentially costly the reassurance strategy, 
the more success it achieved in the three cases.  
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b.  Condition Variable 1 (CV 1): Circumstances and Relations 
Between the Sending and Receiving States 
The question related to the first condition variable is what were the 
circumstances and relations between the two countries over the time period when the 
reassurance strategy was attempted (Question 4). As shown in the diagram of the main 
argument and hypotheses, circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving 
states drawn from three theoretical perspectives—balance of power (realist), 
interdependence (liberal), or identity (constructivist)—influence the motivating factors of 
the receiving state and the intervening variables. However, even though those 
circumstances provide conditions that affect reassurance, they are not sufficient for 
explaining the causal mechanisms for success or failure of reassurance strategy.    
(1) Balance of Power (the Realist Perspective).  The balance of 
power is not sufficient to explain the incentive for use or the success or failure of 
reassurance strategy. Even though the balance of power was more favorable to the 
sending states (South Korea and the United States) in Case I and Case II, Case III 
involved the opposite situation (Table 5.5). However, the simple power comparison does 
not explain the calculations of the sending and receiving states. Even though South Korea 
and the United States were more favorable than North Korea in terms of the balance of 
power, North Korea’s nuclear program as well as asymmetric forces compensated for its 
unfavorable balance of power. Therefore, war against North Korea would bring 
significant damage to South Korea and the United States, even if they would win. 
Leaders and domestic and alliance politics cannot ignore these circumstances. They are 
one of reasons why Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and George W. Bush implemented 
their reassurance strategies. In Case III, Gorbachev did not implement his reassurance 
strategy because the Soviet Union faced on unfavorable balance of power. It was a part of 
his considerations, yet the danger of nuclear war against human beings and the Soviet 
suffering from the arms race were more important factors. Overall, the three cases 
suggest the balance of power is not a significant factor in determining reassurance 
outcomes.  
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Table 5.5. Question 4-a. Balance of Power 
Answers Question 4-a 
(from the Realist Approach) Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
What was the “balance of 
power” between the two 
countries?  
Was it changing and, if so, in 
what direction?  
Is there evidence the balance of 
power affected the calculations 
of either the sending or 
receiving state? 
- Unfavorable 
balance of power 
to North Korea 
- North Korea’s 
nuclear program to 
compensate for  
the unfavorable 
balance of power  
- Unfavorable 
balance of power 
to North Korea 
- North Korea’s 
nuclear program 
to compensate 
for  the 
unfavorable 
balance of power 
- Unfavorable 
balance of power 
to the Soviet 
Union 




balance of power 
(2) Interdependence (the Liberal Perspective).  There was 
almost no interdependence between any of the pairs of states examined in the three case 
studies (Table 5.6). Therefore, this dissertation cannot reach any conclusions about the 
influence of interdependence on the outcome of reassurance except to observe that both 
success and failure are possible under no interdependence. Further study is necessary to 
investigate the role of interdependence on the reassurance strategy.   
Table 5.6. Question 4-b. Interdependence 
Answers 
Question 4-b 
(from the Liberal Approach) Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
What was the level of 
“interdependence” between the 
two countries?  
Was it changing and, if so, in 
what direction?  
Is there evidence that 
interdependence affected the 
calculations of either the sending 








(3) Identity (the Constructivist Perspective).  There are 
correlations between mutual identity and the outcome of reassurance strategy (Table 5.7).  
Table 5.7. Question 4-c. Identity 
Answers 
Question 4-c 
(from the Constructivist 
Approach) Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
To what extent was there a 
shared identity between the two 
countries?  
Was the degree of shared 
understanding changing and if 
so in what direction?  
Is there evidence that identity 
affected the calculations of 
either the sending or receiving 
state? 
Limited rise of 
new identity 
- South Korea: 
from enemy to 
partner 
- North Korea: 
from revolutionary 
object to 
competing object  
Continuation of 
shared enemy 
identity (axis of 
evil vs. empire of 
devil) 






Identity influences all three levels of analysis of both the sending 
and receiving states. In Case II, a shared Hobbesian enemy identity among leaders and in 
domestic and alliance politics between the United States and North Korea contributed to 
the failure of reassurance strategy. In contrast, in Case III, the rise of a new identity 
suggesting movement from Hobbesian culture (enemy) to Lockean culture (rival) among 
leaders and in domestic and alliance politics between the Soviet Union and the United 
States during the Gorbachev and Reagan period helped produce the success of the 
reassurance strategy. When there were positive responses from the Reagan administration 
and more rewards from the Soviet Union, like the arms reduction announcement in 
Gorbachev’s UN speech in 1988, the relationship changed further toward one of partners 
rather than rivals.  
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In Case I, there was a limited rise of new identity from enemy 
(Hobbesian culture) to rival or partner (Lockean culture) in leaders and domestic politics 
in South Korea. However, the majority of South Koreans considered North Korea as a 
threat. Also, there was very limited identity change from revolutionary object to 
competing object in North Korea’s image of South Korea. The dominant identity of 
North Korea toward South Korea was still enemy identity. That resulted in the partial 
success of South Korea’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea.  
Also, it is hard to sustain a reassurance strategy over the long run if 
the receiving state never reciprocates, and to that extent its success will eventually 
depend on the emergence of shared norms of collective identity and recognition of danger 
from a security dilemma. At the same time, to generate shared norms of collective 
identity and awareness of the security dilemma in leaders, and in domestic and alliance 
politics, requires fortitude and persistence. That is why the success of a reassurance 
strategy is difficult to achieve. In sum, the other’s reciprocation to generate shared norms 
of collective identity and recognition of danger from a security dilemma is essential for 
the success of a reassurance strategy. 
c.  Condition Variable 2 (CV 2): Motivating Factors of the 
Receiving State 
(1) Motivating Factors of the Receiving State.  If the receiving 
state has only “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, reassurance 
strategy will fail. Therefore, for the success or failure of the reassurance strategy, it is 
important to know the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV 2). It is difficult to 
know the real motivating factors of the receiving state, but it is necessary to consider 
them. As shown in Figure 1.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, 
IntV, and DV) in Chapter 1, circumstances and relations between the sending and 
receiving states (CV 1) provide a clue to what the motivating factors of the receiving 
state are. In all three case studies, the receiving states not only had “greedy” and 
“opportunity-oriented” motivating factors but also “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
motivating factors (Table 5.8).  
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Table 5.8. Question 5. Motivating Factors of the Receiving State 
Answers 
Question 5 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
What were the receiving state’s 
motivations?  
Is the state best seen as greedy, 
insecure, or having mixed 
motivations?  
What was the sending state’s 
perception of the receiving 








The intelligence community and the military arms of government 
should focus on how to identify these motivating factors. If the target state has only a 
“greedy” motivating factor, a deterrence strategy rather than reassurance strategy should 
be considered. There are always limitations ascertaining motivations through reliance on 
intelligence’s technical data. In the face of uncertainty, the intelligence and military 
services usually exaggerate the “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors 
of the target state. They have a tendency to ignore the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
motivating factors of the target state. The best way to identify motivations of the 
receiving state is to increase any kind of contacts, such as summit meetings and 
exchanges of people, in order to “test” or draw out a response from the receiving state. 
The number of summit meetings and interchange of people is obviously different in the 
three case studies. The level of contact is in proportion to the outcome of reassurance 
strategy. The more they met, the better they understood the real motivating factors of the 
other side.  
In addition, no matter what motivating factor the receiving state 
has, the sending state’s perceptions of the receiving state’s motivations are also important. 
As shown in the three case studies, generally speaking, progressive soft-liners focus on 
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the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors and conservative hard-liners 
emphasize the “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented’ motivating factors. How much soft-
liners or hard-liners can influence policy making, how much leaders support which side, 
and how much either side supports its state’s leaders are all important factors in order to 
understand the intervening variables and their impact on the outcome of reassurance 
strategy. In sum, both the motivating factors of the receiving state and perceptions of the 
sending state need to be considered in the analysis.   
(2) Aversion to War.  In all three cases, win or lose, states had 
an aversion to war based on calculations of the cost of war (Table 5.9).  
Table 5.9. Question 6. Aversion to War 
Answers 
Question 6 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
Did the two parties share an 
aversion to war? Yes Yes Yes 
An aversion to war provides the sending state with an incentive for 
use of a reassurance strategy and the receiving state with “not-greedy” motivating factors. 
In Case I, the two Koreas have built up military forces since the Korean War. Another 
Korean war will bring unrecoverable damage to the Korean peninsula. In Case II, 
considering an estimate of the cost of war on the Korean peninsula and possible strike on 
the continental United States, it would not be easy for the United States to use military 
action against North Korea. In Case III, both the Soviet Union and the United States 
shared an aversion to war, especially nuclear war. The damage from nuclear war between 
the two countries could not be calculated and rebuilding would be impossible. A shared 
aversion to war may be a necessary condition for reassurance, but is it not sufficient to 
guarantee success since it was present in cases in which reassurance failed. 
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d.  Intervening Variables (IntV) and Six Hypotheses 
The individual level (leader’s perceptions), domestic level (domestic 
politics), and international level (alliance politics) all matter. A theory that focuses on one 
level to the exclusion of the others misses important aspects of their interaction and 
generates incomplete explanations and unsatisfactory predictions about the outcome of a 
reassurance strategy. As Philip E. Tetlock points out, “What excites the attention of 
investigators working at one level of analysis may well be invisible to investigators 
working at other levels of analysis.” 1191  One level of analysis is not sufficient to 
understand the causal mechanisms involved in reassurance strategy. This dissertation has 
argued that the threes level of analysis are equally important to foresee the outcome of a 
reassurance strategy.   
(1) IntV 1 and Hypothesis 1: Sending State’s Leader’s 
Perceptions.  Leadership is central to the implementation of a reassurance strategy 
because it needs to be initiated and supported by a leader. In Case I and III, without Kim 
Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun in South Korea and Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, it is 
hard to imagine that South Korea and the Soviet Union would have implemented a 
reassurance strategy. South Korea and the Soviet Union changed their strategies toward 
North Korea and the United States, respectively. In Case II, Bush’s policy change toward 
North Korea was necessary for the reassurance strategy. I added the sending state’s 
leader’s perceptions of the receiving state and its leader as one of intervening variables 
because in each case reassurance strategies were initiated even though there were doubts 
about the leader of the receiving state. As they implemented their reassurance strategies, 
Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Gorbachev changed their perceptions of Kim Jong Il 
and Reagan, respectively; Bush did not change his perceptions of Kim Jong Il (Table 
5.10). These are all related to the outcome of the reassurance strategies. Therefore, 
hypothesis 1 is plausible:  
                                                 
1191 Philip E. Tetlock, “Methodological Themes and Variations,” in Behavior, Society and Nuclear 
War, Vol. 1, eds, Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 339.  
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H1: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the 
sending state leader’s perceptions about the receiving state. 
In addition, although the leader’s role is important, a leader cannot 
implement a reassurance strategy alone. Domestic and alliance support (IntV 3, 4, 5 and 
6) are necessary to continuously implement reassurance strategy and lead to a successful 
outcome. 
Table 5.10. Question 7. Sending State’s Leader’s Perceptions 
Answers 
Question 7 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
How did the sending state’s 
leader perceive the receiving 
state and its leader?  
Is there evidence that common 
psychological biases led the 
sending state leader to 
misperceive the receiving state’s 
leader?  
Or was reassurance implemented 
in a way that was sufficient to 
overcome the sending state 
leader’s cognitive barriers to 
changing his/her image of the 
receiving state? 
Some change in 
Kim Dae Jung’s 
and Roh Moo 
Hyun’s beliefs and 
perceptions of Kim 
Jong Il and North 
Korea. 
Little change in 
Bush’s beliefs and 
perceptions of 





Reagan and the 
United States. 
(2) IntV 2 and Hypothesis 2: Receiving State’s Leader’s 
Perceptions.  The receiving state’s leader’s perceptions are directly related to the outcome 
of a reassurance strategy. Without the change of the receiving state’s leader’s perceptions, 
it is almost impossible to have a positive response to the reassurance strategy. The three 
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case studies show this (Table 5.11). In Case I, some change in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions 
of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea resulted in a partial success. In 
Case II, without a change in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Bush and the United States, 
there was no significant positive response from North Korea. By contrast, in Case III, 
Reagan changed his perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union through their 
personal interactions at various summit meetings and the exchange of letters. Reagan’s 
change was important for providing positive responses to Gorbachev’s reassurance 
strategy. The fact that, unlike Reagan, some conservative hard-liners remained suspicious 
of Gorbachev shows how much the leadership in the receiving state is central to the 
success of reassurance strategy. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is probable:  
H2: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the 
receiving state leader’s perceptions about the sending state. 
Table 5.11. Question 8. Receiving State’s Leader’s Perceptions 
Answers 
Question 8 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
How did the receiving state’s 
leader perceive the reassurance 
strategy offered by the sending 
state?  
Is there evidence that common 
psychological biases led the 
receiving state’s leader to 
discount the reassurance 
strategy?  
Or was reassurance 
implemented in a way that was 
sufficient to overcome the 
receiver’s cognitive barriers to 
changing its image of the 
sender? 
Some change in 
Kim Jong Il’s 
beliefs and 
perceptions of Kim 
Dae Jung and Roh 
Moo Hyun and 
South Korea. 
Little change in 
Kim Jong Il’s 
beliefs and 
perceptions of 





Gorbachev and the 
Soviet Union. 
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(3) IntV 3 and Hypothesis 3: Domestic Politics of the Sending 
State.  There are always supporters and opponents of reassurance strategies in the sending 
state. The relative influence of the two sides affects the prospects for success. In Case I, 
there was a rise of progressives that supported Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo Hyun’s 
reassurance strategy toward North Korea. However, conservative groups that opposed 
Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy had strong power to influence 
domestic politics in South Korea. Therefore, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun did not 
have enough domestic support for implementation of their reassurance strategy. This led 
to the partial success of this strategy. In Case II, Bush’s reassurance strategy could only 
be initiated with the rise of soft-liners within his administration. However, it was 
constrained by the strong opposition of remaining hard-liners as well as Bush’s low 
popularity in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, without sufficient domestic support, the Bush 
administration had difficulty in implementing a reassurance strategy toward North Korea 
in 2007 and 2008. This contributed to the failure of Bush’s reassurance strategy toward 
North Korea. 
By contrast, in Case III, Gorbachev could implement his 
reassurance strategy without the strong opposition from domestic politics. Gorbachev’s 
inner circle advisor group and the broad professional class provided both intellectual and 
political support that produced changes in Soviet policy. Also, there was a decline in 
opposition from hard-liners, such as the military, communist party, and KGB. The more 
authoritarian Soviet system also gave the leader more autonomy relative to democracies. 
Jack Snyder argues, “Ironically, the Stalinist legacy of centralized institutions suited to 
the task of social transformation from above.” 1192  As a result, Gorbachev could 
implement his reassurance strategy with less opposition from domestic politics. This 
resulted in the success of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. As shown in Table 5.12, 
these different domestic politics are in parallel with the outcome of the reassurance 
strategy. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is reasonable:  
                                                 
1192 Snyder, “The Gorbachev Revolution,” 110.  
 418
H3: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic 
politics in the sending state towards support for foreign policy change. 
Table 5.12. Question 9. Domestic Politics of the Sending State 
Answers 
Question 9 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
How did key domestic actors in 
the sending state perceive the 
leader’s reassurance strategy 
offer to the receiving state?  
Did the reassurance strategy 
generate domestic support in the 
sending state?  
Was there sufficient domestic 
support to make the reassurance 
credible, or was the government 
constrained from fully 
implementing its reassurance 
strategy? 











from hard-liners  
- Little support in 
domestic politics 
of the United 
States. 
- Decline of 
opposition against 
Gorbachev and 
support from inner 
circle advisor group 
and epistemic 
communities. 
(4) IntV 4 and Hypothesis 4: Domestic Politics of the 
Receiving State.  Just as there are domestic politics in the sending state, there are always 
supporters and opponents for reciprocity to the reassurance strategy in the receiving state. 
Therefore, the relative influence of the two sides also affects the prospects for success. In 
Cases I and II, there were signs of disagreement between the military and the diplomats 
in North Korea. It is difficult to identify those who disagreed with the military and 
supported reciprocity to reassurance strategy in North Korea due to lack of information. 
However, the conservative military seemed to have been a key domestic actor and there 
was little change in domestic politics in North Korea.  
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By contrast, in Case III, there was a rise of supporters for arms 
control among ordinary people. Also, there was a decline of hard-liners and a rise of soft-
liners in the Cabinet. Therefore, Reagan could provide a positive response to Gorbachev’s 
reassurance strategy without strong opposition from hard-liners. To understand the target 
state and predict the outcome of reassurance, it is necessary to consider the state’s 
domestic politics and how leaders are influenced by it. As shown in Table 5.13, these 
different domestic politics in the receiving states are in parallel with the outcome of the 
reassurance strategies. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is believable:  
H4: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic 
politics in the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.  
Table 5.13. Question 10. Domestic Politics of the Receiving State 
Answers 
Question 10 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
How did key domestic actors in 
the receiving state perceive the 
reassurance strategy offered by 
the sending state?  
Did the reassurance strategy 
generate domestic support in 
the receiving state for 
reciprocity?  
Did powerful domestic actors 
try to prevent the receiving 
state from offering a positive 
response? 
Little change in 
domestic politics 
of North Korea. 
Little change in 
domestic politics 
of North Korea 
- Military first 
policy. 
Rise of supporters 
for arms control 
and changes in 
Reagan’s policy 
toward the Soviet 
Union. 
(5) IntV 5 and Hypothesis 5: Alliance Politics of the Sending 
State.  The support or opposition of allies of the sending state also influences the outcome 
of the reassurance strategy. In Cases I and II, alliance politics provided little support for 
the implementation of the reassurance strategies. In Case I, when Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
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Moo Hyun implemented reassurance strategies, the United States maintained a more 
hard-line policy, such as deterrence or threat of a preemptive attack. Without support 
from the United States, it was difficult for Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun to 
implement their reassurance strategy and induce a positive response from North Korea. In 
Case II, when Bush changed his policy into a reassurance strategy, the new South Korean 
government switched to a more hard-line policy. Japan also kept raising the kidnapping 
issue.  
By contrast, in Case III, in the Warsaw Pact countries, leaders 
grudgingly accepted Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy and ordinary people showed 
strong support for it. With support from ordinary East Europeans discouraging leaders 
from opposing him, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy. Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 is persuasive: 
H5: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance 
politics of the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.     
Table 5.14. Question 11. Alliance Politics of the Sending State 
Answers 
Question 11 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
How did key allies of the 
sending state affect the 
reassurance strategy to the 
receiving state?  
Was there sufficient alliance 
support to make the 
reassurance credible, or was 
the government constrained 
from fully implementing its 
reassurance strategy? 
Little support from 










ordinary people.  
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(6) IntV 6 and Hypothesis 6: Alliance Politics of the Receiving 
State.  Alliance politics of the receiving state also have an impact on the outcome of a 
reassurance strategy. In Cases I and II, China and Russia, North Korea’s two allies, had 
limited influence on North Korea to reciprocate the reassurance strategy from South 
Korea or the United States, respectively. In addition, even though both China and Russia 
wanted to improve their relations with South Korea and the United States, they could not 
ignore their interests in supporting North Korea. By contrast, in Case III, West European 
leaders influenced Reagan to reciprocate Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Also, those 
leaders could not ignore the anti-nuclear weapons movement and its support among 
ordinary people. There were no key allies of the United States that tried to prevent it from 
offering a positive response, with the potential exception of the INF Treaty, where 
domestic peace movements ultimately kept European governments from actively 
opposing the deal. Overall, NATO countries mostly pressured the Reagan administration 
to change the hard-line U.S. policy and talk with Gorbachev. As shown in Table 5.15, the 
situations in Cases I and II were different from that in Case III. In sum, hypothesis 6 is 
credible: 
H6. Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance 
politics of the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.     
Table 5.15. Question 12. Alliance Politics of the Receiving State 
Answers 
Question 12 Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
How did key allies of the 
receiving state perceive the 
reassurance strategy?  
Did the reassurance strategy 
generate alliance support for 
the receiving state’s 
reciprocity?  
Did key allies try to prevent 
the receiving state from 
offering a positive response? 
Little support from 
allies (China and 
Russia) and 
limitations on their 
leverage with North 
Korea.  
Little support 
from allies (China 
and Russia) and 
limitations on 
their leverage 
with North Korea. 
Support from 
NATO allies 
(leaders and their 
public).  
 422
e. Dependent Variable (DV) 
As shown in Table 5.16, the three cases are distinguishable in terms of the 
outcome of reassurance strategy. 
Table 5.16. Question 13. Success or Failure of Reassurance Strategy 
Answers 
Question 13 
Case Study I 
ROK-DPRK 
Case Study II  
U.S.-DPRK 
Case Study III 
U.S.-USSR 
Was there any positive 
response to the reassurance 
strategy from the receiving 
state? 
Or, was there no response or 
rejection from the receiving 
state, followed by an increase 
in tensions? 
Partial success of 
reassurance 
strategy: 











- Rejection from 
North Korea on 
verification 
protocol 
- North Korea’s 





- Summit meetings 
- INF treaty 
- Agreement on 
prior notification of 
ICBM and SLBM 
flight tests 
- End of the Cold 
War 
In Case I, North Korea showed both positive and negative responses to 
Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. The 
two Koreas reached the 2000 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration after 
summit meetings in 2000 and 2007, respectively. There was an increase of interchange of 
people and trade. However, North Korea’s nuclear threat and provocative actions never 
dissipated. The case hence represents partial success and partial failure of the reassurance 
strategy. In Case II, there were no substantial actions to follow the two agreements in the 
Six-Party Talks on February 13 and October 3, 2007. Furthermore, North Korea carried 
out missile and nuclear tests in 2009, which showed the total failure of Bush’s 
reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008.  
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By contrast, in Case III, the United States, as the receiving state of 
Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, offered a series of positive actions, such as summit 
meetings, the INF treaty, and the agreement on prior notification of ICBM and SLBM 
flight tests. Moreover, there was significant tension reduction between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, which led to the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it is an example 
of the success of a reassurance strategy. 
Consequently, the causal relations among variables are made clearer by 
reiterating the questions related to each variable and comparing answers from the three 
cases studies. This “structured, focused comparison” helped develop “contingent 
generalizations” about the conditions of the success or failure of reassurance strategies. 
Answers relating to the six intervening variables are noteworthy based on the dependent 
variable, the success or failure of reassurance strategy. Each intervening variable affects 
the probability of the success of reassurance strategies. However, as shown in the case 
studies, the most important necessary conditions for the success of a reassurance strategy 
are the changes in leaders’ perceptions in both the sending and receiving states (IntV 1 
and 2). Without these shifts, the success of a reassurance strategy is impossible.  
B. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF REASSURANCE 
STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
This dissertation has explored specific ways to answer the research questions: 
under what conditions is reassurance to be an appropriate strategy, and what factors are 
associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy? Explanations based on any 
one theory (realism, liberalism, or constructivism), any one level of analysis (individual, 
state, or alliance), or any one party (sending or receiving state) alone cannot provide a 
satisfactory account for the outcome of reassurance strategy. This requires an adequate 
analytical framework for better understanding.  
To answer the research questions, this dissertation offers two, related 
frameworks—(1) a variable framework; and (2) a “two-by-three” framework to analyze 
reassurance strategy. The variable framework emphasizes the importance of a complete 
theoretical model. It has an independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), 
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intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). On the other hand, the “two-
by-three” framework focuses on the two parties and the different levels of analysis, which 
produce the intervening variables (IntV). Also, as explained in the previous section, this 
dissertation proposed six hypotheses to explain the relations among independent variable 
(IV), intervening variables (IntV), and dependent variable (DV). The frameworks and 
hypotheses make it possible to systematically analyze the incentives for use and 
conditions for success of reassurance strategy.  
1. Variable Framework 
As proposed in Chapter I, this dissertation offers a variable framework for 
analysis of reassurance strategy. The framework tried to reflect two debates—the level of 
analysis and the theory vs. practice—and to solve their problems in international relations.  
a. Level of Analysis 
First, the “level of analysis” issue has been a main debate among 
international relations scholars. 1193  There have been debates between 
atomistic/reductionist and holistic/systemic approaches since Kenneth Waltz’s 
establishment of the “three images” in Man, the State, and War in 1959.1194. Many 
scholars have argued that one level of analysis is more important than the other levels. 
For example, some scholars explained the end of the Cold War by crediting Gorbachev or 
Reagan, others by referring to the nature of the Soviet Union or the United States, and 
others by citing the international system as a whole. The variable framework in this 
dissertation argues that all three levels of analysis—leader, domestic politics, and alliance 
politics—matter and they interact. One level of analysis is not sufficient to explain the 
incentive for use and the outcome of a reassurance strategy. It is necessary to consider all 
three level of analysis together.  
                                                 
1193 Refer to J.D. Singer, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in The 
International System: Theoretical Essays, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), 77–92 and Barry Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered,” in 
International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steven Smith (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1995), 198–216.  
1194 Buzan, 199–202. 
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The three levels of analysis (the leaders’ perceptions and domestic and 
alliance politics) all play important roles in influencing the outcome of reassurance 
strategies. The sending state’s leader’s recognition of the need for a reassurance strategy 
is necessary for its implementation. The leaders’ perceptions of the sending and receiving 
states (IntV 1 and 2) need to change for the success of a reassurance strategy. Without the 
change of the leaders’ perceptions, it is difficult for the sending state leader to continue 
implementing a reassurance strategy and for the receiving state leader to show positive 
responses. Also, the impact of domestic politics of the sending and receiving states (IntV 
3 and 4) has much to contribute to explaining the outcome of a reassurance strategy. 
Without the support of domestic politics, it is difficult to make a reassurance strategy 
successful. There is always resistance to reassurance strategies in domestic politics of the 
sending and receiving states.  
Lastly, alliance politics of the sending and receiving states (IntV 5 and 6) 
cannot be ignored when looking for explanations for the outcome of a reassurance 
strategy. Without support or at least acquiescence from allies, it is also difficult for the 
sending state to implement a reassurance strategy and for the receiving state to show 
positive responses. In sum, this dissertation rejects the arguments for an exclusively 
atomistic/reductionist or holistic/systemic approach and argues that each level of analysis 
is significant. 
b. Theory (Condition Variable) and Practice (Intervening Variable) 
Second, there has been a gap between theory and practice. Samuel W. 
Lewis, President of United States Institute of Peace argues: “From the standpoint of the 
policymaker, the scholar is ‘too academic,’ all too often too prone to abstraction and 
jargon….Scholars, on the other hand, may complain that practitioners are too haphazard 
and ad hoc in their approaches to situations, and too ready to apply pat formulas or 
supposed lesions of history in uncritical ways.”1195 To narrow the gap, this dissertation 
considers theory and practice together. The framework not only includes abstract 
                                                 
1195 Samuel W. Lewis, “Foreword,” in Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice 
in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), ix. 
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theoretical explanations but also investigates the changes in leader’s perceptions, 
domestic politics, and alliance politics to know what really happens in practice. That is, 
by linking circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states (CV1), 
and three levels of analysis of both the sending and receiving states (IntV), a “big 
picture” is provided for understanding the outcome of the use of reassurance strategies.  






1. Sending state leader’s perceptions about 
the receiving state and its leader 
2. Receiving state leader’s perceptions about 
the sending state and its leader.  
3. Domestic politics of the sending state  
4. Domestic politics of the receiving state 
5. Alliance politics of the sending state 







CV 1 →  CV 2 
Circumstances and 
relations between a 
sending state and a 





1. Balance of Power 
2. Interdependence 
3. Identity / Norms  
→  




Figure 5.1. A Framework for Analysis of Reassurance Strategy (IV, CV, IntV, and 
DV)1196  
                                                 
1196 Van Evera, Guidance to Methods, 7–48. 
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This dissertation accepts the importance of theory and investigates the 
influence of balance of power (realism), interdependence (liberalism), and identity 
(constructivism) as condition variables (CV 1) on intervening variables (IV: leader, 
domestic politics, and alliance politics). The combined explanation including condition 
variables and intervening variables captures the causal connections between the 
implementation of reassurance and its outcome better than a separate explanation. In sum, 
the united explanation of condition variables and intervening variables in one framework 
has stronger explanatory power. As shown in Figure 5.1, “a framework for analysis of 
reassurance strategy” including all variables can be drawn in an arrow-diagram.  
2. Two-Party and Three-Level (“Two-by-Three”) Framework for 
Analysis 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the variable framework can be described in a different 
way. This dissertation also offers a two-party and three-level (two-by-three) analysis 
framework to emphasize the importance of consideration of both the sending and 
receiving states. It is important to know how reassurance strategy appears not only to the 
receiving state but also to the sending state.  
 















I have argued that the success or failure of reassurance strategy in the 
three cases resulted from the interplay of the sending and receiving states at all three 
levels of analysis—individual, domestic, and alliances. Therefore, two-party (the sending 
and receiving states) and three-level (leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics), or 
“two-by-three analysis” is necessary for understanding the situation and predicting the 
outcome of reassurance strategies. This eclectic and broad approach can explain the 
relationship between the sending and receiving states and the influence of leaders’ 
perceptions and domestic and alliance politics in the two parties. As shown in Figures 5.1 
and 5.2, the outcome of a reassurance strategy is dependent on all six intervening 
variables between the sending and receiving states, which are in turn affected by the 
condition variables. 
It is difficult to achieve the absolute success of a reassurance strategy, 
which would mean no threat and no war in the world. By applying the “two-by-three” 
analysis framework, this situation is understandable, because each leader has different 
perspectives and there is always debate in domestic politics between conservative and 
progressives about security strategy. Also, allies can have different perspectives, which 
can have significant impact. However, if there is tension reduction and a decrease of the 
possibility of war caused by changes in leaders’ perceptions, and favorable factors within 
the domestic and alliance politics of two states, that situation can be categorized as a 
success or a partial success. 
In sum, the lessons that one should draw from the conditions of success 
and failure of reassurance strategy relate mainly to how leaders’ perceptions, domestic 
politics, and alliance politics can be changed in both the sending and receiving states.  
3. Questions to Apply to Evaluate Reassurance Strategy: Motivating 
Factors and Effects 
To apply and evaluate reassurance strategy, it is necessary to ask two fundamental 
questions. The first question is what the motivating factors of the target state are (Is a 
reassurance strategy relevant)? If the target state has “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
motivating factors, a reassurance strategy would be a relevant strategy. If the target state 
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has only “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, reassurance strategy 
could be counterproductive because the target state could take advantage of any 
reassurance strategy for its benefit.  
Motivating factors are influenced by circumstances and relations between the 
sending state and the receiving state (CV 1). They are also influenced by internal factors. 
However, these variables do not necessarily provide clear answers about the motivating 
factors of the receiving state. For example, identity change in the receiving state is very 
difficult to determine. A primary task for intelligence organizations and the military 
should be to investigate the motivating factors of the target state. The best way to 
determine the motivating factors is not only to develop technology but also to have direct 
meetings. As Hoffman notes, “The United States deployed remarkably accurate satellites 
to collect technical data on missiles, but it lacked the textured and revealing intelligence 
on the new leader that came only from human sources.”1197 Hoffman also points out, 
“The United States had never recruited a spy who provided political information at a high 
level inside the Kremlin.”1198 There were many missed opportunities to know the “not-
greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the Soviet Union during the 
Gorbachev period. Also, because of the lack of information caused by the lack of contacts, 
it is difficult to investigate the motivating factors of North Korea. However, there are 
signs of “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors in North Korea. In sum, it 
is a basic and important requirement to investigate the motivating factors of the receiving 
state.   
The second question is if reassurance strategy will or did have a positive impact 
on the leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the sending state as well as the 
receiving state. In the three case studies, all of the target states had mixed motivating 
factors. Therefore, reassurance strategy was relevant. In these circumstances, how much 
the reassurance strategy affected the leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the 
sending and receiving states decided the outcome of the reassurance strategy. If there 
were impacts on the leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the sending and 
                                                 
1197 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 192.  
1198 Ibid.  
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receiving states, then reassurance would succeed. On the contrary, if there were no 
impacts on leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics, then reassurance would most 
likely fail. If there is neither relevance with the target state nor impacts on the sending 
and receiving states, it can be categorized as an irrelevant case. In cases where the target 
state is not appropriate for reassurance, using it can even be counterproductive if it is 
interpreted as a signal of weakness. Considering the first and second questions above, an 
evaluation diagram of reassurance strategy can be made, as shown in Table 5.17.    
Table 5.17. Evaluation Diagram of Reassurance Strategy1199 
 Relevant Not Relevant 
Will/Has Impact Success  Counterproductive 
Will Not /Has No 
Impact 
Failure Irrelevant 
Compared to the successful case of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the 
Reagan administration in Case III, Bush’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea in 
Case II was a failure because it did not have sufficient impact on all the intervening 
variables such as leaders’ perceptions, and domestic and alliance politics of the United 
States and North Korea, even though it was relevant. Although there was a possibility of 
success for the reassurance strategy because North Korea had mixed motivating factors, 
the effort had almost no effect on leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, or alliance 
politics of both the United States and North Korea. Under these conditions, it would have 
been almost impossible to have successful results from a reassurance strategy.  
Compared to the first two case studies, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward 
the United States in Case III was a success case because it was relevant and had impacts 
on all of the intervening variables. It was relevant because the United States had not only 
“greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, but also “not-greedy” and “need-
                                                 
1199 Professor Jeffrey W. Knopf’s lectures and class discussions, NS 4669 Conflict and Cooperation in 
World Politics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2, 2009.  
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oriented” ones. Also, it had impacts on Gorbachev’s and Reagan’s perceptions, domestic 
politics, and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. In sum, the three 
case studies can be applied to the evaluation diagram of reassurance strategy, as shown in 
Table 5.18.  
Table 5.18.  Case Studies and Evaluation Diagram 
 Relevant Not Relevant 
Will/Has Impact 
Success 
(Case III: Gorbachev’s reassurance 





(Case I: Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy 
toward North Korea) 
-- 
Will Not /Has No 
Impact 
Failure 
(Case II: Bush’s reassurance 
strategy toward North Korea) 
Irrelevant 
4.  Policy Recommendations and Issues for Future Study 
To implement a reassurance strategy, there are some recommendations for 
successful results based on the research findings.  
a. The Importance of the Motivating Factors of the Target State 
First, “the motivating factors of the target state” should be investigated 
fully and objectively to implement an appropriate strategy. As explained earlier, if the 
sending state reassures or appeases a “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” state, it can be 
counterproductive. Also, if the sending state deters a “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” 
state, the deterrence strategy can fail and result in costs to the sending state. However, it 
is always difficult to identify the motivating factors. Furthermore, in most cases, states 
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are likely to have a mixture of both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motivating factors. 
Further research is needed to develop methods to recognize the motivating factors of the 
target state. In the case studies, the military experienced limitations in analyzing the 
motivating factors of the target state. Rather, personal contacts through summit meetings, 
interchange of people, and transnational actors seem necessary to determine the 
motivating factors of the target states in addition to nonpersonalized information 
collected by traditional intelligence equipment such as satellites. 
Also, not enough is known about the implementation of reassurance as a 
complement to deterrence. As Stein said, “If adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance 
may be more effective as a complement to deterrence.” 1200  The combination of 
reassurance and deterrence is likely to be a more effective strategy toward those receiving 
states with mixed motivating factors. Actually, in the three case studies of this 
dissertation, the receiving states showed mixed motivating factors. Also, as shown in the 
case studies, reassurance strategy was typically initiated by the sending state within an 
existing context of deterrence. When the sending state implemented its reassurance 
strategy, deterrence was still important. However, the interactive effects of deterrence and 
reassurance have not been studied. Therefore, it is necessary to research more methods to 
implement reassurance strategy as a complement to deterrence.  
b. Application of the Framework for Analysis and Its Validity 
Second, a variable framework or a “two-party and three-level (two-by-
three) analysis framework” in this dissertation can be applied to implement a reassurance 
strategy. If you know yourself and know your enemy (two parties), you can not only win 
a war but also reduce tension and avoid an unnecessary war. The best way to know 
yourself and know your enemy is to consider a three-level analysis incorporating leaders, 
domestic politics, and alliance politics. In other words, it is necessary to consider one’s 
own perception of the other leader, the other leader’s perception of oneself, and domestic  
 
 
                                                 
1200 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59. 
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and alliance politics of both one’s own side and the other’s. Efforts to change these 
intervening variables to be more favorable to a reassurance strategy are necessary to 
bring about a successful outcome.  
The framework in this dissertation demonstrates the merits of combining 
different explanations and approaches to increase their explanatory power. The validity of 
the framework could be tested by applying it to more cases of reassurance strategy. Also, 
more research on the impact of circumstances and relations between the sending and 
receiving states (CV1: balance of power, interdependence, or identity), on the motivating 
factors of the receiving state (CV2), and on leaders’ perceptions and domestic and 
alliance politics of both the sending and receiving states (IntV) needs to be performed. 
The interplay among leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics also need to be 
considered in future studies. 
Furthermore, the framework for analysis of reassurance strategy in this 
dissertation may be applied to analyze other influence strategies such as deterrence, 
coercion, sanctions, and positive incentives and their outcomes to understand the causal 
relations among variables and the outcomes of influence strategies.  
5.  Final Thoughts 
Decisions about the most appropriate strategy to reduce tensions and the 
possibility of war must be a function of the target state’s motivating factors. If it is quite 
clear that the target state has its “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motives, the 
sending state needs to emphasize a deterrence strategy. But, if it is quite certain that the 
target state shows “not-greedy” and “need-driven” motives, the sending state should 
consider a reassurance strategy. When the target state seems to have mixed motivating 
factors, it is also necessary to consider a reassurance strategy. Therefore, it is valuable to 
investigate the motivating factors of the target state and consider reassurance as an option. 
In addition, it is important to recognize that reassurance strategy only works under 
certain circumstances. Not only the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV 2) are 
crucial for the outcome of reassurance strategy, but also both circumstances and relations 
between a sending state and a receiving state (CV 1) and leaders, domestic politics, and 
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alliance politics of both the sending and receiving states (IntV) need to be considered for 
the success of reassurance strategy. The circumstances and relations between the two 
states (CV 1) influence the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV 2) and leader’s 
perceptions, domestic politics and alliance politics of the sending state and the receiving 
state (IntV). In other words, it is important to “know yourself and your enemy” as a 
whole. As Sun Tzu said in The Art of War, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, 
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, 
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”1201 Just as in war, when crafting an influence 
strategy designed to maintain peace, it is extremely important to know yourself and your 
enemy. 
Although this dissertation shows that many factors are important, it suggests that 
the most important variable among the intervening variables is each leader’s beliefs and 
perceptions. For this reason, among the alternative forms of reassurance studied, more 
persistent and far-reaching strategies such as GRIT appear to have the greatest ability to 
produce success. As Janice Gross Stein suggests: “insofar as leaders can modify their 
strategies to accommodate the political, strategic, cultural, and psychological context of 
their adversary, reciprocal strategies of tension reduction may be useful in changing the 
context of an adversarial relationship, so that deterrence becomes less risky in the short-
term, and ultimately, less necessary.”1202 Reassurance strategies initiated by a prudent 
leader may be useful in changing the context of the relationship, inducing more 
cooperation, and ultimately avoiding war between the adversarial states. In many cases, 
the best policy options to reduce tensions could be reassurance strategies combined with 
deterrence strategies. Therefore, leaders should be more aware of both options in their 
decision making in order to reduce unnecessary and avoidable tensions and the possibility 
of war. 
                                                 
1201 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
2002), 51. 
1202 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 56. 
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APPENDIX A.  THE REASSURANCE GAME 









                                                 
1203 Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” in International Organization, Vol. 54, 
No.2. (Spring, 2000), 330–341. 
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1204 Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 336.  
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APPENDIX B.  ROCK’S QUESTIONS ABOUT APPEASEMENT1205 
Question 1: What objective(s) did policymakers in the appeasing state 
seek in pursuing a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis the adversary? 
Question 2: What concessions did policymakers in the appeasing state 
offer to their adversary? 
Question 3: How did the adversary’s decision makers perceive the 
concessions offered by the appeasing state? 
Question 4: What factors accounted for the perception of the appeasing 
state’s concessions by the adversary’s decision makers? 
Question 5: What was the response, if any, of the adversary’s decision 
makers to concessions offered by the appeasing state? 
Question 6: How did policymakers in the appeasing state perceive the 
adversary’s response to their concessions? 
Question 7: What decision(s) regarding the continuation of their 
appeasement policy did policymakers in the appeasing state make on the 
basis of their perception of the adversary’s response? 
                                                 
1205 Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington, Kentucky: The University 
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APPENDIX C.  THE 1991 SOUTH-NORTH BASIC AGREEMENT1206 
AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION,  
AND EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH 
KOREA  
Effective February 19, 1992  
 
South and North Korea,  
In keeping with the longing of the entire Korean race for the peaceful unification of our 
divided fatherland; Reaffirming the three basic principles of unification set forth in the 
South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972; Determined to end the state of political 
and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation; Also determined to avoid 
armed aggression and hostilities, and to ensure the lessening of tension and the 
establishment of peace; Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and 
cooperation to promote interests and prosperity common to the Korean people.; 
Recognizing that their relationship, not being a relationship as between states, is a special 
one constituted temporarily in the process of unification; Pledging themselves to exert 
joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification; Hereby agreed as follows;  
Chapter 1. South-North Reconciliation 
Article 1. South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of 
each other.  
Article 2. South and North Korea shall not interfere in the internal affairs 
of each other.  
Article 3. South and North Korea shall not slander or defame each other.  
Article 4. South and North Korea shall refrain from any acts of sabotage or 
insurrection against each other.  
Article 5. South and North Korea shall together endeavour to transform 
the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two 
sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until 
such a state of peace is realized.  
                                                 
1206 USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center, “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and 
Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea,” 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/korea-agreement.htm (accessed on February 26, 2009) 
and CSIS Working Group Report, “Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Working 
Group Report of the CSIS International Security Program,” 47, 
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/conventionalweapons/CSISConventionalArmsControl.pdf  
(accessed on February 23, 2009). 
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Article 6. South and North Korea shall cease to compete with or confront 
each other, and instead shall cooperate and endeavour to promote the 
racial dignity and interests of Korea in the international arena.  
Article 7. South and North Korea shall establish and operate a South-
North Liaison Office at Panmunjom within three months of the entry into 
force of this Agreement to ensure close liaison and consultations between 
the two sides.  
Article 8. South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Political 
Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level 
Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to 
consider concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance 
of the agreement on South-North reconciliation.  
Chapter 2. Agreement of Nonaggression between South and North Korea 
Article 9. South and North Korea shall not use force against each other 
and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.  
Article 10. South and North Korea shall resolve peacefully, through 
dialogue and negotiation, any differences of views and disputes arising 
between them.  
Article 11. The South-North demarcation line and the areas for 
nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line 
provided in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the 
areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.  
Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression, the South 
and the North shall establish a South-North Joint Military Commission 
within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement. In the said 
Commission, the two sides shall discuss problems and carry out steps to 
build up military confidence and realize arms reduction, in particular, the 
mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of military units 
and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized 
Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions 
in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction 
and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.  
Article 13. South and North Korea shall install and operate a telephone 
line between the military authorities of each side to prevent the outbreak 
and escalation of accidental armed clashes.  
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Article 14. South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Military 
Sub-Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level 
Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to 
discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the 
agreement on nonaggression and to remove the state of military 
confrontation.  
Chapter 3. Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea  
Article 15. In order to promote the integrated and balanced development 
of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the South 
and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, 
including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as intra-
Korean commerce and joint ventures.  
Article 16. South and North Korea shall carry out exchanges and promote 
cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, 
literature and the arts, health, sports, the environment, journalism and 
media including newspapers, radio, television broadcasts, and other 
publications.  
Article 17. South and North Korea shall implement freedom of intra-
Korean travel and contact among the members of the Korean people.  
Article 18. South and North Korea shall permit free correspondence, 
movement between the two sides, meetings, and visits between dispersed 
family members and other relatives, promote their voluntary reunion, and 
take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.  
Article 19. South and North Korea shall reconnect the railway and the 
previously severed roads, and shall open sea and air routes.  
Article 20. South and North Korea shall establish and link facilities for 
exchanges by post and telecommunications, and shall guarantee the 
confidentiality of intra-Korean mail and telecommunications.  
Article 21. South and North Korea shall cooperate in the international 
arena in the economic, cultural and other fields, and shall advance abroad 
together.  
Article 22. In order to implement the agreement on exchanges and 
cooperation in the economic, cultural, and other fields, South and North 
Korea shall establish joint commissions for each sector, including a Joint 
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South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within 
three months of the entry into force of this Agreement.  
Article 23. A Sub-committee on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation 
shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level 
Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the 
agreement on South-North exchanges and cooperation.  
Chapter 4. Amendments and Effectuation 
Article 24. This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by 
agreement between the two sides.  
Article 25. This Agreement shall enter into force from the date the South 
and the North exchange the appropriate instruments following the 
completion of the respective procedures necessary for its implementation.  
 
Chung Won-shik,  
Chief Delegate of the South delegation to the South-North High-Level 
Negotiations Kim Dae-jung, President, The Republic of Korea,  
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea 
 
Yon Hyong-muk,  
Head of the North delegation to the South-North High-Level Negotiations 
Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea  
 




APPENDIX D.  THE 2000 JOINT DECLARATION1207 
In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful 
reunification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and 
National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 
to June 15, 2000. 
The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks 
were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South-North 
relations and realizing peaceful reunification, declared as follows: 
1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of 
reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean 
people, who are the masters of the country. 
2. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a 
common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's 
formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to 
promote reunification in that direction. 
3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian 
issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives 
on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question 
of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South. 
4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by 
promoting balanced development of the national economy through 
economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in 
civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields. 
5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between 
relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreements 
expeditiously. 
President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited National Defense Commission Chairman Kim 
Jong-il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong-il will visit Seoul at an appropriate time. 
Kim Dae-jung, President, The Republic of Korea 
                                                 
1207 United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection, “South-North Joint 
Declaration,” http://www.usip.org/library/pa/n_skorea/n_skorea06152000.html  (accessed on February 21, 
2009). 
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Kim Jong-il, Chairman National Defense Commission, The Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea  
(Signed)   June 15, 2000 
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APPENDIX E.  OCTOBER 4 JOINT DECLARATION1208  
Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity 
 
In accordance with the agreement between President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea 
and Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, President Roh visited Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007.  
During the visit, there were historic meetings and discussions.  
At the meetings and talks, the two sides have reaffirmed the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration 
and had frank discussions on various issues related to realizing the advancement of South-North 
relations, peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean people and 
unification of Korea.  
Expressing confidence that they can forge a new era of national prosperity and unification on 
their own initiative if they combine their will and capabilities, the two sides declare as follows, in 
order to expand and advance South-North relations based on the June 15 Joint Declaration:  
1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavor actively to realize 
the June 15 Declaration.  
The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on 
their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-
themselves.”  
The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 
anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to 
reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.  
2. The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean 
relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences 
in ideology and systems.  
The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs 
of the other and agreed to resolve inter-Korean issues in the spirit of 
reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.  
                                                 
1208 The Ministry of Unification, the Republic of Korea, Inter-Korean Dialogue, “Declaration on the 
Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,”   
“http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFdialogue_agreements (accessed on March 3, 
2009).  
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The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective 
legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean 
relations in a reunification-oriented direction.  
The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and 
contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas, in 
order to resolve matters concerning the expansion and advancement of 
inter-Korean relations in a way that meets the aspirations of the entire 
Korean people.  
3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an 
end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the 
Korean Peninsula.  
The South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, reduce 
military tension, and resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and 
negotiation.  
The South and the North have agreed to oppose war on the Korean 
Peninsula and to adhere strictly to their obligation to nonaggression.  
The South and the North have agreed to hold talks between the South’s 
Minister of Defense and the North’s Minister of the People’s Armed 
Forces in Pyongyang in November to discuss ways of designating a joint 
fishing area in the West Sea to avoid accidental clashes and turning it into 
a peace area and also to discuss measures to build military confidence, 
including security guarantees for various cooperative projects.  
4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current 
armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the 
North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having 
the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on 
the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.  
With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and 
the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the 
September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement 
achieved at the Six-Party Talks.  
5. The South and the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further 




for balanced economic development and co-prosperity on the Korean 
Peninsula in accordance with the principles of common interests, co-
prosperity and mutual aid.  
The South and the North reached an agreement on promoting economic 
cooperation, including investments, pushing forward with the building of 
infrastructure and the development of natural resources. Given the special 
nature of inter-Korean cooperative projects, the South and the North have 
agreed to grant preferential conditions and benefits to those projects.  
The South and the North have agreed to create a “special peace and 
cooperation zone in the West Sea” encompassing Haeju and vicinity in a 
bid to proactively push ahead with the creation of a joint fishing zone and 
maritime peace zone, establishment of a special economic zone, utilization 
of Haeju harbor, passage of civilian vessels via direct routes in Haeju and 
the joint use of the Han River estuary.  
The South and the North have agreed to complete the first-phase 
construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex at an early date and 
embark on the second-stage development project. The South and the North 
have agreed to open freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong 
and promptly complete various institutional measures, including those 
related to passage, communication, and customs clearance procedures.  
The South and the North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-
Sinuiju railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint 
use.  
The South and the North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes 
for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo, while continuing cooperative 
projects in various areas such as agriculture, health and medical services 
and environmental protection.  
The South and the North have agreed to upgrade the status of the existing 
Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint 
Committee for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to be headed by 
deputy prime minister-level officials.  
6. The South and the North have agreed to boost exchanges and 
cooperation in the social areas covering history, language, education, 
science and technology, culture and arts, and sports to highlight the long 
history and excellent culture of the Korean people.  
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The South and the North have agreed to carry out tours to Mt. Baekdu and 
open nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu for this 
purpose.  
The South and the North have agreed to send a joint cheering squad from 
both sides to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The squad will use the 
Gyeongui Railway Line for the first-ever joint Olympic cheering.  
7. The South and the North have agreed to actively promote humanitarian 
cooperation projects.  
The South and the North have agreed to expand reunion of separated 
family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video 
messages.  
To this end, the South and the North have agreed to station resident 
representatives from each side at the reunion center at Mt. Geumgang 
when it is completed and regularize reunions of separated family members 
and their relatives.  
The South and the North have agreed to actively cooperate in case of 
emergencies, including natural disasters, according to the principles of 
fraternal love, humanitarianism and mutual assistance.  
8. The South and the North have agreed to increase cooperation to 
promote the interests of the Korean people and the rights and interests of 
overseas Koreans on the international stage.  
The South and the North have agreed to hold inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks for the 
implementation of this Declaration and have agreed to hold the first round of meetings in 
November 2007 in Seoul.  
 
The South and the North have agreed that their highest authorities will meet frequently for the 
advancement of relations between the two sides.  
 
Oct. 4, 2007  Pyongyang  
 
Roh Moo-hyun  
President  
Republic of Korea  
 
Kim Jong Il  
Chairman, National Defense Commission  
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  
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APPENDIX F.  CHRONOLOGY OF INTER-KOREAN MILITARY 
TALKS DURING THE KIM DAE JUNG AND ROH MOO HYUN 
ADMINISTRATIONS1209  
Classification Date Place Details of Major Consultations/Agreements 










• Adoption of the five-point joint press release of the inter-
Korean defense ministers talks 












• Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter-Korean 
Agreement on Military Assurances 
- Designation of the timing and scope of the Joint 
Administration Area (JAA), locating of the roads, and 
construction of facilities in the JAA 
- Security assurance issue for DMZ construction works 
- Simultaneous commencement of landmine removal in the 
DMZ 












• Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter-Korean 
Agreement on Military Assurances 
- Finalization of the routes of the inter-Korean roads 
- Discussion of the designation and operation of the JAA as 
well as joint regulations 
- Agreement of signature/entry into force of the agreements 
regarding safety issues during construction in the ministerial 
talks 
- Narrowing the differences regarding the simultaneous 
commencement of landmine removal in the DMZ 












• Centering around the South’s response to the issue regarding 
the concept of main enemy posed by the North.  
- The meeting ends after the South explained and delivered its 
proposed agreement to the North. The two sides decided to 
discuss the proposed agreement in ensuring talks 












• Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter-Korean 
Agreement on Military Assurances 
- Designation and operation of the JAA 
- Mine removal in the DMZ, method of road &railway 
reconnection works, and the method of contact and 
communication between the military personnel in charge of the 
construction sites 
- Security on construction personnel &equipments and safety 
assurance issues 
                                                 
1209 The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, 2008 Defense White Paper, 330–335. 
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• Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the 
Joint Administration Area in the East/West Coast Districts and 
the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South 
and North 
* Signature/entry into force was delayed on the excuse of the 
concept of main enemy 










• Adoption of the Military Assurance Agreement for 
Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/West 
Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads 
Connecting the South and North 
 agreed to sign/exchange/come into force agreement through 
additional two rounds of talks (September 16/17) 










• Confirmation and initial exchange of the text of the Military 
Assurance Agreement, and discussion of the procedures of the 
7th Inter-Korean Military Working-Level Talks 










• Exchange and effectuation of the Agreement on Military 
Assurance for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in 
the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways 
and Roads Connection in South and North  










• Exchange and discussion of the mutual construction plans by 
timeline and route diagrams for the reconstruction of railways 
and roads. 
• Issue to support of communication equipments 










•Balanced construction works for inter-Korean railway & road 
reconnection and demining in DMZ 










• Consultation over balanced construction works for inter-
Korean railway and road reconnection in DMZ 










• Discussion of matters regarding verification of balanced 
construction of road & railway construction, joint survey and 
communication line connection for the Donghae Line 











• Discussion of matters regarding verification of balanced 
construction of road & railway construction, joint survey and 
communication line connection for the Donghae Line 
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• Consultations over the (proposed) makeshift road passage 
agreement regarding the Gyeongeui Line and Donghae Line, 
and connection of the communication lines concerning the 
Donghae Line 










• Adoption and effectuation of the Provisional Agreement on 
Military Assurances for passage of Makeshift Roads in the 
Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts 










• Agreement on mutual visits to the construction sites for 
inspections (Number of personnel : 10 persons each for the east 
and west coast districts on June 11) 










• Adoption and effectuation of the Supplementary Agreement 
on the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for 
Passage of Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administration Area in 
the East and West Coast Districts 










• Expression of mutual positions on the proposed Agreement 
on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint 
Administration Area 
• Consultation of date for the contact between persons in charge 
of communication in relation to connection of communication 
lines of Donghae line 











• Consultation over Agreement on Installation and Operation of 
Guard Posts 










• Exchange and effectuation of the Agreement on Installation 
and Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint Administration Area 
in the East and West Coast Districts 









• Expression of mutual positions regarding measures to prevent 
accidental armed conflict in the West Sea and to stop 
propaganda activities and remove propaganda tools from the 
DMZ 









• Adoption and effectuation of the Agreement on the 
Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and 
the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of 
Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ 
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• Adoption and effectuation of the Subsequent Agreement on 
the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval clashes 
in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities 
and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ 
22nd Round of the 
Inter-Korean 
Military Working-





Paju • Assessment regarding prevention of accidental naval clashes in the West Sea and first-stage propaganda apparatus removal  
23nd Round of the 
Inter-Korean 
Military Working-





• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of first-
stage propaganda apparatus removal, agreement to implement 
second-stage works. ROK, suggested improvement measures to 
prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea 
24th Round of the 
Inter-Korean 
Military Working-







• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of 
second-stage propaganda apparatus removal 
• Consultation over initiating third-stage propaganda apparatus 
removal (July25-Aug.13) 
• Agreement to setting up the communication liaison office to 
prevent accidental naval clashes in the West Sea (since 
August13) 
• Suggestion of the Supplementary Agreement Pertaining to 
Improvement Measures to Prevent Accidental Clashes in the 
West Sea 
25th Round of the 
Inter-Korean 
Military Working-







• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of third-
stage propaganda apparatus removal 
26th Round of the 
Inter-Korean 
Military Working-





• Agreement to discuss the Agenda for General Officer-level 
Talks and the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road 
Passage 










• Agreement to convene the third round of the General-Officer 
level Talks 
• Agreement to discuss the Military Assurance 
Agreement on Railway/Road Passage 










• ROK, to make proposals on prevention of accidental clashes 
in the West Sea and establishment of Joint fishing area, and 
conclusion of the Military Assurance Agreement on 
Railway/Road Passage 
• North Korea, to bring up issues on re-establishing the West 
Sea Maritime Borderline 
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• ROK, expression of the intention to discuss in the inter-
Korean Defense Ministerial Talks on the basis of following two 
principles as regards Maritime Borderline in the West Sea 
 1. Respect/observe NLL as agreed in the Basic Agreement 
 2. Comprehensive implementation as for agreed items of 
military area in the Basic Agreement 
• North Korea, to deny insisting that re-establishing West Sea 
Maritime Borderline is the basic problem that must be resolved 
first. 










• North Korea, to protect against scattering leaflets and 
violation of East/West area transportation order 
• ROK, to raise military assurance measures for economic 
cooperation project and expansion of confidence-building 










• Joint press release for the General Officer-level Talks. 
• Adopting of the Provisional Agreement on Military 
Assurances of Railroad Test Runs. 










• Discussion about implementation of agreements from the 
joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer-
level Talks. 










• Discussion about implementation of agreements from the 
joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer-
level Talks. 










• Discussion about implementation of agreements from the 
joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer-
level Talks. 











• Discussed prevention of west sea clashes, establishment of 
joint fishing area, and military assurances to inter-Korean 
economic cooperation but ended with no progress. 










• Discussion about working-level issues on the second round of 
inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks. 










• Discussed working-level procedures yet to be agreed and 
fine-tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of the 
Defense Ministerial Talks. 
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• Fine-tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of the 
Defense Ministerial Talks. 











• Adoption of the Agreements from inter-Korean Defense 
Ministerial Talks to implement the Declaration for inter-
Korean Development and Peaceful Prosperity, consisting of 
seven Sections and 21 Paragraphs.  










• Military Assurance Agreement on Railway Freight Transport 
between Munsan-Bongdong 











• Adopted the Agreements on Military Assurances for 
Passage/Communication/Customs for Joint Administrative 
Area in East/West Area, but it failed to be implemented 
 1. Extending passage time (07:00-22:00) and guaranteeing 
passage everyday 
 2. Allowing wire/wireless communication and internet 
communication from 2008 
3. Simplifying procedures to shorten passage time, etc.  
• Discussed the establishment of joint fishing area and peace 
zone but it ended with no progress due to contentions on 
location of joint fishing areas.  










• Discussion about railroad cargo transportation between 
Munsan and Bongdong 
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APPENDIX G.  JOINT PRESS STATEMENT OF THE INTER-
KOREAN DEFENSE MINISTERIAL TALKS1210 
Talks between the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the 
People’s Armed Forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were held on 
Cheju Island in the South on September 25~26 to provide a military assurance for the 
implementation of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration adopted during the historic 
Inter-Korean Summit. 
A delegation of five headed by Minister of Defense Cho Seong-tae of the Republic of 
Korea represented the South while a delegation of five headed by the Minister of the 
People’s Armed Forces Kim Il-chol of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
represented the North in the talks. 
In the talks, the two sides held the same view that since the adoption of the Joint 
Declaration various projects are being promoted in earnest to implement it and that 
proper military measures are needed to hasten the process. Based on this, the two sides 
agreed as follows: 
1. Both sides shall do their utmost to implement the Joint Declaration 
made by the heads of the South and the North and actively cooperate with 
each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and 
cooperation between civilians. 
2. Both sides held the same view that to reduce military tension on the 
Korean Peninsula and remove the threat of war by establishing a durable 
and stable peace is a matter of vital importance and agreed that they shall 
work together towards this end. 
3. Both sides shall allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and materials into 
their respective sections of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the 
construction of a railway and a road that connects the South and the North, 
which is a pending issue between the South and the North, and guarantee 
their safety. The working-level officials from both sides shall meet in early 
October to discuss the details related to this. 
4. The two sides will handle the problem of opening the Military 
Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the areas around the 
railway and the road that connect the South and the North on the basis of 
the armistice treaty. 
                                                 
1210 Inter-Korean Document, “Joint Press Statement of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks,” 
http://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/ (accessed on February 20, 2009).  
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5. Both sides agreed to hold the second round of the talks at a location in 
the North in mid-November. 
September 26, 2000 
Cheju Island 
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APPENDIX H.  SURVEY QUESTIONS ABOUT NORTH KOREAN 
THREAT AND THE SUNSHINE POLICY1211  
NORTH KOREAN THREAT 
THRTSK2 Please rate the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear weapon to South Korea. (0 = a very serious threat; 10 = not a threat) 
TRNKNUKE3 To what extent will North Korean possession of nuclear weapons pose a threat to South Korean national interest? (0 = a very serious threat; 10 = not a threat) 
TRNKSALE 
To what extent will North Korea‟ s sale of nuclear materials and weapons 
pose a threat to South Korean national interest? (0 = a very serious threat; 10 = 
not a threat) 
PROJECTS 
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “South 
Korea should suspend the Mount Geumgang tourism and the Gaesung 
industrial park projects.” (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree) 
UNSNCTN 
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “South 
Korea should carry out the sanctions imposed by the United Nations.” (0 = 
strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree) 
SUPPORTUS 
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “South 
Korea should support US military action to prevent North Korea from 
transferring nuclear materials or weapons to third parties.” (0 = strongly agree; 
10 = strongly disagree) 
DEVPNUKE 
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “South 
Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons to counter North Korean 
nuclear weapons.” (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree) 
PSI4 Should South Korea participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative? (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree) 
USNKPLCY4 
To what extent do you support or oppose the policies the U.S. employs to 
eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons? (0 = strongly support; 10 = strongly 
oppose) 
FEELNK2 How would you rate your feelings towards North Korea? (0 = dislike very much; 10 = like very much) 
FEELKIM2 How would you rate your feelings towards North Korea‟ s leader, Kim Jong-
Il and the North Korean regime? (0 = dislike very much; 10 = like very much) 
SPCOLLPS 
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “Since the 
sudden collapse of the North Korean regime can lead to chaos in the Korean 
peninsula, South Korea should prevent regime collapse in North Korea.” (0 = 
strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree) 
                                                 
1211 Appendix to “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea” by Chae Hae Sook and Steven 
Kim, Survey Questions used in the Analysis,  http://www.bw.edu/academics/pol/faculty/chae/appendix.pdf 
(accessed on March 30, 2009)  
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SUNSHINE POLICY 
VIEWNK  Is North Korea a partner in inter-Korean détente or an ongoing military threat? (0 = an ongoing military threat; 10 = a partner in inter-Korean détente)  
VIEWSP  
What is your view regarding whether South Korea needs to change the 
Sunshine Policy in the future? (0 = abandon completely; 5 = status quo; 10 = 
pursue more vigorously)  
SPCHANGE  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “Sunshine 
policy can lead to positive change in North Korea.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 
= strongly agree)  
SPREUNFY  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The 
Sunshine Policy is absolutely necessary to insure that South Korea maintains 
control over the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.” (0 = strongly 
disagree; 10 = strongly agree)  
SPPREVNT  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “Pursuing 
the Sunshine Policy is the only way South Korea can prevent the collapse of 
the North Korean regime.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)  
SPPEACE  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The 
Sunshine Policy will help in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear 
problem.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)  
SPTENSN  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The 
Sunshine Policy enables South and North Korea to reduce tension and avoid 
military conflict.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)  
SPBOLSTR  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The 
Sunshine Policy only maintains the dictatorial regime in North Korea and 
heightens the threat posed by that regime.” (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly 
disagree)  
SPFAILUR  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The fact 
that North Korea conducted a nuclear experiment means that the Sunshine 
Policy has been a failure.” (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)  
SPWTOCON1  
Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “South 
Korea should provide economic aid to North Korea without any 
preconditions.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)  
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APPENDIX I.  JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF 
THE SIX-PARTY TALKS IN BEIJING ON SEPTEMBER 19, 20051212 
The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's 
Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to 
August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005. 
 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexander Alekseyev, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks. 
 
For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at 
large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and 
practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of 
the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this 
context, to the following: 
 
1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party 
Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a 
peaceful manner. The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA 
safeguards. The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on 
the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK 
with nuclear or conventional weapons. The ROK reaffirmed its 
commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with 
the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its 
territory. The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented. The DPRK stated 
that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties 
expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the 
subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK. 
                                                 
1212 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth 
Round of the Six-Party Talks,” and U.S. Department of State, “Six-party Talks, Beijing China.” 
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2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms 
of international relations. The DPRK and the United States undertook to 
respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps 
to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. 
The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations 
in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the 
settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. 
3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the 
fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. 
China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide 
energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 
12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric 
power to the DPRK. 
4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability 
in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent 
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. 
The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-
mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of 
"commitment for commitment, action for action". 
6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in 
Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through 
consultations. 
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APPENDIX J.  INITIAL ACTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE JOINT STATEMENT IN BEIJING ON FEBRUARY 13, 20071213 
The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among 
the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 
February 2007. 
 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, 
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.  
 
I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take 
in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. 
The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill 
their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to 
implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for 
action". 
 
II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase: 
1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual 
abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing 
facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary 
monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK. 
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear 
programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium 
extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the 
Joint Statement.  
3. The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving 
pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The 
                                                 
1213 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Initial Actions for the 
Implementation of the Joint Statement,” and U.S. Department of State, “Six-party Talks, Beijing China.” 
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U.S. will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a 
state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the 
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.  
4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to 
normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, 
on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding 
issues of concern.  
5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, 
the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian 
assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision 
of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The 
initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons 
of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.  
The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be 
implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps 
toward this goal.  
 
III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in 
order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the 
Joint Statement: 
1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
2. Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations 
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations 
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation 
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism 
The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation 
of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to 
the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. 
In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. 
Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a 
coordinated manner. 
The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days. 
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IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase – which includes 
provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and 
disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and 
reprocessing plant – economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent 
of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 
50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK. 
The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations 
and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy 
Cooperation. 
 
V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a 
ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways 
and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
 
VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and 
will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly 
related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an 
appropriate separate forum. 
 
VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 
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APPENDIX K.  PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE HEAD OF 
DELEGATION MEETING OF THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE SIX-
PARTY TALKS IN BEIJING ON JULY 20, 20071214  
I. The Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in 
Beijing from 18 to 20 July 2007. Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro 
Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and 
Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Christopher Hill, 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the 
United States; and Mr. Vladimir Rakhmanin, Ambassador of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation attended the talks as heads of their respective 
delegations. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the meeting.  
 
II. The Parties reviewed the work and progress since the First Session of the Sixth Round 
of the Six-Party Talks, expressed satisfaction with the constructive efforts made by all 
parties to advance the Six-Party Talks process, and welcomed that productive bilateral 
consultations and coordination were conducted to enhance their mutual trust and improve 
relations with each other. 
 
III. For the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of relations between 
the countries concerned and lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia, the Six Parties 
held candid and practical discussions on the work during the period of the next phase and 
reached the following general consensus:  
1. The Parties reiterated that they will earnestly fulfill their commitments 
in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 and the agreement of 13 
February 2007.  
2. The DPRK side reiterated that it will earnestly implement its 
commitments to a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and 
disablement of all existing nuclear facilities.  
3. Economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 
950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will be provided to the DPRK. 
4. All other parties undertook to fulfill their respective obligations as listed 
in the September 19 Joint Statement and February 13 agreement in line 
with the principle of "action for action".  
                                                 
1214 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Press Communiqué of the 
Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 20, 2007.” 
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IV. To implement the above-mentioned general consensus, the Parties decided to take the 
following steps:  
1. Before the end of August, the Working Groups for Denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations, 
Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations, Economy and Energy 
Cooperation and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism will 
convene their respective meetings to discuss plans for the implementation 
of the general consensus.  
2. In early September, the Parties will hold the Second Session of the 
Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing to hear reports of all 
Working Groups and work out the roadmap for the implementation of the 
general consensus.  
3. Following the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party 
Talks, the Parties will hold a ministerial meeting in Beijing as soon as 
possible to confirm and promote the implementation of the September 19 
Joint Statement, the February 13 agreement and the general consensus, 
and explore ways and means to enhance security cooperation in Northeast 
Asia. 
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APPENDIX L.  SECOND-PHASE ACTIONS FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT IN BEIJING ON 
OCTOBER 3, 20071215 
The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among 
the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 27 to 
30 September 2007. 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Chun Yung-woo, 
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States, 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.  
The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five Working Groups, confirmed 
the implementation of the initial actions provided for in the February 13 agreement, 
agreed to push forward the Six-Party Talks process in accordance with the consensus 
reached at the meetings of the Working Groups and reached agreement on second-phase 
actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the goal of 
which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.  
I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to 
abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 
13 Agreement. 
The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon, 
the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the 
Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon will be completed by 
31 December 2007. Specific measures recommended by the expert group 
will be adopted by heads of delegation in line with the principles of being 
acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe, verifiable, and consistent with 
international standards. At the request of the other Parties, the United 
                                                 
1215 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Second-Phase Actions for 
the Implementation of the Joint Statement”; U.S. Department of State, “Six Parties October 3, 2007 
Agreement on ‘Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’”; and U.S. 
Department of State , “Six-party Talks -- Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 
2005 Joint Statement.” 
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States will lead disablement activities and provide the initial funding for 
those activities. As a first step, the U.S. side will lead the expert group to 
the DPRK within the next two weeks to prepare for disablement. 
2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all 
its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 
December 2007.  
3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, 
technology, or know-how. 
II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant Countries 
1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their 
bilateral relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship. The 
two sides will increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. 
Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the 
designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the 
process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commitments to 
the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached 
at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-U.S. 
Relations. 
2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize their 
relations expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on 
the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding 
issues of concern. The DPRK and Japan committed themselves to taking 
specific actions toward this end through intensive consultations between 
them.  
III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK 
In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy and 
humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO 
(inclusive of the 100,000 tons of HFO already delivered) will be provided 
to the DPRK. Specific modalities will be finalized through discussion by 
the Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation. 
IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting 
The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held 
in Beijing at an appropriate time. 
The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting prior to the 
Ministerial Meeting to discuss the agenda for the Meeting. 
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APPENDIX M.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES DISCUSSED 
AT THE 27TH CONGRESS OF CPSU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
THE SOVIET UNION)1216 
A. In the Military Sphere: 
1. renunciation by the nuclear powers of war—both nuclear and conventional—against 
each other or against their countries; 
2. prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and 
the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on the destruction of chemical weapons, 
and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation; 
3. a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to 
limits of reasonable sufficiency; 
4. disbandment of military alliances, and, as a stage toward this, renunciation of their 
enlargement and of the formation of new ones; 
5. balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets. 
  
B. In the Political Sphere: 
1. strict respect in international practice for the right of each people to choose the way 
and forms of its development independently; 
2. a just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts; 
3. elaboration of a set of measures aimed at building confidence between states and the 
creation of effective guarantees against attack from without and for inviolability of 
their frontiers; 
4. elaboration of effective methods of preventing international terrorism, including 
those ensuring the safety of international land, air and sea communications.  
 
C. In the Economic Sphere: 
1. exclusion of all forms of discrimination from international practice; renunciation of 
the policy of economic blockades and sanctions if this is not directly envisaged in 
the recommendations of the world community; 
2. joint quests for ways of a just settlement of the problem of debts; 
3. establishment of a new world economic order guaranteeing equal economic security 
to all countries;  
4. elaboration of principles for utilizing part of the funds released as a result of a 
reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community, of developing 
nations in the first place;  
5. the pooling of efforts in exploring and making peaceful use of outer space and in 
resolving global problems on which the destinies of civilization depend.  
  
                                                 
1216 Gorbachev, Perestroika, 231.  
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D. In the Humanitarian Sphere: 
1. cooperation in the dissemination of the ideas of peace, disarmament, and 
international security; greater flow of general objective information and broader 
contact between peoples for the purpose of learning about one another; 
reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and concord in relations 
between them; 
2. extirpation of genocide, apartheid, advocacy of fascism and every other form of 
racial, national or religious exclusiveness, and also of discrimination against people 
on this basis; 
3. extension—while respecting the laws of each country—of international cooperation 
in the implementation of the political, social and personal rights of people; 
4. solution in a humane and positive spirit to questions related to the reuniting of 
families, marriage, and the promotion of contacts between people and between 
organizations;  
5. strengthening of and the quests for new forms of cooperation in culture, art, science, 
education, and medicine.  
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APPENDIX N.  AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR ON 
NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL 
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED 
BALLISTIC MISSILES 27 I.L.M. 1200 (1988)1217  
Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988, Entered into Force May 31, 1988  
 
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 
referred to as the Parties, affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk 
of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, 
or accident, believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, 
believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war 
serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, reaffirming their 
obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear 
War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 
September 30, 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, and the Agreement 
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, have agreed as 
follows:  
 
Article I  
 
Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no 
less than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of 
impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(hereinafter "ICBM") or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").  
 
Article II  
 
A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM shall be valid for four days 
counting from the launch date indicated in such a notification. In case of postponement of 
the launch date within the indicated four days, or cancellation of the launch, no 
notification thereof shall be required.  
Article III  
 
1. For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the notification shall indicate the area 
from which the launch is planned to take place.  
 
                                                 
1217 Nuclearfiles.org, “Agreement between the United States.” 
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2. For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the notification shall indicate the general 
area from which the missile will be launched. Such notification shall indicate either the 
quadrant within the ocean (that is, the ninety-degree sector encompassing approximately 
one-fourth of the area of the ocean) or the body of water (for example, sea or bay) from 
which the launch is planned to take place.  
 
3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification shall indicate the geographic 
coordinates of the planned impact area or areas of the reentry vehicles. Such an area shall 
be specified either by indicating the geographic coordinates of the boundary points of the 
area, or by indicating the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius 
specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The size of the impact area shall be determined 
by the notifying Party at its discretion.  
 
Article IV  
 
The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions 
relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss 
possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of 
this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be 
agreed upon.  
 
Article V  
 
This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.  
 
Article VI  
 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.  
The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.  
This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the 
other Party.  
 
Done at Moscow on May 31, 1988, in two copies, each in the English and Russian 
languages, both texts being equally authentic.  
 
For the United States of America: George P. Shultz  
 
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic: Eduard A. Shevardnadze  
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